THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

Vol. LII March, 1958 No. 1

Opinions, Personality and Political Behavior .... *M. Brewster Smith* 1

Comment on "Opinions, Personality and Political Behavior" .... *Alexander L. George* 18

Conservatism and Personality .... *Herbert McClosky* 27

Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana ...... *Henry L. Bretton* 46

Model for Study of Soviet Foreign Policy .... *Jan F. Triska* 64

Power and Personality .... *David Spitz* 84

Centralization in Hawaii .... *Norman Meller* 98

The New Metropolis .... *Robert C. Wood* 108

Patterns of Party Allegiance .... *George S. Blair* 123

Two-Party Voting in the South .... *James W. Prothro et al.* .. 131

Constitutional Law in 1956-57 .... *David Fellman* 140

Communications 192

Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography .... *John D. Lewis (ed.)* 193

Research Note

Comparative Study of Interest Groups .... *Gabriel A. Almond* 270

News and Notes .... *Ralph A. Straetz (ed.)* .. 283

(For list of book reviews, see page 193)

Published quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Ohio State University*

WALLACE S. SAYRE, *Associate Editor, Columbia University*

SAMUEL H. BEER, *Associate Editor, Harvard University*

HUGH L. ELSBREE, *Wayne State University*

EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR., *Princeton University*

ALEXANDER HEARD, *University of North Carolina*

VINCENT OSTROM, *University of Oregon*
LEO STRAUSS, *University of Chicago*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

JOHN D. LEWIS, *Book Review Editor, Oberlin College*

RALPH A. STRAETZ, *News and Notes Editor, New York University*

HIRAM M. STOUT, *Washington, D.C.*

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, *Catholic University*
CECELIA M. KENYON, *Smith College*
JAMES G. MARCH, *Carnegie Institute of Technology*
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor
The American Political Science Review
100 University Hall, Ohio State
University, Columbus 10, Ohio

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director
The American Political Science Association
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all members of The American Political Science Association. Individual and institutional memberships are $10.00 a year ($4.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $2.50 per copy. Prices of other issues are furnished on request.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 5th day of the month of publication.

Correspondence concerning contributions to the REVIEW should be addressed to Harvey C. Mansfield, 100 University Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio; *books intended for review,* to John D. Lewis, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio; *News and Notes items,* to Ralph A. Straetz, Department of Political Science, New York University, University Heights, New York 53, New York.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Office of publication: 450 Ahnaip Street, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Entered as second class matter at the post office at Menasha, Wisconsin, under the Act of August 4, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1958, by The American Political Science Association.

The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LII MARCH, 1958 NO. 1

OPINIONS, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR[1]

M. BREWSTER SMITH

Research Center for Human Relations
New York University

It is gratifying to be able to present to students of political behavior the approach that my colleagues, Jerome Bruner and Robert White, and I worked out for the study of "Opinions and Personality,"[2] since throughout our explorations political scientists had been what the current jargon would call a "salient reference group" for us. As a psychologist and "outsider," however, I offer these remarks with some trepidation, since the framework that we arrived at in the detailed study of ten men's outlook on Russia was, after all, distinctly psychological; therefore a limited view that embraces but one segment of the processes with which political scientists are properly concerned. Our investigations were long on the description and analysis of *opinions*, but short on the observation of consequential *behavior*, political or otherwise. And our study did not even focus on *public* opinion, in any sense that attemps a close conceptual distinction between the public and the private.

Yet these very limitations of scope and perspective may be instructive if they are explicitly faced. The domain of political behavior is too large, too complex, to be readily comprehended in terms of any single or simple conceptual scheme, any at least that presents itself to the psychological onlooker as immediately available. It may be more profitable to chart a portion of the larger terrain, taking note of its bearings with respect to maps plotted from other bench marks. If the experience of our mapping expedition can be said to point to a single moral, it is that a useful map of the small region comprising men's opinions in their personal context turns out to be complicated enough—considerably more so than many proposed formulations have been wont to recognize.

---

[1] Revised from a paper presented to the panel on "Personality and Political Behavior," at the New York meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 6, 1957.

[2] M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York, 1956).

I

The need for a map of opinions and personality that takes into account a considerable degree of complexity can be appreciated in any attempt such as ours to make sense of the opinions of a series of persons with whom the investigator has established a close, quasi-clinical acquaintance. But hindsight supports the same conclusion—the need for a comprehensive framework—when one examines the earlier research on opinion determinants. Since it will be my principal point that it is fruitful to study the interrelations of opinions and personality in terms of a more comprehensive set of assumptions than hitherto, a brief critical look at a few of the earlier efforts is in order.

The first major foray by psychologists into the personal determinants of opinion was anything but promising. To the empirically minded American psychologists of the late 'twenties and 'thirties, newly equipped with pencil-and-paper questionnaires for the measurement of personality traits and of attitudes, what could be more natural than to correlate these scales with one another? So there was a spate of correlational studies in this vein, mostly employing the ever-available college sophomore, a good many of them focused on the personal correlates of radicalism and conservatism.[3] The yield was small, and no wonder. Both on the side of attitudes and of personality, conceptualization was meager and inadequate. Personality as caught in the questionnaires of the day was a congeries of traits. More adequate formulation of motivational dynamics and of personality organization had to await the impact of psychoanalysis and of holistic influences from Europe. Attitudes, on the other hand, were measured by crude scales that compressed the many-faceted nature of opinion to the single dimension of pro-con *direction* usually mingled with *intensity*. Correspondences that such a conceptual armory could establish between attitudes and personality can be regarded as almost coincidental.

Now the correlation of trait and attitude variables makes sense when one's concern is with the *expressive* aspects of opinion—opinion as a manifestation of personal style, whether temperamental (for instance, optimism, pessimism, or apathy) or intellectual (for instance, tendency to focus on discrete detail, or on the broad picture). For the study of such correlations to yield returns, however, one must ask the right questions about personality and about opinions; one must discover the aspects of each that are most susceptible to congruent stylistic variation. The approach, in a word, falls into place as a legitimate partial one, when it is guided by more adequate theory. But even in the more sophisticated if not always responsible hands of a modern factor analyst like Eysenck,[4] the correlational approach yields a limited perspective on personality and a very incomplete view of its contribution to opinion.

---

[3] For a summary of the literature, see Gardner Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, 1937).

The next landmark that demands our attention, Harold Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*,[5] suffered from no such dearth of scientific imagination, bringing to bear as it did on political opinion the rich treasure of hypothesis to be mined from classical psychoanalysis, and illustrating the fruitfulness of case studies for the elucidation of political thinking. Displacement and rationalization were for Lasswell the major devices whereby private motives come to be transformed into political opinions. According to his formula for the "political man," private motives are displaced onto a public object and rationalized in terms of the public interest. The formula and the case material introduced by way of illustration served the important positive function of bringing a dynamic view of human motivation into the ken of American political science at a time when most American psychologists eschewed the psychoanalytic jungle with fear or disdain. Negatively, Lasswell's contribution dealt one more blow to the rationalistic view of man as embodied in the political philosophy of the Enlightenment and of the Founding Fathers. Of course, his formula necessarily oversimplified, even in terms of the earlier Freud on whose writings Lasswell drew. From the perspective of modern Freudian psychoanalysis with its emphasis on "ego psychology,"[6] the distortion appears somewhat greater. "Rationalization" in the formula swallows up rational processes without residue while the constructive role of opinion in the functioning of personality goes unregarded. Again we have a partial truth, more provocative and more penetrating, to be sure, than one pursued by the trait-attitude correlators. But the partial insight comes close to error unless it is placed in perspective as comprising only one of a variety of relationships that can be observed between opinions and personality.

No account of opinion research, however selective, can afford to ignore the impact of the opinion polls, even though the sampling survey did not come to a natural focus on the personal setting of opinion. It is not easy to gather useful data on personality in doorstep interviews, though we have recently seen that it is by no means impossible.[7] Rather, the line of least resistance was to relate opinions to the demographic facts of age, sex, education, socio-economic status—"face-sheet" data that were normally collected as a check on the representativeness of sampling. Under the leadership of Paul Lazarsfeld and others,[8] this opinion demography was given a sociological rationale. The demographic uniformities of opinion turned up by the pollsters were attributed to homogenizing pressures of primary group membership. It remained to identify the "cross-pressures" exerted on a person by divergence among the norms prevailing in the various groups with which he was affiliated, and a manifestly powerful tool was in hand for coping with interindividual variation as well as with uniformity. An Index of Political Predisposition such as Lazarsfeld and his collaborators constructed from the Erie County data[9] left but little for personal idiosyncrasy.

---

[4] See H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics* (London, 1954). This work has been stringently criticized. See Richard Christie, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Communists," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 53 (November, 1956), pp. 411–430, and the immediately following reply and rejoinder.

[5] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930).

[6] A good account of these developments from a sympathetic standpoint may be found in Ruth L. Monroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* (New York, 1955).

To this sociological account a social-psychological refinement was added, primarily by Herbert Hyman[10] and Robert Merton,[11] in the concept of *reference groups*. The groups to which a person looks for norms and standards, they pointed out, need not be identical with those to which he actually belongs. The implications of this distinction between membership groups and reference groups are still being worked out in research, but the conception is patently a fruitful one.

While an account of political opinion solely in terms of membership groups and their cross-pressures, matters of apparently objective social fact, presents itself as a competitor to psychological interpretation, the complications of reference group theory bring the person's selective orientation to the social world once more into the picture. What enduring personal dispositions underlie an individual's choice of reference groups? What characterizes the conformist, Riesman's "other-directed" man[12] who finds his reference group in the salient membership group of the moment or in the just-more-prestigeful "Joneses"? What distinguishes him from the maverick whose attachment to an ideal reference group provides him, in Riesman's metaphor, with a gyroscope that frees his judgments from the influence of his immediate associates and social betters? These are legitimate questions for personality theory.

---

[7] See Fillmore H. Sanford, "The Use of a Projective Technique in Attitude Surveying," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1950–51), pp. 697–709.

[8] See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McFee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954).

[9] Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–27.

[10] Herbert H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 269 (New York, 1942).

[11] Robert K. Merton with the collaboration of Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), pp. 225–280; also pp. 281–386 in the same volume.

[12] David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950).

From this perspective, the account of opinion in terms of "group determinants" can be seen to have thrown into focus still another facet of the relational complex linking opinions and personality. The whole story of group influences cannot, of course, be encompassed by the psychology of personality, for opinions and behavior, as Kurt Lewin[13] was fond of emphasizing, are a function of personality and situation taken jointly. One can come to grips with this field of interaction from the standpoint of social groups and the constraints that these important constituents of human situations impose on behavior. Or, and this is the tack taken here, one can take personality as the point of departure. In the latter case, the person's orientation to his social world must be seen as one more partial source of his opinions. It too needs to be put in perspective by viewing it together with strands of relationship that other approaches have chosen to emphasize.

An additional line of development remains to be noted. Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell, and the group associated with them, now the Michigan Survey Research Center, gave currency in the study of opinion to an emphasis, adapted from clinical interviewing, on how the respondent himself formulates or "structures" the topic being investigated.[14] Their emphasis on the texture of a person's assumptions, beliefs, and opinions in terms of which his particular decisions and actions are to be understood—on "cognitive structure"—provided a much needed corrective, on the one hand to the pollsters' undue reliance on categorical statements of preference about preformulated issues, and on the other, to the oversimplifying tendency of academic attitude research to reduce attitudes to the scalable dimensions of direction and intensity. The task of systematizing the analysis of cognitive structure, to be sure, is formidable, and the "open-ended" questioning of the Michigan group may not have progressed very far on it. But they performed the important task of recapturing for research scrutiny a view of attitudes that opens for exploration a rich array of possible relationships to personality. Just as Lasswell's Freudian view of the motivational dynamics of opinion represents a conceptual enrichment on the side of personality in advance of the earlier trait-psychology, so the approach to attitudes as cognitive structures sensitizes the investigator to relevant aspects of attitude that the tradition of attitude scaling had neglected and still neglects. Some of the old questions concerning attitude-personality relationships could now profitably be reopened.

---

[13] See his later writings collected in Dorwin O. Cartwright (ed.), *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York, 1951) and *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948).

[14] See Charles F. Cannell and Robert L. Kahn, "The Collection of Data by Interviewing," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1953), pp. 327–380.

Perhaps this all-too-casual review has sufficiently established that when Bruner, White and I embarked on our case studies a decade ago, the ingredients were available for attempting to encompass the relations of opinions to personality in a comprehensive framework. The prevalent formulations tended to emphasize single strands of relationship, and thus to be offered as competitive rather than as supplementary lines of explanation. We thought that close attention to the thinking of a few people on a controversial topic, coupled with the study of their personalities along clinical lines, would help us in this task of synthesis. As a venture in the natural history of holding opinions, our study could not prove the correctness of specific hypotheses or the general validity of the framework we arrived at. But the richness of clinical detail that our interviews and tests evoked should, it seemed to us, allow us to scotch simplistic formulations in somewhat more definitive vein.

II

Before turning to what seems to me distinctive in our explorations, I must at least mention the related work of Nevitt Sanford, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and the other authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*,[15] not because this monumental study was a source we could draw on—our cases were closed and our thinking about them essentially crystallized before its publication—but because its well-deserved renown among social scientists makes it an essential benchmark in regard to which any subsequent attempt to map the relations of opinions to personality has to be located.

The California investigators, it is important to remember, set out on the trail of the psychological sources of *antisemitism*, and the elucidation of this very archetype of social irrationality remained the focus of their inquiry throughout. As we know, they found—and the finding seems to have stood up in the flood of subsequent research though with some qualification[16]—that people who fall at the antisemitic extreme not only are likely to give evidence of a cluster of related attitudes (general rejection of "out-groups," super-patriotism, and the like), but are also distinguished by a set of character traits that cohere in a meaningful pattern from the authors' psychoanalytic perspective. The so-called F (Fascism) Scale developed to measure this authoritarian syndrome of superstition, cynicism, punitive moralism and the like has turned out, for all its technical deficiencies, to do a fairly good job of separating sheep from goats with respect to a wide assortment of socially relevant attitudes and behaviors.

---

[15] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

[16] See Richard Christie and Marie Johoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of* "THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY" (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), also H. Edwin Titus and E. P. Hollander, "The California F Scale in Psychological Research: 1950–1955," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 54 (January, 1957), pp. 47–64.

As a monographic study of the sources in personality of a socially important set of attitudes, *The Authoritarian Personality* is unparallelled. And the personality syndrome delineated by the California authors has much interest for political scientists, whether for the light it sheds on endemic McCarthyism or for the dimensions it suggests for the analysis of political leadership and followership. What it does *not* provide (it was not intended to) is a generally useful framework for the analysis of relationships between personality and opinions—or a dependable example of the kind of relationships likely to be found in other politically relevant realms. If you start out with a bit of institutionalized irrationality like antisemitism, you are bound to come out with a psychological formula for irrationality, nothing more. In other words, the kinds of phenomena with which Frenkel-Brunswik, Sanford, and their collaborators were dealing, were the sort that fit the early Lasswellian formula. One must cast a wider net, or fish in different waters, to bring more representative kinds of political thinking and behavior into view.

III

I would not argue that our fishing grounds—attitudes toward Russia and Communism during the promulgation of the Truman doctrine—were especially representative. Very likely the topic carried a higher charge of unreasoned emotionality fanned by distorted information than many that we might have chosen. Had we followed the strategy of the California group and singled out the most virulent Russophobes for investigation—or the extreme Communists—we might have come to a formulation more similar to theirs than in fact emerged. But the series of men we studied held positions on Russia covering a wide range of favorableness, involvement, and information, and when we sought to trace in each case sources of opinions in personality that the evidence made clinically plausible, no single syndrome dominated the picture but a variety of linkages came to light. Such variety, we suspect, *is* characteristic of opinions on most political issues.

Central to our inquiry was the question, what kinds of *functions* do opinions serve in the economy of personality? A word is, therefore, in order about the legitimate role of a functional approach, as we see it, in such a psychological investigation. When we ask, of what use to a man are his opinions, what good do they do him, we are posing the functional question in the sense we have in mind—a sense that has a venerable lineage in Darwinian biology and in most post-Darwinian psychology. Clearly the question is *not* one of cause or mechanism; one has not given a causal or genetic explanation to a person's opinions when one discovers their contribution to his personal economy. To confuse function with cause is the error of teleology, and we do not mean to be teleologists.

We recognize that in a maturing science, systematic causal explanation replaces functional analysis: witness physiology since Bernard, Cannon and Henderson, where concern with the detailed operation of homeostatic mechanisms has supplanted the earlier emphasis on the functions of organ systems. Yet in the earlier stages of a biological or human science—and surely the psychology of personality must be placed here together with most social science—a functional approach provides a very useful, perhaps an indispensable strategy for coming to grips with ongoing processes. Wherever one has to do with an entity that behaves as a self-maintaining system, a going concern, it is safe enough to assume that functions are being taken care of that keep the system going. Personality has profitably been regarded as such a system, and the Parsonians find it helpful to take a similar view of societies.[17] And if, as current theories of learning and of personality development lead us to believe, people tend to learn those ways of thinking and behaving that, broadly speaking, *work* for them, the functional approach is not so remote from causal explanation after all. If we can discern the functions served by an item of opinion or behavior, that is, we may be well on the road toward an understanding of—an ability to predict—the circumstances under which the item will be manifested, and those under which it will be modified. The distinctions drawn by a functional analysis, in other words, are likely to be causally relevant. Knowledge of the functions that a particular opinion or belief are serving a man can be put to use without waiting for a full understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms.

The opinions about Russia and Communism held or expressed by our subjects appeared to us to be used by them in ways that we could sort into three broad categories, which we called *object appraisal, social adjustment,* and *externalization.* A person's opinions on a topic are likely to serve all three functions to some extent; the extent to which one or another of the functions predominates varies from person to person and from one topic to another. What, in brief, are these functions?

---

[17] The view of personality as a system is so widely shared as to need no documentation. Representative of a contemporary formal approach to "general systems theory" is James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10 (September, 1955), pp. 513–531. For Parsons, see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), and T. Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951). A related view is developed by Marion Levy, *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, 1953).

It should go without saying—but our look at the earlier literature shows that the saying is necessary—that a person's initial orientation to events is not to be thought of as serving purely autistic needs. *Object appraisal* we understand as the process of testing reality in order to assess its relevance to one's ongoing enterprises. It comprises those activities whereby the events and issues in the person's world are appraised for their relationship to his motives, goals, values, and interests. The "input" of information—from personal experience, from the mass media, from hearsay—has to be scanned for its possible bearing on things that he wants, fears, or otherwise cares about. The process of "opinioning" reflects to a considerable extent such scanning for relevance.

A person's stock of *existing* beliefs and opinions, to carry the argument one step further, simplifies his task of scanning, as Lippmann[18] long ago suggested, by providing him with already evaluated categories to which incoming information can be fitted. To serve this function, his opinions must be closely enough anchored in the reality presented to him to minimize the likelihood of surprise.

People differ greatly from one another in the extent to which a topic like Russia engages their values and interests, in the extent to which their attitudes toward Russia serve the function of object appraisal. Some are sufficiently isolated by social position and habits of attention that the barest minimum of borrowed cliches suffices to satisfy their "placing need" to put in order the modicum of information that filters through. For others, a strong personal commitment to religion, to liberal democracy, or to national interests may organize their view of Russia and the orientation that they take toward it, perhaps leading them even to seek out information that is relevant to their concerns. Even when the interests and values of a person are minimally engaged, however, and his concern with Russia is perfunctory, one can usually see the influence of his central concerns in the aspects of Russia that he singles out for notice.

Under *social adjustment* we consider another major role that opinions play: that of facilitating, disrupting, or simply maintaining an individual's relations with others. Here what matters is not so much the object itself—what Russia is like—but rather the opinions about it that a person thinks are held by other people who are significant to him. In contrast with object appraisal, in which the informational input *about the object* engages with a person's going concerns insofar as he sees the object to be relevant to them, the social adjustment function involves a process in which information about *how other people regard the object* engages with his motives to affiliate or identify himself with them or to distinguish himself from or oppose them. In view of the variety of social motives—needs for autonomy and for recognition, etc., as well as for acceptance and status—the significance of social adjustment for opinions is not just a matter of conformity. The rebel and the autonomous person as well as the conformist give evidence of having come to hold opinions that contribute to attaining or maintaining their distinctive pattern of social relationships.

---

[18] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922).

It is not merely through the *expression* of opinions in the give and take of social intercourse that opinions contribute to an individual's social adjustment. The mere *holding* of an opinion whether or not the person expresses it may symbolize for him his solidarity with some remote reference group; it may be for him a way of saying, "I am like them." Or, for that matter, that "I am *un*like them": so-called "negative reference groups" must also be recognized. During the period of our study, for example, the views of Russia, and of sundry other topics, held by a good many would-be respectable people undoubtedly served the function of confirming in their minds how different they were from the despised Communists. The possibilities of playing upon such a widely shared negative reference group were not, of course, neglected by the masters of political rhetoric.

The third and final class of functions in our list is *externalization*, which involves response to an external event in a way that is colored by a person's unresolved inner problems. Outside events are treated as if they were analogous to inner ones, and the attitude taken toward them corresponds to attitudes taken in the inner struggle. Himself greedy for a share of the world's goods and prestige to a greater degree than he could afford to recognize, one of our subjects, for example, conceived of the Soviet leadership with imagery of "pigs at the trough." In attempting to appraise the object, the person thus unwittingly carries on some of the work that is necessary in dealing with his inner problems. Insofar as he can cope with them more readily as externally symbolized, and thus better contain his conflicts, his burden of anxiety may be somewhat reduced.

Private dilemmas take Protean shapes, so the evidences of externalization that we found in our subjects' opinions about Russia fell into no single pattern. Certainly any expectation of one-to-one correspondence between "standard" conflicts, Freudian or otherwise, and particular opinion content is doomed to disappointment. As if to underline this observation, our single Communist subject, an inveterate externalizer if ever there was one, gave no evidence of the latent father-hatred that some popular versions of the Freudian account would have had us look for; it was his paranoid mother that forced the Sullivan siblings to band together in defensive revolt.[19] But the significant way in which his ideology helped him to cope with almost insupportable dilemmas lay in another highly individual direction.

The relationships we conceptualize as externalization are, of course, essentially those with which Lasswell and the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* were concerned. Those we treat under the heading of social adjustment include points emphasized by the theorists of group influence, as these appear from a perspective focused on personality. In this day of anti-intellectualism in social and psychological theory, however, one must turn to an earlier page of political thought to encounter emphasis on the reality-oriented processes we discuss as object appraisal.

Not that we would reinstate that admirable fiction, the Rational Man. Human interests are more diverse and less reducible than the rationalists supposed, and the information on which men have to judge and act is more often faulty and misleading. And I suppose that today anyone who came close to displaying the classical rational calculus in his political opinions would be checked off as a sick man, an obsessional-compulsive. But there is an undeniably rational component in men's opinions, rooted in the reality-testing function, which current thinking is prone to underplay. Only a social psychologist like Solomon Asch,[20] writing in the Gestalt tradition, can be accused of giving it too much weight.

The kind of pluralistic scheme we have proposed has advantages, we think, over simpler views of the functions of opinion. It would still be an academic exercise in classification, however, if the primary functional grounding of opinion in object appraisal, in social adjustment, or in externalization did not have divergent consequences. We think there is such a pay-off. When a person's opinions on a topic function largely for object appraisal, it seems reasonable to suppose that he should be relatively flexible in assimilating new facts and in changing his mind when these facts point to different implications for his interests. Information campaigns, as a political strategy, assume that object appraisal is importantly involved in the opinions of the relevant publics. Sometimes this is the case; sometimes not: it should be possible to devise ways of assessing the extent to which prevalent attitudes are responsive to new information.

---

[19] *Cf.* Smith, Bruner, and White, *op. cit.*, p. 154–188.

[20] Solomon E. Asch, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1952).

Opinions that are founded largely on social adjustment should be more readily influenced by what others think than by information about their object. Political as well as advertising campaigns employ the strategies of "prestige suggestion" on the assumption, often apparently justified, that the dynamics of the opinions they would alter are of this kind. The case is different with externalization, which lends to opinions a defensive rigidity not amenable to rational persuasion or to simple social manipulation. We would not expect opinions primarily in the service of such a function to undergo gradual change under the pressure of changing fact or group opinion; more characteristic would be "conversion," the saltatory change from one equilibrium to its dynamic near-equivalent, as from Communism to another True Church. The politics of scare and innuendo thus appeals to externalizing tendencies in people, and tries to focus and channel these tendencies in line with the propagandist's objectives. The good democrat who wants his politics along more rational lines, on the other hand, can perhaps foster the flexibility of object appraisal by striving to create an atmosphere of reassurance minimizing the anxiety that sets defensive dynamisms to work. His motto might well be, "There is nothing to fear but fear itself." In a world that presents so much to warrant real anxiety and to tap neurotic fears of the monstrous and uncanny, this may not be an easy course to follow.

Our excursion into the natural history of opinion was not designed to put such hypotheses to test. Fortunately, Daniel Katz and Helen Peak have recently been directing at the University of Michigan a series of studies, conceived independently of our work, that are providing more systematic evidence along these lines.[21]

---

[21] See Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 49 (January, 1954), pp. 115–124; Helen Peak, "Attitude and Motivation," in Marshall R. Jones (ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1955* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1955), pp. 149–188; Earl R. Carlson, "Attitude Change Through Modification of Attitude Structure," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52 (March, 1956), pp. 256–261; Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 53 (November, 1956), pp. 367–372; Daniel Katz, Irving Sarnoff, and Charles McClintock, "Ego-Defense and Attitude Change," *Human Relations*, Vol. 9 (January, 1956), pp. 27–45; Daniel Katz, Charles

IV

There is a tempting error to which functional theories are prone: to over-interpret, to seek functions where none exist. If a function can be found for every aspect of a person's dispositions and behavior, or for every institutional arrangement of a society, one comes close to the position of a Pangloss for whom "whatever is, is right." There are *dys*functions, too, as the good functional sociologist Robert Merton reminds us.[22] Not every feature of a person's opinions is currently useful to him, and just as certainly, not all the linkages between opinions and personality are brought to light by inquiry along functional lines. Although much of what was at one point functional for a person gets embedded somehow in his personality structure as it emerges in the transactions that compose his life history, there is no guarantee that the functional basis persists to the present. Yet personality coheres, and students of personality like Gordon Allport have provided us with ample evidence that different samples of a person's behavior bear that person's distinctive stamp.[23]

A man's opinions, too, carry his signature. So a comprehensive account of the relations between personality and opinions must go beyond the functional question to examine the *expressive* aspect of opinions, the ways in which an individual's opinions are shaped by the kind of person who has them. Both a person's intellectual and his temperamental qualities are revealed in the nature of his attitudes, as we found in our case studies. But the correspondences seldom determined his stand on gross issues such as, for example, whether he supported or opposed the Truman Doctrine—the kind of datum likely to be provided by an attitude test or opinion poll. Support or opposition for the publicly formulated alternatives on current issues appeared to us in the guise of "final common paths" (to borrow a metaphor from neurophysiology) that people could arrive at from a diversity of private routes. The impress of intellectual and temperamental traits of personality was to be discerned rather in the style than in the gross outcome of political thinking and action.

McClintock, and Irving Sarnoff, "The Measurement of Ego Defense as Related to Attitude Change," *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 25 (June, 1957), pp. 465–474.

[22] Robert K. Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[23] Allport's views are best found in his classic textbook, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1937), and in a collection of his more recent papers, *The Nature of Personality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). Some of the basic evidence for the congruence of a person's expressive behavior was collected by Allport and Philip E. Vernon in their *Studies in Expressive Movement* (New York, 1933).

Stylistic features rooted in personality traits remain practically important, even though they are not predictive of a person's particular policy stand. Take, for example, the effects of differences between people in the abstractness or concreteness characteristic of their thinking. In spite of the fact that without our intending it the men we studied were well above average in intelligence as a group, we were forcibly impressed by the narrow limits within which most of them could cope with political issues in abstract terms—a general feature of their thinking. This common attribute of Nonacademic Man has, of course, a lot to do with the prevalence of stereotypy in political attitudes and of the *non-sequitur* in popular political thinking. As a formal condition of political thought and behavior, to look at the matter from another perspective, such incapacity for abstraction puts the functioning of opinion in object appraisal under major constraint. It goes far to explain why opinions that primarily serve this essentially rational function can fall so short of the standards of logical rationality.

V

Let me return to features of our approach that I noted at the outset, by way of introducing some comments on its possible relevance for political scientists.

Our study, I observed, was long on the description and analysis of opinions, but short on the observation of political *behavior*, a result that followed perhaps from our selection of Russia as a focal topic, perhaps from our method that leaned heavily on interview and discussion. From a political scientist's standpoint as from a psychologist's, this is certainly a deficiency in our case materials. But the theoretical position that we worked out from opinion data may nevertheless have implications that extend beyond "mere" opinions. *Expressed* opinions are, after all, a form of behavior, and opinions *held* are but one type of behavioral disposition. To the extent that we learned about things that our subjects did in the service of their opinions—other than talking to us—this behavior seemed to be intelligible in much the same terms as their attitudes. The Communist who avoided subjecting himself to Party discipline but avidly sought out information to feed his internalized version of the Marxist "line"; the affable real estate agent who rarely discussed Russia but accepted a wide range of favorable or unfavorable information about Russia without being much affected at the core of his beliefs; the cautious accountant who avoided controversy at all costs in spite of a view of Russia as a villainous regime: all of these behaved in ways that were congruent with the functions their opinions about Russia were serving, if not always logically consistent with the letter of their beliefs. Discrepancies between attitudes and behavior pose a logical or moral problem, hardly a psychological one.

That our studies barely touched on *public* opinion in any strict sense is a more serious reservation. There are general implications here, I think, for the political scientist who is interested in psychological approaches. If I understand the uses of the term in political and social theory, "*public* opinion" implies not so much the contrast between public vs. private circumstances of expression, as the existence of *consensually defined issues* in the social group whose opinions are under consideration.[24] Our scheme for describing opinions (which I have not summarized in this paper) did take cognizance of the person's position on public issues, under the rubric of *policy stand.* But the interesting correspondences that we found between opinions and personality primarily involved the richer aspects of attitude content and structure as uniquely patterned by the particular individual. Indeed, we came to see the necessity of arriving at a simple policy stand—"Are you for or against the Truman Doctrine?"—as imposing a kind of Procrustean frame on the much subtler distinctions often drawn in the attitudinal object as privately construed, and in the person's orientation toward it. It is in the nature of public opinion, we came to see, that a wide range of personal opinions are brought into focus on a highly limited set of alternative proposals for collective action.

If knowledge of personality does not, in general, permit the prediction of policy stands, need the political scientist who is interested in public opinion concern himself with personal opinions and with personality? This crucial question is not easy to answer. There is undoubtedly a Sirens' lure to personality studies that political scientists who are tempted would do well to view with sturdy suspicion. How easy it is to be enticed into the pursuit of humanly fascinating facts that, in last analysis, have rather little to do with the broader issues that purportedly motivate one's inquiry! For many purposes, the student of political behavior is clearly justified in ignoring personality; he can take people's policy stands as *data* without close inquiry into the private ingredients of which they are resultants.

Yet the burden of this paper is, obviously, that the personal setting of public opinion does matter, and that political scientists will surely have recurrent needs to come to grips with it. Not, usually, through the intensive study of individual cases, on our model: this procedure is too inefficient for purposes other than the exploratory search for illustrative specimens. More extensive appraisals can be envisaged, however, as for example, of the personal values and interests with which a particular topic engages, in a defined public, or of the degree to which the attitudes prevalent on a topic in a defined population serve one or another of our three functions. Such partial but extensive inquiries into opinion dynamics look particularly promising as avenues to the understanding and perhaps prediction of *shifts* in public opinion in response to events and to different styles of leadership or manipulation.

---

[24] See Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McClung Lee (eds.), *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1954), pp. 50–84, for representative approaches to the definition of public opinion.

The final limiting feature of our work that I mentioned at the outset—a matter related to the point just discussed—arises from the fact that our approach maintains a distinctly psychological perspective focused on the individual personality as a functioning system. How is such an approach to be integrated with others that are appropriate to the broad domain of political behavior, particularly that of sociology with its emphasis on roles, groups, and institutions? I shall not attempt an easy solution to this chronic source of difficulty, which presents resistant obstacles to empirical research on social behavior as much as it troubles the theorist who ventures across disciplinary boundaries. Aspects of our discussion may nevertheless have suggested, perhaps, some lines along which a *modus vivendi* may be approached among differently focused conceptual approaches. Group-related concepts, we have seen, enter the psychological account among the variety of considerations relevant to the functional analysis of opinion. Had the paper attempted a genetic formulation of how opinion develops, I would also have had to call upon them in identifying the sources of information from which opinions are constituted. Not everything that a group theorist would have to say about public opinion finds its way into this personality-oriented schema, but no matter. The sociologist, on his part, extends his conceptual linkages from the group to the personality level, without any obligation to include in his formulation everything that the psychologist of personality can contribute to the study of opinion. For the political scientist, it seems to me, the profitable question is not, "Which account is more valid, the psychological or the sociological?" but rather, "For what problems of political behavior is the vantage point of personality theory more useful, and for what problems that of groups and institutions?"

My very tentative suggestion with respect to this question runs along lines already hinted at. So long as concern is focused on whether people accept or reject the various positions on an issue as they are publicly formulated at a particular time, a sociological emphasis on group affiliations may well be the more promising. A "cross-pressures" analysis, for example, may account for differences in policy stand where the detailed study of personality does not carry us very far. To look at the matter from a slightly different angle, *public* opinion as a phenomenon of social consensus may best be described in categories of sociological theory. In order to anticipate *changes* in people's policy stands under the impact of attempts to influence them or of events, however, one has to look behind the facade of relatively stereotyped public opinion to the private, individual level. Here a psychological approach may well be the method of choice. The present paper has attempted to illustrate one such psychological approach from the vantage point of personality theory, and to suggest an orderly framework for the study of the complex relations between opinions and personality.

COMMENT ON "OPINIONS, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR"[1]

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE
The RAND Corporation

The type of comprehensive conceptual scheme presented by Professor Smith in the foregoing paper is, in the writer's opinion, the most useful framework currently available for studying the relationship between opinions and personality. The paper draws upon a major work by Smith and his colleagues, *Opinions and Personality,* which has not only been greeted as a "pattern-setter for a new phase of attitude research"[2] but is already having an important impact on political behavior studies.

I

That political scientists should find the pluralistic theory proposed by Smith congenial, cannot be explained merely by the fact that it is accompanied by an emphatic rejection of the type of simplistic theorizing about personality and opinion already in disfavor with most of them. Rather, its appeal is solidly intellectual, deriving from the fact that it stems from a general (and long awaited!) movement of convergence within the field of psychology.

Political scientists interested in making behavioral studies in the field of politics have long recognized the need for contact with, if not immersion in, the fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology. But these disciplines, themselves in a state of ferment and rapid movement, have presented a bewildering array of competing and often discordant voices. To make productive use of the theories and findings of one of these neighboring disciplines often seemed to require the political scientist to become a better—certainly a more detached—critic of the products of that discipline than many of its own members could claim to be. A work which carefully explores the possibility of synthesis in an important research area, as the Smith-Bruner-White study does, enormously simplifies for political scientists the task of grasping and profiting from the collective wisdom of the various schools of psychology, each of which has something important to say.

Recent years have seen, in fact, a gradual breakdown of the compartmentalization of psychology into different theoretical schools. A lively intellectual traffic has developed, especially between the fields of social psychology and the psychology of personality. Despite the usefulness of many specific findings of attitude studies in the past, social psychologists have been increasingly aware of the fact that the vast body of research they had produced was not yielding the principles and generalizations needed for understanding the dynamics of attitude formation and change. This was most keenly felt by those who hoped to further efforts within the community to modify ethnocentric and other potentially divisive social attitudes. Increasingly dissatisfied, some social psychologists have turned to the psychology of personality for assistance in formulating more adequately the motivational processes that enter into the formation and change of attitudes.

---

[1] Revised from a comment on Smith's paper at the time of its initial presentation. In preparing this comment I benefited from opportunities for study and discussion as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during the year 1956–57.

[2] Elizabeth Douvan, of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, in her review of *Opinions and Personality in Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 20 (Summer, 1956), p. 478. Political scientists will also find helpful the commentary on *Opinions and Personality* by a leading authority on attitude research, Herbert H. Hyman, in *World Politics,* Vol. 10 (October, 1957) pp. 144–153.

The functional scheme worked out by Smith and his associates represents a deliberate, self-conscious selection and drawing together of recent points of view in the field of attitude research. Not only have the authors of *Opinions and Personality* profited from earlier developments in this field: they have taken pains to trace the movement of convergence and to locate their own approach within the historical development of which it is part in a manner which is at once informed and critical, and not at all polemical. Their book is a perceptive, eminently useful account of major trends in social psychology and personality theory which have affected research on the opinion process. In his paper Smith is able to give only an abbreviated sketch of these trends and the interested political scientist would be well advised to turn to the full essay, "Converging Approaches," which is Chapter 2 of *Opinions and Personality.*

II

In the final section of his paper Smith considers the possible relevance of his approach for certain problem areas in political science. He does so with sobriety and sophistication, well aware that focus upon opinions from the viewpoint of individual psychology has limited utility for many standard problems in political science. He considers the possible uses and limits of his functional conceptualization of opinions and personality from three standpoints: (1) the relation of opinions to behavior; (2) the relation between private and public opinion, and (3) the problem of integrating a psychological approach such as his with others, particularly those drawn from sociology.[3]

Smith's reformulations of the second and third of these familiar, long-standing problems and his tentative suggestions regarding the role of a psychological approach in these areas are both sensible and stimulating. His case is the stronger because he advances only a minimal claim, namely that the psychological approach is appropriate whenever the problem chosen by the political scientist concerns "opinion dynamics" and requires him to understand and perhaps predict shifts in public opinion.

---

[3] Since in the foregoing paper Smith concentrates his remarks on the possible utility of his approach for the study of opinion, I have reluctantly decided not to comment on the importance of his work for the study of political leadership and political personality, though I believe it has considerable relevance for political scientists from this standpoint too. See especially *op. cit.*, pp. 280–284.

This claim, which may be readily conceded, is much too modest when limited to the study of public opinion, for students of political behavior are and must be interested in the dynamics of opinion in other problem areas. They will have recurrent need for the type of conceptual approach proposed here, and for elaborations of it, in studying political movements from a dynamic and developmental point of view, with reference to the conditions under which different types of individuals are attracted or repelled by different types of ideologies, and enter into and leave organized political movements.

It is, indeed, in this latter area rather than in the study of public opinion that, so far as I know, the Smith-Bruner-White approach has had its earliest and perhaps as yet its most influential impact. In the course of his research on why people joined the Communist movement and why they left it, in four Western countries, Gabriel Almond drew upon this functional scheme. Following publication of his *Appeals of Communism* (1954), Almond undertook to integrate this type of opinions-personality approach into a theory of political choice. In a paper delivered in 1955,[4] Almond articulated the theoretical assumptions implicit in *Appeals of Communism* and commented on the divergence of his approach from that of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality.* No summary of Almond's closely reasoned discussion is possible here, but he argues for the analysis of political movements in terms of a more comprehensive opinions-personality schema and criticizes that of *The Authoritarian Personality* for its oversimplification and distortion. "Careful consideration," he says, "suggests that personality characteristics affect political choices in a wide variety of ways, and that the assumption of congruity between types of personality and types of political attitudes is an untenable one."

Political scientists are interested in the relative importance of, and relationship between, social structure and personality structure as determinants of political attitudes. *The Authoritarian Personality* appears to postulate a simple pattern of continuity from social structure to personality structure to political attitudes and choices. Against this, Almond argues that political attitudes can have their origin and derive their content predominantly from the political and social process itself, "*i.e.*, the psychological component can be essentially cognitive and adjustive rather than the consequence of basic personality characteristics." His position in this respect, it will be seen, is very close to, if not identical with, that outlined in Smith's paper.

It is in discussing the problem of the relation of opinions to behavior that Smith is least successful in coming to grips with some of the special needs of political science. To say this, however, is to say no more than that we have still with us residues of the long-standing parochialism of the social psychologists' effort to approach the analysis and prediction of behavior primarily from the standpoint of attitudes.

Sensing that the political scientist is concerned with a broader range of be-

---

[4] Gabriel A. Almond, "The Appeals of Communism and Fascism," (mimeo.) presented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boulder, Colorado, 1955.

havior than that encompassed by his opinions-personality schema, Smith limits his remarks to behavior which is "in service of" opinions and to behavior which is made necessary in some fashion by opinions.[5] He is not primarily concerned with a broader segment of behavior, that involving the *choice* of action, policy and strategy, which is of central interest in politics, and therefore also of central interest to political scientists. It is doubtful, though to be sure Smith does not advocate it, whether we can go very far in illuminating political behavior which involves the choice of one line of action from among alternatives by viewing it merely as the expression or manifestation of attitudes, or general dispositions to act in a certain way.[6] The analysis of *action*, rather, requires a more comprehensive framework, one which includes a larger number of variables than does the familiar attitudes→behavior schema. For conceptual assistance to that end the political scientist must look to the general models of rational behavior in situations of conflict and uncertainty employed for many years by the economists, and perhaps also to the more recent theory of games of strategy.[7]

The notion that political man is a purposive being, engaged in instrumental behavior and exercising reason in attempting to choose his course of action wisely is, of course, a traditional and highly respected one in political science. This notion, moreover, has long served as the basis for interpreting and accounting for political action by means of the so-called "rational hypothesis."[8] But political scientists have usually employed the model of rational instrumental behavior quite unrigorously and casually, as if its application to specific problems of political analysis were little more than a matter of informed commonsense. In this respect, therefore, the political scientist has remained close to the historian with whom he has long shared both an intense interest in interpreting the "subjective" side of single actions and a reluctance to explicate a method for doing so.

Karl Popper has aptly termed interpretation of political action by means of the rational hypothesis the "logic-of-the-situation" type of explanation.[9] The actor is assumed to choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of his assessment of the logic of the situation which confronts him. His choice of action is based upon a set of conditions (termed "initial conditions" in some technical formulations of the method) under which he is operating at the time. These initial conditions include (a) the actor's values, (b) his aims, (c) the information available to him about relevant aspects of the situation, and (d) the knowledge available to him for estimating future developments and the probable consequences of each of the alternative courses under consideration.

---

[5] In addition to the pertinent passages of Smith's paper, see also the discussion of "Opinion and Action" in *Opinions and Personality*, pp. 46–47.

[6] The authors of *Opinions and Personality* define "attitude" (which they use interchangeably with "opinion" and "sentiment") as "a predisposition to experience, to be motivated by, and to act toward, a class of objects in a predictable manner" (p. 33).

[7] Helpful in this regard is Herbert A. Simon's discussion of such models in "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social Science Models," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1954), pp. 388–415. Purely psychological models of action (such as, for example, that proposed by Edward C. Tolman, in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., *Toward A General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) may also be suggestive, but they seem less applicable to problems met in political science. Useful leads for the empirical study of action have also been furnished by practitioners of social and market research. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955), esp. p. 7 and Section V.

[8] See, for example, Hans Morgenthau's statement on how the rational hypothesis is applied in analyzing foreign policy, in his "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December, 1952), pp. 965–6.

These four conditions, or types of determinants of the choice of action, may be regarded as among the important variables of a systematic framework for the analysis of action. "Attitudes" cannot be easily fitted into such a schema, though their relevance is clear, for it appears that this concept, as employed by social psychologists, constitutes not one but several separate variables of action. While "attitudes" may be a sufficiently homogeneous concept for other purposes, it is likely to require considerable differentiation in order to permit a good theory of opinions-personality, such as the present one, to be incorporated into the broader one required for the analysis of action. For, as it stands, "attitudes" is an omnibus term which includes a variety of beliefs, opinions, dispositions, sentiments, etc., which play different roles in the determination of action, and affect all four of the conditions just listed.*

Among the weaknesses of the logic-of-the-situation approach as usually conceived and employed has been its lack of means for dealing with opinion and personality dynamics. To some extent it has been able to do so by stretching the notion of what constitutes rational behavior to include the impact of unconscious interests, goals and motives upon calculations leading to a choice of action. But such a psychological modification of the logic-of-the-situation approach, undertaken on an *ad hoc* basis and without any attempt at methodological formulation, tends to be suspect and to open the way for undisciplined speculation.

A psychologically more sophisticated approach to the study of political action is likely to emerge if the type of comprehensive view of opinions-personality offered by Smith can be merged, in some fashion as yet not clear, with the logic-of-the-situation approach. For, be it noted, having incorporated the cognitive and reality-testing aspects of ego functioning into a broader theory of attitudes and personality, social psychologists are now ready for a reappraisal of the role of rational processes in opinion dynamics. While Smith makes clear that the new emphasis on the object-appraising function of opinions is not a bid for the reinstatement of the admirable fiction of the Rational Man, he remains impressed with the fact that "there is an undeniably rational component in men's opinions, rooted in the reality-testing function, which current thinking is prone to underplay."[10]

---

[9] In *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Routledge and K. Paul, London, 2d ed., rev., 1952), Vol. II, pp. 96–7, 265. See also Patrick Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (London, 1952), pp. 49–50, 113–139. A fuller version of these remarks on the logic-of-the-situation approach is contained in forthcoming publications on propaganda analysis (for the RAND Corporation) and on the problems of psychologically oriented political biography.

* In a personal communication after this comment was written, M. Brewster Smith has kindly called my attention to the fact that *Opinions and Personality* contains a number of differentiations of "attitudes" and suggestions for taxonomy, and that he is in essential agreement that "attitudes" is too global a concept for the analysis of action.

This is only one of many indications in *Opinions and Personality,* which cannot be taken up here, of the importance attached by its authors to a closer examination of ego functioning. Suffice it to say that such an emphasis serves to make their approach particularly congenial to political scientists who think it an important task for political behavior research to develop a systematic typology and analysis of the *situations* which confront the actor. While prepared to admit the need for taking account of psychological variables, such political scientists rightly insist that the difference between psychological and situational variables should not be blurred in the analysis of action.[11] The point is that much behavior which seems to be psychologically determined may turn out upon closer examination to be primarily a response to the logic of the situation—*as seen by the actor* who attempts to select a course of action rationally, albeit with great difficulty. The difficulty arises from the fact that he must decide which of a number of competing values and needs he should attempt to satisfy, and because he possesses only limited information about the situation and about the means-ends relationships necessary for estimating the probable consequences of alternative lines of action.

It may be noted, finally, that in *Opinions and Personality* (p. 47), though not in his paper, Smith indicates that he is well aware that attitudes "are but half the formula" for the satisfactory formulation of the problem of action. Also required, he notes, is an analysis of the situations with which the actor is confronted.

III

Smith's search for a more comprehensive framework to encompass the relationships between opinions and personality reflects a widely shared dissatisfaction with one-sided, oversimplified approaches to the problem of motivation. Many social psychologists recognize that a broader, more systematic theory of motivation must be wedded to the study of attitude formation and change. But the whole problem of motivation itself is being subjected to a new scrutiny by psychologists of personality and the final results of their reappraisal are not yet evident.

---

[10] In *Opinions and Personality,* the authors explain that they have given much attention to the "object appraisal" function of opinion "out of a sense that the time has come, given the assimilation of Freud's great insights, to look again at the manner in which and the degree to which man deals rationally with the world around him in the light of his interests" (p. 266).

[11] See, for example, David Easton's extended discussion of this problem in his *The Political System.*

It is understandable, therefore, that Smith and his associates, whose conceptual interest in this border area falls more heavily on the side of opinions than personality, should have decided upon a cautious, conservative course in dealing with the problem of motivation. They have deliberately limited themselves to "a minimal conception of personality, one that skirts controversial issues when they are not immediately crucial to a functional theory of opinion."[12]

More, the authors of *Opinions and Personality* settled for a *functional* concept of the relations between opinions and personality rather than a causal one, a decision which further relieves them of the necessity to articulate or commit themselves to any detailed theory of personality structure, its motivational sub-systems and their complex inter-relationships.

In his paper Smith ably defends the legitimacy of a functional approach in the present instance, even while recognizing that in a maturing science systematic causal explanation replaces functional analysis. Many students of political attitudes who do not share a lively interest in the theoretical issues and controversies implied here will be satisfied to judge the conceptualization offered on the grounds that it makes good sense in terms of their own experience of the complex and varied personal roots of political opinions. Others more actively concerned with the matter of a correct theoretical approach will note that Smith, in contrast to some enthusiasts of a functional approach, regards his resort to it as an interim measure necessary in the present stage of attitude research. Thus, he defends it on the grounds that it provides a "useful, perhaps indispensable strategy for coming to grips with ongoing processes."

In fact, it could be argued that though cast in functional terms Smith's scheme is not a pure case of functional analysis. For in *Opinions and Personality* the authors reveal a lively interest in causal processes and in the motivational determinants of opinion and of resistance to opinion change. This interest is evinced particularly in dealing with the specific materials of their case studies. But in conceptualizing their approach the authors stop short of an attempt to formulate a general causal model for the study of opinions viewed as a form of purposive, instrumental behavior.

This is not to criticize Smith and his colleagues for their decision to settle for a functional formulation. Rather it is to warn the interested reader of Smith's paper that his general scheme cannot possibly capture or summarize the rich insights and hypotheses as to the intricacies of opinion dynamics which they have presented in their fuller publication. In the book the reader will find each of the three functions worked out and applied with considerable specificity in the interpretation of case materials. Incidentally, the authors of *Opinions and Personality* are not as thorough and systematic in their analysis of ego functions and adjustive strategies as, for example, Fritz Redl and David Wineman were in their study of the egos of delinquent children;[13] however, they do attempt occasionally to state findings in the form of explicit propositions of more general scope. (See particularly the four propositions concerning the externalization function, *Opinions and Personality*, pp. 271–5.)

---

[12] *Opinions and Personality*, p. 33.

[13] F. Redl and D. Wineman, *Children Who Hate* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951). While concerned

In any case we can readily accept the claim advanced in Smith's paper that the functional scheme he proposes "is not so remote from causal explanation after all." For if one takes account of the actual and programmed use of these three functions—"object appraisal," "social adjustment," and "externalization"—it becomes evident that they at least imply motivational forces and therefore also causal processes. In fact, these three general functions of opinion can be translated fairly readily into general motivational terms, as can be seen by comparing the Smith-Bruner-White conceptualization with that proposed by a group of researchers at the University of Michigan (Daniel Katz, Irving Sarnoff and Helen Peak), to whose work Smith refers in his paper. Such a comparison shows the three-fold functional scheme under discussion here to be closely paralleled by the three general "motivational contexts" which Sarnoff and Katz[14] propose as a framework for experimental study of the problem of changing "inappropriate" attitudes.

It would be instructive and fruitful to compare the starting points of these two separate, and somewhat differently oriented efforts to evolve a more comprehensive scheme for the personality setting of opinions, and to consider as well how their proposals and findings usefully supplement and reinforce each other. But for present purposes it suffices to depict the striking parallel between them schematically and to invite the reader to pursue the comparison for himself:

Three Functions of Opinion (Smith-Bruner-White)	*Three Motivational Contexts of Attitudes* (Sarnoff and Katz)
"object appraisal"	(1) "reality testing" (gestalt psychology and field theory)
"social adjustment"	(2) "reward and punishment" (learning theory)
"externalization"	(3) "ego defense" (psychoanalysis)

Both teams of researchers make the same fundamental points: (1) that there is no simple or rigid one-to-one relationship between the opinions (attitudes) that a person develops and the underlying weight of any one of these functions (motivational contexts); (2) that while individuals differ with respect to the weight that any one function (motivational context) has in the formulation of

---

with a problem at some remove from that of political opinion, these authors too find it necessary to push further the analysis of ego functioning. Their study is extremely suggestive of the directions in which clinically oriented research on opinions and personality might move. See particularly the restatement and discussion of four major ego functions (pp. 61–67) and the systematic inventory of the variety of techniques and strategies employed by delinquent children in order to defend themselves against their own consciences and to resist efforts to bring about changes in their behavior and attitudes (pp. 141–199).

[14] Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 49 (January, 1954), pp. 115–124.

his opinions, all three are at work to some degree in every individual; and (3) that to change particular opinions or attitudes requires the choice of a method or approach that is appropriate to the particular function or motivational context which that opinion has in a given individual.

The fact that two separately pursued efforts to chart a new course have come up with parallel conceptual approaches and a set of essentially similar general postulates offers additional assurance of the soundness of the direction in which they are attempting to reorient attitude research. It also testifies to the strength and vitality of the forces underlying the process of convergence within psychology that two major research projects of this type, one clinical in its general orientation, the other following an experimental approach, should have been launched independently at about the same time.

CONSERVATISM AND PERSONALITY*

HERBERT McCLOSKY

University of Minnesota

If justification were needed for taking notice once again of the liberal-conservative distinction, it would be sufficient, I suppose, merely to observe that this division has been injected into the politics of Western nations for at least two centuries and, depending on the nature of one's criteria, perhaps longer.

I. INTRODUCTION

The distinction between the two camps has not always been sharply drawn, of course, for both have been compelled, as a condition for survival, to hold important beliefs in common. Moreover, each has reversed itself on certain issues, such as government regulation of the economy, casting off old views in favor of beliefs previously cherished by the other. Competing for popular support in elections, and succeeding one another in office, the two camps have, of necessity, taken on many values in common, tempering their programs and adjusting their courses to the practical requirements of political contest. In a system like ours, where the parties have functioned less as ideological movements than as brokerage organizations hoping to attract majority support from almost every segment of the electorate, the distinction has tended to be dulled even further, until, at the actual scenes of daily political struggle, it has often faded entirely. Even in political systems abroad where doctrinal parties are more frequently in evidence, the differences between liberals and conservatives have become operationally more obscure as the parties have shared office, confronted the reality of common problems, and competed for the support of the waverers at the middle ranges of the ideological spectrum.

We would be mistaken, however, to infer from this that all distinctions between the liberal and conservative tendencies are spurious, or that they are mere inventions of office-seekers or publicists. Not only do our Minnesota studies find many of the differences to be genuine, but the two camps bear a remarkable continuity with the patrilineal doctrines from which they have descended. For example, the credo of the "New Conservatives" (as distinguished from the shifting programs of conservative parties) includes few notions not already expressed by Edmund Burke, whose writings, despite seeming inconsistencies, are generally considered the fountainhead of modern conservative thought. The political writings of Russell Kirk, Clinton Rossiter, John Hallowell, or Richard Weaver, of the refurbished Southern Agrarians like Donald Davidson, the poets of nostalgia like T. S. Eliot, or of magazines like *Measure*, the *National Review*, the *American Mercury*, and *Modern Age*—express with varying degrees of intensity and spiritual violence the principles and doctrines which have enjoyed currency among self-styled conservatives for generations. Thus, despite modifications imposed by political exigency and despite even the sharp reversals that have occasionally developed on specific issues, the outlook of conservatism has, like liberalism, remainded fairly firm through recent centuries. This suggests that both conservatism and liberalism may be "natural" or polar positions around which individuals of certain habitual outlooks, temperaments, and sensibilities can comfortably come to rest and be united with others of like disposition.

---

* This paper was initially prepared for delivery at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1957. It is presented here as an interim report of research in progress, the full product of which will be presented in book form under the tentative title, *The Image of Conservatism.* Many questions only touched upon or passed over in the present paper will be extensively considered there.

The two large field studies to which the paper refers have been carried out through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, University of Minnesota, one of them in collaboration with Professors Kenneth E. Clark and Paul E. Meehl of the Department of Psychology, with the assistance of Norris C. Ellertson. In making these and a group of related studies in the area of political participation, affiliation, and belief, the author has had support from a Faculty Research Fellowship awarded by the Social Science Research Council; from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; from the Carnegie Corporation; and from the Graduate School Research Fund of the University of Minnesota. Gratitude is hereby expressed for their generous assistance, although all must be exonerated from any responsibility for the research findings or their interpretation.

Many people, of course, do not exhibit the patterns of mind and personality that are fully identified with either of the polar positions, but embrace elements of both, in varying proportions. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that a characteristic conservative focus exists, not only because of the historical continuity already noted, but also because liberal and conservative values would not, in the absence of such focus, fall into pattern, but would instead be distributed randomly throughout all sections of the population; *i.e.*, even if one knew some of the beliefs a given individual possessed, one could not predict by better than chance what other beliefs or values he held.

The data I will present show, however, that there is considerable regularity and coherence not only in the body of norms professed but in the relation between certain casts of character and personality on the one side and the degree of conservatism or liberalism expressed on the other.

Before proceeding to the body of the paper bearing on this relation, I should point out that we have had less interest in the conservative-liberal distinction as such than in the example it offers for the further study of political preference, belief, and affiliation—the subjects with which we have been centrally concerned in our research. Hence we have not been occupied with many of the questions about conservatism which have commanded the attention of political scientists and essayists. It has not been our purpose, for example, to explore the historical unfolding of conservative thought; to describe conservative movements of the past; to present the case for embracing or rejecting conservatism as a doctrine; to estimate the truth of its essential propositions or the validity of its claims; to ascertain the excellence or shabbiness of its moral outlook; or to resolve the question of its "real" definition. It has not been our intention either to challenge or support its assumptions, to make policy recommendations, or to exhort anyone for or against its doctrines. Admittedly, we have opinions and biases on these matters, and we are not blind to the possibility that they may influence the interpretation of our findings. Indeed, we assume that they will, no matter how disinterested our original intention. We should be very disappointed, nevertheless, if the controversial nature of the subject matter or the heat that may be generated by the findings were to obscure the scientific validity we have worked so hard to achieve.

A prefatory note concerning our interest in personality may also be helpful. Although certain assumptions about the nature of man were implicit in the thought of many of the classic political writers (Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham come immediately to mind), the relation of personality to politics has, I think, received less attention from contemporary political scientists than it deserves. Spurred, however, by the injunctions of Graham Wallas that we must "deal with politics in its relation to the nature of man," and stimulated by the progress of academic, as well as Freudian, psychology, attention has here and there begun to be focused upon personality as an important dimension for the study of politics. In recent years the work of Lasswell, Fromm, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Almond, and a few others offer cases in point, and these have stimulated others. For my own part, I should like to make it clear that while I believe the study of personality to be extremely valuable, it would be naive to suppose that it could possibly serve as a universal device for the study of every problem encountered in political research. It cannot be substituted for certain other types of investigation which have interested political scientists, such as the study of institutional and legal structures, descriptions of political process, or the formal analysis of normative propositions. Rather, the study of personality offers one more category of explanation to accompany those already familiar to us, thereby adding an important new dimension to our understanding of political phenomena, and helping us to clarify or correct certain propositions about politics that have never been put to adequate empirical test.

II. THE CONSERVATISM MEASURE: DEFINITION AND VALIDITY

Because it is a key term in the language of political conflict, choked with emotive connotations, "conservatism" has naturally evoked controversy over its meaning. The problem of defining it has, furthermore, been confused in recent decades by the already mentioned switch in the economic attitudes of both conservatives and liberals, and by the rise of movements of the "radical right" of which the fascist parties are the most extreme example but which are also represented in somewhat milder form by such groups as the Conservative Citizens' Committees. Some prefer to reserve the "conservative" label for the advocates of laissez-faire capitalism, for critics of the New Deal, or for Republicans of whatever ideological persuasion; for some it mainly signifies intemperate right-wing values of the McCarthy or *Chicago Tribune* type; while for others, it recalls the somewhat romanticized image of a Boston Brahmin—genteel, cultivated, practical, a gentleman of exquisite sensibilities and manners, a critic of the vulgarities of mass society, saddened by, though resigned to, the heavy price of equalitarian democracy.

Arguments occur as well over more esoteric questions: whether conservatism is a full-blown ideology or only a state of mind; whether it is a social posture found among the defenders of every type of society or a clutch of prejudices appropriate to a specific social class at a given historical stage; whether it is a set of empirically settled propositions about man and society or a body of self-evident truths, intuitively prized by persons of sufficient character to grasp their significance; and so on.

In the face of these diverse opinions, we cannot hope that the definition employed in our research, and the measure or "scale" that we constructed from this definition, will satisfy everyone. We have made an earnest effort, however, to extract from the tradition of self-styled conservative thought, and especially from the writings of Edmund Burke, a set of principles representing that tradition as fairly as possible. We have concentrated upon those attitudes and values that continually recur among acknowledged conservative thinkers and that appear to comprise the invariant elements of the conservative outlook. By the same token, we have tried to avoid attitudes or opinions that seemed to us situationally determined and which, for that reason, appear to be secondary and unstable correlates of liberal or conservative tendencies. Many attitudes that arise mainly from party or class affiliation fall into this category, *e.g.*, attitudes toward free enterprise, toward trade unions, toward expansion of government functions, toward the New Deal and its welfare measures, toward tariffs, farm supports, and a number of similar issues that have featured prominently in political campaigns.

In spite of the differences, there is astonishing agreement among the disciples, and among disinterested scholars as well, that the following are characteristic, if not quintessential elements of the conservative outlook:[1]

(1) Man is a creature of appetite and will, "governed more by emotion than by reason" (Kirk), in whom "wickedness, unreason, and the urge to violence lurk always behind the curtain of civilized behavior" (Rossiter). He is a fallen creature, doomed to imperfection, and inclined to license and anarchy.

(2) Society is ruled by "divine intent" (Kirk) and made legitimate by Providence and prescription. Religion "is the foundation of civil society" (Huntington) and is man's ultimate defense against his own evil impulses.

(3) Society is organic, plural, inordinately complex, the product of a long and painful evolution, embodying the accumulated wisdom of previous historical ages. There is a presumption in favor of whatever has survived the ordeal of history, and of any institution that has been tried and found to work.

---

[1] The doctrines expressed in these paragraphs have been drawn from the writings of such acknowledged conservative spokesmen as Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France;* F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *Conservatism in England* (London, 1933); R. J. White, ed., *The Conservative Tradition* (London, 1950); Quentin Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism* (Harmondsworth, 1947); Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953); Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1955); Francis G. Wilson, *The Case for Conservatism* (Seattle, 1951); Peter Viereck, *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* (New York, 1955); and others. In addition, books and articles by numerous commentators were consulted, including such recent articles as Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 454–73.

(4) Man's traditional inheritance is rich, grand, endlessly proliferated and mysterious, deserving of veneration, and not to be cast away lightly in favor of the narrow uniformity preached by "sophisters and calculators" (Burke). Theory is to be distrusted since reason, which gives rise to theory, is a deceptive, shallow, and limited instrument.

(5) Change must therefore be resisted and the injunction heeded that "Unless it is necessary to change it is necessary not to change" (Hearnshaw). Innovation "is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress" (Kirk).

(6) Men are naturally unequal, and society requires "orders and classes" for the good of all. All efforts at levelling are futile and lead to despair (Kirk and Rossiter), for they violate the natural hierarchy and frustrate man's "longing for leadership." The superior classes must be allowed to differentiate themselves and to have a hand in the direction of the state, balancing the numerical superiority of the inferior classes.

(7) Order, authority, and community are the primary defense against the impulse to violence and anarchy. The superiority of duties over rights and the need to strengthen the stabilizing institutions of society, especially the church, the family, and, above all, private property.

Some of the points in the conservative creed are, unfortunately, distinguished more for their rhetoric than for the clarity and crispness of their content. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that they comprise an integrated outlook, we were able to construct a scale that makes it possible to measure the strength of conservative belief in individuals and groups, and thus to classify persons according to the degree of conservatism they exhibit.

In constructing this scale, we began with an initial pool of 43 items, the majority of which were fairly straightforward statements of the various conservative beliefs just discussed. Here, for example, are some typical items from the original set of 43:

If something grows up over a long time there is bound to be much wisdom in it.

If you start trying to change things very much, you usually make them worse.

It's not really undemocratic to recognize that the world is divided into superior and inferior people.

All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way.

You can usually depend more on a man if he owns property than if he does not.

Our society is so complicated that if you try to reform parts of it you're likely to upset the whole system.

I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas.

A man doesn't really get to have much wisdom until he's well along in years.

I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be willing to take a chance on it.

No matter how we like to talk about it, political authority comes not from us but from some higher power.

Private ownership of property is necessary if we are to have a strong nation.

It is never wise to introduce changes rapidly, in government or in the economic system.

It's better to stick by what you have than to be trying new things you don't really know about.

Together with the items from a number of other scales we were simultaneously trying to build, the 43 items in the conservatism pool were submitted, through survey methods, to a large general sample of persons in the vicinity of the Twin Cities who were asked to state, in relation to each item, whether they agreed or disagreed. The patterns of their responses were then analyzed, with a three-fold purpose in mind: 1) to select from each pool those items which, by reproducibility and other statistical tests, clustered sufficiently to convince us that they belonged to the same universe; 2) to reduce the number of items in each scale to manageable proportions (we began with more than 2300 items, and over 80 pools of scale items); and 3) to ensure that every item selected for a given scale was in fact measuring some degree of the same attitude dimension or, in other words, that all the items in the final scale were consistent with each other.

Altogether, the responses of over 1200 persons were sampled and analyzed in this preliminary scale-construction stage, a procedure that took more than two years to complete. Some 539 items, comprising an inventory of 53 separate scales, survived this stage. The remaining thirty item pools failed to meet our scale standards and were dropped. Conservatism emerged as a twelve-item scale, tighter, more refined, and with greater internal consistency than was found in the original 43-item pool, with which, however, it correlated +.83. Although the twelve-item scale did not encompass as wide a range of values as were contained in the initial item pool, its ranking of people from extreme conservatism on the one end to liberalism on the other was very close to the rank order yielded by the original 43 items, as the high correlation attests. Empirically, then, the shorter scale may be taken as an adequate, if not actually a superior and more refined substitute for the initial set of "conservative" items. (The scale has subsequently been refined further in a succeeding study, and the items reduced in number to nine.)

The validation of a scale, *i.e.*, determining the degree to which it in fact measures the thing it purports to measure, is at best a difficult and frustrating affair. Although we have not yet exhausted all the validation procedures planned for this scale, several considerations bearing on its validity can be offered. For one thing, the scale possesses a certain amount of "face validity," which is to say that the items it includes express on their face the values which most knowledgeable people would designate as conservative. In one validation procedure employed, we submitted subsets of items from the twelve-item conservatism scale to an advanced senior-graduate class in political theory, whose members had no prior knowledge of the study or its purposes. Each student was asked to supply a name or label for the group of statements and to write a paragraph explaining or justifying the label he had chosen. Of 48 students participating, 39 volunteered the word *conservatism* as best describing the sentiments expressed in the statements, five offered names that were virtually synonymous with conservatism (*e.g.*, *traditionalism*), while two supplied other names and two did not answer.

Thus, over 90 per cent of an informed group recognized that the items expressed values characteristic of conservatism, and were able to supply explanations consistent with the labels they chose.

The conservatism scale also correlated highly, and in the predicted direction, with several related measures that were being tested at the same time. For example, persons who scored as strongly conservative in the preliminary runs also proved, by comparison with the low scorers, to hold extremely conventional social attitudes, to be more responsive to nationalistic symbols, and to place greater emphasis upon duty, conformity, and discipline.

We also checked a number of individual statements that were not included as part of the conservatism scale but which, nevertheless, express sentiments or opinions that would be widely recognized as related to conservatism. In all but a few instances, the persons who score as extreme conservatives agree with these statements far more frequently than do those who score as liberals. The following are a few examples:

	Per Cent Agree	
	Liberals (N = 258)	Extreme Conservatives (N = 282)
Duties are more important than rights.	32%	63%
The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but experts.	26%	51%
You can't change human nature.	30%	73%
People are getting soft and weak from so much coddling and babying.	31%	68%
The heart is as good a guide as the head.	22%	58%
We have to teach children that all men are created equal, but almost everyone knows that some are better than others.	35%	73%
No matter what the people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	33%	63%
Few people really know what is in their best interest in the long run.	43%	77%

By reason of such criteria, we believe that the conservatism scale possesses the properties of a valid measure, and that it can be used with confidence in group studies or in research involving large samples. Similar procedures were employed in the development of the 52 other scales used in the original study (referred to as the *PAR* study, the initials standing for political participation, awareness, and responsibility); and the process was repeated in the development of 18 additional scales employed in a subsequent study of persons with extreme or "marginal" political beliefs (the *Marginal Believer* study). In constructing and validating some of the personality and social attitude scales, we were able to build on a great deal of previous work by clinical and social psychologists interested in the classification and measurement of personality traits; while in the case of other scales, such as Dominance and Social Responsibility, we were compelled to start afresh and to undertake elaborate empirical procedures to develop measures that fitted these concepts.[2]

The *PAR* study was carried out on a sample of 1211 persons in the Twin City area (not to be confused with the 1200 subjects previously employed in developing and pre-testing the inventory of scales). The *Marginal Believer* study drew upon a cross-section sample of 1082 persons from the entire state of Minnesota,[3] together with two special samples of extreme Right-Wing and Left-Wing believers, numbering almost 300 each. The data from the cross-section sample of the *Marginal Believer* project have confirmed in virtually every detail the findings relative to conservatism yielded by the *PAR* study. Hence the results described below have been borne out by two separate studies, carried out six years apart, on entirely different samples of the adult population. Most of the findings presented in this paper are drawn from the general population data of the *Marginal Believer* study, although we have equivalent results that could as easily be reported from the *PAR* project.

---

[2] We have described the procedures employed in the development of these scales in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46 (1951), pp. 360–366; and Vol. 47 (1952), pp. 73–80.

In each study, we broke the entire sample into quartiles of several hundred persons each, assigning subjects to one quartile or another according to their scores on the conservatism scale. Subjects scoring 7–9 on the conservatism scale were thrown into the uppermost or Extreme Conservative quartile; those with scores of 5–6 were labelled Moderate Conservatives; with scores of 3–4, Moderate Liberals; and the lowest quartile, with scores of 0–2, were called Liberals.

With these classifications, we next computed the scores of the four groups on each of the remaining scales used in the two studies, as well as on a large number of personal background characteristics for which we had also collected data in the course of the two surveys. A variety of tabulating and statistical procedures were then employed to check hypotheses, to note differences and similarities between groups, and to ascertain patterned or prototypic responses. In addition, all major tabulations were re-run with controls introduced for such factors as education, occupation, socio-economic status, and possible response set bias,[4] in order to be certain that the findings were not the spurious product of some hidden or disguised factor which, conceivably, we had been failing to take into account. We discovered, however, that even with such factors partialled out or otherwise accounted for, the tendency to affirm or to reject conservative doctrines was significantly related to social and personality characteristics.

III. RESULTS

In turning now to some of the outcomes of the research, I will confine myself in the main to the data that bear most immediately on personality and related attributes, omitting, for reasons of space, the material on political and social attitudes with which both studies have been greatly concerned.

---

[3] I should like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the *Minnesota Poll* and of its director, Sidney Goldish, for assistance in selecting this sample and administering the questionnaire.

[4] Among the most important and interesting of such response sets is the tendency exhibited by some respondents to agree—or to disagree—with statements regardless of their content. This tendency obviously distorts the response scores of the individuals who possess it. A number of special procedures were introduced to correct for this phenomenon, and to eliminate, as far as possible, the spurious influence of this factor. The procedures and findings bearing upon this "unthinking," "uncritical," or "acquiescent" tendency will be described elsewhere in a forthcoming technical monograph.

Intelligence. One of the clearest findings in both studies is that, contrary to claim, conservatism is not the preferred doctrine of the intellectual elite or of the more intelligent segments of the population, but the reverse. By every measure available to us, conservative beliefs are found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated, and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent. The following table sets out a few of these relationships:

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS BY EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE, MINNESOTA SAMPLE*

	Liberals (N = 190)	Moderate Liberals (N = 316)	Moderate Conservatives (N = 331)	Extreme Conservatives (N = 245)
Education				
% with grade school education	9	14	29	49
% with some college education	47	33	21	12
Awareness				
% scoring low	9	25	45	66
% scoring high	54	32	21	9
Intellectuality				
% scoring low	7	20	34	56
% scoring high	62	43	26	11

* In this and the following tables *high* always means a score in the upper third of the scale named; *low* always means a score in the lower third of the scale named. The middle third is omitted from these tables. The table should thus be read across, as follows: Whereas 54 per cent of the Liberals score among the upper (or "high") third of the distribution on the Awareness scale, 32 per cent of the Moderate Liberals, 21 per cent of the Moderate Conservatives and only 9 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives have "high" scores on Awareness. It should also be noted that the differences between the extreme groups in this table, and in all the subsequent data reported, are statistically significant beyond the 1 per cent level of significance, which is to say that the probability is less than one in 100 that differences of these magnitudes could be occurring by chance, given the size of our samples.

The Awareness scale, referred to in the table, is a test not only of actual knowledge but also of the clarity of one's grasp of the social process, past and present. It serves, to some extent, as a crude intelligence test. The same can be said, though less authoritatively, for the Intellectuality scale, which assesses the degree to which intellectual habits have been formed and are perceived as attractive. The findings on these measures make plain that there is a sharp decline in the level of information and intellectual grasp as one moves from the more liberal to the more conservative sections of the population. Similarly, an increase in the level of knowledge is usually accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the incidence of conservatism. Individual items correlated with intelligence bear out the same general tendency. Thus, the item "I was a slow learner in school" is answered yes by 34 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives but by only 14 per cent of the Liberals. These differences on Awareness and Intellectuality remain large and statistically significant even when education and other status factors are controlled.

Of course, not all conservatives are uninformed, not all liberals are knowledgeable, and not all the unlearned are conservative. The data show clearly, nevertheless, that the most articulate and informed classes in our society are preponderantly liberal in their outlook. Procedures carried out with a special sample of civic and political leaders in the *PAR* study bear this out even further, regardless of party preference or of other affiliations that might ordinarily be expected to have an influence upon liberal-conservative tendencies.[5]

Social-Psychological Attributes. Related to status and intelligence are a set of traits that reflect the interrelation of personality and life-style, and especially the degree to which people feel themselves to be the masters or victims of their

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS BY PERSONALITY TRAITS—SOCIAL

	Liberals (N=190)	Moderate Liberals (N=316)	Moderate Conservatives (N=331)	Extreme Conservatives (N=245)
Dominance				
% low	9	19	37	51
% high	72	50	29	14
Anomie				
% low	71	48	32	10
% high	4	16	30	59
Alienation				
% low	57	47	35	18
% high	11	20	27	45
Bewilderment				
% low	61	40	33	10
% high	9	20	34	57
Pessimism				
% low	44	35	31	19
% high	25	35	42	53
Social Responsibility				
% low	12	25	36	62
% high	47	31	23	8
Self-Confidence				
% low	18	23	32	35
% high	46	38	24	20
Guilt				
% low	62	42	36	18
% high	16	18	28	47

---

[5] This conclusion receives at least implicit support from the findings of Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955) in which leadership groups were found to be uniformly more tolerant of diversity and non-conformity than the general population.

immediate environment and of themselves. These traits have to do with one's sense of security, with the sense of belonging, isolation, and social support, with feelings of worthlessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity, self-assurance, personal strength, and the like. In the preceding table are some of the scales we developed to assess this universe of feelings and attitudes, together with the scores registered by liberals and conservatives for each of these traits.

As these figures make plain, the Conservatives tend to score at the more "undesirable" end of the distributions on every one of the above traits. Uniformly, every increase in the degree of conservatism shows a corresponding increase in submissiveness, anomie, sense of alienation, bewilderment, etc. To some extent, the vast differences appearing in this table are a function of the somewhat higher status and education of the liberals in the sample. But the differences remain almost as large even when we control for these factors. Conservatism, in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and purpose, who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society which seems to them too complex to fathom.

Readers of Eric Hoffer will recognize in these findings support for his brilliant, intuitive characterization of the conservative and of the conditions which give rise to him.[6] Far from being the elite or the masters or the prime movers, conservatives tend on the whole to come from the more backward and frightened elements of the population, including the classes that are socially and psychologically depressed. The significance of this, and of other findings reported in this section, will be considered in the evaluation section shortly to follow.

Clinical-Personality Variables. Turning now to a set of traits that are more straightforwardly clinical and psychological, conservatives and liberals are found to be sharply distinguished from each other in many of these characteristics as well. The differences, furthermore, are consistent with those cited in the personality-life style group. Scores on the more important of the clinical variables are shown in the following table.

The figures demonstrate with overpowering effect that conservatives tend once more to score on the more "undesirable," poorly adapted side of these personality variables. Of the four liberal-conservative classifications, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for their imperfections or weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most easily moved to scorn and disappointment in others, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgments. Although aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others, they are unusually defensive and armored in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly inte-

---

[6] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, 1951), Ch. 1, and *passim.*

TABLE III. COMPARISON OF CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS BY PERSONALITY TRAITS—CLINICAL

	Liberals (N = 190)	Moderate Liberals (N = 316)	Moderate Conservatives (N = 331)	Extreme Conservatives (N = 245)
Hostility				
% low	59	38	26	9
% high	18	37	46	71
Paranoid Tendencies				
% low	56	42	28	13
% high	16	27	37	62
Contempt for Weakness				
% low	61	33	21	5
% high	8	18	29	55
Need Inviolacy (Ego Defense)				
% low	68	58	36	17
% high	11	20	38	60
Rigidity				
% low	58	43	29	14
% high	18	32	41	60
Obsessive Traits				
% low	47	40	29	22
% high	24	31	43	55
Intolerance of Human Frailty				
% low	52	30	17	6
% high	8	16	23	54

grated psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike or fear in themselves.

If space permitted, these data could be buttressed by numerous other related findings in our studies, and the relationships so briefly presented here could be elaborated in dozens of ways. We must, however, move on to evaluate the data just offered and to analyze, in particular, their relation to conservatism as a political and social outlook.

IV. ANALYSIS

If we may trust the evidence just presented, there seems little doubt that support for conservative doctrines is highly correlated with certain distinct personality patterns. The quantitative data do not immediately make plain, however, the nature of the connection between the two or the reasons for the particular relationships found. These questions take us into realms that are somewhat more theoretical and speculative.

In the explanations that follow I have proceeded from the view that most of the propositions fundamental to the conservative creed (as well as to the liberal creed) are in reality normative rather than empirical statements. Hence, they can neither be demonstrated nor refuted by experience or observation of the external world. The universe to which conservative doctrines refer is so ambiguous that it is often possible to assert with equal validity a given proposition or its contrary. For example, which can we demonstrate more firmly, that men are naturally equal or unequal? Anarchic or law-abiding? Essentially wicked or essentially good? Which is it correct to believe, that man is governed more "by emotion than by reason," or the reverse? Which generalization can best be supported by evidence, that change is a "devouring conflagration," destructive of mankind, or a boon that prevents stagnation and the withering of the human spirit? As for statements which claim—or for that matter deny—that society is ruled by "divine intent" and that power is made legitimate by Providence, one would be hard put to decide what manner of data would be needed before one could rationally embrace or reject either view.

If the assertions contained in the conservative creed cannot be referred to the world of experience for proof or refutation, we may conclude that one is led to conservatism not by the facts as such, but only by the way one happens to perceive or "structure" the facts. There are, I think, three main ways in which such structures are developed:

First, one may impose structure on an ambiguous field of phenomena by logical procedures. Conservative doctrines might, for example, be formally derived from some set of postulates or from another system of beliefs or cognitions. Many of us like to think that our beliefs are carefully reasoned out in this way, and that our several outlooks and attitudes are internally consistent, dispassionately arrived at, and valid. The practice of reasoning out and forming attitudes on complex social questions in this purely disinterested way is, however, rare. It may occasionally be found in a few intellectuals of unusual philosophic inclination, but it is not likely to be the essential element in determining most people's convictions. As Graham Wallas observed, even the methods of reasoning about social affairs are fixed by habit and by subjective leanings. Numerous psychological studies have shown, moreover, that judgments thought to have been derived analytically, or sometimes even from observation, become notoriously more unreliable as the ambiguity of the stimulus field increases.

A second possibility is that one's views of man and society are learned through indoctrination and group influence, so that an individual reared in an environment of conservative belief absorbs its attitudes unconsciously and with no particular awareness of alternatives. While such learning is obviously important in the formation of opinions and doubtless accounts for a great number of conservative (and liberal) believers, it cannot by itself adequately explain the personality differences revealed in our research. One should also keep in mind that Americans appear mainly to have been exposed to a liberal rather than a conservative tradition.[7] Then, too, it is difficult for anyone in a society as mobile and as literate as ours to escape all contact with alternative doctrines; hence, individuals reared in an environment of conservative belief are likely to have had *some* contact with liberal sentiments as well. Some measure of choice has probably been exercised, therefore, even by those whose beliefs have been determined chiefly by indoctrination.

---

[7] For a full scale development of this thesis, *cf.*, for example, Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955). Interestingly enough, a belief in the predominance of a liberal tradition in America has frequently been advanced by new conservative

This brings us to a third process by which cognitions of the external world may be structured, namely, through projection of the personality of the observer himself. In this way, an individual creates a set of perceptions that express, or that are consonant with, his own needs and impulses. The more ambiguous the thing observed, the greater the likelihood that he will fashion his perceptions of it to accord with his own inner feelings. In other words, conservatives believe what they do not because the world is the way it is but because they, the observers, are the way *they* are. Liberals, observing the same world, arrive at quite different judgments about it. Thus, conservative doctrines may tell us less about the nature of man and society than about the persons who believe these doctrines. Although we cannot explain all our findings by reference to these projective processes, they do, I think, provide a key to the explanation of a good many of the results.

Even the data on intellectuality, knowledge, and intelligence bear some relation to these processes. The conservative, as we have seen, is psychologically timid, distrustful of differences, and of whatever he cannot understand. He fears change, dreads disorder, and is intolerant of nonconformity. The tendency of the prototypic conservative to derogate reason and intellectuality, and to eschew theory, seems in some measure to be an outgrowth of these and related elements in his personality. He is inclined to regard pure intellectual activity as dangerous to established arrangements, for in his view of the world such activity often gives way to utopian "schemes" or unrealistic "plans." Intellectuals are likely to be impractical dreamers and potential radicals, unstable people whose theories may weaken the foundations of the social order. The conservative tends, furthermore, to perceive intellectuals as bohemians, as deviants and non-conformists who flaunt the requirements of convention and who lack respect for property or religion. Excessive intellectual activity is thought to lead to skepticism and rationalism and, consequently, to the destruction of faith. Like Cassius, the intellectual thinks too much and is therefore very dangerous.

It will be obvious that this manner of perceiving intellectuals has little to do with the characteristics of the class of people being observed and much to do with the anxieties and torments of the observer.

Related to this is the tendency for conservatives to be attracted to senti-

---

writers, who point to it as an obstacle to a victory for conservatism. For example, Clinton Rossiter, *op. cit.* p. 68, asserts that: "The American political tradition is basically a liberal tradition, an avowedly optimistic idealistic way of thinking about man and government. It is stamped with the mighty name and spirit of Thomas Jefferson, and its articles of faith, an American Holy Writ, are perfectibility, progress, liberty, equality, democracy, and individualism."

ments that would have to be described as mystical, and even obscurantist. One comes upon this not only in the writings of Russell Kirk, Eric Voegelin, or other spokesmen for the "New Conservatism," but also in the responses of conservatives throughout our samples. To cite but one illustration among dozens, over 67 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives score in the upper third of the Mysticism scale compared with only 15 per cent of the liberals. Similarly the conservatives show a far greater tendency to agree or to say yes to items that are sweeping in nature and somewhat obscure in meaning. To judge from their responses, they apparently set far less store upon rigor or precision of thought, and allow less scope to the critical faculties. They also tend to score higher on the more extreme religious items and on the Religiosity scale itself.

To some extent, the findings on intellectuality are the result of the lower average education of conservatives. In the United States, at least, education is likely to lead to liberal rather than conservative tendencies. For one thing, it exposes the student to the American inheritance which, as we have noted, is primarily liberal. For another, education trains people in some measure to demand greater precision in speech and thought, to be more open-minded and tolerant, to be intellectually flexible and receptive to scientific modes of discourse, to reject mystical or non-natural explanations, and so on. These are traits which we find to be negatively correlated with conservatism; or, put another way, we find that individuals who learn to think in the ways just described are, other things being equal, far more likely to become liberals than conservatives.

If we turn next to the connection between conservatism and the variables reflecting hostility and suspicion, the role of personality in the formation of social beliefs becomes even more striking. In many ways hostility is a principal component of the conservative personality, as it is a principal component of conservative doctrine. It does not seem accidental, considering the data on hostility, that conservatives prefer to believe in man's wickedness, that they choose to see man as fallen, untrustworthy, lawless, selfish, and weak. Expressed as political doctrine, these projections of aggressive personality tendencies take on the respectability of an old and honored philosophical position. These tendencies may also lie at the root of the conservative inclination to regulate and control man; to ensure that he will not violate the conditions necessary for order; to train him to value duty, obedience, and conformity; and to surround him with stabilizing influences, like property, church, and the family. The high values placed on authority, leadership, and natural hierarchy, and on an elite to guide and check the rest of mankind, apparently derive from the same set of psychological impulses.

These personality needs can also be discerned in the scores registered on several of our other social attitude measures, as well as on many individual items. It may be noted, for example, that only 11 per cent of the Liberals scored at the high end of our ethnocentric prejudice measure,[8] compared with

---

[8] Adapted and revised from the California Ethnocentrism scale, the original version of which is reported in T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), Ch. 4.

71 per cent of the extreme Conservatives. Similarly, 45 per cent of the Liberals but only 12 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives were high on a measure of Faith in People. A scale dealing with Political Suspiciousness showed conservatives to be far more mistrustful of others in this respect as well (55 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives were high, but only 14 per cent of the Liberals). From whatever direction we approach him, the prototypic conservative seems far more impelled to contain, to reject, and to take precautions against, his fellow creatures.

The data on psychological rigidity offer additional support for these interpretations. It will be recalled that conservatives showed up as relatively inflexible and far more inclined than the rest of the sample to exhibit compulsive-obsessive traits. Not only are they less able to tolerate human foibles or weaknesses, but they are less tolerant of any and all differences between themselves and others. On a Tolerance scale developed for these studies, 55 per cent of the Liberals fell into the highest third of the distribution, compared with only 25 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives. An item asserting that "A man oughtn't to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is talking about" was answered affirmatively by 55 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives, but by only 8 per cent of the Liberals. Seventy-seven per cent of the Conservatives say that "It is wrong ever to break a law," while only 38 per cent of the Liberals assert this. As we have seen, 32 per cent of the Liberals but 63 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives think that "Duties are more important than rights." In a measure of the ability to tolerate ambiguity—a scale which expresses a need for certainty and for having all matters neatly pegged and ordered—the Extreme Conservatives appear considerably less able than others to live with uncertainty or ambiguity (67 per cent of the conservatives, but only 12 per cent of the Liberals, score high on this measure).

These are a few of the many supplementary findings which lend support to the hypothesis that the inflexible and exacting features of conservative social doctrine are related to the prototypic personality attributes of conservative believers. The connection does not seem surprising, so soon as one thinks about it. The extreme emphasis on order and duty; the elaborate affection for the tried and familiar; the fear of change and the desire to forestall it; the strong attachments to the symbols and rituals of in-group culture; the hope for a society ordered and hierarchical in which each is aware of his station and its duties; the unusual concern for law, authority, and stability—all these can easily be understood as doctrinal expressions of a personality pattern that has strong need for order and tidiness; that adjusts only with difficulty to changes in the environment; that cannot bear the uncertainty of questions left open, and requires answers; that is made uncomfortable by the give-and-take of free inquiry and the open society; that yearns for consensus, harmony of values, unequivocal definitions of the norms, and conclusive specification of the sources of authority.

It may seem ironic, in light of these traits, that conservatives also tend to exhibit the submissive, indecisive, retiring, and somewhat spiritless demeanor noted in our discussion of the social-psychological variables. I cannot pretend to follow, if indeed anyone can, the complex threads by which these several personality configurations are somehow held together. One can, nevertheless, observe (without explaining it) that persons who feel inadequate and who for one reason or another dislike themselves are often the quickest to aggress against others and to demand perfection of them. Similarly, by a process which psychologists have labelled "reaction formation," the disgruntled often seem to venerate the very society which frustrates them. It is almost as though, disliking themselves, they seek solace and support in an over-defense of society and in the over-institutionalization of life. Conservatives make a fetish of community, although it is apparent that in many ways they are more alienated from the community than most. This conclusion is suggested not only by their scores on such measures as anomie, alienation, and social responsibility, but by their unusually high scores on political cynicism, feelings of political impotence, and status frustration. In the same vein, although the intensity of their patriotism exceeds that of any other group, their faith in democracy (American or otherwise), is lowest of the four groups, while their scores on the totalitarian, elitist, and authoritarian values (which for the most part, the American creed rejects) are the highest of the four.[9]

V. CAUTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Impressive though the conservatism data may be, we must take note of several important qualifications and problems bearing upon their interpretation, to which fuller attention will eventually have to be given. Here, for reasons of space, I can only comment briefly upon a few of these points.

1. The findings refer to aggregates, not to specific individuals. Doubtless, many of us know individual conservatives whose personalities differ in key ways from the prototypic pattern described here. In our research, some conservatives have been turned up who, in personality and other attributes, essentially resemble liberals. These, however, are exceptions, since the probabilities are strong that a conservative selected at random from the general population will resemble the conservative profile that emerges from the preceding data.

2. A question might also be raised about the propriety of classifying highly informed, upper status conservatives in the same category with uneducated conservatives of low status. Conceivably, the "elite" and the "mass" conservatives are motivated by very dissimilar influences and could be scoring high on conservatism for quite different reasons. This possibility cannot be dismissed lightly, especially when one considers that status and education factors account, by themselves, for a significant share of the total variance found in our data. Subsequent analyses will make it possible, we hope, to settle this matter conclusively; but for the present, at least one important consideration can be

---

[9] For a fascinating set of data on *conformity* as measured in an experimental group situation that fit, even in detail, with the findings presented here on conservatism, see Richard S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10 (1955), pp. 191–198.

noted: when education and other status factors are controlled, we find that informed, upper status conservatives differ from informed, upper status liberals in precisely the same ways that conservatives in general differ from liberals in general; or, for that matter, in the same ways that "mass" conservatives differ from "mass" liberals. While the *range* of the scores varies as occupation, education, or knowledge varies the *direction* and *magnitude* of the differences between liberals and conservatives remain very much the same for all status and education levels. In short, personality factors seem to exercise a fairly uniform influence on the formation of conservative or liberal outlooks at all social levels.

3. The association between conservatism and the traits outlined exists in the form of correlations, which only tell us that the two go together. *How* they go together, and which is antecedent to which, is a more difficult and more elusive problem. Conservative doctrines appear, in some measure, to arise from personality needs, but it is conceivable, at least, that both are the product of some third set of factors. Both, for example, may have been learned or acquired simultaneously, through family indoctrination, in which case the connection between the two would be more epiphenomenal than causal. I do not think that this explanation can account for most of our results, but it will need to be checked out further.

4. The terms employed in the description of traits must be seen as relative and as having been mainly defined by the items in the scales themselves. Satisfactory external validation has not always been available. Also, although clinical terms have been employed that might be used in the diagnosis of psychotics, we have used the terms only as terms of tendency within the normal population. None of them is intended to signify the presence of a pathological mental state.

5. One must be careful to avoid the reductivist fallacy of assigning all significance in the problems considered to personality factors. Equally, one must avoid the temptation to "psychologize" problems to such an extent as to strip them of their significance as genuine political or philosophical problems.

6. The term liberalism has been inadequately defined in our study so far. We have tended to call someone liberal if he rejected the values of conservatism. While our findings suggest that most of these people would in fact meet the definition of a liberal, our present classification of liberals is crude and needs to be refined. All persons who reject conservatism may not be liberals, for, as in the case of the "authoritarian-democratic" dimension, liberalism-conservatism may not be variables, paired in such a way that a high score on one necessarily signifies a low score on the other.

7. The connections between classical conservatism (or liberalism) and such factors as party affiliation, attitude on economic issues, and liberal-conservative self-designation have been extensively explored in our research, but could not be reported in the present paper. The correlation between them tends, however, to be fairly low, suggesting that for the present, at least, many Americans divide in their party preferences, their support of candidates, their economic views, their stands on public issues, or their political self-identifications without reference to their beliefs in liberalism or conservatism. The latter have influence, of

course, especially among some of the more articulate groups; for the general population, however, political divisions of the sort named appear to be more affected by group membership factors than by personality.

8. Some readers may be inclined to identify our "conservatives" with "right-wing authoritarians," in the belief that we are measuring the latter rather more that the former. This view would be difficult to support, however, for not only have we defined conservatism by reference to its most frequently articulated values (which are by no means identical with right-wing values), but we have also found that while right-wing authoritarians are in some respects a more extreme version of our conservatives, there are also significant differences between the two.

9. Finally, our findings have so far been drawn entirely from Minnesota samples, and the degree to which the conclusions can be generalized to conservatives everywhere and at all times is open to debate. We shall soon have comparable data on a national cross-section sample, which I have reason to think will bear out the present results. In fact, I am inclined to believe that the connections between conservatism and the personality configurations presented in the foregoing would very likely prevail wherever, and whenever, the members of a society are free to choose between conservatism and alternative, liberal systems of belief. But this is a subject for future research.

CURRENT POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE IN GHANA*

HENRY L. BRETTON

University of Michigan

On March 6, 1957, the Gold Coast, now called "Ghana," attained fully responsible status within the British Commonwealth.[1] African nationalists, Pan-Africanists and their supporters in other parts of the world hailed the event as a milestone on the road to complete emancipation of the Africans, as proof that the "dark continent" had come of age and that all of its people were now fully capable of governing themselves.

This study of several key factors in the development of political thought and practice in the former colony was undertaken with a view toward an assessment of the stability and soundness of the country's new political institutions and practices. In a more general sense, it may be regarded as a commentary on the process of institutional transfer from colonial (European) to African political control. Since the formal structure within which the transfer took place is classifiable, nominally at least, as parliamentary-democratic, the evaluation may also serve as a commentary on contemporary performance of what, to reflect its second-hand nature, may be termed "colonial-parliamentary democracy." The study yields no definitive findings on African political affairs, for it is not yet possible to generalize with finality and for an extended period on what for a considerable time to come is bound to remain an extremely fluid situation. For purposes of long-range research in African politics, the study only attempts to identify and isolate some of the problem areas and political characteristics implicit in behavioral patterns in contemporary and future political systems in under-developed areas. No implication of forecasting should be read into it.

---

* This study was made possible by two grants of the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the University of Michigan, a Summer study grant for 1955 and a travel grant to the Gold Coast in 1956. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance rendered by these grants, and by African, British, and American officials and private persons in Ghana, frequently to their great inconvenience.

[1] For an explanation of the new designation "Ghana" by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, see Gold Coast, *Legislative Assembly, Debates* (hereafter cited as *Assembly, Debates*), May 18, 1956, cols. 130–31; unless otherwise indicated, bibliographical references to official documents pertain to Gold Coast publications. The principal constitutional documents pertaining to the granting of independence are Great Britain, Colonial Office, *The Proposed Constitution of Ghana*, Cmnd 71 (HMSO, London, 1957); Great Britain, Statutory Instruments (1957, No. 277); *The Ghana* (Constitution) *Order in Council 1957;* Great Britain, *The Ghana Independence Act*, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 Ch. 6. For historical background, see F. M. Bourret, *The Gold Coast* (Stanford, 1952); David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955); Richard Wright, *Black Power* (New York, 1954); The Bow Group, *Race and Power* (The Bow Group, London, 1956) pp. 37–56; Giorgio Borsa, *L'esperimento Democratico Della Costa d'Oro* (Instituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale, Milan, 1955); see also, James S. Coleman, "A Survey of Selected Literature on the Government and Politics of British West Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 49, pp. 1130–50 (Dec., 1955).

In its topical arrangement, the study commences with an analysis of contemporary political thought among leaders, and proceeds to practice and behavior with reference to party organization, the conduct of elections, and parliamentary and administrative affairs.

The emphasis is almost exclusively on current developments. This stems from no lack of regard for the work of historians, particularly the historians among Africanists, namely the anthropologists. It does signify that in this writer's opinion the subject of modern African politics cannot convincingly be linked, in documentary and reliable fashion, to the past of Africa. Bronislaw Malinowski, among others, has cautioned that "a certain amount of modesty is indicated in the formulation of generalizations based on so meager a body of data as is available to the researcher in that area. Historic antecedents of current social relationships and institutions are extremely dim in outline, in most instances also in substance."[2] Further, the impact of historical antecedents on contemporary affairs is modified in the case before us by the following factors, among others: (a) the institutional framework for current political activity in Ghana is not indigenous in origin; (b) with few exceptions the manipulators of the governmental and administrative instrumentalities are working with improvisations and are themselves improvising with little regard to established patterns or traditions; and (c) economic, social, and psychological factors, conditioned again by forces which in the main originate outside the area, far outweigh in their influence on current political behavior such factors as may reliably be established out of the murky past.[3]

For example, advocates of the introduction of parliamentary democracy in the Gold Coast frequently pointed to certain political practices in tribal society in support of their contention that the country was adequately prepared for the operation of a democratic form of government.[4] Such assertions are unconvincing. In the first place, we possess very little reliable information on the *actual* workings of this alleged tribal democracy. Secondly, to see a similarity between the practice of removing (destooling) a chief in tribal society and removing a government in modern parliamentary democracy, or between any aspects of the chief-elder-people relationship and the government-parliament-electorate relationship is rather far-fetched. To infer from the comparison that a people which could remove its chiefs under certain conditions now also can operate a modern parliamentary democracy is to disregard the expansion and complexities of present-day government. The frames of reference are totally different in tribal society—assuming that we possess reliable data—and in the society now developing in the politically significant urban areas. The primitive "elector," who by one process or another, exercised some control over his tribal government in the past, resembles his modern counterpart only in a most superficial sense. No analogies with the past should obscure the fact that parliamentary democracy reflects a political and legal response to social and economic conditions in another part of the world, conditions as yet almost totally absent in the Gold Coast.

---

[2] Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, Phyllis M. Kaberry, ed. (New Haven, 1945), p. 154.

[3] This should in no way detract from the work of such outstanding authorities on Africa as Melville J. Herskowits, Malinowski himself, William R. Bascom, and others; it only doubts the relevance of historic-anthropological research in Africa to modern political problems.

[4] *E.g.*, Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Gold Coast Report* To His Excellency The Governor By The Committee *On Constitutional Reform 1949* (hereafter cited as *Coussey Report*), HMSO, London, 1949), p. 15 (par. 81); also, Bourret, *op. cit.*, p. 78, and Martin Wight, *The Gold Coast Legislative Council* (London, 1947), p. 34.

On the other hand, while the student of current phenomena no longer relies for his data on statements extracted from illiterate village elders, tribal sages, and similar unreliable sources, he should beware of another hazard, namely that of failing to take properly into account the effects of the confluence of an unknown, mythical, and—in, for our purposes, vital respects—unresearched past and the dynamic present. The principal effect of this confluence so far is to impair, at times considerably, the accuracy and long-range reliability of research in current problems. In under-developed countries thrown within the span of a few years into the maelstrom of twentieth century technological progress, the shape of things to come can be forecast with even less confidence than in countries where developmental patterns have crystallized clearly in time and in space. Writers are unrealistic who treat political and social phenomena and relationships in under-developed countries as if they were known factors, the properties and inner as well as external propensities and potentialities of which can be observed accurately and treated mathematically.[5]

Likewise, the overly zealous application to under-developed areas of research methods derived from experience in advanced, highly developed countries leads to the promulgation of wholly unrealistic theories. For instance, David Apter, for some reason expecting parliamentary democracy to develop in the Gold Coast, given certain conditions, bases upon this expectation an elaborate theory of institutional transfer.[6] His utilization of advanced sociological principles to the Gold Coast lends the experiment there—it is no more than that—an unwarranted appearance of respectability and permanence.

Issue may also be taken with a school of thought which employs a rather narrow view of government in the comparison of advanced Western constitutional models with their African shadows. This view, first of all, raises formal constitutional structure to an undue level of significance. Secondly, it creates the impression both that a transfer of structure is possible and, in the case before us, that all significant structural aspects of British democracy have actually been transferred. But meaningful transfer of structure is not possible where a wholly African population is involved, and in the case of the Gold Coast the transfer of all significant structural features of the British model has not even been attempted. Above all, certain social and economic prerequisites essential to British democracy have not been transferred and are not transferrable; not to speak of the wider historical bases of British parliamentary institutions.[7] Furthermore, the introduction of the curtailed edition of British democracy into the Gold Coast, although possibly planned at one time, in some quarters, was carried out with undignified haste once the decision was reached to set the colony free. Western European democracies were preceded by generations of mercantilist monarchies, with planning and control in the hands of a relatively few. They could not become strong states without such undemocratic practices, and could not become democracies until after they were strong.

---

[5] "We indicated the progressively complex impacts of new norms and structures of politics upon the traditional. Such impacts can be likened to the accelerator principle of which some economists speak in which the input of a unit compounds its consequences." Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

[6] Apter, *op. cit.*

If a pattern for transition must be discovered, it seems more likely, with all required qualifications, to pass from traditional via colonial-authoritarian (imperial) to modified-authoritarian or "indirect rule" *i.e.*, rule by the colonial hierarchy through recognized traditional institutions. From there, rather abruptly, the continuum may range to colonial-parliamentary democracy, which in turn, by the premature application of universal franchise, might be followed by a pronounced non-democratic, in all probability authoritarian-totalitarian movement.

Lastly, although this study does not include evaluation of economic and social aspects of Ghana's development, it does not suppose that a full assessment of the politics of that country can be based on political factors alone. To the contrary, side by side with political thought and practice should be considered such matters as the country's precarious one-crop economy; the inevitable primacy of Government control over the economy; the ever increasing social mobility of the Gold Coast population, and the attendant influx of migrants from neighboring French colonies; the extreme sensitivity of the social fabric to technological developments, and other socio-economic factors.[8] The scarcity of investment capital alone, it has been pointed out, may require totalitarian methods for some time to come. If these matters are here considered only obliquely, it is to save space for a concentrated analysis of political factors alone.

I. POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE LEADERSHIP GROUP

At the outset it should be noted that interviews with leaders in all categories established nearly unanimous agreement to the effect that the British model of parliamentary democracy does not constitute the best possible solution of their political problems. They accepted the model only for want of concrete ideas for alternative forms of government. The few who would accept democracy in principle fear that its premature introduction in the Gold Coast actually has ruined its chances to strike roots in the area. Assertions that nationalist politicians would not accept anything but the "self-government which the British have in their own country" are founded on wishful thinking or self-delusion.[9]

---

[7] *Cf.* Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Approach to Self Government* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 1–2, 8.

[8] For discussions of the socio-economic problems likely to be faced by the new state, see W. A. Lewis, *Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast* (Government Printer, Accra, 1953), especially p. 8; Great Britain and Gold Coast, *Volta River Project* (HMSO, London, 1956) 2 vols; F. J. Pedler, *Economic Geography of West Africa* (London, 1955); for a practical illustration of the problem sketched, Jennings, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48 (the example of the Maldivian Islands); also Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana* (Nelson, London, 1957), p. x, and R. B. Davison, "The Challenge of Ghana," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 28, pp. 271–284 (July–Sept., 1957).

There is a noticeable dearth of ideas among Africans as to alternative solutions and systems. Some of the leaders trained in the United States, and in other, non-Commonwealth countries, as well as some trained in the Gold Coast itself, hold some vague concepts of other solutions, admittedly not all as respectable as the British-originated system. To this latter group must be added the graduates of Marxist or even communist "study circles" and other such suspect training centers, found until recently in the proximity of the regular centers of learning in the United Kingdom itself.

The possibility suggests itself that the British Labour movement may have instilled some systematic and concrete political thought in the young African students who sought and obtained friendly admission to Labour circles in Britain. This does not appear to have been the case, however. No doubt in some instances very close personal relationships have developed, but this has been true also of those formerly revolutionary African leaders now identified with the conservative reaction. If some elements in the revolutionary leadership group now evince some interest in the Labour Party, it seems to be more a matter of identification with a "big brother" than of a deeper ideological association. After all, the experiences of British Labour are not really relevant to the African nationalist-revolutionary movement. It seems safe to state that aside from a certain social consciousness—and even that may be more classical Marxist than Labour in origin—contemporary political thought in Ghana shares little with intellectual activities in western socialist parties, not to speak of the parties of "imperialist" Britain in particular.[10]

Of the various identifiable sources of inspiration for Gold Coast leaders "from which the main outlines of political organization may be drawn," Apter singles out four: the traditional, the Marxist, the parliamentary, and possibly the islamic.[11] One might add a fifth, a very real source of inspiration, not unknown to students of politics, namely opportunism or expediency. Political organizations drawn from this source may take any direction or none, and may be oriented toward totalitarianism, not only of the Marxist, but also of the fascist variety. Actually, this source of inspiration lacks any ideological content, addressing itself solely to the attainment and retention of absolute power by any and all means. This source suggests itself in any setting where a small group of men possess a monopoly of education and practice in a society of illiteracy and ignorance. Western observers will not render the new state of

---

[9] Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[10] See Nkrumah, *op. cit.* p. 58.

[11] Apter, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–20.

Ghana a service by glossing over or minimizing this particular source of inspiration.

African Modern Political Leaders. Personal interviews, and analyses of writings and public pronouncements of government leaders, reveal a lack of sophistication about the constitutional system under which the country changed from colonial to sovereign status, even among those who were fully or partly trained in the United Kingdom. They show a striking lack of depth in political thought, an inability or unwillingness to become concerned with the practical, administrative consequences of political planning. Members of the Cabinet, without exception, appear to be attracted to the least democratic features of the British model, namely those identified with the term "cabinet dictatorship;"[12] but they do not recognize, or do not wish to concede at this time, that these features, cut away from their broad, traditional, ideological, social and economic substructures, have nothing to do with democracy. There is reason to believe that if the more radical of the nationalist leaders appear to be attracted to the British model it is only so far as it permits circumvention of normal democratic restrictions on the exercise of executive power.

The dominant personality in the all-African government of Ghana is the present Prime Minister Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.[13] Some attribute to him hypnotic powers, others see in him only a symbol around which the struggle for independence had to be waged. Apter assesses the charismatic force associated with his political performance as the most significant factor in the transitional process leading the country from traditional to modern political existence.[14] In terms of positive, reliable evidence, and notwithstanding the publication of Nkrumah's autobiography, little is known about his political thought. The Watson Commission investigating the disturbances of 1948 expressed the belief that he had strong Communist leanings, and would, given an opportunity, translate his ideas along these lines into practice.[15] To the extent that organizational and tactical features of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) are traceable to Nkrumah, they may be regarded as corroborative evidence: democratic centralism, as the guiding principle; an anonymous, inner, politburo type Central Committee; life chairmanship on the leader's part; and candidate memberships, etc. Evidence of this nature is of course only circumstantial. Any leanings toward Stalinist totalitarian Communism may very likely have been affected by anyone of several factors: the recent developments in the international Communist movement, the responsibilities of office and consequent recognition of certain fundamental inadequacies of Marxism as a valid ideological basis for political and economic action in

---

[12] This side of the British model was underlined recently by *The Economist* in connection with the Anglo-Egyptian conflict of 1956; see the January 12, 1957 issue, pp. 95–96.

[13] For biographical data see Nkrumah's autobiography, *op. cit.*, and Timothy Bankole, *Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1955).

[14] Apter, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–323.

[15] Great Britain, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast*, 1948 (hereafter cited as *Watson* Report), (HMSO, London, 1948), pp. 17–20; appendices nos. 11, 12; see also Nkrumah, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 57, 60–61 and 303–4.

Africa, the attainment of a new social status and new role perceptions on his own part and on the part of his closest associates, both as Africans and as politicians. Even the socialist orientation of the C.P.P. gives way to something else in practice when the Prime Minister speaks of the role of private enterprise in the development of post-independence Ghana.

While conducting the struggle for independence and until the country has achieved a level of development facilitating real independence, and most likely beyond that stage, Nkrumah appears to favor what may be described as a "benevolent dictatorship." He appears to have accepted the British model temporarily as a convenient means to organize mass support behind his person and, incidentally, as his price for recognition by the colonial power. Actually, by temperament and by background, he has no use for it.[16] He finds the operational aspects of the system of parliamentary democracy burdensome and costly, in time and effort wasted, and entirely contrary to what may somewhat ambitiously be classified as his "statist" concept of independent Ghana. As a young leader in a hurry, he looks to the examples of Turkey and Portugal, and presumably still of the Soviet Union, finding these countries developmentally much closer to his own than the United Kingdom.

Other leaders, at Cabinet level, show a similar proclivity for dictatorial methods. In public as well as in private, they display a certain attachment to power, an impatience with critics and criticism. Power to them is a prerogative of office, not to be reduced or interfered with by any group or person. When discussing such questions as juvenile delinquency, economic planning, labor problems, etc. one is impressed by the apparent high regard—consciously entertained—for measures taken in these fields by the German National Socialist and Yugoslav regimes. In their view compulsory military and labor services are certainties in the near future, to be supplemented by totalitarian type youth and general social mass organizations.

A most telling test of the extent to which parliamentary democracy is accepted by the leadership may be found in their attitude toward the Opposition in and outside parliament.[17] Leaders in Government and Party (C.P.P.) appear to be unanimous in their opinion that conditions in Ghana do not require an

---

[16] At one time, he coined the term "Ghanacracy," meaning a modern version of traditional practice; Borso, *op. cit.*, p. 32. In the Preface to his Autobiography he summarizes his political beliefs as follows: "Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialist society. But even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind," Nkrumah, *op. cit.*, p. x.

[17] To cite but two representative samples of public commentaries by Government spokesmen on this subject: "With regard to the new name, Ghana, for the country, I am surprised to learn that the People's Educational Association . . . demanded from the Government an explanation for it. Nobody has ever asked the imperialist Government for the meaning of Gold Coast but when our own Government proposes a new name for the country, the P.E.A. *has the impudence to ask for its meaning.*" *Assembly, Debates* (May 22, 1956), col. 219, (my italics); and: "I should like to ask the hon. Members of the Opposition to tell us whether they sincerely believe that the minority should dictate or that the majority should dictate?" *ibid.* (August 1, 1956), col. 33.

"alternate government." Some hold that for purposes of checking the Government in power , a "small opposition" would be adequate. Others point out that an opposition already exists within the majority party and that this should be quite enough for purposes of providing a check on the leadership. In general, the Government front bench in the Assembly regards the members opposite as no more than a group of unscrupulous men wanting to usurp their seats and offices.[18]

On the surface at least, the leaders of the Government and the C.P.P. show no concern that the electorate of Ghana may not be ready for the weighty decisions demanded of it. Officially, they are unanimous in their defense of "the people's right to run their own affairs," and in their assertion that the electorate has an adequate understanding of the issues placed before it. Yet, it cannot possibly escape their attention that the electorate, approximately nine-tenths illiterate on the eve of independence, and for the greater part not yet emerged materially and spiritually into the twentieth century, must have great difficulties trying to adjust to and comprehend the political, social, economic, and legal implications of modern government. Constitutional controversies, problems attending the governmental operation of cocoa purchasing and marketing boards, industrial development plans, fiscal problems, cannot be said to meet with the approval or disapproval of an electorate which has yet to learn to run local government systematically and efficiently. References by the leaders to the alleged political maturity of the people should not be accepted at their face value but rather as conscious efforts to keep alive a myth which brought them to power.

The element of opportunism is ever present. So viewed, the advocacy of an extension of universal franchise to a substantially illiterate and politically ignorant population could reflect less lofty motives than are usually associated with it. It could be a device for exploitation, not education. Proponents of a generous application of democratic precepts may then include those, to a greater or lesser degree, who have discovered that democratic institutions produce vast opportunities for the attainment of social prestige and for personal enrichment, opportunities which their own talents and capabilities would not have created under different conditions. Those who would counsel caution in the application of democratic processes may include those whose professional abilities and training do enable them to attain positions of prestige and to accumulate wealth outside the governmental framework, and who by dint of their training, native ability, inheritance, or by traditional rights and privileges, may enjoy positions of economic independence. This group would have reason to fear a universal franchise, prematurely applied, because it would in all certainty lead to their own disenfranchisement and ruin as a social and political group of consequence. At any rate, it remains to be established to what extent—if at all—ideal devotion to the principles of democratic government is reflected in political action in Ghana. No conclusive evidence to sustain the governing party's claims and assertions on that score has yet emerged.

---

[18] See *ibid.* (May 18, 1956), col. 155; (May 22, 1956), col. 213–14; (August 2, 1956), cols., 76, 95, 102.

In Opposition circles pseudo-parliamentary democracy imported from Britain and lacking the historic bases which endow that form of government with the meaning and strength required to resist stresses and strains, constitutes, as applied to Ghana, not a bulwark against but an invitation to the erection of a totalitarian-oriented dictatorship, modified only by the lack of organizational ability on the part of the revolutionary leadership. They would disagree with the view that the elements of charisma carried by Nkrumah represent "an important step in the process of creating parliamentary democracy in the Gold Coast."[19] If ever there had been an opportunity for such a development, which many of them would contest, Nkrumah's strategy and tactics effectively destroyed it by the assault on traditional African institutions and indigenous morality. They would contend that if a genuine and meaningful indigenous democracy ever comes to Ghana, it will be in spite of Nkrumah, not because of him.

If given their choice, the majority of the leaders in the Opposition would subscribe to a constitutional monarchy, African or British, continued active participation by the chiefs in government through a bi-cameral legislature, retention under constitutional guarantees of certain aspects of local tribal and state government (considered vital to maintenance of the chief's powers), independence of the judges from political control, constitutional protection of individual and basic rights, and only a cautious application of universal franchise to the selection of the central government. To them, federalism is the only means of slowing down the process of disintegration of African society, begun by the Nkrumah revolution. To many of them the granting of independence before the country was really ready for it constitutes a source of grave misgivings.[20]

African Traditional Political Leaders. Among the chiefs, of course only the educated ones entertain positive, classifiable and systematic ideas for the future political organization of the country. Among those, several, led to a greater or lesser extent by the paramount chief of Ashanti, can be classified as constitutional monarchists and supporters of a federal form of government.

It is not clear to what extent Moslem leaders in Ghana have sorted out their religious and political thoughts. The Moslem Association Party has only a small following but its leaders count on ever growing support in the wake of the progressive spread of Islam to the South. If the trend continues, Moslem leaders of the Northern People's Party (N.P.P.) may have to allow amalgamation of considerable portions of their own regionally conditioned movement with a national islamic organization. A party having the support of most

---

[19] Apter in *Africa in the Modern World*, Calvin W. Stillman, ed. (Chicago, 1955), p. 139. There is reason to believe that charismatic leadership is to blame for the migration of intellectuals from the C.P.P. into the Opposition.

[20] See Dr. Busia, as quoted in Nkrumah, *op. cit.*, p. 279; also, Bawumia and Owusu, *Assembly, Debates*, August 2, 1956, cols. 67 and 79 respectively.

Moslems in Ghana, and gaining strength as a result of progressive conversions, might stimulate there the development of a political outlook of an entirely different variety. It would contain elements of anti-Europeanism—for unlike Christianity, Islam is of Afro-Asian origin—and it would be based on the Islamic way of life that more closely resembles the African mode of living then the Western European social model.

II. POLITICAL PRACTICE AND BEHAVIOR

Political Party Organization.[21] The first notable characteristic of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) is the unrestricted application of the leadership principle. Whether this stems from the party's revolutionary orientation or whether it is to be linked to personal ambitions, cannot be determined with accuracy; but both factors have a bearing on it. At any rate, the party organization is built around and is dominated by the personality of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. He is "life chairman" of the Party, and by the party rules is responsible only to himself.[22]

The second basic organizational principle appears to be what in Communist terminology is called "democratic centralism." The formal party structure, as laid down in the Party constitution, would convey the impression that control is exercised from below. Close analysis reveals that the opposite is true. Two facts suffice to bring out the actual control structure. First is Nkrumah's life tenure as Party chairman, coupled with his right to select the eight members of the key Central Committee of the National Executive. Second, notwithstanding the restricted functions assigned to it under the Party constitution, the Central Committee—the exact composition and membership of which are not revealed—actually provides policy direction for the National Executive and for all other Party bodies, and may thus be considered the practical equivalent of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (USSR.) In times of emergency even the Party constitution assigns to it "full responsibility of safeguarding the basic programme of the Party."[23] For the duration of electoral campaigns the Central Committee acts as the supreme command. An annual National Conference of the Party is supposed to "lay down the broad basic policy and programme of the Party," hears reports from the National Executive and is to "deal with other matters affecting the Party and the Country." In actual operation, however, the Central Committee, if not the Life Chairman himself, formulates the programme and policies and assures acceptance through a rule governing the qualifications of delegates to the Conference, namely: "Every delegate must individually accept and conform to the constitution, programme, principles, and policies of the Party." That means that the delegates individually accept the fundamental principle of leadership by Nkrumah. This rule is reinforced by strict disciplinary provisions, and of course by the power of patronage.[24]

---

[21] For a general discussion of African political parties see James S. Coleman in *Africa Today*, C. Grove Haines, ed. (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 225–256.

[22] *Constitution of the C.P.P.* (Accra, n.d.), p. 12. The text of the party rules is also given in *Nkrumah, op. cit.*, pp. 291–302.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Central control also extends to the nomination process for various elective offices and to the parliamentary group of the Party. The Party Constitution prescribes that candidates for central and local government elections be nominated from lists prepared and submitted by the regional and constituency executive committees "or other bodies duly empowered by the National Executive Committee," and that the nominations be approved by the National Executive Council. Actually, as was repeatedly demonstrated in the 1956 election, the Life Chairman ultimately selected the candidates, assumed sole responsibility for the nominations, and personally persuaded certain constituencies to accept "his" candidates over others locally preferred.[25]

The totalitarian orientation of the Party is perhaps most clearly revealed in the provisions governing "affiliated membership." Underlying these provisions is Nkrumah's adopted dictum: "organization decides everything."[26] All affiliated members "must accept the aims and objects, policy and programme of the Party," and this language is followed by a remarkable, all-inclusive list of any and all conceivable civic, professional, trade, social, cultural, educational and other organizations.[27] If one adds the fact of Government control in key sectors of finance, commerce, industry, and in all other significant phases of public life, the establishment of a one-party state, supplanting and excluding all other private organizations, and hence all other political activity, appears to be but a matter of time.[28]

The most consequential opposition group is the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). The only recognizable bases, aside from the formal paper organization, from which the N.L.M. carries on effective and politically significant operations, are the tribal structures of the states grouped within the Ashanti region. There the organizational cadres are provided by the chiefs and their staffs. In some instances the tribal state organization and the party branch are identical. Although there is a National Executive Committee of the N.L.M., the center of political activity is the Asanteman Council, the governing council of chiefs in the Ashanti region. There is not even a pretense of democratic control in the selection of leaders and the formulation of policy in that tribal hierarchy.

What is true of the N.L.M. applies to a greater extent to its allies, the Northern People's Party, the Togoland Congress, the Moslem Association

---

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11; *cf.* Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition, op. cit.*, p. 316: "The authoritarian potential of the C.P.P. remains unknown."

[25] For specific illustrations of this, see *Daily Graphic* (Accra), July 14, 16, 1956.

[26] "Operation 104," C.P.P. 1954 *Election Manifesto* (C.P.P. National Headquarters Accra, n.d.), p. 4; and *Government Proposals in regard to the future Constitution and Control of Statutory Boards and Corporations in the Gold Coast and Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company Limited* (hereafter cited as *CPC Enquiry* and *Report*), (Government Printer, Accra, 1956), p. 26 (par. 60).

[27] Constitution of the C.P.P., *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[28] *CPC Enquiry and Report*, p. 26 ff.

Party, and other lesser groups. None of these ought really to be classified as political parties, being no more than factions or loose conglomerations of tribal and other interest groups seeking autonomy. None reveal the slightest promise of democratic orientation. None could be expected to become effective carriers of a system of parliamentary democracy. All, in so far as they are linked to tribal organization, will find the ground removed from under their feet with the progressive destruction of traditional institutions.

Maurice Duverger presumably would describe parties of Africa as being "but followers grouped around an influential protector, clans formed round a feudal family, camarillas united by a military leader." This is too sweeping a statement as applied to Ghana. It would be more appropriate, but without reference to ideological orientation, to compare the C.P.P. with Communist or Fascist parties, making allowance for organizational deficiencies. Duverger's formula for such parties could then readily be applied to the C.P.P., particularly to its strict, centralized leadership based on autocratic methods "in which the influence of parliamentary representatives is practically non-existent," and to the low regard, if any, in which it holds electoral struggles.[29]

Electoral Behavior. The analysis of electoral behavior may rest on the 1956 General Election for the second all-African Legislative Assembly.[30] This election provides a specially suitable case for study because it was the last electoral contest conducted under the direct or indirect supervision of the British tutor, the Colonial Service, the British-led army and police. This circumstance generally served to encourage manifestations of democratic thought and practice while discouraging the contrary. Furthermore, the legal-administrative framework for the election was made up of a British-drafted Constitution and the administrative instrumentalities set up under it.[31]

---

[29] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London, 1954), pp. 2–3.

[30] 1956 Election Results:

Party	*No. of seats won*
Convention People's Party	71
National Liberation Movement	12
Northern People's Party	15
Moslem Association Party	1
Togoland Congress	2
Others	3
	104

In October 1957, six groups identified with the Opposition, joined forces under the new name The United Party; see *The Times* (London), October 8, 1957, p. 9.

[31] For purposes of the Assembly election, the country had been divided into 104 electoral districts. The Minister of Local Government, responsible for the election administration in general, appointed for each district a Returning Officer, who in turn appointed his Assistants. From among those, the Returning Officer designated the presiding officers, responsible for the individual polling stations. Candidates, properly nominated, and upon payment of fifty pounds' deposit, were allowed to appoint two Polling Agents of their choice. Voters, at least twenty-one years of age and subject to certain minor residence and tax qualifications, registered voluntarily. Upon proper identification from the register,

There was no evidence of fraudulent production of ballots, a development rendered extremely unlikely by stringent precautions. However, the precautions taken and the charges and allegations made by all parties concerning alleged fraud in this respect revealed tendencies which may no longer be controllable once the outside supervision is absent. Wherever possible at least one European (British in most instances) official was assigned to an electoral district. This, no doubt, contributed to the reduction of cases of improper conduct by partisan African officials and voters. It must be understood in that connection that what may be improper election conduct according to western standards for national elections is regarded by the uneducated Africans as more of a sport, with rewards and penalties depending not so much on right and wrong as on the skill and cleverness of the participants.[32] Troubles were compounded by a shortage of qualified election administrators, poor communications, inadequate equipment. There is every reason to believe that election administration, once the controlling European influence has been withdrawn, will deteriorate and that genuine election results will be impossible to obtain.

The campaign methods of the parties varied from outright intimidation through the use of organized gangs called "action groups" or "action troopers," through bribery, blackmail, economic pressure, deliberate circulation of misleading rumors, invocation of fetishes, ju-ju, tribal sanctions, to propaganda work in the fashion of modern mass parties.[33] Rational discussion of issues was reserved to top candidates, but even they resorted, when hard pressed, to demagoguery or even to clear violation of the election code. One very effective deterrent to more widespread application of fraudulent methods on the part of the C.P.P. was of course the fear entertained by its leaders that a fraudulent

---

voters were handed a ballot paper, bearing a printed number which corresponded with a number on the counterfoil. Special precautions had been taken to prevent counterfeiting of ballots. Before the voter was allowed to cast his ballot, his left thumb was stained with indelible ink to prevent duplicating voting. The balloting was to take place in a screened enclosure. The ballot paper was to be placed in one of several wooden boxes, depending on the number of candidates contesting the seat. Each box displayed the symbol of the candidate or party to be voted for. Further precautions were taken to avoid stealing of ballots, switching of ballot boxes or of symbols, spoiling of ballots already cast, and to keep the boxes secure until the official count was completed. The election was conducted under the *Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954;* governing the election administration were *The Electoral Provisions Ordinance, 1953* and *The Electoral Provisions (Assembly Elections) Regulations, 1954* as amended up to 1956; separate instructions were published for the guidance of Returning and Presiding Officers and for Polling Assistants. These were for official use only. For the list of candidates, see *Gold Coast Gazette Extraordinary* No. 42 (June 27, 1956), pp. 812–42.

[32] *Cf.* Jennings, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–84; also see *Memorandum No. 2 on the General Election, 1956* (Government Agents and Returning Officers Conference, Tamale, June 15, 1956), par. 3 and "Control of Drumming," *ibid.*, par. 5.

[33] See a letter by the Commissioner of Police to the political parties entitled: "Measures To Ensure Calm Elections," *Gold Coast Weekly Review* No. 23 (June 6, 1956), pp. 11–12.

election might be contested by the Colonial Office, leading possibly to postponement of Independence Day.[34]

The handling of campaign finances by the C.P.P. in connection with the 1954 and 1956 elections encountered vigorous criticism from the Opposition.[35] It was alleged that the governing party channelled government funds to constituencies where their candidates faced strong opposition. According to the findings of a Commission of Enquiry, and to Opposition sources, this was done through manipulation of loan applications with the Government controlled Cocoa Purchasing Company, dispensation of considerable salaries to leading citizens in key areas through appointment to bogus government jobs and sinecures such as inactive border guards or liaison officers attached to Government controlled public corporations.[36] Much was made of the charge, not uncommon in western democracies, that the C.P.P. received substantial "kick backs" from Government contractors. True or not, opportunities for such replenishment of party campaign funds are greatest in a country where ethical restraints in government and business and the necessary legal and moral safeguards are relatively undeveloped and ineffective in practice.[37]

The Opposition parties appear to have employed similar methods of fund-raising. Where the Opposition parties were in control of local government, fund-raising techniques ranged from subtle pressure emanating from local government offices, to blackmail punctuated by occasional dynamitings of homes and businesses.[38] The argument that all financial transactions by the parties were legitimate and lawful since no prosecutions have been recorded, is hardly persuasive, for it is virtually impossible to obtain reliable witnesses in court proceedings in a country where a person's first loyalty is to his kin, be that by blood relation or by tribal, *i.e.*, usually political, ties.

Voter registration generally was not unimpressive. Forty-six per cent of those registered participated, a total of 696,908. It is not likely, however, that more than a very small minority of those voting were sufficiently educated and informed to lend meaning and substance to the act of voting.

---

[34] One unusual but interesting case came before the court in Accra. Two men were sentenced for attempting to place a handbag "containing undisclosed matter," into the Accra water reservoir. The men explained that they had committed the deed "so that anybody who drank the water might vote for Dr. Awooner Renner (M.A.P.), candidate for Accra West."

[35] For a discussion of the problem and for existing regulations see, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Representational and Electoral Reform* (Government Printer, Accra, 1954), p. 14; also *The Electoral Provisions* (Assembly Elections) *Regulations*, 1954, Part IV, esp. pars. 54–64.

[36] See, *Why CMB-CPC Probe*, Petitions submitted by N.L.M., etc. (Kumasi, n.d.); and *CPC Enquiry and Report*, pars. 54–85, 86–93, 163–173, 175–177, and summary of findings, par. 203.

[37] The C.P.P., of course, collected regularly a certain percentage from the salaries of its officeholders in central and local government positions, but its expenditures exceeded income from this source by far.

[38] According to a Government source, considerable sums were contributed to the Opposition by the "imperialists," presumably the United Africa Company, Cadbury and Fry, Taylor Woodrow and other European concerns; see A. E. Inkumsah, *Assembly, Debates* (August 3, 1956), col. 136; also, *CPC Enquiry and Report*, par. 72.

In an evaluation of the vote and voter participation, these considerations should be noted: (1) inadequate publicity concerning the registration date and procedures as well as the relation of registration to the right to vote; (2) inability on the voters' part to comprehend the electoral process in general, especially inability to relate it to government, public policy, and self-interest; (3) lack of public confidence in African election officials; (4) reluctance of farmers to leave the fields; (5) vulnerability to intimidation and rumor-mongering about the polling process, the election result, and the consequences of voting one's conscience; (6) effect of superstitution upon voting; (7) belief that a proxy vote was possible; and (8) failure to remember the election date and the time. Large numbers of voters were disfranchised as a result of spelling errors in the registers. These errors may have been the result of faulty copying of the names from the 1954 registers, or of deliberate tampering on the part of persons interested either in causing the defeat of a given candidate by disfranchisement of his supporters or desirous of invalidating the entire election through confusion of the electoral rolls. A special problem was posed by the absence of uniform spelling of African names and the absence of reliable birth and police records.[39]

Parliament and Administration. One observer has suggested that "the rock of parliament could easily submerge if improvements in material well-being are not soon forthcoming."[40] The analogy is not justified by the brief record of parliamentary performance. Rather than a rock, the Gold Coast parliament appears to resemble more a weak reed that may require much less than failure to bring material well-being to demonstrate that the reed has no roots at all.

Indications are that before the parliamentary process becomes institutionalized in Ghana—if at all—it will rather be discredited by the performance so far. We have a dilemma here between the argument that a certain training value attaches to the experiment in parliamentary democracy, and the risk that the disadvantages of premature introduction may outweigh the advantages under the circumstances.

Proceedings in the all-African Legislative Assembly could leave no doubt in the mind of an objective observer that the institution of parliamentary democracy ill fits the African temperament, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the leadership on both sides of the House to enforce observance of Westminister rules. More basic, proceedings were characterized by a total lack of agreement on fundamental questions. For instance, the right of members of a democratic parliament to hold the government to account for its acts and policies was categorically denied by the C.P.P. leadership in all but minor routine matters. Instead, attempts by the official Opposition to debate the major aspects of Government policy were countered by extended, acrimonious, and frequently vicious acts of intolerance on the part of members of the majority party. If one takes the most sympathetic view of the Government party's resistance to expressions of criticism, one might ascribe it to a sense of pride in the achievements of an African administration and to a reluctance to reveal its weaknesses and mistakes to a critical and skeptical outside world, particularly to observers in the Union of South Africa. Likewise, the guiding forces within the Convention People's Party have evinced a driving ambition to advance Ghana to a position of leadership in an Africa-wide Negro liberation and emancipation movement. This undoubtedly will accentuate further the aversion to criticism at home.[41] But one might also detect in the demeanor of the governing party a will to possess power exclusively, a determination to crush all opposition at the earliest possible moment.[42] Whatever the motivations, it is extremely unlikely that public debates critical of significant acts of the Government will become institutionalized in Ghana. There also are many indications that even the formal aspects of the parliamentary debating process, during the early stages meticulously observed, will undergo substantial alterations following independence.

---

[39] A specimen shown to this writer by a member of the Cabinet would support the suspicion voiced by that source that the errors were the result of deliberate tampering, although no pattern was discernible favoring a particular party. In the constituency of the Minister of Local Government, who was responsible for the election and registration administration, a voter participation of 91 per cent was recorded, compared with an overall average of 46 per cent. For illustration of the registration problem, see Ministry of Local Government, *Specimen Instructions to Polling Agents*, pp. 2–3.

[40] Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

The administrative structure does not reveal hopeful potentialities of furthering the cause of democracy in the new state. The African civil servant, who is rapidly replacing the veteran British colonial officer, is unlikely to develop a positive attitude toward parliamentary or any other variant of democracy for a number of reasons. As a literate, educated person, he is separated from the public he is to serve by a wide gulf, which is even wider if he obtained his education abroad, *i.e.*, in Britain, the United States, or other non-African centers of learning. This is most strikingly illustrated by the behavior of the African officials sent from the more advanced Colony to administer the Northern Territories. The term "black imperialism" does not appear to be an inappropriate description of that relationship in the light of the contemptuous treatment accorded the peoples of the "NT's" by their compatriots from the South.

---

[41] *The Times*, (London), March 6, 1957, p. 6. Replying to criticism of the Government by the Opposition, the Minister of Interior issued this most revealing warning: "Another important point is that perhaps the hon. mover and the members of the Opposition have not realized the great harm that they do to the reputation of this country, outside as well as within, when they make such vain allegations. They little think that they give the impression to our friends both outside and within that the African is actually not qualified to handle his own affairs." The Minister concluded: "In the future hon. Members should be very careful as to what they say here." *Assembly, Debates,* March 4, 1956, as reprinted in *Why CMP-CPC Probe, op. cit.*, p. 54.

[42] On July 21, the CPP Minister of Communications announced that a new "get tough" policy, including deportations, would come into operation to deal with opposing elements. *The Times* (London) July 23, 1957, p. 7. The controversies arising over the deportations reflected not only the aversion of the new rulers to criticism, but also the problems flowing from the application of British principles of justice in a substantially alien setting; see *The Times* (London) September 25, 1957, p. 8, and September 28, p. 6.

For a long time to come, the African civil servant will be unable to provide the minimum of efficiency and integrity required for a smooth functioning of the governmental machine. For one thing, the proclivity of the African to strive for a higher position than the one he may be qualified to occupy at a given time, the "upward draft," tends to divert his attention from his immediate responsibilities. Likewise, many an able and qualified young African is handicapped in developing his talents by a custom which permits as many individuals in a family as care to take advantage of the opportunity, to make financial claims upon its most successful member. These social attitudes and customs cannot but affect adversely efficiency and honesty in administration.[43] Most important, as the inevitable breakdowns in the administrative apparatus occur, as they become more serious, and consequently as the frustrations in the Government mount and as the public becomes more restive, the African civil servant will be tempted to applaud any efforts by his hard-pressed political superiors to conceal their common failings behind a screen of arbitrary censorship and oppression. The civil servants may then have an incentive to join those who advocate an early abolition of the potentially troublesome parliamentary system.

In the sphere of government and administration, local government perhaps could have provided the most promising opportunities for training in political democracy.[44] However, the developments at higher levels could not wait until basic inadequacies found at the local tribal level, had been removed. Thus, "the proper development of efficient organs of local government" as "a foundation on which to build a democratic central structure" was abandoned as a priority project in favor of rapid material progress through centralized administration. Instead of being allowed to grow organically from below, democracy was all too hastily introduced at the top.[45]

Under the circumstances it is most doubtful whether the policy of progressive

---

[43] In parts of the country it is considered entirely proper if an individual succeeds in defrauding the public treasury. "The imperialists have helped themselves so long, now let the African take his share," is the not uncommon explanation of graft or bribery. This is not a monopoly of any political party or group. For an illustration, see *CPC Enquiry and Report*, p. 45 (pars. 212, 213). Evidence obtained at the Enquiry revealed the absence of a separation, in policy making and administrative respects, between operations of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, Ltd. (C.P.C.), and of the governing political party, the C.P.P. It was found that the C.P.P.'s Central Committee, through direct intervention, made decisions and gave instructions concerning the disposition of loans, and appointments of personnel on the sub-boards. In some respects, the Party's Central Committee actually ran the operations of the C.P.C. Evidence was submitted showing a certain correlation between approval of loan applications and electoral requirements of the C.P.P. The C.P.C. emerged as in fact part of the Party's organization; *ibid.*, pp. 26–30 (pars. 54–100).

[44] Training at the local level could have rendered parliamentary democracy at the national level more intelligible to the electorate.

[45] See *Coussey Report*, p. 15 (par. 78).

"democratization" of local government organs, as advertised by the C.P.P. government, can be effective. What is represented as an effort to make local government more responsive to the people, could under the circumstances very well be part of a plan to make the people more responsive to manipulation from above, precisely by means of the extension of universal franchise to an illiterate and therefore vulnerable electorate.[46]

The problems of local government organization and development are intimately connected with the problems arising from regional differences and diversities. Discussions between the Government, the Opposition, and the Colonial Office concerning demands for a constitutional acknowledgement of these diversities through a federal structure for the new state of Ghana led to a last-minute compromise, but notably again only after the Colonial Office had intervened.[47] This fact throws an ominous light on the concessions made by the central Government. The demands of those advocating federalism to safeguard certain traditional and regional interests were only partially met and only on paper. It remains to be seen whether they will be met in practice, at least to the extent expected by the federalist camp. As with all such schemes, unless basic conditions and forces favor federal or regional decentralization, structural arrangements, constitutional provisions, may not prove very significant. The *Economist* put the problem succinctly when it observed on the eve of independence: " . . . a very complex constitution is being imposed on a very inexperienced and divided country, whose trained white administrators are departing fast."[48]

---

[46] For documentation on local government reforms, see *State Councils* (Northern Territories) *Ordinance* No. 5 of 1952; *State Councils* (Colony and Southern Togoland) *Ordinance* No. 8 of 1952 and *Amendment Ordinance* No. 37 of 1955; *State Councils* (Ashanti) Ordinance No. 4 of 1952 and *Amendment Ordinance* No. 38 of 1955; *The Local Government Ordinance* (Gold Coast), rev. ed. 1954, (Chapter 64).

[47] The principal documentation on the constitutional debate preceding independence may be found in *Report of the Constitutional Adviser* (Bourne Report, Govt. Printer, Accra, 1955); *Report of the Achimota Conference* (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956); *Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence* and *Statement on the Report of the Constitutional Adviser* and the *Report of the Achimota Conference* (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956); *Statement by the National Liberation Movement and Its Allies* on the Gold Coast Government's Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence (Kumasi, 1956); *Assembly, Debates*, (August 1–3, 1956), cols. 17–178; *The Government's Revised Constitutional Proposals* for Gold Coast Independence (Govt. Printer, Accra, 1956); Great Britain, Colonial Office, *The Proposed Constitution of Ghana*, Cmnd 71, *op. cit.*, and Great Britain, Statutory Instruments (1957 No. 277), *The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council*, 1957.

[48] *The Economist*, February 16, 1956, col. 55.

A MODEL FOR STUDY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY*

JAN F. TRISKA
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace,
Stanford University
and
University of California (Berkeley)

Soviet foreign policy has been a subject of extensive and intensive study ever since the painful birth of the Soviet state. All the writings and investigations, except for the purely descriptive, are based in some degree on one or several key premises and assumptions of authors who used them to explain and interpret Soviet foreign policy. This is understandable and probably inevitable in view of the enormous significance of the subject matter, the vastness of observed behavior in time and in space, and the lack of available information on policy making. Consequently, scientific, intuitive, and even merely hopeful thinking has been applied to the evidences of Soviet foreign policy in an effort to find a method of analysis, a frame of reference, a tool of orientation which might permit some systematization of the whole subject.[1]

Clearly, a single seemingly well-constructed theory of Soviet foreign policy which purports to offer a key to broad analysis is too attractive for an analyst to ignore. But however plausible it may seem, it cannot possibly offer the whole answer. Some elements of Soviet foreign policy may be isolated, focalized, dissected, and examined, but others cannot be subject to even speculative, crude estimates. Any theory of foreign policy is bound to labor under limitations imposed by the inscrutable, ever-present human element. Such a theory may reduce the area of doubt, but cannot and does not eliminate it. Furthermore, any policy has to be considered within its context, in its inter-relationship with other policies, and as one of the many components of a complex social process. A policy of conflict, like Soviet foreign policy, never consists of a single course leading to action; rather, at any given moment a conglomeration of actions directed to confuse, paralyze, and overpower enemy and friend alike may be observed. How does any one action, then, fit into the whole scheme, and how does the foreign policy fit into the plan of the Soviet system? Especially is this puzzling if the motives of Soviet leaders are to be analyzed, as they are in the theories mentioned above. Many of these theories contradict each other and are incompatible with others. They vary in degree of sophistication and often, albeit unwittingly, strain facts to fit the postulated theory.

---

* This is drawn from a Ph.D. thesis submitted at Harvard in 1956. The author is indebted to William Y. Elliott, Rupert Emerson and Carl J. Friedrich for their critical comments on the construct. Robert M. Slusser, the author's associate at Hoover Institution, offered valuable suggestions.

[1] Thus, some authors have considered Marxist philosophy the key; others have stressed the over-all significance of Soviet ideology; still others claim that Soviet foreign policy represents simply a continuation of Russian nationalism, traditionalism, and imperialism; the theory of bureaucratic tyranny has been advanced in several variants; the Byzantium theory of Russian-Western conflict explains Soviet foreign policy in terms of its inherent antagonism towards the West; the need for security or the necessity for expansion is another rationale; and geographical location, Asiatic influence and heritage, urge to the sea, Gorer's swaddling hypothesis, social psychology explanations of "national character," and many other theories have been developed to clarify, explain and interpret Soviet foreign policy, either by themselves or in combination with others. See William A. Glaser, "Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Classification of the Literature," *World Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 27, pp. 128–152 (July, 1956). See also John S. Reshetar, Jr., *Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior*, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science (New York, 1955).

However, if understood and accepted more modestly as new insights, new attempts for understanding, new tools, new bases of observation, new departures for systematic study, these approaches, theories and hypotheses are often useful and relevant frames of reference. Viewed, in spite of their authors' claims, as tentative and tolerant suggestions, they may and should be examined by students of Soviet foreign policy, if for no other reason than to explore the complexity of the problems, the relativity of possible answers, and the necessity for further study.

All these approaches represent in fact a search for rules, laws, inner consistencies, methods and attachments to factors and principles which may govern the making of Soviet foreign policy and its conduct. The profound deviations, ambiguities and contradictions, varied as they are and have been in policies abroad, may belong to a higher order, a systematic pattern of their own. An absolute assessment of intentions and expectations, screened and camouflaged as they are, is difficult, if not impossible. The record of history, however, offers a wealth of information on the way Soviet decision-makers have fashioned policies in the past; if nothing else, it should be helpful in the assessment of the chief attributes of the thinking processes on the part of elites responsible for policy. The varied theories seek some, and often partial, answers to the central problem; together, however, they represent major contributions to the understanding of the subject.[2]

For these reasons, another cautious attempt is made here to elaborate a hypothesis on the basis of which Soviet foreign policy can be analyzed. It is set forth in the belief that not a single dictum but a plurality of approaches is the most fruitful way of investigating Soviet foreign policy.

I. POLICY AS STRUGGLE

It is a well-known and generally accepted fact that Soviet leaders view war and peace as interchangeable periods of struggle.[3] The world is structured in terms of combat; the fundamental framework for all evaluation is the Clausewitz tenet, "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Evidences of the fundamental combat attitude are many and range from ideology to the actual usurpation and perpetuation of power by the Soviet regime. Illustrative is the constant use of warfare terminology—advances, retreats, maneuvers, cadres, strategy, tactics, encirclement, battle for peace, etc.

---

[2] The extreme view, that Soviet foreign policy is "too enigmatic to be analyzed at all and leaps must therefore be made into the dark," (British Foreign Secretary Macmillan was reported to have said in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons that Soviet moves could be interpreted "either as reassuring signs of a new policy" or as "sinister warnings of a more subtle but just as deadly threat. One can speculate on all that for ever. . . . What we have to do is to act." *The Economist*, June 25, 1955, p. 1105) is widespread but irrelevant; a search for *some* theory of Soviet foreign policy is preferable to such a view, if only because the decisions of Soviet policy-makers have affected the non-totalitarian world more than have decisions of the leadership of the latter: the Second World War, the cold war, and the Korean war illustrate this fact abundantly.

The Soviet one-party system had to develop and retain a combat technique and formation in order to win the revolution while still in the minority. It had to accustom itself to constant counter-attacks, to the atmosphere of mortal danger, emergency, and risk *after* the revolution, while attacking again, this time the social basis of pre-revolutionary society. Once solidly entrenched, it had to perpetuate the psychology of emergency within its ranks for the sake of retaining its power. Foreign affairs became a source, both real and convenient, of the permanent emergency at home. Unchangeable social forces make the permanent struggle inevitable, irrespective of the hopes and inclinations of all wishing to interfere. Strategic armistice is possible and may be desirable, but its duration is limited. "Men cannot change physical laws, and they cannot change social laws."

Struggle is the key which chiefly explains Soviet actions and responses. The National Socialists similarly viewed their system as a rule of permanent martial law, an expression of politics as permanent combat: "With us politics is as soldierly as the waging of war is political. Both pursue the same aims," said Joseph Goebbels.[4] The struggle may be carried on by various means and in different forms: "The mobilization of the German people which began [in 1933] was so total that war was merely one form—though the highest—in which it became manifest."[5]

The Soviet Communists have expropriated ideas, ideals, principles and symbols hostile to communism and incorporated and utilized them against their enemies: they have used socialism against socialists, nationalism against nationalists, tradition against traditionalists, internationalism against internationalists, democracy against democrats, capitalism against capitalists, imperialism against imperialists, "proletarian" against "bourgeois" science, etc. The weapons of the enemy have been used against the enemy. To attack and attempt to destroy hostile forces with their own arms and weapons shows a mastery of warfare:

---

[3] On the "interchangeability" of political and military weapons, see especially M. Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Harvard, 1954), p. 285; also G. B. de Huszar, "Strategy and Tactics of Expansion," in Huszar et al., *Soviet Power and Policy* (New York, 1955), p. 395. For strategy and tactics in political movements, see R. Heberle, *Social Movements, an Introduction to Political Sociology* (1941), p. 359; W. Ebenstein, *Today's Isms* (New York, 1954), p. 72; Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27 (1949), p. 157; Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: the Totalitarian State in a World at War* (New York, 1942) ch. 1; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Harvard, 1956), p. 24; Diplomaticus, "Stalinist Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 14, (1952) p. 468; X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25 (1947), p. 566.

[4] *Das Reich*, May 11, 1941, p. 1.

[5] *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 30, 1941, p. 1.

> An army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess, behaves in an unwise or even in a criminal manner. But this applies to politics even more than it does to war. In politics it is even harder to forecast what methods of warfare will be applicable and useful under certain future conditions. Unless we master all means of warfare, we may suffer grave and even decisive defeat.[6]

The Soviet Communists have not only adopted and adapted enemy weapons, but at the same time have branded their new weapons as the true, authentic, only weapons, as contrasted with the false, contemptible, discredited weapons of the enemy. If this method should be carried so far that facts are destroyed in the process, the worse for the facts.

To analyze Soviet foreign policy, then, it may be useful to superimpose a model based on the Soviet concept of military doctrine, a complex system which deals with all problems of war. It consists of four components: the principles of war, military ideology, military science, and military art. For our purposes, the last is the most interesting part because it concerns directly the application of communist ideology to action. It consists of strategy, operational direction, and tactics.[7]

Thus, the analytical military model to be applied to Soviet policy includes *ideology*, *strategy*, *operational direction*, and *tactics*. *Propaganda* serves both as an instrument of the four component parts as well as the fifth substantive part of policy.

Ideology is the essence of the matter, the eschatological key to the past, present, and future; it is the rigid frame of reference and basis for action and a permanent component. It stands uncompromisingly for revolutionary conquest:[8]

> The strength of the Marxist-Leninist theory consists in the fact that it enables the Party to orient itself in a situation, to grasp the internal connection, to foresee the course of events, and to discern not only how and when events are developing in the present, but also how and when they must develop in the future. [It is both] the science of proletarian revolution [and the] science of the construction of communist society.[9]

Strategy concerns the direction of Soviet security, the *sine qua non* of world conquest; it attempts to achieve the greatest possible results in the foreseeable future under foreseeable circumstances. It is subordinate to ideology, by which it is guided. Although a long-range concept, it does change with the passage of time from one stage to another. It provides "general direction along which the revolutionary movement of the proletariat should be directed with a view to achieving the biggest results."[10] Defense of the Soviet base as the proper means of ensuring future world victory is, with respect to action, first on the priority list of Soviet strategy.

---

[6] Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (New York, 1920), p. 31.

[7] N. A. Bulganin, *Tridtsat' let Sovetskykh vooruzhennylh sil* (Moscow, 1948), p. 12. *Cf.* also *World Today*, Vol. 11 (1955), p. 492; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953), p. 30; and pertinent articles in *Red Star* (24 March, 1955, Soviet Marshal Rotmistrov; 20 May, 1955, Major-General Kalachnik; 28 May, 1955, Col. Kashirin and Col. Federov) and *Soviet Fleet* (6 May, 1955, Major-General Korniyenko). See especially N. Galay, "New Trends in Soviet Military Doctrine," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. 3 (June, 1956), pp. 3–12.

[8] "The Socialist ideology can exist by nature only in constant contest, in fight." *Neues Deutschland*, January 23, 1957, p. 1.

[9] Stalin, *Istoria vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii* (Moscow, 1938), p. 339.

Operational direction is subordinate to strategy and concerns the direction and unification of tactical episodes. It is more flexible than strategy, but less so than tactics. Its range of duration is shorter than strategy: it changes with new clusters of tactics, which it funnels along the lines established by strategy. Tactical moves such as the Soviet entry into the League of Nations, creation of united fronts abroad, and virtual standstill of the Comintern are, as a whole, manipulated centrally by operational direction.

Tactics are individual episodes of Soviet foreign policy in different parts of the world; they consist of choices of particular actions or responses best fitted to existing exigencies. Tactics are subordinate to operational direction and to goals determined by strategy; tactics require initiative and discipline. A tactical victory which endangers ideology is viewed entirely as temporary and meaningless in the long run. It may be necessitated by propaganda considerations, expediency, etc.

Tactics are, of course, even more flexible and of shorter duration than operational direction.

> Tactics, guiding itself by the directives of strategy and by experience of the revolutionary movement, . . . marks out those concrete courses for winning of the wide masses to the proletarian side and leading them to battle stations on the social front . . . which most surely pave the way for strategic successes.[11]

There may be at the same time variations of tactics on different planes; tactical moves then appear contradictory, incompatible, in conflict and at variance with other tactical moves, and even with ideology. This technique allows for considerable latitude in attitudes and behavior.

Propaganda serves as a tool of these four components of policy. It may have content as well, however, especially when tactics are being utilized primarily for propaganda purposes. The Soviet "waging of peace," an important propaganda weapon always closely associated with abuse of "capitalist" countries, was often a tactical move necessitated by the realization of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union and its desire to develop trade and gain technological assistance from "capitalistic" countries. Propaganda plays a prominent part in the execution of Soviet foreign policy. It often contradicts ideology and strategy and supports tactics. It is an economical, convenient, and expedient instrument for both ideology and strategy.

---

[10] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 62. "Socialism in one country" is a strategic concept: the ideological goal "will be more rapid and more thorough, the more thoroughly Socialism fortifies itself in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism." Stalin, "Oktiabrskaia revoliutsia i taktika russkikh kommunistov," *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1945) p. 104.

[11] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, *ibid.*

According to our hypothesis, Soviet foreign policy at any given time, then, could be viewed as composed of ideology, strategy, operational direction, tactics, and propaganda. While ideology is the basis for action, the other four components of policy are direct springboards for action, which may be understood in terms of the function of these components. On the one pole is the rigidified doctrine as the frame of reference for action; on the other is the immediately desired development in the world, based on the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both the Soviet and the "capitalist" camps. Strategy requires long-range planning for its implementation; tactics, centralized in operational direction, and propaganda are the means. Propaganda is the necessary lubricant easing the whole motion.

Soviet foreign policy is, of course, subject to constant change, as is the relative proportion and mutual relationship of its five ingredients. At times of crisis, the progressively more flexible, temporary, and expedient factors of the policy spectrum tend to predominate; conversely, at times of relative security the permanent and rigid ideological content of policy rules the show.

The temporary and even accidental components of policy and the permanent goal of ideology are, then, not mutually exclusive but complementary factors. "The rigid orthodoxy of aim and elasticity of method,"[12] the constant contradictions, duality of behavior, inconsistency between the formal and the effective, the astonishing substantive flexibility coupled with rigid immutability—they all can be understood in terms of the operational model. The communist method of reasoning is founded on the combat dialectics of Marx-Leninism, which the communists use as a matter of course.

It may be argued that a policy spectrum of this kind could be used as a model for non-totalitarian policy making as well. The chief point of departure, however, seems to be the rigid Soviet reliance on this military analogy of policy, the persistence in its application, and the direct permeation of the central communist goal throughout. The institutional arrangement by which policy is carried into action and which shapes the action is distinctly totalitarian. Inevitably, action reflects not only the policy which designed it, but also the institutions and practices which brought it about. In the last forty years, Soviet foreign policy has been anything but static; of all its traits, change is probably the most characteristic. The foreign policy model is based on change and accepts permanent change in the pattern of Soviet foreign policy as a *sine qua non* of that policy.

II. IDEOLOGY

Soviet communist ideology is a body of ideas, beliefs, and patterns of thought officially promulgated; a curious blend of philosophy, cosmology, history, eschatology, sociology and psychology; a total explanation of everything that was, is, and shall be. It demands purposeful action as a sign of total acceptance and absolute loyalty. It is revolutionary, predictive, and promissory.[13]

---

[12] Harold J. Laski, *The Secret Battalion; an Examination of the Communist Attitude to the Labour Party* (London, 1946), p. 37.

It is admitted that a study of Soviet official ideology may not wholly answer how and why the Soviet government functions in terms of the controls which it employs and the types of appeals on which it relies. However, of all the determinants which may or do influence Soviet policy—cultural, anthropological, psychological—ideology seems to play a crucial role in terms of motivation. Soviet ideology excludes no strategic, operational, tactical or propaganda devices; it accommodates them all. There may be disagreement among non-Soviet observers as to the share of ideology in any given Soviet foreign policy; few would deny, however, that ideology at least formally affects Soviet decisions. For example, Marx-Leninism is taught daily as one of the compulsory subjects in all Soviet schools, from the elementary school level to post-graduate university training; all the various youth, labor, party, farm, professional, and other organizations and groups discuss and teach Marx-Leninism, as does the Red Army; there is not an article, book, pamphlet, movie, speech or subject in the Soviet Union which does not have a definite and direct ideological point of view.[14] Even in the pre-Stalingrad crisis of World War II, when traditional and nationalist symbols replaced Marx-Leninism on a mass scale, ideology did not disappear, and party members were well aware of that fact.

The Soviet leaders are integral parts of their system. They cannot but think in terms of ideology and anticipate ideological ends.[15] The assumptions imposed upon them by ideology are part of their being. An outsider can understand Soviet attitudes only when he views facts through Soviet eyes and can identify himself with the trends, conditions, expectations and beliefs framed by ideology.

The Soviet system by its very nature attempts to secure the universality of its absolutes, as stipulated by Soviet ideology. Any given policy expresses to some degree this underlying motivation. The larger the obstacle, apparent or real, facing such universalization, the less emphasis is put on universalization itself and the more flexible components of policy designed to cope with and eventually disintegrate the obstacles. Once this objective is accomplished, the true goal of policy resumes its full role. The aim of Soviet ideology—domination of the world—does not change; strategy, operational direction, tactics, and propaganda do. Soviet ideology permits this flexibility and serves, in addition, as a proved tool of analysis of social, economic, and political events in the world. It has an enormous propaganda and indoctrination value.

---

[13] *Cf.* H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951); B. Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (Harvard, 1950); J. Towster, *Political Power in the USSR*, 1917–1947 (New York, 1948); C. J. Friedrich, "The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society," p. 52, and section on "Totalitarianism and Ideology" (A. Inkeles, F. H. Litell, and W. Gurian) p. 87, in *Totalitarianism*, ed. Friedrich (Harvard, 1954); F. S. Northrop, *Meeting of East and West* (New York, 1946); Historicus, *op. cit.;* Diplomaticus, *op. cit.* For additional valuable material see M. Florinsky, *Fascism and National Socialism* (New York, 1936); M. Rader, "The Conflict of Fascist and Democratic Ideals," *Antioch Review*, Vol. 3 (1943), p. 250; F. L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics (New York, 1957); "X," *op. cit.*

[14] The recently published and widely debated book *Not By Bread Alone* by Vladimir Dudintsev proved to be such an exception to this rule that it caused quite a stir within the Soviet Union.

[15] American viewers had this fact solidly and vividly confirmed by Khruschchev when he appeared on the CBS television network's "Face the Nation" on June 2, 1957, and prophesied that "your grandchildren in America will live under socialism."

III. STRATEGY

Soviet strategy requires the use of flexible components of policy to approach and enhance the ideological objectives. It involves direction of the main blow (advance and retreat) and disposition of forces and reserves (direct and indirect); primarily, however, strategy involves the appraisal and evaluation of the strength of the Soviet Union as the principal attacking force to reach the ideological objectives. This is why a strong, secure Soviet base is an imperative strategic goal.

Marx never contemplated the existence of socialism in one isolated country. Lenin was more flexible: *temporary* socialism in one country was not only possible—it was inevitable because of the uneven development of capitalism. He did not exclude—but neither did he emphasize—temporary peaceful coexistence or even cooperation with capitalist countries.

Lenin's tactics became Stalin's strategy: the coexistence of capitalism and socialism acquired a kind of semi-permanent status in Soviet foreign policy.[16] Stalin made a virtue of Lenin's necessity:

> What Lenin really means when he speaks of "victory on the world scale" is that the success of socialism in our country, the victory of consolidating Socialism in our country, has such an immense international importance that it (the victory) cannot be limited to our country alone but is bound to call forth a powerful movement toward Socialism in all capitalist countries, and . . . it must in any event lead to a strong proletarian movement of other nations toward the victory of world revolution.[17]

Because of the "victory of socialism" in the Soviet Union, the USSR became the "inspirer" of world communism.[18] Defense of the communist base as the immediate and temporary means of ensuring the future victory of communism everywhere was the first item on the priority list of international communism, and the primary allegiance of the foreign proletariat was to the socialist base, the Soviet Union. "The development of world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the aid rendered to the first socialist country by the workers of all other countries."[19] The ideological goal was communization of the world; the means to this aim, the strategical ". . . goal is to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."[20]

---

[16] A. Zhdanov, *The International Situation* (Moscow, 1947), p. 22.

[17] *Ob oppozitsii* (Moscow, 1928), p. 465.

[18] Kermit E. McKenzie, "The Soviet Union, the Comintern and World Revolution," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 65 (1950), p. 214.

[19] Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1945), p. 104.

Stalin accepted Lenin's temporary hiatus and extended its duration into a long-range "phase of socialist development," changing with the passage of revolution from one phase to another.[21] Khrushchev extended, indirectly, this phase even further in terms of its consequences. Socialism in one country was proclaimed accomplished; the Soviet Union moved toward building "communism in one country" and, simultaneously, socialism emerged "from the confines of one country [and was being transformed] into a world system."[22] Still, "the struggle for the consolidation of the might of our country" was first on the agenda of the Twentieth Congress. Molotov, corrected, assured his audience that "as early as in the pre-war period, our people basically built the Socialist society and are now engaged in the realization of a gradual transition from socialism to communism."[23]

The *cause* of "socialism in one country" was preservation of the socialist revolution in Russia in the face of adverse reality; it was a compromise of communist ideology with the facts of life. The *consequences* of "socialism in one country" were immediate survival of the Soviet Union, the new base of world communism; increased security and efficiency of this base; repression (in the name of the Marxist dictum that all social problems must be dealt with in terms of class war); rearmament; compromise in foreign policy (which shifted from isolationism to neutrality, to coexistence with capitalist states, to positive cooperation, including membership in the bourgeois international organizations); traditionalism and nationalism at home; and, at least formally, gradual abandonment of the concept of absolute world revolution, replaced by arguments in favor of communism triumphing globally without coercion. As Molotov pointed out to a *New York Times* correspondent, "We should like the [global] change-over to communism to be as painless as possible."[24]

The demand for peaceful coexistence (defined as an intensified fight "to undermine and overcome bourgeois ideology and to strengthen and develop socialist ideology"[25]) was a direct consequence of Soviet strategy; it was not a tactical concept:

> The Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems was, and remains, the general line of our country's foreign policy.
>
> It is alleged that the Soviet Union advocates the principle of peaceful coexistence exclusively from tactical considerations of the moment. However, it is well-known that we

---

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[21] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 62.

[22] Khrushchev, Speech before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Feb. 14, 1956, Second (evening) Session. *XX s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza* 14–25 *fevralia* 1956 *goda. Stenograficheskii otchet.* Gos. izd-tvo pol. literatury (Moscow, 1956), p. 10.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 452.

[24] C. L. Sulzberger, "Soviet Foreign Policy—New Methods, Old Aims," *N. Y. Times*, January 30, 1956, Editorial Page.

[25] *Neues Deutschland*, Jan. 23, 1957, p. 1.

have advocated peaceful coexistence just as persuasively from the very inception of Soviet power. Hence, this is not a tactical strategem but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.[26]

With the cultivation of self-centered and self-oriented "socialism in one country," nationalist and traditionalist exaltation, against which Marx and Lenin warned, was incorporated in Soviet policy to strengthen the "socialist motherland." Stalin denied the label of nationalism even to National Socialism, and in adopting it at home stripped it of its derogatory connotation. "The Fascists are making excellent use of nationalism, so why should not we," asked Dimitrov at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International;[27] but this was a rhetorical question. The Soviet leadership learned to handle the new tool more subtly and with considerably greater skill than its chief rivals.[28]

The Soviet ideological objective has been communization of the world by means of the "revolution of the world proletariat." The method of achieving this objective, however, has been a changing concept; under the impact of Soviet strategy, it alternated between inevitable revolution because of the laws of history; world revolution aided by the Soviet Union; aid to the Soviet Union by the world proletariat; conquest and "liberation" by the Red Army; and "evolutionary, peaceful" revolution by parliamentary means. The Soviet leaders, realizing that as to Rome there are many roads leading to communization of the world, began stressing the *roads* as well as the destination.

The "parliamentary-pathway-to-communism" doctrine approaches so closely a Fabian gradualist socialism that Khrushchev felt compelled to open his remarks on peaceful revolution by saying that

> it is true that we [Leninists] recognize the necessity for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into Socialist society. This is what distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from reformists and opportunists.[29]

But this was mere lip service, designed to pacify staunch communists; behind it was a serious attempt to win the collaboration of socialists and left-wing parties for the task of parliamentary transformation. It was followed by a series of overtures by communist branches to the local socialist parties in Western

---

[26] Khrushchev, *supra*, pp. 34–35.

[27] Abridged Proceedings, Seventh World Congress, *The Communist International*, No. 17–18, Vol. XII, p. 128 (Sept. 20, 1935).

[28] Soviet nationalism, however, was claimed not to be of the old-fashioned kind: it was alleged to be different on the ground that it was built upon the conglomeration of races and nations composing the Soviet Union. "The strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that it is based not on racial or nationalist prejudices but . . . on the fraternal partnership of working people of all the nations of our country." (Stalin, speech of Nov. 6, 1944, quoted in E. H. Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (1949), p. 98.) It was a combination of old nationalism, history, military exploits, etc., plus new nationalism, glorification of revolution, the common heritage of the Soviet regime, the common struggle against others, and common identification in terms of domestic struggle for security in the Soviet Union first.

[29] Khrushchev, Speech before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, *supra*, p. 39.

Europe. The invitation, made officially at the Twentieth Congress, was reaffirmed in a resolution that proposed the "elimination of the split in the working class movement and the restoration of businesslike contacts between the Communist and Socialist parties."[30] The Soviet leaders in the spring of 1955 had already agreed in Belgrade that socialism may have other forms than Soviet communism. The bureau of the Socialist International, at a meeting in London in January, 1956, revealed that the Soviet Communist Party approached the Socialist parties in Western Europe and invited them for talks in Moscow with communist party members in order to establish closer relations with parties representing workers in different nations. Socialist parties in Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and France were invited.[31] The Soviet leaders now emphasized the coincidence and similarity of socialism, in contrast to the rigid Bolshevik view that "true communism exists only in the USSR." Toward western Socialists, the former "traitors to the working class," the Soviet Communist Party now took a radically different, friendly, and soft attitude. In particular, the Soviet leaders invited the Socialist parties to cooperate on problems concerning international tensions, the banning of nuclear weapons, and the creation of an all-European collective security system in the hope that a communist-socialist alliance "would prevent a new war." After all, Communist-Socialist cooperation in France and Italy benefited "the entire workers' movement" in these countries.[32]

The goal of communization of the world, or the Soviet Republic of the World, as Lenin used to call it, is today more alive than ever. However, methods of bringing it about have traveled a long way since the communists came to power in Russia.

Here, then, both security at home and insecurity abroad are united. The expectation of offensive armed conflict of the Soviet base with representatives of world capitalism has been found compatible with defense of the base's security, and *vice versa*. The ideological concept of struggle as a *sine qua non* of life itself has been the foundation of Soviet ideology, and security of the Soviet Union a strategic corollary of world revolution. Accumulation of power is, after all, a requisite of both successful defense and successful attack—whether waged by infiltration, intimidation, undermining of societies, conspiracy, coup d'etat, exploitations of indecisions and power vacuums, nationalism in colonial and non-self-governing areas, economic friendship or hostility, propaganda, military adventures, or "parliamentary" means.

The Soviet Union is thus both particularist and generalist: *particularist* because of its self-centered, self-interested stress on its own security, which admits only temporary, expedient alliance and permits no other interest in the ally than security. The differentiation is between absolute and relative hostility of the external world towards the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet system is unique in the world, it must be totally isolationist. The Soviet Union is *generalist* because of its will and messianic need to extend its ideological, social, economic, and political system to any region, continent, and the world. The balance of power concept is foreign to a Soviet planner. All-out domination is the goal; steps toward it may be paved and foreign powers placated by some formal balance of power—hence the formal satellite "independence." But since the world is almost uniformly hostile, on the one hand, and complete domination is the ideological aim on the other, "balance of power" is an empty phrase.

---

[30] *New York Times*, March 6, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.

[31] *New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1956, p. 8.

[32] B. Ponomarev in *Pravda*, March 31, 1956, p. 1.

Promotion of Soviet security is compatible with the ideological goal because, simply, that which strengthens the Soviet Union weakens the rest of the world and contributes, *ipso facto*, to the eventual victory of communism in the world.

IV. OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

The objective of communist ideology is an absolute world-wide victory. The strategic goal is unconditional security of the Soviet base, which would permit the further prosecution of the ideological objectives. Operational direction receives and elaborates strategic estimates and transmits them into practice through tactics and propaganda. It both channels the alterations required by strategy into new clusters of tactics and at the same time centralizes all tactical episodes and moves, revising and adjusting them to the ever-changing social and political situations. Operational direction constitutes the changing and adjustable portion of central policy, focalized in very few hands; this is the domain of "practical politics."

The significant changes described above—direct consequences of the strategic decision to build socialism in one country first—namely, attitudes toward the external world, methods of communizing the world, and ways of eliciting support at home when needed, are transmitted through operational direction for immediate elaboration into practice. Here such changes are studied, coordinated, synchronized, and then distributed into proper channels for execution in the field.

Examples of Soviet operational direction should be obvious by now: they range from the early isolationism (in order to preserve Soviet revolutionary gains); non-aggression and neutrality pacts with neighbors; increase of insecurity abroad through the Comintern; radical internationalism at home shifting to coexistence and collective security (in order to shield the Soviet Union against aggression before it was ready for war); adherence to the Kellogg Pact; entry into the League of Nations; virtual standstill of the Comintern; communist participation in united fronts in Western countries; nationalism at home; change from revolution-from-above of the pre-war, war, and post-war period to the present increased demand for cooperation with all countries and systems; broadening of the base for cooperation to include socialists and other heretics; combining moderate patriotism with "cosmopolitanism" at home; underplaying revolutionary and stressing parliamentary methods abroad; and finding important scapegoats for past international mistakes.[33]

---

[33] The present trend represents a softening—but not change—of Stalin's practical goals for Soviet foreign policy: "(1) to utilize every contradiction and conflict among sur-

Soviet party programs, when effective, indicate changes in operational direction. But party programs are seldom effective; important decisions cannot wait for implementation months and years later, and future decisions cannot be anticipated in present programs. Consequently, party platforms formalize obsolete directions. A good example is the recognition by the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1952 that the original goals, adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, were obsolete; the romantic, visionary, revolutionist, and highly impractical platform of the 1919 program could not possibly promote confidence in the Soviet Union's wish for peaceful coexistence with the capitalistic world. It branded disarmament, international arbitration, and the League of Nations as "reactionary utopia" designed to disarm the proletariat and divert it from the task of disarming the exploiting class.[34] There was no resting place for new friends of the Soviet Union who are non-communist, such as India, Burma, Afghanistan, etc. The 1919 program, also, too loudly proclaimed that "only a proletarian communist revolution can lead humanity out of the deadlock created by imperialism and imperialist wars."[35] Tactically, this idea is presently considered a *faux pas,* and revision is both "necessary and opportune," the 1952 Party Congress unanimously agreed. It appointed a Special Committee headed by Stalin and including Beria, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, and others to present a newly revised program to the next Party Congress, which would meet in February, 1956.[36]

At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev, who presided at the final meeting, proposed again a new party program to be prepared for submission to the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1960. He had to admit that the new program would replace, again, the antiquated 1919 platform, which the Nineteenth Party Congress failed to revise. This proposal, as before, was unanimously adopted. Tass reported that the "new" party program is to be based on

> the main provision of Marxist-Leninist theory, constructively developed on a foundation of the historical experience of our party, the experience of fraternal parties of Socialist countries, and the experience and achievements of the whole international Communist and workers' movement.[37]

Operational direction has another task: it centralizes tactical and propaganda information on economic, political, social, and military situations in different parts of the world and transmits it for diagnosis and comparison with the

---

rounding capitalist groups and governments for the purpose of disintegrating imperialism; (2) to spare no pains or means to assist the proletarian revolutions of the West; (3) to take all necessary measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the east; and (4) to strengthen the Red Army." "The Party before and after the Seizure of Power," *Works,* Vol. V (1947), p. 111.

[34] *VIII s'ezd Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Bolshevikov), Moskva,* 18–23 *marta* 1919 *goda. Stenograficheskii otchet.* (Moscow, 1919) p. 337.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Rezoliutsii XIX s'ezda kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza,* 5–14 *oktiabria* 1952 g. Gos. izd-stvo pol. literatury, 1952, p. 56.

[37] *New York Times,* Feb. 26, 1956, p. 2, col. 8; for the text of the resolution, see *XX s'ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiwza,* supra, pp. 409 and 499.

Soviet Union's own strength and for long-run modifications of strategy. Soviet analysis of economic, political, social, and military situations of other states is an important modifier of Soviet attitudes.

Operational direction, then, is an important clearing house for direction from above and information from below; Soviet decision-making is limited by the long-range directives of strategy and the permanent objectives of ideology.

V. TACTICS

Individual tactical episodes of a given Soviet policy represent individualized actions and reactions in a given time to a given situation; they must be speedily revised and adjusted to fit the current changes and distribution of political power. Tactics seek compromise: Stalin, for example, often quoted Lenin's dictum that conciliation and compromise are possible only on the periphery of ideology, in terms of tactics:

> The task of a truly revolutionary party is . . . to be able through all compromises, as far as they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary task, to its cause of preparing the revolution and educating the masses of the people for victory in the revolution.[38]

Tactics are flexible: "Party tactics must be elastic, taking into consideration all the special features of the moment and the new problems advanced by life."[39] They are "concrete" short-range moves, vertically differentiated to fit as many exigencies as possible.

Soviet tactics and their use today may be illustrated as follows: Soviet *strategy* currently demands international cooperation on as wide a basis as possible. Khrushchev stated that the Party in its foreign policy must

> undeviatingly . . . follow the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence among different states, irrespective of their social order. To fight actively for peace and the security of nations, and for confidence among states, by seeking the conversion of the relaxation achieved in international tension into lasting peace.[40]

Operational direction on this basis divided the world into three categories: (1) countries of "fraternal peoples,"[41] (2) countries which "refuse to be involved in military blocs,"[42] and (3) the "military bloc" countries.[43] Other criteria than military could be used, of course, but the result would not be much different.

---

[38] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Bk. 1 (1932), p. 152.

[39] E. Jaroslawski, *Aus der Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowiet-Union*, Part I (1931), p. 167, quoted in F. M. Marx (ed.), "Totalitarian Politics, Symposium on the Totalitarian State," *Proc., American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 82 (1940), p. 10.

[40] Khrushchev, Twentieth Party Congress, *supra*, p. 41.

[41] "To strengthen by all means the fraternal relations with the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, the (East) German Democratic Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of (North) Korea, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Mongolian Peoples Republic, remembering that the greater the unity and might of the Socialist countries the more secure is the cause of peace.

"To strengthen by all means friendship and cooperate with the fraternal people of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." *Ibid.*

[42] "To reinforce indefatigably the bond of friendship and cooperation with the republic of India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and other states that stand for peace. To

"*Tactics* guiding itself by the *directives of strategy* . . . marks out [then] those concrete courses for winning of the wide masses to the proletarian side and leading them to battle stations on the social front. . . ."[44] What are these "concrete courses" which are guided by operational direction for strategical purposes?

(1) The first group of countries, those "fraternal" to the Soviet Union, signify, in Khrushchev's words, "the principal feature of our epoch," namely "the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and its transformation into a world system."[45] In political, military (Warsaw Pact), and economic (Council for Mutual Economic Aid) terms, the seven Eastern European countries are thought to be more integrated with the system of the Soviet Union than other communist countries, with the exception of Mongolia—in a system of political bondages, enforced loyalties, military and economic dependencies, combined with effective Soviet mercantile colonialism.[46]

The sequence of events in Poland and especially the violent revolt in Hungary spoiled the series of prophesies of Soviet leaders at the Twentieth Party Congress concerning the "most" fraternal countries. Hungary revolted forthright; despite the many speeches condemning Stalinist methods of suppression, the erring child was clasped back to the Soviet bosom with brutality and force. Poland, on the other hand, appeared to be straying from the Soviet Union and getting away with it; although geographically a full-fledged satellite, Poland began to behave, and the Soviet Union appeared to accept this behavior, just as Communist Yugoslavia and Communist China did, on the theory that each country determines its own methods and forms of socialism. This theory, first expounded by Tito, brought about the rupture between Yugoslavia and the Cominform in June, 1948; proclaimed by Gomulka, it led to the Warsaw crisis in October, 1956; and it was again confirmed by Mao Tse-Tung in February, 1957, as valid for Communist China.

Soviet cooperation with other communist countries has been close but less integrated for a number of reasons. Especially Communist China and Tito's Yugoslavia have been important exceptions among the "close ranks of the countries of the Socialist camp" and have had to be dealt with separately. China, obviously, is a case *sui generis* and has been even more so since the

---

support countries that refuse to be involved in military blocs; to cooperate with all forces seeking to preserve peace.

"To develop and strengthen friendly relations with Finland, Austria, and other neutral countries." *Ibid.*

[43] "To conduct an active policy of further improving relations with the United States of America, Britain, France, Western Germany, Japan, Italy, Turkey, Iran and other countries, with a view to strengthening mutual confidence, extending trade, and expanding contacts and cooperation in the sphere of cultural science." *Ibid.*, pp. 41 and 42.

[44] *Stalin, Sochineniia*, Vol. V (1947), p. 62. Italics added.

[45] Khrushchev, Twentieth Party Congress, *supra*, p. 10.

[46] On Soviet attempts for economic integration of its satellites, see H. Schwartz, "Soviet Tightens Economy of Bloc." *New York Times*, March 25, 1956, p. 19.

speech of Mao Tse-Tung on February 27, 1957, to the closed session of the Supreme State Conference; "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" again challenged Moscow as the ideological center of world communism. Yugoslavia, expelled from the Cominform in 1948, has been subject to embarrassingly attractive offers of Soviet economic assistance, trade, and friendship ever since Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visited Tito in 1955. The Communist Information Bureau, guilty of having expelled Yugoslavia in 1948, was dissolved to appease Yugoslav communists.

By and large, however, Soviet operational direction in regard to the "Socialist camp" countries seeks to build through individual tactical episodes a strong, integrated, efficient, and unified regional system; as Mikoyan stated, "The isolation of Soviet public and state organizations from the outer world has been liquidated."[47] The Soviet Union is not opposed by the whole rest of the world any more:

> The simultaneous existence of two opposed and world economic systems of capitalism and socialism, developing according to different laws in the opposite direction, has become an irrefutable fact.[48]

For the Soviet leaders, a regional organization of states based upon common ideology and similar political, military, and economic structures is an important step and a "sacred duty" toward the ideological goal;[49] for us, this is an excellent example of how Soviet tactics, unified by operational direction for strategical purposes, serve Soviet ideology and "lead the masses to battle stations on the social front."

(2) The second group of countries, termed by Soviet operational direction as "neutrals" who wish "to cooperate with all forces seeking to preserve peace," includes virtually all nations not members of either the "Socialist camp" or the "military bloc," and in particular the "uncommitted" nations. They include twenty-seven per cent of the world's population living on forty per cent of the world's territory. The nucleus of this neutral camp is the African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian nations, which comprise most of the underdeveloped lands of the world. This whole area is not, obviously, the immediate Soviet target. In his speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev mentioned India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria as states to be "supported" and with whom "the bond of friendship and cooperation should be indefatigably reinforced." At any given moment, certain countries matter more than others.

Economically, Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries has until recently been relatively negligible, limited to loans and barter deals. Soviet offers of technical assistance through the United Nations have been in blocked rubles only; however, the propaganda impact of Societ economic assistance has been extremely favorable, and there are current indications of tactical changes to put more emphasis on this field of activity. *Militarily,* the Soviet leaders have been in an excellent position to try to influence other nations by offering armament for sale, of which the "Socialist camp" has a vast stock. Actual *trade,* or offers of trade, provides another golden opportunity for increasing communist influence; the greater the volume of trade, the more dependent and vulnerable the recipient, has been the Soviet motto. And in *diplomacy* the Soviet leaders find the widest range of tactical possibilities; their dialectical, bilateral behavior seems to have paid the highest dividends and scored real successes.

---

[47] Twentieth Party Congress, *supra,* p. 310.

[48] Khrushchev, *supra,* p. 10.

[49] "It is the sacred duty of every state where the working class is in power to preserve and develop mutual friendship and coöperation, and the unity of the Socialist states will continue to strengthen with each day." *Pravda,* June 20, 1957.

(3) The third group of countries, namely the United States and nations associated with it in one way or another, are the "military bloc" countries, with whom "mutual confidence should be strengthened [and] contacts and cooperation in the sphere of cultural science . . . expanded." The recent Soviet emphasis on amity with the United States "as the world's strong power" has been mentioned. The Soviet approach to Britain has been changing recently as well. France is attracted by the Soviet stress on disarmament and economic aid (particularly in oil and crude oil) to Western Europe. However, the Soviet leaders have approached some special countries, like Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the Latin American countries, Japan, Denmark and Norway, bilaterally, hoping to swing them to the side of the USSR or at least to neutralize their cooperation with the West.

Individual tactical moves, then, guided globally through operational direction, aim to strengthen the Soviet Union and the "Socialist camp," to bring closer to or even within this camp the "uncommitted" countries, and to neutralize the "military bloc," especially in terms of its more vulnerable links. Diplomatic, political, military, and economic pressures are used formally; tactics do not exclude, of course, various types of subversion and clandestine techniques wherever appropriate. Bilateralism has been preferred by Soviet leaders to a multilateral approach as a means of isolating individual countries and piecemeal disrupting of the enemy line.

The obvious ambiguity which characterizes Soviet tactical episodes is an extremely useful weapon which at any given moment identifies tactics as the "real thing," attracts followers and supporters who normally would not be taken in, utilizes confusion in the enemy camp, and creates a useful domain of indecision which feeds its new moves. Consequently, tactical episodes operate in situations of both stability and instability simultaneously; they function on two planes at the same time, something that seems, but is not, a contradiction in terms. Peaceful coexistence and constant struggle are compatible, as are, for example, Soviet diplomacy, which carries out Soviet foreign policy, and communist parties abroad, which supplement and complement such policy in its concrete given aims.

Conciliatory gestures, offers of future benefits, conditional threats, explicit and far-reaching demands in behalf of peace, evasions on vital points, multiple variations on the neutralist theme, monopoly of peaceful intent: the wealth of Soviet tactics, often combined with propaganda, has no limits.

VI. PROPAGANDA

Depending on the prevalence of either ideology or tactics as ingredients in the current policy, the outcome may result either in less hostility and more friendliness to non-Soviet partners in the world arena, or the other way around. Virulent attacks are perfectly compatible with appeals for coexistence and even cooperation between the two systems, just as flexible, temporary tactics are compatible with rigid ideology. In the long run, this persistent contradiction pays off in terms of propaganda: The USSR, for example, may point out its tactical "unwavering attempts to secure peaceful coexistence of the two systems by all possible diplomatic and international means," which are frustrated by the Western response to its ideological goals.[50]

A student of the Soviet Union has to be aware of this constant contradiction and be able to differentiate and sort actions, available statements, and documents into the appropriate columns of the Soviet foreign policy spectrum. Soviet leaders, speaking to a world-wide audience, cannot afford to talk in terms of doctrinal or even strategical directives if such revelations would cause the failure of contemplated actions; they must emphasize the immediate minimum Soviet program and mislead, confuse and lull the suspicions of the world at large. Propaganda must be utilized to speed up action in a particular phase of short-range duration.

Because of the well guarded protective screen of the iron curtain, Soviet leaders have developed in international relations a technique which at times fools not only their friends but their opponents as well: any lofty issue demanding complete territorial applicability is acceptable and vocally supported by the USSR in its role of the most devoted champion of peace, justice, equality, democracy, freedom. The loophole is that Soviet representatives abroad always combine such an acceptance with an adamant refusal to agree to any specific proposal for international implementation, control, or enforcement of such policies as incompatible with Soviet sovereignty. This position offers so many advantages that it has been part of Soviet foreign policy—or that part of it which is reserved for propaganda—almost ever since the Bolshevik revolution. Disarmament, collective security, human rights, the United Nations Convention on Genocide—all these issues, staunchly defended by the Soviet Union, fall into this category.

USSR propaganda may be a technique of both the minimum and maximum Soviet program, just as tactics may complement ideological objectives. On the other hand, the Soviet Union may prefer to prolong its fight as long as possible, to postpone its victory, or even to lose the battle, if such tactics may appear advantageous for propaganda reasons.

Once Soviet propaganda abroad becomes more subtle, refined, patient, and sophisticated, as has been lately the case, the danger of its success may disproportionately increase: the newly advertised evolutionary communism; communist eagerness to collaborate with all parties representing the workers abroad; the Soviet economic offensive in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America; the well calculated individualized approaches to Western European countries; European collective security—these are instances of tactics skillfully employed for propaganda purposes as well.

---

[50] For Soviet propaganda as a factor economizing the material cost of world domination, see H. D. Lasswell, "The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda," *Proceedings, The Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 24 (1951), p. 214.

The best recent example of this newly emerging effective propaganda in foreign policy is, perhaps, the resolution of the communist Partisans of Peace at their 1950 Congress in Warsaw to cooperate with—of all things—the Movement for world government. The executive committee of the Congress, the World Peace Council, approved the resolution; consequently, the Executive Council of the World Movement for World Federal Government invited the Partisans of Peace to send observers to the Fourth World Congress of the World Movement.

The expected happened. The invitation almost crushed the World Movement; in a storm of protest and threats of resignation, the invitation was withdrawn. The communists succeeded in a skillful maneuver and caused quite a controversy. Needless to say, their generic hostility to a world government which they would not control would have prevented any kind of cooperation, but their cool play *forced* their enemies to lose.[51]

Instances of this kind will undoubtedly increase in the future; I suggest that, judging from recent experience, Soviet propaganda is improving with time. If the free world can do no more in the face of this artful diplomacy than adopt defensive and negative postures, it will lose not only the "friendly competition" for the uncommitted nations, but confidence in itself.

It is now possible to draw conclusions from this brief study of the major components of Soviet foreign policy: (1) Soviet ideology, although frequently a latent factor, is of crucial importance in the Soviet decision-making process. (2) Soviet strategy is responsible for quantitatively more Soviet decisions in foreign policy than any other factor. It signifies the Soviet compromise with obdurate reality and endows Soviet ideology with the element of power. The consequences of the raw necessity of incorporating strategy into policy are many: the most significant of these are nationalism at home and coexistence abroad, both of which are, because of their limitations, compatible with the Soviet ideological objective of world revolution to be accomplished by any method available. (3) Soviet operational direction is an important clearing-house for instructions from above (strategy) and information from below (tactics, propaganda), a necessary transmission belt. (4) Soviet tactics are the soldiers in the field, responsible for carrying into effect Soviet foreign policy on the spot, guided by operational direction and conditioned by the immediate response of the limited environment. (5) Soviet propaganda, a prominent psychological factor in the execution of Soviet foreign policy, is the conditioning and softening element of foreign policy in general and of Soviet tactics in particular.

---

[51] *Cf.* Elliot R. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and World Government," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (1953), p. 251.

In order to test the application of this operational model to known Soviet policy moves, a considerable number of past Soviet actions in foreign affairs were viewed through the analytical spectrum of the model described above, in preparation for this study. Lack of space prevents detailed illustration of such experiments here, to show how Soviet foreign policy actions may be categorized, processed and interpreted with the aid of this conceptual framework in order to gain more insight into Soviet foreign policy and facilitate the search for Soviet behavior and attitudes to the world not obvious at first—or even at second—glance. Others may try such applications for themselves, to test the utility of the model.

Usually, and unfortunately for an analyst, actions do not take place in separate, neat situational compartments; they occur in the context of a series of varied situations, often simultaneous, and as a part of many responses to various stimuli; they often are imperfect attitudes, formal or effective, important or unimportant, adapted to the environment in which they take place. Therefore, the resulting analyses are indicative of elements which are related to or affect attitudes and behavior and which are helpful in tracing the choices made; factors that may be responsible for the choices; and patterns of behavior and attitudes shaped by these factors. But awareness of the limitations is imperative at all times in the study of any foreign policy, and even more in the study of the Soviet policy of conflict. Judicious restraint does limit the scope of the inquiry; but since such limitation adds to the value of an empirical theory—while the investigation itself reveals significant policy implications—the process is a useful one.

POWER AND PERSONALITY: THE APPEAL TO THE "RIGHT MAN" IN DEMOCRATIC STATES*

DAVID SPITZ
Ohio State University

At least from the time of Socrates, in whose ideal state philosophers would be kings, the appeal to the right man has played a major role in systematic reflections on the control of power. For if the right man does rule, Socrates argued, neither institutional nor other controls—*e.g.*, law—need to be employed. Because he is the right man, he will do the right things: he will rule wisely; he will establish or, where already established, he will perpetuate, that order in human affairs that best approximates or achieves justice and secures liberty.

The problem, then, for those who hold this view in democratic states, is not whether the right man should rule, but how he is to be discovered and how he can be assured the reins of political power. Or, to formulate the problem in negative terms, how can we identify and exclude from power those who are the "wrong" men, those who are likely to rule badly and unjustly, those who—because they are, for example, "authoritarians" at heart—may if they achieve positions of power violate the very principles of the democratic state and thereby endanger its existence?

A preliminary—and perhaps crucial—difficulty must be noted. The appeal to the right man may not be altogether compatible with the appeal to democracy. If, for example, the right man is subject to democratic controls, primarily to the principle of responsibility, he may be removed from or not elected to office, in which case democracy is revealed to be a form of state in which the "wrong" man can rule by popular approval. If, on the other hand, those who appeal to the right man insist that the right man rule, or that the wrong man be excluded from political power, without regard to what the people want, then the state which adopts their view ceases to be (if it formerly was) a democratic state. Most political philosophers who have looked to the leadership of the right man for political salvation, have seized the latter horn of this dilemma. With Plato and Santayana—to take but two from among the more noted of such writers—they have mocked democracy's trust in public opinion. They have derided what they have contemptuously called the rule of the common (by which they mean vulgar) or average (by which they mean inferior) man. They have appealed instead to a form of the aristocratic state—to a political order in which those few who allegedly know what is right will also, precisely because they "know" (*i.e.*, have wisdom), follow the path of "virtue."

This is not the place to discuss the easy assumptions and many fallacies of the aristocratic appeal to the right man,[1] for, whatever its merits or deficiencies, to the extent that it departs from or negates the principle of democracy it offers no solution (and is therefore irrelevant) to our central problem, which is the control of abuses of power *within* the democratic state. When we turn, however, to democratic expositions of the appeal to the right man—to the doctrines of men who, like Harold Lasswell and Karl Mannheim, take the position that only through a reliance on the right man, and a concomitant rejection of the wrong man, can democracy hope to prevent or to escape from abuses of power—we encounter other, and scarcely less serious, difficulties.

---

* This article is a chapter from a forthcoming book, *Democracy and the Challenge of Power*, to be published by Columbia University Press in the Fall of 1958.

[1] For an analysis and criticism of the various forms of this aristocratic appeal, see my

For one thing, who is the right man, and who the wrong man? How, and by what criterion or set of criteria, is such a man to be identified or defined? Secondly, will a reliance on the right man, or a repudiation of the wrong man, really eradicate oppressive rule? On the one hand, the right man may succumb to and be corrupted by the normal temptations of power, in which event he ceases to be the right man, or may in retrospect be held never to have been the right man. On the other hand, he may, to retain his office, yield to the pressures of public opinion; he may give the people what they want, or what they say they want, and in this event, should the demand be (say) for oppressive rule over a despised minority group, he would no longer fulfill the purpose for which as a right man he was called. If either of these eventualites were to be realized, we would find that we had but traveled a full circle: for we began by looking to the right man to prevent and even to eliminate the ravages of oppressive rule, and we end by looking for some means to rid ourselves of the man who is no longer the right man, and who may in fact have himself become the worst of oppressors.

To make clear that these are real and probable difficulties and not merely hypothetical horrors, it is necessary to consider each of them in turn.

I. THE DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT (AND WRONG) MAN

Despite the bitter judgment of Ecclesiastes, who warned that "there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not,"[2] some of those who would save democracy from its sins have looked yearningly for a just man, one who would do good and commit no evil. Such a man, in traditional political thought, was not merely the competent but the superior man; he excelled all others by virtue of his merit or achievement.

Merit, to be sure, is an ambiguous term, and has been variously defined. In some constructions it has been equated with learning or wisdom; in others, with that technical training or experience that produces what is commonly called expertise; in still others, with certain intrinsic qualities allegedly associated with blood and breeding; and in others, again, with the prescriptive sanction of a higher authority such as God. Each of these qualities is susceptible, in turn, of different definitions. Thus, while learning to the ancient Greeks meant philosophy, to what is perhaps the dominant strand of contemporary American

---

Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought (New York, 1949), chs. 4–9, and R. M. MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard* (New York, 1950), ch. 5 and pp. 130–133.

[2] *Eccles*. 7:20.

opinion it means knowledge of such applied sciences as medicine and law; and this knowledge is generally associated less with scholars in the law schools (say) than with practicing lawyers, especially those who for one reason or another have attained a place on the Supreme Court. Similarly, the term achievement is not without considerable ambiguity: for one who has acquired great wealth may not enjoy great fame; one who has achieved fame may not also be wise; and one who is wise may remain always in poverty and relative obscurity. Which is the greatest achievement?

It need not follow, of course, from the fact that traditional political philosophy has produced no agreement as to who is the superior or right man, that there is no such man. One among the many divergent views may prove, ultimately, to be well-grounded. One among the many claimants may emerge as "the" right man.

But the dilemma referred to above would still remain to bedevil those who appeal to this right man. For if, on the one hand they place him beyond popular control, they move out of the realm of democratic theory into the never-never land of what they choose to call aristocracy—a world that can appear real only to one who seriously believes that some men at least are, if not perfect, uncontrolled by passion and by the pursuit of self-interest; that some men are, indeed, possessed of so compelling a sense of duty and so abundant a measure of intelligence as to be motivated only by what is advantageous to all and to be unaffected by the corrupting influences of power; that such men are, consequently, to be unhesitatingly entrusted with the lives and destinies of other men. Unfortunately for such a belief, it ignores certain inconvenient historical truths, not least among them the fact that the very existence of democracy is to be accounted for as a reaction against the demonstrated incompetence and tyranny of "aristocrats" and other self-styled superior men. Not all who have affirmed the aristocratic theory have had the honesty and courage of Santayana, who, while he dared to hope, admitted too that good government—from his aristocratic point of view—has never yet existed (and perhaps can never exist) in this world, that all past aristocracies have in fact been artificial and corrupt.[3]

If, on the other hand, the appeal to the right man is limited to an exhortation to the people to select a particular man or type of man on the ground that he is the right man, it is an appeal not to the wisdom of the right man but to that of the popular will, in which case it is the judgment of the latter that is at stake.

Another form of the appeal to the right man, however, has emerged in recent years. This appeal eschews the language of morality—of right and wrong, of good and bad, as ethical terms—and seeks instead, in line with what is conceived to be the approved method of modern science, to use such terms only in relation to a stipulated goal. If that goal is the preservation (or the achievement) of democracy, and more immediately the control of oppressive power, the right man is not one who is abstractly the best or most virtuous man but one who is specifically committed—dedicated, if you will—to the attainment of that goal. He shares "democratic" values, he avoids abusing his power, not because it is fashionable for him to do so or because it may happen to serve his convenience or his purposes, but because he *must*, because he really wants to, do so. He is so constituted, in fact, that he cannot (or at least is unlikely to) think or act otherwise. This is because, in the language of the theorists of this school, he is a "democratic" as distinguished from an "authoritarian" personality; he has the "right" type of character structure.

---

[3] George Santayana, *Dominations and Powers* (New York, 1951), p. 413.

It would be misleading to imply, as do some of the more extreme formulations of this view, that the appeal to democratic personality altogether neglects or moves outside of the institutional framework. On the contrary, it is most commonly an appeal to personality precisely because that personality is held to be in accord with a particular institutional framework. Thus Mannheim, one of the more sophisticated exponents of this "scientific psychology," assumes as an underlying premise of his argument "a correlation between social organization and personality pattern." He draws a contrast between democratic and authoritarian types of personality and between democratic and authoritarian societies, and insists that only where we have *both* a democratic social structure and a democratic man can we hope to realize the good—*i.e.*, the democratic—society.[4]

A like argument is advanced by Lasswell. Ideally, Lasswell believes, human freedom requires the elimination of power; it means a world "in which coercion is neither threatened, applied nor desired." Since, however, there is no likely probability that power will be eliminated, the immediate task is to curb its destructiveness, to prevent it from interfering with or deviating from the "network of congenial and creative interpersonal relations" that, in Lasswell's conception, constitutes democracy. To guard against such "antidemocratic and destructive" deviations, he would have us rear, choose, and support "leaders with the personality formation appropriate to democracy." He would have us look not to their beliefs but to their adjustment; and this, of course, makes democratic leadership a function not simply of popular desire but of social psychiatry—"the social psychiatry of democracy." "What is needed," Lasswell insists, "is a *National Personnel Assessment Board* set up by citizens of unimpeachable integrity which will select and supervise the work of competent experts in the description of democratic and antidemocratic personality." For unless we support the one and reject the other, "the equilibrium essential to sustain the democratic commonwealth cannot be maintained."[5]

Now the contention that in every society some men are visibly—*i.e.*, impressionistically—more prone than others to resort to arbitrary or "authoritarian" methods is, I think, unexceptionable; as is too the conclusion from this fact that a democratic society, if it is intelligent, should not select cruel and vicious men in the hope that upon attaining power they will succumb to the father-instinct and become shepherds rather than wolves, that it should look instead to the leadership of "decent" and reasonably stable persons. None would dispute such a position. But if I understand Lasswell and Mannheim correctly, their argument goes further than this. They would have such men selected, or at least initially screened, by "scientific" methods—*i.e.*, tests, questionnaires, interviews, and the like—that would, because they are "scientific," admit of little or no error. And this is quite a different thing.

---

[4] Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (New York, 1950), especially chs. 7–9. The quotation is on p. 231.

[5] H. D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948), pp. 110, 108, 115–118, 146, 187, 108.

In the first place, the difference between a "democratic" and an "authoritarian" personality is sometimes not in how he behaves but in how he is treated. In this respect Shaw's conversion of Eliza Doolittle from a flower-girl into a duchess attests to a greater insight than that simplistic psychology which mechanistically reduces adult conduct to its alleged infantile origins, or equates it with a particular type of character structure. No one who has seen the products of prison or reform school brutality, or who has witnessed the frustrations and anxieties imposed on administrators by the formalized routines and other pressures of a bureaucratic system, can doubt that personality is as much molded by the situation in which a person finds himself as it is by the imputed compulsiveness or aggressiveness of his neurotic nature. If, then, a so-called "authoritarian" personality is thrust into a "democratic" environment, it does not necessarily follow that his personality will remain unchanged.

In the second place, it is not at all clear just what a "democratic" or an "authoritarian" personality *is*. Despite the urgency (let alone the confidence) with which Mannheim and Lasswell and others of this school plead their cause, they have nowhere adequately spelled out the specific nature of these conflicting character profiles or personality types. It does not carry us very far, for example, to say, as Lasswell and Mannheim do, that the democratic personality is tolerant, cooperative, and secure, while the authoritarian personality is domineering, resentful of criticism, more prone to resort to violence and other forms of pressure, and burdened by social anxiety. These are, for the most part, tautologous terms; they hide rather than reveal meanings. They also overlook the fact that few if any individuals are in all the facets of their being consistently the one or the other personality type, that nearly every man exhibits a complex of both "democratic" and "authoritarian" behavior traits. It is not unusual, then, for many who are "democratic" in their social relationships to be "authoritarian" in their family or professional life. It is, to revert to our first point, the situation and not the so-called personality type that is often crucial.[6]

---

[6] As Else Frenkel-Brunswik, one of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* (see note 8 below), elsewhere put it: "Since every individual possesses features of the authoritarian as well as of the democratic personality, though in varying proportions, such objective factors as economic conditions and such psychological factors as feelings of dissatisfaction, helplessness, and isolation may decide the issue in a particular overall situation." "Interaction of Psychological and Sociological Factors in Political Behavior," this Review, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 63. See further her paper, "Further Explorations by a Contributor to 'The Authoritarian Personality,'" in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), especially pp. 227 ff.

It follows, thirdly, that if we do not know with "scientific" precision what a democratic or authoritarian personality *is*, and if what any one person *is* depends on the dynamics of a situation as much as, and perhaps more than, upon some static character trait or set of attitudes, then any attempt to test or to measure an assumed and fixed personality "type" is bound to be ambiguous or meaningless. And if we turn from the work of a sociologist like Mannheim and a political scientist like Lasswell to the tests, questionnaires, and interviews of the professional social psychologists and psychoanalysts, we find that this is precisely what occurs: the tests do not measure what they purport to measure; the evidences do not *prove* the existence of a definite "democratic" or "authoritarian" personality type.

This is true whether we take as our point of departure the simple though politically meaningless definition of the authoritarian personality given by Erich Fromm—that the authoritarian personality craves power over men but at the same time esteems it in others and longs to submit to it[7]—or the more complex if somewhat contradictory definition given by the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* (perhaps the most influential of recent studies espousing this point of view)—that the authoritarian personality is rigidly conventional but is also cynical and destructive, is unimaginative and opposed to the subjective but is also disposed "to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world," holds to a deterministic view of man's fate but is also preoccupied with sex and power, and so on.[8] Neither definition is very helpful, for both describe or delineate features that can be found in some measure in nearly every man and hence do not enable us to discriminate among them. Since, moreover, both Fromm and the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* employ an approach to personality that focuses on attitudes or predispositions rather than (as Mannheim in one place urges[9]) on behavior, they run into a larger difficulty—namely, the inability to distinguish (and consequently to measure) opinions or ideology from character. If we add to these limitations the failure of both contributions to take adequate account of the varying intensities with

---

It ought to be observed in passing that what is true of personality is true also—in this respect at least—of society: for no society completely fits into one or the other of these rigid categories of the psychologist; every society contains both "democratic" and "authoritarian" elements. Mannheim occasionally pauses to recognize this point, both in relation to personality and to society (see, for example, *op. cit.*, p. 208), but his argument generally ignores or minimizes the importance of this consideration.

[7] *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941), pp. 163–164, 168, 236.

[8] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), p. 228 and *passim*. See also Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "Environmental Controls and the Impoverishment of Thought," in C. J. Friedrich (ed.), *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 171–202, and her papers cited in note 6 above. *Cf.* further A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 18 (1943), pp. 401–411; G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, 1954), ch. 25; and Gerhart Saenger, *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (New York, 1953), ch. 9.

[9] Mannheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–180.

which such attitudes or predispositions may be held, and to relate them to the dynamic situations in which they may emerge or in which they may be present but subdued, we see that neither work can take us very far toward a "scientific" understanding of what the "authoritarian" personality is.[10]

Lasswell, indeed, in commenting on *The Authoritarian Personality*, argues that such a concept as the "authoritarian" personality—which he here defines as the "power centered" or "power oriented" man—is more properly applied to *followers* than to *leaders*, or to those who play comparatively minor rather than major roles in the power structure; conversely, he suggests, "all top leaders in democratic or totalitarian regimes . . . tend to be recruited from fundamental personality patterns that are not primarily oriented toward power."[11] If this hypothesis is valid, it would seem to negate his own earlier thesis as well as to cast into disrepute the entire notion of the appeal to the "right" personality (and the concomitant rejection of the "wrong" personality) as the indispensable corrective to the abuse of power.

II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE RIGHT MAN

It may, however, be argued that these strictures are not permanently binding. I have, after all, conceded that the *idea* of an authoritarian personality has a certain plausibility as an impressionistic or intuitive-apprehending if not scientific fact. Consequently, it may be said, refinements in testing techniques may in time enable us to verify such impressions and reduce them to demonstrable facts. They may help to isolate what is intrinsic to character structure from what is part of the total environment. But whether or not they succeed in doing so, it can be argued, the important fact remains that the authoritarian personality—however men may differ as to its definiton—can in some measure be detected even now; hence, this awareness properly becomes, or should become, a guide to political action.

Now the possibility that refinements in testing techniques and in other devices will be achieved, is hardly to be contested. Nevertheless, two problems at least will still plague those who hope to demonstrate through such means the validity of a particular personality typology. One problem derives from the curious but not surprising fact that while the concept of the authoritarian personality has received much attention and can be held to rest on some "scientific" evidences, the concept of the so-called democratic personality hangs very much in the air, and is more likely to remain there. For however difficult the task of defining the authoritarian personality may be, the description of those character traits or attitudes that constitute the democratic personality is a most dubious and controversial—because unscientific—undertaking.[12] The other problem stems from the fact that the line between the individual and the social cannot be effectively drawn. This, of course, was precisely the point on which Mill's otherwise admirable essay *On Liberty* floundered, and it is by no means evident that psychologists and sociologists since his time have succeeded in establishing a legitimate principle by which to differentiate that which is intrinsic to man from that which is inherited or acquired from society. I do not mean to imply by this that personality cannot be distinguished from culture; for the two, while not separable, are not the same. I argue only that the individual, be he conformist or rebel, is so much a product of his society that his attitudes, values, and behavior are always in some measure socially conditioned; they are always a reflection of his cultural environment. When we add to this the very great complexity, the continuing mystery, of personality itself, we see that no psychology can hope through an analysis of individual character alone to establish a particular typology of democratic and authoritarian personality.[13]

---

[10] For some of these and other criticisms as applied to *The Authoritarian Personality*, see Paul Kecskemeti, "Prejudice in the Catastrophic Perspective," *Commentary*, Vol. 11 (1951), pp. 286–292, and Christie and Jahoda, *op. cit.* These findings are summarized in Nathan Glazer, "New Light on 'The Authoritarian Personality,' " *Commentary*, Vol. 17 (1954), pp. 289–297.

[11] Lasswell, "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in Christie and Jahoda, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 220–224.

Let us, however, set these objections aside. Let us grant, in the face of our ignorance of future events, that a meaningful distinction may be drawn between democratic and authoritarian personalities, and that adequate tests may be devised to tell us into which category our various political leaders or would-be leaders belong. Can we then really expect the eradication of oppressive rule?

The answer, I fear, must still be negative, and for two reasons pre-eminently. On the one hand, abuses of power are not simply a consequence of some psychological quirk or defect in the ruler; they are also the product of conflicting interests, of long-sustained prejudices, and of established traditions. On the other hand, the right man, once in power, is not likely always to remain the right man. Contrary assumptions, while not wholly false, are insufficiently true to warrant the high expectations that some men have placed in them.

Consider first the view that men who abuse power do so primarily (in some formulations of this theory, exclusively) out of evil intent or vanity or madness. The list of tyrants who meet this view is a long but not an exhaustive one; Attila the Hun and Hitler and others like them are known, after all, only because they were, even among tyrants, unusual men. But, more importantly, the abuses of power that disfigure democratic states are customarily of a different order. They derive not merely from the caprice or malevolence of those who come to power, but also from the fact that those who rule, like the factions of the people who support them, tend all too often to pursue their own narrow or selfish interests; that rulers tend all too easily to identify the good of the whole with the material good of their class or of some special portion of the whole, such as their families and themselves. Thus, unless it can be shown that personality stands in some necessary—or even approximate (understanding by this a highly probable)—relation to policy, so that the right man will by virtue of his "rightness" act justly (*i.e.*, in a way that transcends particularity of interest) and the wrong man will by virtue of his "wrongness" act unjustly (*i.e.*, in a way that sacrifices the rights of the many, or even of the few, to greed and ambition), the appeal to personality is no solution to our problem.

---

[12] Thus A. H. Maslow, who finds it impossible to avoid using the term, admits that "the concept 'democratic personality' is simply not a scientific concept; there is no agreement whatsoever on its meaning." "Power Relationships and Patterns of Personal Development," in Arthur Kornhauser (ed.), *Problems of Power in American Democracy* (Detroit, 1957), p. 94. Other recent attempts to describe these traits—*e.g.*, by Lasswell in his *Democratic Character* (published in *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* [Glencoe, Ill., 1951], pp. 465–525) and by Allport, *op. cit.*, chap. 27—are quite unconvincing when read in the light of such strictures as those by Kecskemeti and Glazer (works cited above, note 10) and by E. A. Shils ("Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,' " in Christie and Jahoda, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–49) on the definition of the democratic personality employed in *The Authoritarian Personality.*

[13] *Cf.* Reinhard Bendix, "Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 58 (1952), pp. 292–303; David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 172, 178, and *passim*, and D. H. Wrong, "Riesman and the Age of Sociology," *Commentary*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 331–338.

This cannot be shown. There is no demonstrable relation between "democratic" or "authoritarian" personalities and policy such that authoritarian men will line up on one side, and democratic men on the other side, of each conceivable issue. The lines of ideological division do not respect those of personality, whether we look at a particular issue such as desegregation or at more general questions of domestic and foreign policy or even at the basic problem of the form of the state itself. Indeed, if the theory of the authoritarian personality is a valid one, it is precisely among authoritarians that the greatest ideological divisions are likely to occur; for here the driving force is said to be not ideology but ambition, the craving for power, and in this context policies will be supported or opposed not in terms of their relation to one's character structure but in terms of their utility as steps along the pathway to power. The shifting positions on policy questions taken by Communist political parties in all democratic states at the command of the rulers in the Kremlin, most strikingly at the time of the Nazi-Soviet pact and again at the demise and subsequent denuding of their "great leader Stalin," is a continuing illustration in point; as are too the autocratic methods sometimes employed by democrats in combatting those whom they deem to be authoritarians. On the other hand, persons of quite different dispositions may well behave in a more or less uniform manner, as is evidenced, for example, by the wide diversity of personality characteristics to be found in any political movement, including a democratic one.[14]

In fact, to argue that there is a causal relationship between democratic personality and social role, is to imply that the specific undemocratic practices in this country—many and varied as they are—could all be eliminated merely by placing men with democratic personalities into positions of power. But this, surely, is a fanciful expectation. History is not made by the impact of personalities alone. A Carlyle may look to the ablest man in loyal reverence, and decry any institutional or other restraints that lesser men seek to put upon him. But politics in a democracy is more than a matter of heroes and hero-worship.

---

[14] *Cf.* Shils, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–49.

Other influences are also at play: the individual must come to grips with the interests and traditions of parties and pressure groups no less than with the established organs of government; he cannot ignore social conditions and the power of non-political organizations; he must look to the will, however erroneous he may believe it to be, of the electorate which put him in power, and which can vote him out. He is bound, in a word, by historical, political, and economic forces that are not of his own making and that are often beyond his effective control. Consequently, even if the ruler should be the right man, the right personality, it does not follow that he can, in a democratic state, do what he conceives to be the right thing.

Nor should he be permitted to do so. If it is the business of a democratic state to give the people what they want, to satisfy their stated desires rather than their objective needs (*i.e.*, what some allegedly wise men conceive their needs to be), then it is the function of the government to meet, not to negate, that demand. This is why, in principle, all the people, and not just a few of them, are given political rights. They need those rights, as Mill said, not in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned.[15] And for this purpose it is not the right or the outstanding man, not the so-called democratic personality, that is required, but the representative man—who is sensitive to the changing tides of public opinion and will faithfully seek to translate them into public policy. This is not to imply that a democratic leader ought never to attempt to mold or to change public opinion, that he ought never to be more than an effective recording device for the popular will. But it is to say that however much he may essay a leading role, he ought not, by and large, to act contrary to the judgment of his constituents. So long as he fulfills this role effectively, it is no proper concern of the public what manner of man he is. In this respect it is the part of wisdom to distinguish, so far as one can, the ruler's public life from his private character.

All of this is not to deny that evil or stupid men can cause great harm, and that those states are fortunate that can keep such men out of power. It is only to argue that since tyrannical policies are not necessarily the result of wrong or authoritarian character structures, those policies can neither be removed nor prevented by a remedy that looks to personality alone.

This conclusion is reinforced when we turn to the second of our two major objections to the relevance of the right personality: that the right man is also prone to do great harm. In part, this is because the temptations of power may sooner or later corrupt him, in which case he ceases to be the right man. But in part too, it is precisely because he is the right man that he may do wrong things.

For if the right man is "right" in the moral sense of the word, and is moved by his intelligence and good will to correct the injustices that exist about him, he is sometimes apt to resent those of lesser talents or firmness of character who disagree with him and who would impede his work. Rather than risk failure, rather than have to say later, as the utopian communist Wilhelm Weitling bitterly said: "If all had followed me as the children of Israel followed Moses out of Egypt, I would have succeeded,"[16] he may endeavor to silence or to override dissent and to impose his own right judgment. Unhappily, in a world of conflicting moral codes, the right man is right for himself and perhaps for some others, but not for all men; and for those whose judgment is at variance with his own his coercive rule is as wrong as it may, in a particular situation, be oppressive. This is not, let it be understood, to argue that it is impossible to obtain a "right" man (*i.e.*, right to those who so conceive him) as a leader in a democratic state, or that it would be undesirable to have such a right man rule. Nor is it to contend that such a right man could not, under any conditions, succeed both in remaining a right man and in ruling wisely. It is only to insist that such a right man *may*, in a particular set of circumstances, insist on having his own way (*i.e.*, the "right" way) even if this requires him to act contrary to the popular will or to violate basic democratic rights.[17]

---

[15] John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government* (Everyman's ed., 1910), ch. 8, p. 291.

If, on the other hand, the right man is "right" in the democratic sense of the word, he is prone to respond affirmatively to the dictates of public opinion. But public opinion may bid him on occasion do an undemocratic thing, in which case he must choose between conflicting policies. As a right man, he wants to give the people what they want; but as a right man, he is committed too to the preservation of democracy itself. To remain loyal to the latter obligation is to defy public opinion and thereby to risk dismissal from public office. To accede to the public will is to repudiate his greater allegiance and thereby to retain public office only at the cost of ceasing to be the right man. In the first case, he is right but he may also prove ineffective; in the second case, he is neither right nor effective. In both cases, therefore, the appeal to the right man, to the leadership of (say) the democratic personality, provides no sure solution to the abuse of power.

I do not mean to carry this self-defeating perplexity too far. The fact that too many men would rather have power than be right does not necessarily imply that all right men will seek at all costs to retain power. Not all power corrupts all men. Some power, in fact, is requisite to the making of a man. Without some autonomy of action, without some delegation of power and the responsibility to administer that power wisely, a man may never grow out of the mentality of a child; he may remain always a dependent animal. And if experience is any guide, the histories of the British and the American democracies make it abundantly clear that, within a respected tradition and an institutional framework that renders rule neither permanent nor absolute, power does not necessarily corrupt; by affording opportunities, it enables many to rule moderately, and some to achieve greatness.[18]

[16] Quoted in Carl Wittke, *The Utopian Communist: A Biography of Wilhelm Weitling* (Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 234.

[17] In this respect Santayana does no more than barely overstate a basic truth when he argues that "all living creatures become wicked under pressure. Absolute singleness of purpose cannot but be ruthless; it is ruthless initially, because it has no eye for any contrary interest; and it becomes ruthless again deliberately in the end, because all contrary interests seem odious and sinful to its fanaticism." *Op. cit.*, p. 436.

[18] *Cf.*, for example C. J. Radcliffe, *The Problem of Power* (London, 1952), Lecture V.

But the temptations of power, though resisted by some, overcome many more. The lure of glory, of pride, of material gain, no less than the conviction that given the power to implement his will one can achieve great things, the right things, for the whole of his people—all these combine to make the pursuit, and later the retention, of power a more than necessary thing. Good men may begin the quest reluctantly, but they rarely end that way. The game is too serious, the weapons too biting, the stakes too high, for them to remain in fact what they strive to appear to be—selfless and genteel servants or would-be servants of the body politic. Those who lack power yearn for what appears now to be well within their grasp, and the failure to achieve it but stimulates them to greater endeavors than before; while the actual conquest and enjoyment of power, despite its bitter fruits, is yet so sweet as to seduce those who possess it into thinking that they were destined for the offices they hold, or (what amounts to the same thing) that their achievements will be destroyed if they surrender their protective role. And always there are the *courtiers*—the flatterers and the sycophants, the profit-seeking groups and the glory-seeking adventurers—whose own possibilities of success are linked to that of the rulers and who are ready, therefore, always to praise their rulers' actions and to encourage their idolatry of themselves.

It is not, therefore, surprising that even good men should begin to think that their power should be commensurate with their goodness, and that this being (in their own eyes at least) unlimited, they should desire their power to be unlimited too. It is true that many have echoed D'Avenant's warning that "no one man ought to think of being omnipotent, unless he could be omniscient and omnipresent."[19] It is true also that in this respect the American political system has heeded only too well Montesquieu's warning "that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. . . . To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check on power."[20] But those who look to the guardianship of a right man do so precisely because the power which was designed to check the abuses of a lesser power is seen to require a check on its own abuses in turn. And those who, while recognizing the impossible requirement of omniscience and omnipresence, insist nevertheless on omnipotence (or a near-omnipotence) in the hands of a right man, do so precisely because they are confident that the right man, because he is a "democratic" man, will not abuse his power.

---

[19] Charles D'Avenant, *An Essay upon the Probable Methods of Making a People Gainers in the Balance of Trade* (London, 1699), p. 270. And compare Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Bradley ed., Vintage Books, 1954), I, 270: "Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing. Human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion. God alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are always equal to his power. There is no power on earth so worthy of honor in itself or clothed with rights so sacred that I would admit its uncontrolled and all-predominant authority. When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws."

[20] *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book XI, ch. 4.

Yet surely it is here, at the level of such absolute or near-absolute power, that the greatest danger of tyranny lies. For while power in itself may have no more than a tendency to corrupt, absolute power, as Mill and Acton said, corrupts absolutely. It gives its holders a new importance, a new set of habits. Finding themselves worshipped by others, they soon come to worship themselves. Finding that they can do as they like, they indulge in actions that previously seemed so improbable of achievement as to be put beyond the realm of serious contemplation. This is why it is foolish to assume, as the theorists of "democratic" personality are too often inclined to do, that a man out of power will remain the same man when in power. We must never forget, after all, that temptations come more often to him who is in power, and who can by his indulgence advantage the tempter, than to one who is out of power, and who can therefore indulge but give nothing in return.[21] Or that the removal of restraints on the bad as well as the good parts of one's nature makes possible the release of inhibitions that may work to the detriment of the community.[22]

What requires emphasis here, however, is not the corrupting effects of absolute power; for absolute power, even in the hands of the best, the most "democratic" man, is incompatible with democracy. What must be noted is the more relevant fact that even a limited grant of power works somehow in invidious ways to corrupt many of those who exercise it. It is, therefore, a wise political system that looks not only to the beneficent uses that good men will make of power but also to the unhappy consequences that might flow from power in the hands of those who were the wrong men before they achieved power or who became the wrong men after they obtained it.

I have argued, to this point, two things: first, that those who appeal to the right man to control abuses of power have provided no satisfactory definition of that right man; and second, that even if that right man were adequately defined, he would not necessarily remain the right man or do the right things. I have suggested, conversely, that the idea of the wrong man, of (say) the authoritarian personality, is of no real value to a democratic society, and this for two reasons in turn: first, that the definition of the wrong man is hardly less ambiguous or more applicable than is that of the right man;[23] and second, that since oppressive policies are the product of other, and more important, factors than that of personality alone, the repudiation of the wrong man would not necessarily secure the democratic state from the excesses of arbitrary rule.

---

[21] This is one of the reasons why extreme radicals and reactionaries, when out of power and with relatively little chance of getting into power, are so often men of inflexible principle. They are incorruptible because, in part, no one seeks to corrupt them. They are inflexible because, in part, no one seeks to compromise their differences in order to enlist their support.

[22] *Cf.* Mill, *op. cit.*, ch. 6, pp. 252–253.

[23] It ought perhaps to be added that if by an authoritarian personality is meant one who is congenial to totalitarianism, a distinction must be drawn between the kind of personality that seeks totalitarianism (*e.g.*, a rebel or non-conformist) and that which remains under it (*e.g.*, a conformist). *Cf.* Albert Lauterbach, "Totalitarian Appeal and Economic Reform," in Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 288. Unfortunately, those who most vigorously press the notion of the authoritarian personality rarely pause to note this distinction, much less to consider what it means.

It remains now only to stress one further point—namely, that it is the very meaning of democracy to accommodate the different personality types (if there be such) on equal terms, and not to discriminate among them. Democracy as a method of resolving differences among equals does not guarantee that the best or the right or the so-called democratic man will be put into positions of power, though it should be added that it is preferable for that purpose to other methods of choice. It is no proper concern of a democratic state that one man resents criticism while another welcomes it, that one man lacks independent and critical judgment while another is a creative thinker, that one man seeks power while another shies away from it, that one man is seemingly "well-adjusted" while another is a solitary and difficult or "ill-adjusted" man. Men with such personality traits are to be found in every society, democratic and oligarchic alike, for there is no demonstrable relation between a democratic man and a democratic society, or between an authoritarian man and an oligarchic society. What history teaches is always, of course, a matter of considerable controversy, but this much at least seems clear: that democratic societies have always produced some "authoritarian" men, and that authoritarian societies have been confronted in every age by men who have been "democrats" both in personality and belief.

Whatever the historical teaching, however, it is the logic of the democratic principle that all men,[24] and not just a particular few, be admitted on equal terms to the rights of citizenship, to the contest for political power. It is also a part of that logic to insist that even the best men, when in power, be held responsible for their actions; for in no other way can a people hope to correct the errors that even the best, because they are still fallible, men commit. And it is a part of the faith, if not the necessary logic, of democracy, that improvement in human affairs is to be anticipated not when a society is made up of like men, for that is the way of stagnation; but when a society cultivates, perhaps to an even greater degree than we thus far have, those conflicts of values, those differences in personality traits, that give challenge and variety and zest to the otherwise drab and penurious existence that is the everyday lot of so many men.

---

[24] I except, of course, children and the insane.

CENTRALIZATION IN HAWAII: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT[1]

NORMAN MELLER
University of Hawaii

The Hawaiian Islands, in Mark Twain's words "the loveliest fleet of Islands that lies anchored in any ocean," offer more than a vista of sub-tropical splendor to the student of government. Hawaii presents also an extreme of centralized administration probably unequaled in any state on the mainland. The century prior to annexation by the United States saw the major islands of the Hawaiian archipelago come under the jurisdiction of a single government which rapidly underwent a metamorphosis from stone-age, native absolutism, through restricted constitutional monarchy, to the status of independent republic. "Adjustment rather than reorganization defines the change in government necessary when Hawaii entered the Union as a Territory."[2] Allowed by Congress almost all the powers of a state, and wide discretion in erecting its own local structure, the Territory chose to continue the concentrated administration which had characterized government throughout the century of independent rule. Only within the last few years has this centralization been shaken by the introduction of challenging centrifugal forces. Today, Hawaii affords the prospect of an ocean-girt test tube in which can be observed the interplay of these new formative forces with the old causative factors of centripetal tendency; the end product may be a decentralized administration more on the model of the mainland.

I. CENTRALIZATION

Hawaii has long lent itself to government through administrative units island-wide in area or even spanning island clusters.[3] Attempts at establishing self-government through New England-type town meetings, local school districts, and local road districts all met with indifferent success or outright failure during the period of the Monarchy. At the time of annexation in 1898, the short-lived Republic was the sole governmental unit in the Islands. The Hawaiian Organic Act permitted perpetuation of this by merely authorizing—but not requiring—the creation of "counties and town and city municipalities within the Territory. . . ."[4] Local dissatisfaction and Congressional rumblings of disapproval contributed to territorial establishment of county government in 1905, and from that time until the present, the three counties of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, and the city and county of Honolulu,[5] have represented the sum total of local government for Hawaii's half-million people.[6] The recent addition of soil conservation districts hardly changes this picture.

---

[1] Material in this article extracted from a manuscript on government in Hawaii now in process of completion.

[2] Hawaii, *Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior, 1926* (Washington: G.P.O., 1926), p. 2.

[3] To the south, the Island of Hawaii, comprising the County of Hawaii; then the cluster of Maui, Molokai and Lanai, composing the County of Maui; the Island of Oahu, which accounts for practically the whole of the City and County of Honolulu; and, to the north, the County of Kauai, consisting of the Islands of Kauai and Niihau.

[4] Hawaiian Organic Act, sec. 56. The history of the Act's passage through Congress indicates that the Senate advocated compelling the Territory to provide local government

Hawaii's centralization has been distinguished more by the direct performance of functions by the central government than by the assignment of functions to the counties, under territorial administrative oversight. Health, education, and welfare—all traditional strongholds of local government on the Mainland—are almost wholly administered by the Territory in the Islands. When to these functions are added agriculture, forestry, fish and game conservation, labor, and the public service enterprises encompassing airports, harbors and housing, the scope of direct services rendered by the territorial government assumes imposing dimensions. The Territory and the counties divide many of the remaining functions of government, with the Territory occupying the major share; taxation, highways, and regulation of business serve as illustrations. In the remaining group of functions which have been left to the counties for administration, the Territory utilizes the entire gamut of techniques available for assuring central administrative supervision of local performance—from the innocuous requiring of reports by local officers to the extreme of the Territory's substituting for a county in its performance of a particular activity.[7]

Despite the long history of centrally rendered services, the Islands at intervals over a span of a hundred years have nevertheless experimented with the operation of central control devices superimposed upon local administration. It is thus not due to inexperience nor chance that the Territory has adopted direct performance of governmental services as a distinguishing mark of its centralization. Rather, Hawaii's distinctive form of government is the result of several formative causes which have tended mutually to reinforce each other in shaping the Islands' administrative system. Different periods have their own distinguishable climates which appear to favor particular administrative forms. The Islands, perhaps uniquely, have long displayed a complex of forces which has encouraged the development of concentrated authority at the territorial level.

---

while the House of Representatives concurred with the Commission which drafted the bill in making it permissive. *Congressional Record,* 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900), Vol. 33, Part 5, p. 4458.

[5] The City and County of Honolulu dates from a 1907 act converting the County of Oahu created in 1905.

[6] Technically there is a fourth county, the County of Kalawao, comprising the Hansen's Disease Settlement located on a peninsula on the Island of Molokai. The territorial board of health actually governs this area. For other minor local units of government see U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Local Government Structure in the United States,* State and Local Government Special Studies No. 34 (Washington, 1954), p. 87.

[7] See Schuyler C. Wallace's typology of control in his *State Administrative Supervision over Cities in the United States* (New York, 1928), pp. 39–59. All Wallace's forms of administrative control, plus a few indigenous to the Islands, are to be found in Hawaii.

II. FORMATIVE FACTORS

The localizing of administration in Honolulu suggests the importance of the physical landscape in enabling the centralizing of functions. Honolulu's excellent port facilities encouraged its development as the metropolis of the Islands. In turn, during the Monarchy, nationwide commercial and financial institutions sprang up adjacent to the harbor and contributed to the control of the economic life of Hawaii through decisions made in Honolulu. The limited natural resources of Hawaii permitted most profitable exploitation through the plantation of the tropics with its attendant dependence upon a few staple crops worked by a horde of cheap labor. The plantation, characterized by its system of private government, obviated the necessity in the rural areas for most municipal services normally performed by local government; those remaining unmet could be handled adequately by field representatives of the government in Honolulu. Although Hawaii's mosaic of islands separated by open ocean may appear *a priori* to have favored the erection of a decentralized governmental structure, with the boundaries of each local unit at best coterminous with those of one of the seven major islands, the formative political influences in Hawaii early overcame this divisive factor of internal geographic insularity.

With the rise of the plantation, the labor markets of the world were tapped to meet the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the sugar fields for new manpower. Over 400,000 foreign-born laborers and their families—chiefly Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, Korean, and Filipino, in the order of their importation—came to the Islands in the last century. This rapid change in the demographic landscape introduced into Hawaii a variety of ethnic groups untrained in the American forms of local government. It also discouraged the development of a strong, rural yeomanry to challenge Hawaii's economic and political leaders. The small urban settlements on the Outer Islands failed to grow at a rate commensurate with the rest of Hawaii's expanding population. With the gradual drift to Honolulu of the ex-plantation workers remaining in the Islands, Honolulu's population increased both relatively and, in the last few decades, absolutely at the expense of the other counties. Ultimately, most of the need for public regulation and services occasioned by the presence of three-fourths of the Islands' peoples in Honolulu could be met directly by the agencies of the central government at the capital.

The *kapu* system of old Hawaii placed an arbitrary power of life and death in the hands of King and *alii* (chiefs). The founding in 1820 of the Hawaiian Mission with its somewhat oligarchic control gradually established a new, but still authoritarian pattern for evolving political institutions to follow.[8] Later, the authoritative position of the plantation manager, with his all-embracing concern for the details of plantation life, reinforced previous Hawaiian[9] and immigrant experience with autocratic political forms. The Mission and the plantation were both interested in the maintenance of the strong central government introduced by Kamehameha's unification of the Islands, but for different reasons: the former, for securing the adoption of a new moral order; the latter, for obtaining the world-recognized status so essential for treaty writing, for assuring observance by contract laborers of their commitments, and for maintaining the private government of the Islands against the threat of inundation by the Orientals it had imported. The continued concern for the community welfare displayed by the descendants of the missionaries nicely dovetailed with the paternalism of the plantation in directing Island ways and delaying the growth of vigorous local government in which all might participate.

---

[8] The congregations of the various churches did not govern their own affairs. Each was in subordination to the missionary who controlled the activities of the churches in his district within the course cut by the annual General Meeting of the Hawaiian Mission in which only the missionaries participated.

[9] As used in Hawaii, and in this paper, "Hawaiian" refers ethnically to the original Polynesian inhabitants of Hawaii and their descendants, and includes *all* part-Hawaiians.

A closely related factor has been the guidance of *haole*[10] leadership in the Island Community. Almost contemporaneous with their advent in the Islands, *haoles* commenced exerting a formative influence over government in Hawaii, and by the mid-nineteenth century were its administrative mainstays. Thereafter they came to dominate, and upon the overthrow of the Monarchy, established the Provisional Government and later the Republic. When the Hawaiian Organic Act went into effect in 1900, for a short period the overwhelmingly Hawaiian electorate of that day experimented with the franchise and the Hawaiians' Home Rule Party captured most of the elective offices. *Haoles* again assumed positions of political leadership despite the enlarged electorate ushered in by territorial status, and until recently it has been part of the Island tradition that when the *haoles* want some local reform, if they "want it with enough enthusiasm, they can always get it adopted."[11]

It has been claimed that the *haoles* secured the demise of the ill-fated Home Rule Party, with its pro-Hawaiian bias, through reaching an understanding with the remaining *alii* group among the Hawaiians; others consider economic control as alone having been sufficient to enable the *haoles* to regain their political influence. Certain it is that a relatively few *haoles* in the Islands, many of them descendants of the missionaries, intermarried and socially a class apart, have owned the vast bulk of the Islands' wealth. This economic control has been institutionalized through the Islands' financial organizations and the sugar factors—the "Big Five"—which came to direct the course of the sugar industry as well as set the tempo of the entire economy by virtue of their relation to the water carriers servicing Hawaii and the Islands' external and internal trade. The very structural forms which grew up within the sugar, and later, to a lesser extent, in the pineapple industries—the Islands-wide plantation association, the industry-wide marketing cooperative, and the joint experiment station—only added further emphasis to the centripetal tendencies of the

---

[10] "Haole," a word unknown to any standard English dictionary, is a common component of the Islander's lexicon. Originally it probably meant "foreigner" but it has long since assumed overtones of status. It means "the whites of North-European complexion, most of whom have come from the mainland United States." Robert M. C. Littler, *The Governance of Hawaii* (Stanford, 1929), p. 65. Until recently even official publications distinguished the "haole" from persons of Portuguese ancestry

[11] Littler, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

Islands. Unions introduced a disturbing power element into this economic oligopoly. But the inclusion of sugar workers, pineapple workers, and longshoremen in one dominant union, that union with but a single local situated in Honolulu, and with its top *haole* union leaders negotiating all-industry contracts with management through a Territory-wide employer group, reiterated the Hawaiian bent for the concentration of economic institutions having their situs in Honolulu.

From the Mission days the *haoles* carried over the conception of the Hawaiians as a people untrained in matters both ecclesiastical and political. Being a small minority—only during the mass inflow of defense workers during World War II did the total of *haoles* attain a third of the entire civilian population—the *haoles* have tended to look askance at what they have called irresponsibility at their expense on the part of the Hawaiians. In addition, some feared the growing size of the Oriental component of the Islands' peoples. Upon the incorporation of Hawaii into the Union, it appeared to these *haoles* that their security would be protected by bulwarking decision-making against the excesses of local opinion. Hence the necessity for action by Congress to amend Hawaii's "constitution," its Organic Act; appointment of the highest executive and judicial officers in the Territory by the President; elimination of any elected office in the territorial executive branch able to defy the Washington-appointed governor's directions; and maintenance of the center of decision-making in the territorial government, one level removed from the vicissitudes of local politics—all this, though in the pattern of other territories, nicely coincided with these Islanders' desires. Also, a central government subject to *haole* suggestion afforded greater opportunity for *haole* staffing of its key subordinate positions. Local government has thus remained weak, for after the rise of King Sugar, there was little to be gained by those setting policy from altering Hawaii's concentrated form of government. As an astute commentator writing two decades ago concluded, it was general knowledge that since the beginning of territorial status, governors, legislators and government officials had been to a large degree determined by and considerate of the sugar leaders.[12]

The near monopoly which the Republican party enjoyed until recently in all but the City and County of Honolulu provided the small *haole* group dominant in Hawaii's economy with a vehicle for translating their influence into political action, in good part through the leverage provided by financing the party. The Hawaiians, long comprising the majority of the voters, could be satisfied with a major role in the limited county government and with the outward trappings of authority attained through office holding or employment made possible through party patronage. Because of the strength of the Democratic party in the City and County, any major surrender of the central government's functions to the counties obviously was detrimental to the Republicans; meanwhile, due to the failure to reapportion since 1900, Outer Island majorities in both Houses of the Territorial Legislature assured the offsetting of Democratic votes in bipartisan Honolulu. Centralized government under Republican direction supplied a neat solution to the entire problem of Island political and ethnic diversity.

---

[12] Frank E. Midkiff, "The Economic Determinants of Education in Hawaii" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School, Yale University, 1935), p. 132.

A final major factor has been the subservience of the Orientals in the Island community. Hawaii's aliens were bred in a status society in which the extended family and customary conduct overshadowed individualism; their participation in Island politics had to wait upon their acculturation and the growth of a new generation born on American soil. From 1887 under the Monarchy and until the United States naturalization law of 1952, the election and naturalization laws denied voting rights to foreign-born Orientals. Rather than continuing the psychology of the frontier, the Orientals retreated into their little "Chinatowns" and "Tokyos." Meanwhile nationalistic movements, extraterritorially oriented, provided an outlet for political urges unsatisfied through the Orientals' conduct of their own private communities. Syngman Rhee lived long years in Hawaii agitating for Korea's independence, and Sun Yat Sen's false Hawaiian birth certificate evidenced he was no stranger to the Islands. The Japanese alien's sublimation of his political urge was subtler, and took the form of pride in the accomplishments of his homeland, overtly represented by collections for the Japanese war effort and by patriotic exercises.

With the shedding of the first generation's authoritative institutions, Hawaii's citizens of Oriental ancestry were unconsciously preparing themselves to question the hegemony of the dominant *haole* group and the governmental system it supported. Each decade since the grant of territorial status, citizens have comprised larger fractions of all ethnic categories in the Islands except the Hawaiian, and have offered an ever greater potential for the organizers of both major parties. Gradually the Oriental component of the civil service expanded; hesitantly, at first, Orientals ran for public office. The following tables well illustrate the changes a half-century has brought:

TABLE I. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF HAWAIIAN TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURES, AT DECADE INTERVALS

Senate						Year	House					
Haw.[1]	Haole	Port.	Ch.	Jap.	Other		Haw.[1]	Haole	Port.	Ch.	Jap.	Other
8	7	—	—	—	—	1907	23	4	3	—	—	—
8	6	1	—	—	—	1917	20	5	5	—	—	—
7	7	1	—	—	—	1927	15	8	6	1	—	—
5	9		—	—	1[2]	1937	11	13		3	3	—
6	7		1	1	—	1947	9	13		3	5	—
1	5		1	8	—	1957	4	11		—	14	1[3]

[1] Haw. includes part-Hawaiian.

[2] Haole-Oriental.

[3] Korean.

Source: Annual reports of Governor, Congressional hearings, author's interviews and personal knowledge.

TABLE II. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF HAWAIIAN TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT PAYROLL IN PERCENTAGES (EXCLUDING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS)

Year	Haw.[1]	Haole	Port.	Chin.	Jap.	Other	Total
1926[2]	37	37	12	6	5	3	100
1930	33	36	10	10	7	4	100
1933[2]	33	31	10	12	11	3	100
1942	31	30		12	24	3	100
1954	26	18		11	39	6	100

[1] Haw. includes part-Hawaiian.

[2] Apparently includes school teachers.

Source: Littler, pp. 74–80, reconciled by author; Sidney L. Gulick, *Mixing the Races in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Porter Printing Company, Ltd., 1937), p. 88; Midkiff, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Hawaii Civil Service Commission, "Fourth Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission . . . " (Honolulu, 1942), p. 148; 1954 computed as of December by author on 5% random sample.

Initially the citizens of Oriental ancestry engaged in the political process more as a matter of ritual than of personal concern, for the vote symbolized citizenship. As formalism changed to active interest, the text-book education which equated home rule and grass-roots government with democracy became alive with new meaning. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, the stage was being set for Hawaii's self-appraisal of the administrative centralization which history had bequeathed and a unique complex of contributing causes had continued.

III. WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

In retrospect, World War II marks the turning point. Hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the Islands and resulted in sizable capital accretions, encouraging additional wholesale outlets to develop and mainland-type retail merchandising to spring up, independent of typical *haole* ties. Correlatively, the small entrepreneurial home-owning middle class, which previously had a minor role, rapidly grew in importance. Hawaii's fighting men distinguished themselves on the war fronts of the world and returned fresh with the enthusiasm of new horizons of personal experience. A number of "coast" *haoles*—newcomers, hailing chiefly from the west coast of the United States—stationed in the Islands during their military service or attracted by Hawaii's war boom, remained to settle permanently. Politically, their opportunity lay in the disorganized Democratic party. The ferment for questioning, if not the fuel for change, was at hand.

The first significant development on the political front occurred in 1946 and carried the portent of events to come—the Territory-wide success of the Democratic party in electing half the members of the Territorial House of Representatives, in overturning the entrenched Republican organization in the County of Maui, and in displaying a new-found vigor in its stronghold, Honolulu. Although after a protracted deadlock the Republicans organized the House, the

1946 elections gave evidence of the introduction of unionized plantation labor into the political arena and presaged the loss of other Outer Islands from the Republican fold. The Republican party continued to concentrate its efforts upon the Territorial Legislature, and for the moment the Democratic tide appeared to have subsided on the territorial level. But the Democrats in 1954 won a majority of the seats in each House of the Territorial Legislature, and when in the 1956 elections they filled the post of Delegate in addition to capturing the legislature again, the half-century of Republican control was clearly broken. A virile two-party system in Hawaii now seemed assured.

The Democratic victory was won, in the opinion of observers, by focusing the attention of a more sophisticated electorate upon issues; and one of the strongest planks in the party's 1954 platform was a demand for home rule. Inept leadership in the 1955 Territorial House, a strong Republican minority in the Senate, and a Republican governor, all combined to prevent any modification of the territorial administrative structure. Perhaps foreshadowing what the future may hold, the Democratic majority attempted to enact laws transferring police and liquor functions entirely to the counties. They would also have eliminated the attorney general's removal and directory powers over local county attorneys, and would have granted to the counties greater discretion in determining the amount of their income to be derived from the territorially-collected property tax.[13] The same fate of gubernatorial veto faced these or similar measures in the 1957 Legislature, for the Democrats again failed to secure sufficient seats in both houses to override the governor's objections. However, in the biennium between legislatures the Republican party displayed signs of reconsidering its stand on home rule while the Democratic party's ardor for full grass-roots government cooled somewhat. The Democratic shift of mood reflects the conservatism which tends to accompany an accession to power, as well as the realization that Hawaii's centralization facilitated the achievement of many of the party's other goals. Democratic legislators, like their Republican predecessors, hesitate to abdicate their newly-won, personalized control over governmental affairs in favor of the local officials of their home counties.

Although the same Democratic home rule measures were introduced in the 1957 Legislature, some of them had engendered enough opposition within the party to place them low in priority. A few succeeded in becoming law. Thus county attorneys no longer are deputies of the Attorney General; the latter, however, retains his authority over prosecuting offenses against territorial laws. More significant was the general climate pervading the legislative halls. This was manifest in such forms as writing safeguards into new planning legislation to require county approval for administratively proposed, territorial master plans; or seeking to grant initiating authority to the counties should the territorial authorities fail to take designated zoning action. In short, Democratic legislators continue to smile favorably upon greater local participation in government but are less inclined to undertake the major revision contemplated when the party first came to power.

---

[13] Meanwhile, the Republican governor submitted to the 1955 Legislature recommendations for an integrated territorial police force and for a Territory-wide motor vehicle registration system in place of the locally conducted arrangements now prevailing. These may be taken as highlighting the difference in position of the two parties on home rule as of 1945.

The threshold for definitive action was recently approached when the Republican governor pocket-vetoed the Democrats' 1957 tax reform bill, an omnibus measure designed to afford greater taxing powers to the counties as well as to reduce the regressiveness of the territorial tax system. This measure followed quite closely the provisions of the similar measure pocket-vetoed by the governor after the 1955 session. The governor's objections rested in part upon granting greater taxing discretion to the counties. At the ensuing special session the issue was clear, and this time the Democratic majorities, aided by three sympathetic Republicans in the lower house, repassed the tax measure over the third gubernatorial veto. Here the Democratic majorities were taking their stand, but were obviously now content to test the winds of reaction before proceeding further. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 4 of the Special Session expressly warns the counties that the exercise of their newly granted tax "power over the next several years may well determine whether or not the people of this Territory will favor further expansion of home rule by the counties."

IV. PROSPECT

The prospect is not yet clear; though the impact of the new centrifugal forces can be seen, their full strength has yet to be tested. Two vehicles which might have served this purpose promise little. A convention in 1950, as part of the Islands' drive for statehood, drafted a proposed constitution for the State of Hawaii. Within a more narrowly circumscribed compass, a charter commission created by the 1955 legislature has been formulating a charter for the City and County of Honolulu. The charter commission is expected to propose a stronger executive for Honolulu, but probably not more than minor readjustments in the allocation of functions between territorial and local governments. It is expected also to ignore requests to carve independent cities or towns out of the dormitory suburbs in the City and County. The "hope chest" state constitution already approved by vote of the electorate provides for the chartering of counties under general law but embodies no self-operative machinery to that end; the establishment of other political subdivisions is to remain at the discretion of the legislature. The proposed constitution does not require a reallocation of functions between central and local units of government; even in the area of education, in contrast to the mainland, a statewide school system would remain, the only sign of the changing times being the requirement that the governor name the school board from lists nominated by local advisory councils. The present tactic of seeking piecemeal amendment of the Organic Act to include the main portions of the proposed State of Hawaii's constitution assures that, come statehood or not, the relations between territorial and local government need not be disturbed.

The complex of centripetal forces which contributed to the extreme concentration of administration found in Hawaii has been broken. Yet it appears that the centralization embodied in governmental structure and processes has so engrained itself in the Islands as not to be easily reversible. In response to present pressures, the form of Hawaii's administrative centralization may be modified by delegating greater authority for direct administration to the counties. Of itself this will reflect only a superficial change; territorial administrative oversight, if not exacted as a condition of the grant, is likely to be immediately applied at the first sign of local inadequacy. Only over the long run, as the people of Hawaii come to trust the competence of their local government officials and, resolving their ambivalence, cease looking to the territorial government as the epitome of efficiency and the repository of leadership, can decentralization in fact occur. Whether that condition will be reached before increasing centralization of state and federal supervision over local governments on the mainland sets up a parallel countercurrent in Hawaii is problematical.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, 1975: AN EXTRAPOLATION OF TRENDS*

THE NEW METROPOLIS: GREEN BELTS, GRASS ROOTS OR GARGANTUA?

ROBERT C. WOOD
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Whatever the strengths and weaknesses in the study of urban government today, one fact seems clear: a process of transformation is underway. How fundamental a restructuring of research and teaching is involved is not yet certain, for the tide of debate still runs strong. At the very least however, the new model will be longer, wider and indelibly stamped with the forward look.

The boundaries of urban study are no longer limited to the formal structure and administrative processes of local government; they now embrace the variety of public activities within metropolitan regions, whether local, state, or federal in origin. The ranks of political scientists are augmented by sociologists, economists, demographers, and planners demonstrating renewed interest in the field. And almost every analysis is dynamic in scope and method, designed to anticipate the policy problems yet to come.

This last characteristic deserves emphasis. Few areas in political science seem to have accepted more completely Harold Lasswell's injunction in the Presidential Address of 1956 to scan "the horizon of the unfolding future." Acutely aware of the abundant signs of technology at work, armed with indices of population shifts, economic growth, and new living patterns, the modern student of metropolitan affairs works in a changing world. In the atmosphere of apparent crisis which surrounds his subject, he accepts almost enthusiastically the responsibilities of forecasts and predictions—with all the problems of significance and inference these terms imply.

In the spirit of the times, this paper reports the results of a limited venture in such a projection. It is not an extrapolation in the exact sense of the word, for no explicit relationships among variables are established and no series of values are assigned each factor. Certainly, all the relevant factors have not been identified, nor have all the new forces emerging in the area been "discovered." Yet without claiming mathematical purity or substantive completeness, the analysis does try to summarize some of the important new data now available, to identify some major trends, and to evaluate their significance on established doctrine respecting metropolitan government.

On balance, the effort to look ahead seems useful. For one thing, some inadequacies in existing doctrine come to light. For another, some of the shortcomings and uncertainties involved in the best of forecasts are revealed. Finally, and perhaps most important, it appears that while the ecology of the new metropolis will undoubtedly be different, the value issues which the new setting provokes will not. When the returns are in, political science remains free to repair to its traditional role of normative commentary and our obligation to render judgment is not diminished but intensified.

---

* A paper presented at the annual meetings of the Association, New York City, September 1957.

I

Growth and change in almost every aspect of American life form the backdrop of the studies of metropolitan regions and provide a concomitance of forces from which an analyst must choose. Innovations in transportation and communication, changes in housing construction and residential finance, mutations in the pattern of industrial development, almost instinctive aspirations for space and separate family accommodations, all play their part. So do the rising birth rate, the tradition of restlessness, nourished and intensified by the depression and the wars, the surging "upward mobility" within the middle class, prosperity and the family ethic.

From this concomitance, most of us who discuss the "metropolitan dilemma" and who call for radical reorganization of metropolitan government have traditionally selected three forces as being of major importance. The first is the pattern of population growth and distribution within the typical SMA, in particular the disproportionate increase in suburban residential population traceable for at least thirty years.[1] The second is the slow diffusion of industry and large commercial activities throughout the area which has been taking place as new enterprises build their factories and shopping centers in fringe areas and old ones desert the central city to join them.[2] The third is also diffusive in character, although less tangible: the gradual spread of the cultural ethos of the metropolis to enfold formerly independent communities and to blanket the hinterlands with a common set of mores and values.[3] To most of us, each of these trends, taken alone, appears to have negative consequences for the fragmented pattern of government in metropolitan areas, and taken together, they seem to point positively in the direction of a common conclusion.

The now familiar negative aspects of suburban population growth are primarily three. The first concerns the costs of metropolitan governments. The journey to work, which the separation of residence and place of sustenance imposes, appears both to burden unfairly the central city and to impose crush-ing demands on the suburbs. The core is required to handle the cost of servicing a daytime population thirty to fifty percent in excess of its permanent number; the suburbs have unnecessarily large capital budgets since, in the welter of jurisdictions, economies of scale and size cannot be realized. Duplication and overlapping of facilities between surburbs and the core city and among suburbs result.

---

[1] *Cf.* Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government*, (Chicago, 1942); John C. Bollens, *The States and the Metropolitan Power* (Chicago, 1956); the National Conference on Metropolitan Problems, East Lansing, 1956, and individual metropolitan area surveys. Several of these rely on population trends almost exclusively to develop reform proposals. Amos H. Hawley, *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America* (Glencoe, 1956), analyzes demographic developments. SMA means the Census Bureau's "standard metropolitan area."

[2] *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, Part II, Coleman Woodbury, editor, (Chicago, 1953), and *Financing Metropolitan Government*, a symposium conducted by the Tax Institute (Princeton, 1955), place special emphasis on this trend.

[3] For a general summary of this position, see S. A. Queens and D. B. Carpenter, *The American City* (New York, 1953), Chapter 7; R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York, 1933), Chapter 9; and Don J. Bogue, *Structure of the Metropolitan Community* (Chicago, 1949).

The population shift and the journey-to-work pattern which ensues appear to have a second negative effect. They seem to lead to a deterioration in the political process. The sturdy burgher class deserts the city, but the rigor of the commuting schedule makes its effective participation in surburban affairs unlikely. Big city politics is seen as becoming increasingly a struggle between the very rich and the very poor; suburban governments are held to be controlled by the old residents, merchants, and real-estate dealers, with only an occasional high-minded foray by the League of Women Voters. Most metropolitan inhabitants have their feet in at least two political jurisdictions; they are half-citizens, disfranchised either in law or in fact.

Third, what politics remains is likely to be bifurcated. As the suburban exodus goes on, we are told that the fringe and the central city are drifting farther and farther apart, the former increasingly Republican, the latter Democratic, so that the metropolitan areas are likely to be split into two warring camps. Prospects for mutual cooperation and understanding diminish, the metropolitan situation becomes cast in a rigid mold, and the opportunity for responsible consideration of regional problems diminishes.[4]

These implications of suburban growth *per se* seem dismal enough, but the second force of industrial diffusion adds a further difficulty. It appears to compound the metropolitan fiscal problem by making impossible an orderly matching of resources to requirements, by taking away revenues from the jurisdictions which need them most. Again, the plight of the central city is highlighted. Its tax base, already weakened by a large proportion of tax-exempt property devoted to educational and cultural purposes, is weakened further by the departure of business. Slums and blighted areas take the place of busy commercial districts, renewal efforts become more difficult, and welfare and public safety costs increase. Meanwhile in the outer ring some suburbs receive windfalls from new industry, but adjoining ones are saddled with the expenses of the workers living in cracker-box houses and putting four children per family through school. Because population and economic location patterns do not coincide, the traditional inequities and inadequacies of the American local tax structure are further intensified.[5]

As the metropolis extends its cultural influence, a third set of "negative" consequences ensues. Discrete local communities disappear; friendships become scattered randomly throughout the area; associations made in the course of work are different from those developed in residential neighborhoods. Only the ties of kinship and the stultifying communications of mass-media remain to bind men together.[6] This development is thought to have two untoward effects: first, as men wander aimlessly in the lonely crowd, the capacity of existing units of government to function vigorously and effectively is impaired for they no longer engender civic consciousness and a sense of belonging. Second, without regional institutions, no loyalty to a higher order is possible. All that remains is a weak notion of metropolitan patriotism, a New Yorker's superficial pride in being part of the Big Show. So regional problems find no vehicle for their solution and the capacity to look ahead, to plan rationally, to awake a regional consciousness is lost.

---

[4] Edward C. Banfield, "The Changing Political Environment of City Planning," a paper delivered at the 1956 meeting of the Association.

[5] This conclusion is a major point in almost every description of metropolitan government. Charles Adrian, in *Governing Urban America* (New York, 1955), Chapters 2 and 11, gives an able summary of this and the other negative consequences discussed earlier.

In a positive sense and in a broad way observers believe these trends are interrelated and that they lead to a common conclusion so far as political analysis is concerned. The separation of home and place of work, the rise of "nuclear centers of dominance" in the metropolitan economic system, the spread of metropolitan culture, taken together seem to signify that a metropolitan community has come—or is coming—into being. We have been imprecise about what the word "community" means. Rarely are political scientists as rigorous in their definitions as, for example, one of the panel members from a companion discipline has been.[7] But generally, we have assumed that if an aggregate of people in a given area achieve economic autarchy, if social intercourse extends over the area, and if common mores and customs exist, the basic foundations for a genuine community are present. The three factors we have studied seem to indicate that fairly self-sufficient metropolitan economic systems have developed, that social interaction now takes place across the entire area, and that a growing consensus about values is at hand. The prerequisites for the metropolitan community appear imbedded then in the trends we emphasize today.

Given this positive interpretation, the common conclusion is that for a single community, there should be a rationally constructed set of political institutions. The metropolitan dilemma is defined as the existence of many governments within a common economic and social framework. The metropolitan solution has been seen in variations on the theme "one community—one government" by any one of the half dozen ingenious political inventions. Running through all these recommendations is the premise that if somehow present units of government are brought together, if they can share resources and administrative responsibilities, the negative consequences of the forces now at work will be avoided and their impact guided into useful channels. If such reorganization is not forthcoming, we have generally believed these areas face governmental crises of substantial proportions. To drift with the tide is to court political, financial, and administrative disaster for urban government in the United States.

---

[6] An authoritative review of past and current literature dealing with the character of the metropolitan community is found in Scott Greer's "Individual Participation in Mass Society," a paper prepared for Conference Study of the Community, Northwestern University, 1956.

[7] Conrad Arensberg, "American Communities," *The American Anthropologist*, vol. 57, pp. 1143–1162 (Dec. 1955). See also Albert J. Reiss, "Some Logical and Methodological Problems in Community Research," *Social Forces*, vol. 33, pp. 51–57 (October, 1954).

II

The facts on which the case for metropolitan government depends are quite real, and we have not misread the figures. Yet nothing demonstrates the complexity of analysis so well as the results of our reliance on three trends, and three trends alone. Despite our predictions, disaster has not struck: urban government has continued to function, not well perhaps, but at least well enough to forestall catastrophe. Traffic continues to circulate; streets and sewers are built; water is provided; schools keep their doors open; and law and order generally prevail. Nor does this tolerable state of affairs result from an eager citizenry's acceptance of our counsel: we know only too well that our proposals for genuine reform have been largely ignored.

It may be, of course, that the breaking point has simply not been reached. There is certainly little sign that the tide of suburban growth is ebbing, or that industrial diffusion is slowing down, or that the representatives of the new American character are remorseful now that their values have been so cruelly exposed. If we are to look forward to 1975, we have good reason for believing that these trends will continue until the "linear city" is in being on both our coasts and probably in regions in between. Yet conditions were already serious enough in the nineteen-twenties to prompt investigation and to set loose prophecies of doom. Developments have continued unabated, and it is a fair question, given the technological changes of recent years and the stubborn public reluctance to listen to our counsel, to ask if we have discovered the whole story.

If we dip back into the arrays of factors and forces at work in metropolitan regions, other trends appear, and the more they are studied, the more important they appear. In effect, when other trends, formerly left unexplored, are reviewed, they seem to operate as countervailing forces that modify the trends on which we have concentrated our attention. At times they abate the consequences our basic factors imply; at times, they change the relationships we have assumed existed. And, at least in one important respect, they present a completely different picture of the SMA than we have been accustomed to portraying.

For example, while it is true that the disproportionate growth in suburban population has accelerated since World War II, that growth has been accompanied by an extraordinary period of prosperity. As the dominant feature of our economy for the past 15 years, inflation has swollen the cost of government, but it also swelled, although belatedly, the revenue. Urban governments have managed spectacular increases in their tax returns in the past few years, and we are told by no less authority than the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that the potential of the property tax is by no means realized.[8]

---

[8] Allen P. Manvel, "Trends in Municipal Finance," *Municipal Yearbook*, 1957, show-

Moreover, the rising level of incomes has an economic consequence quite apart from any particular tax structure: once basic necessities of life are satisfied, higher tax burdens, however imposed, are more tolerable, and borrowings become easier, so long as the market is not surfeited.[9] Thus communities may be forced to a general reassessment of property values, or they may skate on fiscal thin ice, but they need not undertake a general structural reorganization. Metropolitan governments may be forced to pay the excessive costs which the fragmented pattern requires, but they have been able to do so without encountering municipal bankruptcy.

Nor should other forces which bolster the capacity of metropolitan governments to sustain themselves be overlooked. While no major structural reform has been accomplished, state and federal grants-in-aid have helped support critical services and new municipal tax sources have been discovered and utilized. The plight of the central city has been to some extent relieved by grants and shared taxes, and by state assumption of important responsibilities. The commuter has either directly by earnings taxes or indirectly through his payments to state and federal governments contributed some of his share to the core municipality. The special district has been used more and more frequently to sidestep statutory debt limits, to tap new revenue sources, and to scale jurisdictional barriers in important functional fields. And some suburbs have been content to forego services, to get along with amateur governments, and to ignore the welfare state in order to remain autonomous.[10]

In less easily explicable ways, the deterioration of the urban political process seems to have been checked. Healthy signs of reinvigorated, capable political leadership have appeared in many of our large cities. Newcomers in suburbia have won important political battles, over schools and public improvements. Even the prophecy that the suburbs are irrevocably Republican and the central city irrevocably Democratic seems suspect in the light of the most recent election returns.[11] The party battleground is more complex than previously supposed.

---

ing the doubling of annual revenues for the 481 largest cities between 1942 and 1955 and the six-fold increase in non-property taxes.

[9] Projecting the municipal bond market is a risky business and certainly a strong case can be made that cities have explored this avenue to the limit in the last few years. Over the long run, however, if continued prosperity is assumed, it seems clear that municipal offerings will continue to play an important part in the investment market.

[10] Non-property tax revenue accounted for 27% of all local revenue in 1953. State and federal aid was about 8 billion dollars. It is also worth noting that an inverse relation usually exists between grants and non-property taxes by local units of government, so that units incapable of exploring a broader tax structure are bolstered disproportionately by aid formulae. For a fuller discussion, see The American Assembly, *The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators* (New York, 1955).

[11] Relatively little attention has been given to the subject of metropolitan voting behavior, and no general hypotheses seem firmly established. The Banfield analysis assumed a constant city Democratic majority of 60% and a Republican suburban majority of 60%. This assumption may be unrealistic after close analysis of the 1952 and 1956 national elections. For 14 metropolitan areas showing increasing Republican strength in 1952 over 1948, the gain in 8 central cities was greater than in their suburbs. In 1956, Republican

While the apparently obvious consequences of disproportionate suburban growth have been modified, other developments have affected the revenue side of the picture. Metropolitan areas as a whole have continued to hold their own in relative economic importance, and industry has continued to move out to the fringe. Yet, by concentrating on the pattern of industrial diffusion alone, we have overlooked even more important economic changes which sharply modify the "mismatched supply and demand" thesis.[12]

The first of these is the shift in consumer demands. As output and income per worker have grown, and per capita consumption has risen, a relative decline has occurred in the consumption of agricultural products and a relative increase in the demand for "services." Employment has expanded dramatically in the fields of trade, amusement, research, education, medical care—the white collar category in general. Since these are the fields where real output per man has not increased very rapidly, the proportion of the labor force thus absorbed expands more rapidly than the absolute decrease in other categories would imply.

Second, the structure of manufacturing activities has changed. Not only have industry classifications included a larger number of truly white collar workers—management, advertising, special repair and maintenance staffs—but manufacturing processes and products have become increasingly specialized. An increasing number of specialists offer intermediate processes and products to a number of different industries, and their facilities provide the small manufacturer with "external economies" which allow him to compete effectively with larger firms. There are an increasing number of "unstandardized" final products, too, as firms depart from offering a few stable lines and present their customers with an array of choices.

Together with the decline in the pull of raw material sources as a locational factor, the relative increase in transportation costs, and the growing size of metropolitan markets, these changes in demand and in the structure of manufacturing help explain the continued growth of urban areas as entities. More

---

central city gains continued, only San Francisco and Los Angeles managing a slight Democratic comeback. In spot Congressional elections in suburban St. Louis, sharp Democratic gains were registered between 1946 and 1954. A study of Boston metropolitan elections, state and national, between 1940 and 1954, showed 15 suburban towns growing increasingly Republican, 9 increasingly Democratic, and 13 changing from Republican to Democratic. While these analyses do not provide anything like a firm basis for positive speculation they do cast considerable doubt on the theory of suburban "conversion" to Republicanism, so prevalent in recent years.

[12] In the following discussion of metropolitan economic developments, the analysis is based upon interim findings of the New York Metropolitan Region Study. I am indebted to Raymond Vernon, Director of the study, and the other economists on the staff for their patient revelations of the mysteries of regional economics. The study has not yet reached the point where the trends discussed can be stated in quantitative terms, and considerable modifications of the reasoning here summarized may take place before the project's conclusion in 1959. At the present time, however, these findings appear fairly well substantiated. The Study, and the economists therein are, of course, not responsible for the interpretations and inferences I have made so far as metropolitan government is concerned.

important for our purposes, they move in the direction of counter-balancing the consequences of the industrial diffusion trend within metropolitan regions.

The rise in the importance of "services" in the urban economy means a broadening of the non-residential tax base exclusive of industrial plants. Offices, salesrooms, medical buildings, trade establishments of all sorts and sizes, while not as advantageous to municipalities in their cost-revenue ratios as manufacturing plants, still return more in taxes than they demand in public services.[13] As the white collar occupations grow in importance, the facilities in which they work become part of the resource base, and as they are scattered through the region in general they provide additional sources for revenue quite apart from those supplied by factories. If only industrial location trends are studied, this growing number of service establishments is overlooked and important increments to the resource base omitted.

The changes within the structure of manufacturing also make an exclusive reliance on the industrial location trends undependable, particularly since, quite frequently, only larger firms are singled out for attention. The increasing specialization which characterizes more and more modern manufacturing means that the processes in any given industry from receipt of raw material to delivery of finished goods may be dispersed throughout a region. Large plants and service facilities may drift toward the suburbs in search of cheaper space, but this does not necessarily mean that former locations in the central city or inner ring remain deserted.

On the contrary, many small firms frequently find a location within the central city attractive, for here are available all the specialists in the intermediate stages of production whose services can be contracted for to permit competition with the larger plants. Other "external economies" arise: fractional use of transportation facilities at less-than-carload or truckload lots, urban public services—police and fire protection, water and sewage facilities—which might not exist in the suburbs, rented space, a larger labor market, and so on. The appearance of unstandardized end products also enhances the central city's position, for purchases usually depend on visual inspections, and when styles and grades of material are important, inventories have to be kept within strict limits. These conditions make the core attractive as a "seed-bed" for industrial development, and take up the slack as larger firms depart.

Moreover, for all firms, large and small, the central city offers certain unstandarized inputs which are best provided in a central location. Advertising agencies, law firms, banks, home offices, some types of salesrooms, are activites which require proximity with their competitors, both because of the irregular schedule in which they may be used, and because "knowledge of the industry," gossip of the trade, face-to-face confrontation are prerequisites for doing business. Here again the central city offers advantages which few suburbs can yet supply.

When the changes in the manufacturing structure are considered, neither the central city nor the suburbs seem in such desperate straits as are often described. As industrial diffusion goes on, and available land is taken up, more suburbs will receive "windfalls." More will actively search them out as well, for changes in plant architecture and the elimination of unfavorable site conditions, smoke, smells, water pollution, mean that many suburbs formerly hostile to development, will become enamoured of "light industry." Those who do not want, or will not find, industry will have their resources bolstered by service establishments following the market or by special facilities within an industry which can be separated from the parent plant.

---

[13] George A. Duggar, "The Tax System and a Responsible Housing Program," unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1956, Ch. 6.

Meanwhile, the central city is likely to find alternative economic activities, plants of small firms, business offices of large ones, and the cluster of professional and semi-professional services on which both depend. Moreover, the overriding necessity of these economic activities to maintain their central location makes their response to tax changes highly inelastic. Existing levies can be increased, or even new taxes on earnings and income imposed, and these special groups will still "stay put." Together with continued prosperity and a rise in real income, this inelasticity helps explain the recent successes in discovering new revenue sources. It further reduces the "certain" consequences of financial crises, which population and industrial trends have been thought to portend, to the status of mere possibilities, less likely than alternative courses of development.

Not only are our demographic and economic series suspect, but the less tangible hypothesis of "metropolitan dominance" comes in for critical scrutiny also. Without questioning the accuracy of the measures of newspaper circulation, postal delivery areas, telephone exchanges and journey-to-work patterns which imply the existence of a metropolitan "community," contradictory trends can be established. It is possible to submit that each region is an economic entity, that it has a circulatory and communication system of its own, and still argue that a scatteration of society has accompanied the scatteration of government; that metropolitan growth promotes a "huge mosaic of massed segregation of size, class, and ethnic groups" a "crazy quilt of discontinuities."[14]

Admittedly, as indicated earlier, when we speculate about community, we are talking about a nebulous term. The models used for the study of community are many; the essential elements of community life are still uncertain and their relative importance unweighed.[15] Yet it is significant that when authorities speak of the break-up of local communities in the metropolitan area, and the onrush of metropolitan dominance, their departure point is almost always the primary community, preliterate society, savage village or feudal holding where economic autarchy, social isolation and consensus of values were most complete.[16] Such a community, if it ever existed at all, never existed in the United States. Our archetype has been the New England town or the hamlet of the Old Northwest, both quite different in their organization of space and their feeling for community affairs, but both relatively sophisticated types, having substantial economic and social intercourse with the outside world, numbering speculators and entrepreneurs among their inhabitants, and displaying mature political systems. While their differences were many, the common elements of these communities were the qualities of propinquity, homogeneity, interdependence, and equality, which produced our ideal local government—grass-roots democracy.[17]

---

[14] Arensberg, *op. cit.*

[15] Reiss, *op. cit.*

[16] Greer, *op. cit.*

If these qualities are taken as the essentials of smalltown life, then modern suburbs may be on the way to finding a substitute for economic self-sufficiency and social isolation to promote a sense of community consciousness. They may be using their political boundaries to differentiate the character of their residents from their neighbors and using governmental powers—zoning, residential covenants, taxation, selective industrial developments—to promote conscious segregation. From the variety of classes, occupations, income levels, races and creeds which the region contains, a municipality may isolate the particular variant it prefers and concentrate on one type of the metropolitan man. In a sense it may even produce a "purer" type of community than the American archetype, because it has a wider range of choice and it need not reproduce all the parts of a self-contained economic system. It can simply extract the particular functions it chooses to support, and achieve a social homogeneity never before possible.

Moreover, growth itself may aid and abet the process of strengthening community bonds in subareas of metropolitan regions. To the extent that a feeling of fellowship waxes strong in the early stages of community growth, that "political democracy evolves most quickly while the process of organization and the solving of basic problems are still critical," many suburbs may resemble earlier American towns in their political and social processes.[18] At any rate, provocative comparisons have been made between group and individual characteristics in modern housing developments—the acknowledgment of equality and the recognition of interdependence in Levittown and Park Forest—and frontier towns of old.[19]

A thesis that small communities are reappearing in the metropolitan areas, that the high-water mark of the process of communal disintegration has passed, is conjectural. But so is the rationale for the new metropolitan man, unattached and unrooted, and some interesting statistics support the first hypothesis. For one thing, the existence of fragmented governments do break up the area into manageable proportions—more suburbanites live in towns between 10,000 and 25,000 than in towns of any other size.[20] For another, modern suburbs have captured that portion of the middle class most oriented, in terms of education, occupation, income and family status, toward being responsible members of their locality.[21] Third, subareas in metropolitan regions are displaying a tremendous variety in their economic functions, social rank and ethnic and occupational order.[22] Most important of all, this variety does not seem to be random in nature, but the result of conscious coalescing according to a pattern of spatial homogeneity. In brief, each suburb may be gathering its chosen few to its bosom, and not just in the broad terms which Burgess and Hoyt have outlined.[23] More specifically, a clustering according to occupations seems to be taking place, in which different occupations, representing different status points in the social spectrum, put space between each other; and the wider the social differences, the further apart the members of disparate occupations live within the metropolitan area. Tracing this development in the Chicago metropolitan area, Otis and Beverly Duncan found a consistent pattern of residential segregation among occupations and a preference for neighbors with closely related occupations.[24]

---

[17] Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 69, pp. 321–353, and pp. 565–602 (Sept. and Dec., 1954).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Otis Duncan and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950* (New York, 1956). The citations here are both with respect to conclusions in the book, as well as an indication of source data from which independent statistical series have been developed.

If this process of natural neighborhoods goes on in an area in which each neighborhood is equipped with a local government, then instinctive feelings of community are enhanced by the fact of legal and political power. A cultural *sui generis* results, and the existence of separate political institutions, separate powers to be exercised, individual elections to be held, reinforces the bonds which make the neighborhood. Within the region as a whole, we may be witnessing a popular attempt to dissect the metropolitan giant into small pieces, and to cap each with legal authority and some degree of civic consciousness.

To the extent that this is true, the notion of one metropolitan community may be misleading, and the characterization of modern culture as new may be overdrawn. Economically the region may be one, but it may be powerless to bid for the loyalties of its residents against the claims of the smaller neighborhoods. Its inhabitants may be conformists, gregarious, adjusted, seeking approval from their peer groups, participating eagerly in every form of social endeavor; but these qualities may not signify a new dominant culture. Instead, they may mark a return to the smalltown life De Tocqueville found, an expression of protest against the stratified, pecuniary structure of the Victorian city, a desire to recreate again the ". . . opportunity for companionship and friendship, for easy access to local services, and for certain forms of security. . . ," a new vision of open-country culture to stand against the metropolis.[25]

There are not enough reliable data over a long enough period of time to weigh the relative pulls of metropolitan dominance and grassroots renaissance. But there are enough data to allow us to be sceptical of the one community hypothesis, particularly when the history of public resistance to metropolitan reform is on our side. At least it seems clear that local loyalties are by no means abandoned, and that, if by some political sleight-of-hand, a metropolitan government is created, it may not find the instinctive springs of support and popular understanding which is supposed to be anxiously waiting for the creation of regional institutions.

---

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Ernest W. Burgess, "Urban Areas" in *Chicago, An Experiment in Social Science Research*, ed. T. V. Smith and L. D. White (Chicago, 1929), pp. 113–138, and Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington, 1939).

[24] Otis D. and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupation Stratification," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, pp. 493–503 (March, 1955).

[25] Woodbury, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

III

So far this analysis has undertaken only to expand the frame of reference in which metropolitan politics and government is usually considered, to bring other factors and forces under review, and to qualify conclusions derived from a limited review of empirical facts. The results of the inquiry certainly do not unveil the metropolitan future, nor do they indicate what steps should be taken. Our findings to date have been tentative and negative. Seriously adverse financial or political effects may not be arising from suburban growth. There may be no shortage of resources for the central city or the inner ring. There may not be one community to bring into maturity. In short, there may not be the metropolitan crisis which so many of us have expected for so long, either now or in the future.

This does not mean that there are no metropolitan problems, nor that there is no case for reform. Problems there are aplenty: ugly implications of the growing segregation of classes, races, and occupations in suburban ghettoes; marginal costs and wastes and inefficiencies in government finance and organization to be eliminated, the overriding issue as to whether we will realize the potential, in politics, in land use, in social intercourse, in the amenities of existence which metropolitan regions promise. We may not face catastrophe, but this is no reason for countenancing one-hour commuting schedules, for permitting blight, for condoning the repellent sprawl of cheap commercial developments, inadequate parks, congested schools, mediocre administration, traffic jams, smog, pollution, and the hundred and one irritations which surround us. Even if we can exist in the present metropolis, the fact of survival does not excuse a failure to plan the future with more care, to avoid the mistakes we have made in the past and to bestow a more worthwhile legacy.

Yet while these are real problems and genuine issues, they are not categorical necessities. They are fundamentally questions of value and of judgment, of what we should and should not do, and of how much. In short they are issues for political science to tackle in its traditional way, and no trend is clear enough to give us the easy answer "we have to do it one way." Alternatives are before us; choice remains, and the burden of responsibility is off the shoulders of the economist and the sociologist and back again on ours.

Within this normative framework, the alternatives are several and, in this analysis, only a brief summary of their implications can be undertaken. But those which seem most important are three—greenbelts, grassroots or gargantua—and they are genuine alternatives. Quite frequently, we have tended to think of metropolitan planning, federation and consolidation as related steps to the single goal of achieving political institutions suitable to the metropolitan community. In practice, we have frequently chosen between them on grounds of political expediency. Yet, these reforms do not move in the same direction; they lead us down quite different paths and, in a certain sense, a choice among them can be "extrapolated" too. In a reasoned way we can explore the implications which a certain set of values have for the future, judged by the benchmark of constitutional democracy. When this is done, though the task of metropolitan reform is complicated, its objectives are clarified. The discussion proceeds on the basis of a comparison of the values involved, in place of an excitable response to "inexorable" trends.

So far as the greenbelts alternative is concerned, the vision of order, balance, and beauty has timeless appeal for political philosophy as it has for the profession of planning. There are overtones of Plato and Aristotle, "an organic sense of structural differences," a corporate whole, in the concept, and there is the tough-minded insistence of Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and Lewis Mumford that the vision is practical. When technology promises so much in terms of the capacity to shape nature to man's purposes, when the age of abundance is actuality, it seems reprehensible to permit the shapeless metropolitan sprawl. With such little effort, balanced communities could come into being, rational transportation systems provided, land set aside for recreational and cultural purposes, and the way cleared for Jefferson's common man to find "life" values in place of monetary values. The promise of individual dignity is combined with the aesthetics of a pastoral scene from which insects are banished and in which running water is supplied, and the metropolitan region becomes a true commingling of the best of rural and urban virtues.

There is of course a serpent in the garden of greenbelts as there was a crucial flaw in the Greek polis. Who defines the shape and substance of beauty, who determines the balance of each community, who arbitrates good taste, who decides the values of life? The advocates of greenbelts have always answered with injured innocence "the people," but they have been peculiarly reluctant to specify the means by which the people decide. They have, in modern times, reluctantly admitted that planning is properly a staff function; but when the chips are down, they have been scornful of the politician who curries votes, and indignant at his intrusion. The planners who have gained the most notoriety are those who have been the most ready to ignore the role of the elected official, to be contemptuous of the slow process of popular deliberations, and to hold themselves aloof from the electoral process. In short, while one implication of the greenbelt philosopy is harmony, another is in twentieth century socialism, American municipal style. Until the defenders of this alternative are much more specific as to the ways and means they can suggest to reconcile their values with the public's in a liberal tradition, we are rightly suspicious of their plans.

In contrast, the grassroots alternative clearly avoids the danger of professional controls imposed from above, and of an excessive commitment to communal order and balance. If we retain our belief in the efficacy of small communities and small governments which spring spontaneously into being, there is actually very little action called for at all. Given the accuracy of the economic and social statistics reviewed earlier, the likelihood of suburban governments disappearing or of crises forcing an expansion of public authority does not appear great. We can drift with the tide, fairly confident that the course of events will produce the best possible arrangement for the metropolitan complex.

This wedding of an ancient image in American political folklore to favorable modern trends makes the second approach both attractive and plausible. First the existence of all shapes and sizes of communities within the region offers an individual a freedom of choice as to where and how he wishes to live. Second, the continued segregation of occupations, classes, and races fits in well with modern doctrine on how to "manage" social conflict. Let each man find his own, abstain from social contact with antagonistic elements, abjure political disagreement and debate by joining a constituency which shares his values, and his tensions, anxieties, and uncertainties are relieved. The virtues of small-town life come to the fore, and the elemental qualities of neighborliness, friendship, and civic spirit are revived.

Yet even though the grassroots thesis has ample precedent in our history, underneath it lurk some assumptions which seem unpalatable. The individual who chooses his community in the metropolitan free-market in the same way in which he buys his car is essentially a laissez-faire man. He pursues his own self-interest to the maximum, and depends on a natural order of events to provide for the common good. Local governments become truly a bundle of services, to be purchased by those who can afford them without regard to more general social consequences. Those with resources insulate themselves from those without them, and issues of equity and humanitarianism become muted. The garden city planners may place too much reliance on the social nature of man, but grassroots advocates reach toward the opposite extreme of unfettered individualism.

Further, given the general American consensus on values, our basic commitment to democracy and capitalism, the management of social conflict is not likely to be our most pressing public problem. The pressures for conformity, the profoundly anti-individualistic element which punishes the deviate so swiftly in our society, the absence of variety, are more serious issues. Encouraging a scatteration of communities and governments in the metropolitan area does not solve this problem; it intensifies it. The individual may be free to choose his community, but once this selection is made, it is difficult for him to change his values if he wishes to stay in his own home town. The small community is friendly and comfortable and it promises fraternity, but it is also intolerant, inquisitive, barren of privacy. It is at least an open question whether this creation of political boundaries around disparate groups and classes is an appropriate development in a democracy, or whether it truly frees the individual in the manner its advocates intend. Perhaps variety, disagreement, discussion, and debate are to be encouraged rather than avoided.

To the extent this proposition is true, there is something to be said for the third alternative—of gargantua—the creation of a single metropolitan government or at least the establishment of a regional superstructure which points in that direction. If genuine metropolitan political institutions and processes are provided, the excessive marginal costs which overlapping and duplication bring about are reduced, a genuine arena exists for debate about meaningful issues which affect the area as a whole, and there is an opportunity to realize the metropolitan potential which is at our disposal.

In this scheme, decisions about the regional destiny are not the exclusive province of professional value-makers; they lie with the constituency as a whole. Freedom of choice remains for the individual, for the entire variety of spectacles and experiences which a metropolis offers is open to him. But, in a political sense, this freedom is accompanied by responsibility. A man cannot escape his neighbor by retreating to an exclusive suburb; he has to face him, to persuade or be persuaded. Political parties cannot rest secure in the knowledge that they have preponderant majorities in particular jurisdictions; they compete in a region with so many diverse temperaments and outlooks, as almost to guarantee a close two-party fight. Harmony does not appear automatically, it is painfully put together by compromise, by adjustments, by trial and error.

A plea for gargantua is not an attack against neighborhoods, against the importance of "moral integration" or against the need for fellowship and companionship. It is simply a plea against confusing these socially desirable qualities with the prerequisites of good government, against equipping neighborhoods with political prerogatives. We do not have, in the philosophical sense, a conservative tradition in the United States which emphasizes communal purpose and morality or gradations in social status. We have instead a liberal tradition, however confused in its definition of individualism and beset with contradictions; and the essence of that tradition is a distinction between society and government, a preference for legal contractual relationships in public affairs in place of personal ones. Solutions which either in the name of the public good or paradoxically in the name of rampant individualism emphasize communal bonds excessively, seek harmony instinctive or contrived, and discourage variety, are alien to the highest purpose of that tradition. Men have always found privacy, civility, and urbanity, the marks of civilization, in great cities even though they have often paid the price of anonymity and loneliness. They are most likely to find the same qualities there today.

In the end, the case for metropolitan reform, the drive for larger governments and for one community is as strong as ever. It is not a case built on necessity, on the threat of impending disaster, or on the consequences of modern technology. It is a case dependent on value judgments and philosophical disputation. But it is a strong case and perhaps a more appealing and persuasive one once its norms have been frankly admitted, and pretensions of scientific objectivity left behind. Metropolitan reform may not have been right so far as its analysis of empirical data is concerned, but it has always been righteous in the best sense of the word, and it remains righteous today.

CUMULATIVE VOTING: PATTERNS OF PARTY ALLEGIANCE AND RATIONAL CHOICE IN ILLINOIS STATE LEGISLATIVE CONTESTS

GEORGE S. BLAIR
University of Pennsylvania

Cumulative voting is a rough method of proportional representation perhaps more familiar to more Americans as a device for choosing corporate boards of directors, such as Montgomery Ward's, than as a means of choosing legislative representatives. Among American state electoral systems it is unique to Illinois, where it has been in operation since 1870. Like the one-house legislature in Nebraska, it has been admired there but not copied elsewhere. As used in Illinois it retains the district system of representation, but each district is the unit for choosing three representatives, and each voter is allowed three votes.[1] Thus, in contrast with a single-member district system, it aims to secure representation for a substantial minority without jeopardizing the principle of majority rule; and it has done so. If this were all, the Illinois example might remain as a museum piece to be observed by students of comparative electoral methods, or by constitution drafters considering a change in systems.

As it happens, however, Illinois superimposed on this cumulative voting scheme for the lower house a conventional single-member district system for the choice of state senators, and providentially for students of voting behavior, from 1870 through the election of 1954 it used the same district boundaries for both purposes.[2] Over that eighty-odd year period each of the state's fifty-one legislative districts returned one senator and three representatives, the one chosen by a straight plurality and the other three by cumulative voting.

This combination of circumstances turns the voting statistics of Illinois state legislative contests into a made-to-order body of materials for investigating at least two significant questions about voting behavior. The opportunity is the more welcome because, although an increasing volume of research in recent years has been devoted to the behavior of American voters,[3] nearly all of it has centered on national elections.[4] The Illinois figures permit a closer study of the persistence of party allegiance, and of the extent of rational calculation among voting alternatives, when voters have a wider range of choices than a single-member district system alone permits. This paper reports the results of such a study.

---

[1] These can be cast in any of four ways: (1) all three votes to a single candidate; (2) equally divided between two candidates with each receiving a vote and a half; (3) equally divided among three candidates, one vote to each; and (4) two votes to one candidate and one vote to another. This last division of votes was upheld by a majority decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in *Allen* v. *Fuller*, 322 Ill. 304 (1929).

[2] A legislative reapportionment act approved in 1955, H.B. No. 1123, ended this districting pattern by creating separate senatorial and representative districts for the 1956 elections and thereafter.

[3] See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (White Plains, N. Y., 1954); and Ralph and Mildred Fletcher, "Consistency in Party Voting from 1896 to 1932," *Social Forces,* Vol. 15, 1936.

[4] An important exception is V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956), esp. Chap. VI. The analysis of party allegiance in this study is limited

The Illinois system, down through 1954, allowed any of the following nine situations to appear and endure for periods of time in any particular district: (1) the senator and three representatives are Democrats; (2) the senator and three representatives are Republican; (3) consistently the senator is Democrat, two representatives are Democrats, and one representative is Republican; (4) consistently the senator is Republican, two representatives are Republican, and one representative is Democrat; (5) the senator is consistently Democrat, but the three House seats shift between one Democrat and two Republicans and two Democrats and one Republican; (6) the senator is consistently Republican, but the three House positions shift between one Republican and two Democrats and two Republicans and one Democrat; (7) the Senate seat shifts between Democrat and Republican, but consistently two representatives are Republican and one is Democrat; (8) the Senate seat shifts between Democrat and Republican, but consistently two representatives are Democratic and one is Republican, and (9) the Senate seat shifts between the two parties and the two parties also shift in holding two of the three representative seats.

Since the voter can supposedly choose any one of these nine possible combinations in expressing his preferences for members to serve in the General Assembly, cumulative voting is a more acid test of his allegiance than a normal single-member district affords. Also, voting patterns, if any, emerging over time from a nine-way choice, can hardly have been the result of chance or counterbalancing shifts of voting as they might more likely be in single-member districts.

The period 1944–1954 was selected for the study. It spanned six elections for all members of the House of Representatives for two-year terms and three elections for senators for four-year terms from each district. It also encompassed the large population shifts and growth during and following World War II. The election results in the fifty-one electoral districts show that within that interval seven of the nine possible situations in fact occurred. No district elected a Republican senator and three Republican representatives (situation 2), and no district consistently returned a Democratic senator while the three house positions shifted between one Democrat and two Republicans and two Democrats and one Republican (situation 5). The frequency of the other situations is shown in Table I.

As Table I reveals, the election results were unchanged during the entire period in thirty-three of the fifty-one districts. Voters in ten districts (third pattern), all lying within Cook County, consistently elected a Democratic senator and Democrats to two of the three House seats. Republican majorities in

---

to primary elections, but it is the most challenging study of state legislative election patterns and trends to date.

TABLE I. FREQUENCY OF ELECTORAL PATTERNS IN ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS, 1944–1954

Electoral Pattern	Districts
(1) Senator consistently Dem.; 3 House seats consistently Dem.	27*
(3) Senator consistently Dem.; 2 of 3 House seats consistently Dem.	1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21, 29
(4) Senator consistently Rep.; 2 of 3 House seats consistently Rep.	6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51
(6) Senator consistently Rep.; 2 of 3 House seats shift between parties	28, 33
(7) Senator shifts between parties; 2 of 3 House seats consistently Rep.	30, 31, 36, 48, 50
(8) Senator shifts between parties; 2 of 3 House seats consistently Dem.	13, 47, 49
(9) Senator shifts between parties; 2 of 3 House seats shift between parties	5, 11, 23, 25, 38, 40, 42

* This pattern was modified in 1954 when Republicans elected one of the three House members for the first time since 1940.

twenty-three districts (fourth pattern) were equally consistent in sending a Republican senator and two Republican representatives out of three to the General Assembly. District 27 in Cook County can also be counted as fitting into the third pattern since the senator and at least two of the three representatives have regularly been Democratic.

Thus, voters in two-thirds of the districts displayed a highly consistent pattern of party allegiance in successive general elections for legislators. It seems reasonable to conclude that the election results reflect the durable relative strengths of the two parties within these thirty-four districts. This conclusion is strengthened by an analysis of votes cast in these districts in the three gubernatorial elections and six elections for state treasurer during the period. The thirteen districts lying within Cook County must be treated as a whole for this purpose since the county-wide vote for state offices is not broken down by legislative districts. However, voters in eleven of these thirteen districts regularly returned a Democratic senator and two Democratic representatives. This pattern parallels the general popular vote, for the county cast a majority for the Democratic candidates in all three gubernatorial elections and in three of the six elections for treasurer.[5]

A significantly close correlation also shows up in the other twenty-one districts between the votes for legislative offices and for the offices of governor and treasurer. Republican candidates for the two state-wide offices won majorities in all nine elections in fifteen districts (8, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, and 51); in eight of the nine elections in five districts (10, 18, 24, 44, and

---

[5] Two of the three elections in which Republican candidates for treasurer carried Cook County came in years when the office of governor was not at stake.

45), with the exception of 1948 when the Democratic gubernatorial candidate won a majority of the popular vote and with it the office; and in seven of the nine elections in the 46th district, where Democratic candidates for governor and treasurer carried the district and the state in 1948 also.

The force of these correlations, however, is partly vitiated by the fact that much of this "allegiance" for legislative members was determined for the voters by the party committees in each district. Under Illinois election law, both major parties have senatorial district committees in each district, composed of three or more members, depending upon the number of counties within the district.[6] They are empowered to determine the quota of party nominees to be selected in the party primary to stand in the general election. Occasionally, these committees underestimate the party's vote-getting strength and limit the party to one less nominee than the later results show it could have elected on the basis of party votes cast. Less frequently, they overestimate party strengths and permit the nomination of one more nominee than the party can actually elect.

A far more frequent practice of these committees has been to allow only three candidates altogether, thereby creating a "set-up" condition for the three candidates in the general election. This has happened in twenty-four districts in one election, in twenty-six districts in two elections, in twenty-seven districts in one election, and in twenty-eight districts in two elections. Thus, a total of 159 of the 306 district elections since 1944 have been "set-ups."

Table II shows the pattern of legislative nominees in the six general elections since 1944. Twenty-two districts have given the voter no choice, with district committees of the Republican Party establishing its quota as two nominees in fifteen districts and one in seven districts, while Democratic district committees reversed these numbers. Naturally, this condition accounts for much of the voter allegiance displayed in these twenty-two districts. If only three candidates are nominated, then the opportunity for voter defection from the prescribed pattern occurs only every fourth year when a senator, to serve four

TABLE II. PATTERNS OF CANDIDATE CHOICE PERMITTED BY SENATORIAL DISTRICT COMMITTEES IN ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS, 1944–1954

Candidate Pattern	Districts in Which Pattern Occurs
Three Candidates—Two Republicans and One Democrat	6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26, 32, 35, 37, 41, 45, 51
Three Candidates—Two Democrats and One Republican	2, 4, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21
Four Candidates—Two Republicans and Two Democrats	11, 13, 22, 23, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50
Varied Number of Republican and Democratic Candidates	1, 3, 5, 10, 24, 27, 29, 39, 42, 43, 48

---

[6] *Illinois Laws*, 1910, Special Session, 46–82.


COPYRIGHT BY RAND McNALLY & COMPANY, CHICAGO
WIS.
DUBUQUE
GRANT
LAFAYETTE
GREEN
ROCK
WALWORTH
KENOSHA
JO DAVIESS
STEPHENSON
WINNEBAGO
BOONE
McHENRY
LAKE
JACKSON
12
10
8
CARROLL
OGLE
DEKALB
KANE
COOK
1 TO 7
9, 11
13, 15
17, 19
21, 23
25, 27
29, 31
CLINTON
DU PAGE
14
WHITESIDE
LEE
35
KENDALL
WILL
SCOTT
IOWA
LAKE
HENRY
BUREAU
LA SALLE
MUSCATINE
GRUNDY
41
ROCK ISLAND
37
39
LOUISA
MERCER
33
STARK
PUTNAM
KANKAKEE
NEWTON
DES MOINES
WARREN
KNOX
MARSHALL
LIVINGSTON
20
PEORIA
WOODFORD
IROQUOIS
43
18
16
LEE
HENDERSON
FULTON
McLEAN
BENTON
HANCOCK
McDONOUGH
TAZEWELL
FORD
26
32
CLARK
MASON
VERMILION
WARREN
CHAMPAIGN
LEWIS
SCHUYLER
30
LOGAN
DEWITT
ADAMS
PIATT
24
22
VERMILLION
28
BROWN
CASS
MENARD
MACON
INDIANA
MARION
MORGAN
SANGAMON
DOUGLAS
EDGAR
RALLS
PIKE
SCOTT
MOULTRIE
36
45
CHRISTIAN
COLES
PIKE
SHELBY
34
VIGO
CLARK
GREENE
MACOUPIN
40
CALHOUN
CUMBERLAND
MONTGOMERY
LINCOLN
38
FAYETTE
EFFINGHAM
JASPER
CRAWFORD
SULLIVAN
JERSEY
MADISON
BOND
CLAY
ST. CHARLES
47
RICHLAND
LAWRENCE
KNOX
ST. LOUIS
MARION
CLINTON
42
MISSOURI
ST. CLAIR
WAYNE
EDWARDS
WABASH
49
WASHINGTON
JEFFERSON
46
JEFFERSON
GIBSON
MONROE
HAMILTON
WHITE
RANDOLPH
PERRY
POSEY
48
44
FRANKLIN
STE. GENEVIEVE
JACKSON
SALINE
GALLATIN
PERRY
WILLIAMSON
50
51
UNION
UNION
JOHNSON
POPE
HARDIN
CAPE GIRARDEAU
CRITTENDEN
ALEXANDER
PULASKI
MASSAC
LIVINGS-TON
SCOTT
BALLARD
McCRACKEN
KENTUCKY
MISS.
0 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 MILES

FIG. 1. Legislative districts in Illinois.

years, as well as three representatives, to serve two-year terms, are selected. However this defection has not occurred in a single district.[7]

Nevertheless, along with the results in these twenty-two districts, voters in twelve other districts have shown the same pattern with equal consistency in spite of more varied choices allowed them among candidates in the general election. Of these twelve districts, voters in four have consistently elected two Democratic representatives and one Republican representative. These districts (1, 3, 27, and 29) are all within Cook County. The pattern in the other eight districts (10, 22, 24, 34, 39, 43, 44, and 46) was the opposite, two Republican and one Democratic representative. These eight districts lie outside Cook County, and are scattered throughout the state as indicated in Figure 1.

Thus, voters in these twelve districts demonstrated a high degree of persistent allegiance to a political party, enduring through the six elections in spite of the wide range of opportunities under cumulative voting for inconsistent voting behavior. Both majority and minority party voters in these districts appear to have exercised their votes rationally to gain their greatest possible representation.

The fact that the minority party, in twenty-eight of the twenty-nine districts that did not create "set-up" conditions in the general elections, has been able to elect one of its own candidates for representative is a further evidence that minority party members can and do make rational choices. By plumping their votes—casting all three for their party's single nominee, or concentrating a large part of their vote on one candidate if more than one stands in the general election—the minority voters have made the most of their ballots. Cumulative voting for three is a crude form of proportional representation, making it possible for a well organized and disciplined minority to elect one of the three representatives from a district if it amounts to twenty-five per cent plus one of the district's total voting population.[8]

For extreme instances of such an effective use of minority voting strength, it is necessary to turn to earlier legislative elections in Illinois. Although there have always been some "set-up" districts in the general election, the number was not so large in earlier years. Senatorial district committees were also less restrictive, and there have been occasions when voters in particular districts were offered three majority candidates and two minority candidates in the general election. This happened in two districts in 1936, when the Republicans offered three candidates and the Democrats two in each district. In both cases, the Republicans cast the greater total vote but won only one of the three representative seats, as indicated in Table III.[9]

---

[7] While Table I reveals that voters in eight districts consistently returned two representatives of the same party with the senatorial seat shifting between the two parties, none of these eight districts are among those which have nominated only three candidates for the three assembly seats.

[8] For illustration, assume a district of 60,000 voters. If the minority party has a strength of 15,001, it can cast a sufficiently high vote to elect one of the three representatives regardless of how the majority party vote is divided among three or more candidates.

[9] In these districts the Republicans gave one of their three candidates a larger vote

Table III lists nine other instances in recent years in which the minority party outsmarted the majority in this way. In each of these district elections, both parties nominated two candidates to stand in the general election; and in every instance, the party casting a majority of the total votes won only one of the three seats. The reason for this seeming failure of a majority will to prevail is that the voters of the majority party, perhaps underestimating their strength, plumped their votes for one of their candidates, giving him a far greater vote than was needed for his election. This resulted in a smaller vote for the second candidate of the majority party. The voters of the minority party, on the other hand, split their votes almost evenly between their two candidates, giving them the second and third highest vote totals of the four candidates and so electing them to office.

TABLE III. ELEVEN DISTRICT ELECTIONS ILLUSTRATING RATIONAL VOTER CALCULATIONS

Year	Dist.	No. of Rep. Candidates	Total Rep. Vote	No. of Dem. Candidates	Total Dem. Vote	Candidates Elected	
						Rep.	Dem.
1954	30	2	77,184	2	76,839	1	2
1946	47	2	83,252	2	80,515	1	2
1942	47	2	78,906	2	74,045	1	2
1940	5	2	175,922	2	176,234	2	1
1940	28	2	105,326	2	106,944	2	1
1938	38	2	71,941	2	69,937	1	2
1938	44	2	84,089	2	84,743	2	1
1936	5	2	177,966	2	177,534	1	2
1936	10	3	111,036	2	85,507	1	2
1936	38	2	90,954	2	85,476	1	2
1936	39	3	82,465	2	63,844	1	2

Another possible explanation may be advanced for the occasional tendency of voters to concentrate their votes too heavily on one candidate to the detriment of a second on the same ticket. This could occur intentionally if the word were passed down from party headquarters to the party faithful that a particular candidate was to be "knifed" or benched in the general election. As might be expected, there is little concrete evidence to support or refute this possibility. In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that the majority party usually won the district's senatorial seat, in spite of losing two of the three representatives. The senatorial seat was also at stake in five of the eleven district elections, and the majority party's candidate won in four of the five contests.[10]

---

than was necessary for his election, thus resulting in smaller vote totals for their other two candidates. Democratic voters, on the other hand, divided their votes almost equally between their two candidates, making them the second and third highest vote getters of the five candidates.

[10] These occasions were the 47th district in 1946, 47th district in 1942, 28th district in 1940, and the 10th district in 1936.

This indicates that voters of the majority party too were acting in disciplined concert.

Further circumstantial evidence of possible knifing is revealed in an analysis of the candidates and the individual vote totals in some of the eleven districts. An illustrative case is the action of Republican voters in the 30th district in 1954. There the successful Republican candidate was seeking his first term as representative while his unsuccessful colleague was a candidate for re-election. Exactly the same thing happened in the 47th district and the 44th district in the elections of 1946 and 1938 respectively. In these cases it is legitimate to doubt whether the "majority" really wanted its unsuccessful candidate.

However, strong supporters of the principle of majority will need not be fearful of cumulative voting as a device to enable the minority to win a majority of representative seats even when the stronger party casts a considerably higher total vote. This phenomenon has occurred in only eleven of the last 510 district elections, and in several of them the party vote totals were so close that the party which lost a representative seat had little ground for complaint of injustice. Nevertheless, these are real instances in which voters of the minority party exercised more rational calculation in casting their ballots than the majority party voters whether the latter acted by intent or accident.

In summary, this study of legislative election results in Illinois brings out clearly two significant characteristics of Illinois voting. One of these is the high degree of persistent party allegiance in the face of more opportunities for defection than a single-member district system permits. The second is the capacity for voters and party managers to manipulate the possibilities of cumulative voting by rational calculation to get the maximum advantage from it. To this extent this study may give a fair notion of what may be expected from adoption of the device.

TWO-PARTY VOTING IN THE SOUTH:

CLASS VS. PARTY IDENTIFICATION*

JAMES W. PROTHRO, ERNEST Q. CAMPBELL, AND CHARLES M. GRIGG
Florida State University

This study was undertaken to test the relations between two basic observations which have appeared in the literature of political behavior. First, party identification has been found to be a major factor not only in determining votes but also in shaping ideology. Party appears to serve a "standard-setting" function for its adherents, especially on questions that are most clearly "party-related," and resultant ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans have been found independently of such demographic factors as socio-economic status.[1] The second observation stems from studies in the field of stratification that have yielded an explanatory proposition in political analysis: a shift in party affiliation tends to follow a shift in class identification, as indicated by the tendency of suburban America to vote Republican.

The southern culture offers a promising field for the study of conflicts in these pressures. First, the historical fact of a one-party system maximizes the influence of party identification as a force independent of class or of attitudes on specific issues. The emphasis on unity among the "whites" in the south's one-party system de-emphasizes class differences or issues involving conflict within the white group. Moreover, indifference to or even rejection of the party's national platform or the pronouncements of its presidential candidate will not necessarily affect the votes. In the south, that is to say, one finds something close to influence of party in a "pure" sense, unaffected by other variables like class or issue orientation. Second, mass media of communications, population growth and migration, and increasing industrialization are bringing the belated development of a class structure in the south more similar to that of the nation as a whole. But the traditional one-party politics of the region makes party identification a stronger barrier than in two-party states to the influence of class and class-related issues. Given the latter general influence on voting in our society and the sectional barrier to it in the south, the following proposition was formulated and a suitable research design was devised to test the hypothesis.

In the south, despite the barrier of the one-party system, a switch in party affiliation as a response to a change in class identification may be made, under conditions which minimize party and ideological differences and maximize differences in the candidates. This condition was met in both the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. The great appeal of Eisenhower as a personality rising above issues and parties appeared to surmount the barrier to Republican voting. But it is our hypothesis that the personality appeal did *not* operate in random fashion, that southerners who responded to it were principally those of higher socio-economic status who—outside the south—would be expected to vote Republican. Our hypothesis would thus explain the 1952 and 1956 Republican votes in the south, not simply in terms of a charismatic leader appealing to all, but in terms of "natural" class-related forces which a popular personality permitted to come into operation in the south.

---

* This study was jointly sponsored by the Center for Social Research and the Research Council of the Florida State University.

[1] See Angus Campbell and Homer C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes* (University of Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1956), p. 81.

Thus if our hypothesis is correct there will be, first, certain socio-economic differences between "Eisencrats" and "Stevencrats."[2] Second, there will be differences in the patterns of migration between the two, in that those who have lived outside the state or region will be less bound to the one-party norms of the south. Third, there will be a decided emphasis among Eisencrats on the belief that there are no real differences between the two parties, that the personal characteristics of the candidates should be the basis of a vote decision. The argument that there are no differences between the parties may be construed as indicating a weakening of the tie to party. If Eisencrats go further and relate their vote to a Republican party stand on issues, they would appear to be in process of transition to a more permanent identification with the Republican party.

Research Design. This is part of a larger study in political behavior by the authors. For this particular study, a predominantly white precinct was chosen which would encompass all segments of the white population and also include within its boundaries a definite area of high socio-economic residences. The precinct also fitted the purposes of our inquiry in being characterized by a large increase in Republican voting. Whereas Dewey received only 19.9 per cent of the precinct's vote in 1948, Eisenhower received 48.2 per cent of its vote in 1956. A list of those who voted in the 1956 election in this precinct was secured from the registrar of voters for the county. There were 2,078 Democrats and 359 Republicans from the precinct who voted in this election, and from this list a twelve per cent random sample was drawn. In this sample, 53.4 per cent voted for Eisenhower and 46.6 per cent for Stevenson. While our sample gave a larger vote to Eisenhower than did the precinct as a whole, the difference is not significant at the .01 level of probability.

A five-page schedule was administered to each person selected in the sample. The field work lasted three months, during which time at least three attempts were made to secure a reply to the schedule from respondents not at home. In view of the small number of Negroes and of registered Republicans in this precinct, and in view of our concern in this paper with cross-pressures from party and class identification, we shall confine our analysis here to the whites registered as Democrats.[3] Within this group there were four refusals and fourteen persons who had moved or died since the election, leaving a total of 225 usable returns. Of these 225 registered Democrats, 109 or 48.4 per cent voted for Eisenhower in the 1956 election.

---

[2] To avoid cumbersome phraseology and to make for more facility in understanding, these terms will be used to refer to Democrats for Eisenhower and Democrats for Stevenson, respectively.

[3] An independent study is being made of registered Republicans from the county as a whole and of Negroes in a predominantly Negro precinct. This will be separately reported, but it may be stated here that the Negro vote for Eisenhower cannot be ascribed to class

Socio-Economic Differences. A number of measures have been related to social class. Of these, family income, education, and occupation of the respondent were used as measures of class differences. Table I gives the distribution of Eisencrats and Stevencrats in the 1956 election by income level. The disportionate number of Eisencrats (53.8%) in the highest income bracket as compared with the Stevencrats (36.8%) supports our hypothesis that economic differences were a basis of voting behavior.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION BY FAMILY INCOME OF DEMOCRATS VOTING IN 1956 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FROM A SELECTED PRECINCT, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

Family Income	Eisenhower		Stevenson	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Under $4,000	14	13.2	14	12.3
$4,000 to $7,999	35	33.0	58	50.9
$8,000 and Over	57	53.8	42	36.8
Total	106	100.0	114	100.0

$X^2 = 7.82$; $P < .02$.

Since family income was used as a measure of economic difference, the education of both the respondents and their spouses was the basis upon which educational differences were analyzed. Level of education followed the pattern of family income; 43 per cent of the Eisencrats as compared with 28 per cent of the Stevencrats had completed college (see Table II).

Occupation, the last of the three measures used to indicate socio-economic differences, was not as revealing as the other two. The distribution of the male respondents in our samples showed no difference between the two groups. This is not surprising in view of the fact that our sample was restricted to a largely middle class precinct and did not include a wide range of the occupational spectrum. A more minute classification of occupations than that employed[4] might have revealed differences in our sample that the standard classification conceals. However, there was a significant difference between the two groups in the percentage of wives working. Only 36 per cent of the Eisencrat wives were working as compared with 70 per cent of the Stevencrat wives. This is important for two reasons. First, the lower percentage of working wives among

---

factors. Hence the votes of neither the registered Republicans nor the Negroes are of direct concern in studying the resolution of conflicts between class and party pressures in the south.

[4] The one-digit code of the United States Bureau of the Census. See *1950 Census of Population: Alphabetical Index of Occupations and Industries* (revised edition).

Eisencrats indicates a set of values more appropriate to upper-middle and upper class families. Second, the larger proportion of working wives among those families voting for Stevenson increases the income differential between the male members of the family even though there was no significant difference in the occupational distribution of the male members.

TABLE II. 1956 PRESIDENTIAL VOTES AND EDUCATION OF RESPONDENTS AND SPOUSES

Education	Eisenhower		Stevenson		Total*
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
High School or Less	60	29.3	85	41.0	145
Some College	57	27.8	64	30.9	121
Completed College	88	42.9	58	28.1	146
Total	205	100.0	207	100.0	412

* The totals in this table are larger than those in other tables because we include here the education of the respondent's spouse for all married respondents.

$X^2 = 10.94$; $P < .01$.

Patterns of Migration. The second factor which disturbs the present one-party system within the south is the rate of migration into the region. This operates in several ways to weaken the "Solid South." First, the native-born southerner who has lived outside the state or region has a certain degree of mobility which distinguishes him from the locally oriented person. Second, migrants from outside the region represent an ever increasing number who have not long been subjected to the one-party system in the south, and so may more easily respond to class rather than party identification.

TABLE III. PATTERNS OF MIGRATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Migration Patterns	Eisenhower		Stevenson		Total
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
Spent Life in Florida	18	16.5	37	31.9	55
Lived Outside Fla. but in Region	60	55.0	63	54.3	123
Lived Outside Region	31	28.5	16	13.8	47
Total	109	100.0	116	100.0	225

$X^2 = 11.20$; $P < .01$.

Table III gives some indication of the effect of mobility on political behavior in the south. The patterns of movement are categorized into three broad types: those who have lived in Florida all their lives, those who have lived outside of Florida but not out of the region, and finally those who have lived out of the region. Over 83 per cent of the Eisencrats have lived outside of Florida as compared with 67 per cent of the Stevencrats. Probably more important is the fact that 28 per cent of the Eisencrats have lived outside the region as compared with 14 per cent of the Stevencrats.

The Voter's Explanation of His Decision. From the results presented in the above sections, it becomes clear that the seeds of party realignment in presidential elections have taken root and that this realignment is related to class realignment and the weakening of traditional values by migration. The one-party system of the south is closely related to many irrational elements in the culture, however, so that a change of party requires some type of personal justification. Not only disloyalty to one's previous party, but—more important in the south—disloyalty also to a way of life, present cross-pressures which a Republican voter must overcome. The easiest resolution of these cross-pressures is found in a "non-Republican" Republican vote.

As a justification for this change of voting behavior, one does not deny the basic ideology of the party when he can more easily base his decision to change on the rationalization that there are no party differences and that a decision must consequently be based on an evaluation of the two candidates. Thus when asked to name "the most important thing" causing them to vote as they did, the Eisencrats give the anticipated emphasis to candidates and the expected de-emphasis to parties and issues. Principal reasons and the number of respondents offering each reason were:

Positive But Not Intrinsic Features of the Man (*e.g.*, "experience," "best man in a crisis," "best administrator," "a military man," "has world prestige")	34 (33.3%)
Adulation of Eisenhower the Man (general adulation with no reference to specific characteristics, *e.g.*, "I like Ike," "best man," "above politics," "more my type of leader")	24 (23.5%)
Positive Features Intrinsic to the Man (purely personal traits, *e.g.*, "integrity," "honesty," "Christian man," "dignity")	12 (11.8%)
Negative Features of Opposition Candidate(s) (*e.g.*, "don't like Stevenson," "Stevenson poorly qualified," "don't like Kefauver," "Stevenson is divorced")	12 (11.8%)
Performance During First Term	10 (9.8%)
Miscellaneous (no single reason offered by more than three respondents, *e.g.*, "needs a second term to complete his work," "favors less government," "lesser of two evils")	10 (9.8%)

The four reasons offered with greatest frequency, accounting for 80.4 per cent of all reasons given by Eisencrats for their vote, mentioned some sort of personal characteristics of the candidates.

The principal reasons Democrats gave for voting for Stevenson offer a sharp contrast:

Party Loyalty (*e.g.*, "I voted for the party," "need Democrats in office")	63 (54.3%)

Positive But Not Intrinsic Features of the Man (*e.g.*, "better qualified," "good business man," "better understanding of people," "better understanding of world affairs")	13 (11.2%)
Party Platform and Achievements (in general terms)	7 (6.0%)
Economic Issues (*e.g.*, "farm depression," "inflation," "against big business")	7 (6.0%)
Negative Features of Opposing Candidates (*e.g.*, "Ike's health," "don't like Nixon," "I don't want a military man in the White House")	6 (5.2%)
Civil Rights (*e.g.*, "the race issue," "internal differences")	6 (5.2%)
Miscellaneous (no single reason offered by more than four respondents, *e.g.*, "his sense of purpose," "high level campaign," "Florida Senators are for him")	14 (12.1%)

Only 16.4 per cent of the Stevencrats as compared with 80.5 per cent of the Eisencrats gave personal characteristics of the candidates as the most important factor in their vote decisions. Over half of the Stevencrats spoke in purely "party" terms, an emphasis that does not appear among the leading reasons of the Eisencrats. While most Stevencrats spoke of voting for their party, then, most Eisencrats did not talk about voting against it—they spoke of voting for a man.

Perceptions of Party Differences on Policy. Responses to a specific question about the policy orientation of the parties confirm our hypothesis that the Eisenhower voters would perceive little difference between the two parties. As shown in Table IV, 70.6 per cent of the Eisencrats and only 49.1 per cent of the Stevencrats feel that the two parties are "about the same" in what they stand for. Of those who specified differences, 65.0 per cent of the Eisencrats and

TABLE IV. PERCEPTION OF POLICY ORIENTATION OF PARTIES*

	Stevencrats		Eisencrats	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
About Same	57	49.1	77	70.6
Difference; DK what	8	06.9	12	11.1
Free Enterprise; Socialism, Regulation	—	—	5	04.6
Conservative; Liberal	4	03.5	5	04.6
Big Business; People	33	28.4	2	01.8
Tight money; Loose money	4	03.5	1	00.9
Civil Rights; Segregation	2	01.7	1	00.9
Federal Control; States Rights	1	00.9	1	00.9
Miscellaneous	7	06.0	5	04.6
	116	100.0	109	100.0

* In rows three through eight, the view of Republican policy is stated first.

80.4 per cent of the Stevencrats saw similar differences that might be loosely described as falling into a left-wing *versus* right-wing dichotomy (rows 3, 4, 5, and 6). Those in both groups who saw differences in the parties thus perceived them along similar lines, although they chose different words to describe them. Stevencrats, like Democrats in the nation as a whole, emphasized the Republican identification with "big business" and the Democratic identification with "the people" or "the average man"; Eisencrats, like Republicans in the nation as a whole, emphasized the Republican identification with "free enterprise" and the Democratic identification with "socialism" and "government regulation." Eisencrats thus went beyond mere "liking Ike"; they tended to see the parties as about the same, or, when they did perceive differences, they saw them in Republican terms. In view of the keen interest of Negro southerners in party differences on civil rights, it is worth noting that this issue did not work significantly to the advantage of either party among white southerners. Both parties apparently succeeded in confusing this issue in the minds of white southerners sufficiently so that they were able to repress it as a conscious basis of choice between the candidates.[5]

Party Identification. In the previous two sections, a psychological explanation was offered to indicate how the traditional Democrat justified his change in voting behavior. If this interpretation is correct, how would the individual respond to questions concerning his party loyalty? Would the Eisenhower voter face reality, or would he dodge the issue? Having justified his vote in terms of candidate appeal without reference to party ties, he would presumably remain free to think of himself as a Democrat. Three specific questions were asked which give some indication of his reactions:

(1) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?
(2) Would you call yourself a strong Republican (Democrat) or not a very strong Republican (Democrat)?
(3) Suppose there was an election where your party was running a candidate that you didn't like or you didn't agree with. Which of the following things comes closest to what you think you would do?
    (a) You probably would vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party.
    (b) You probably would not vote for either candidate in that election.
    (c) You probably would vote for the other party's candidate.

In summary, responses to these questions indicate that a majority of the Eisencrats will not admit a switch in party identification, but do admit that they are not strong Democrats. They also admit that they would vote for the other party's candidate in case the Democratic candidate was not to their liking.

Specifically, Table V indicates that although a majority of both groups described themselves as Democrats, more Eisencrats refused to answer the question and more of those who did answer considered themselves Republicans or independents. Thus, despite the fact that all respondents were registered as

---

[5] This is by no means true of Negro voters, as our interviews with a Negro sample indicate. This portion of the study will, however, be separately reported.

Democrats, 23.6 per cent of the Eisencrats described themselves as something other than Democrats, as compared with 4.4 per cent of the Stevencrats. Within the Eisencrat group, the defection from the Democratic party is stronger the higher one goes in the income scale. Only one of the thirteen Eisencrats with family incomes less than $4,000 described himself as something other than a Democrat, as compared with 23.3 per cent of those with family incomes between $4,000 and $8,000, and 26.4 per cent of those with family incomes exceeding $8,000.

TABLE V. PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Republican	Democratic	Independent	Other	Refusal
Eisencrat	6	74	15	2	12
Stevencrat	1	108	4	—	3
Totals	7	182	19	2	15

Strength of party identification similarly discriminates between Eisencrats and Stevencrats. Among those who think of themselves as Democrats, only 26.4 per cent of Eisencrats as compared with 72.0 per cent of the Stevencrats regard themselves as "Strong Democrats"; on the other hand, five of the six Eisencrats identifying themselves as Republicans were "Strong Republicans." Eisencrats seem to make strong Republicans but weak Democrats; Stevencrats seem to make strong Democrats. When queried about their 1960 vote intentions, most Eisencrats responded in a fashion consistent with their 1956 behavior: 90.6 per cent say they would vote for the other party's candidate in an election where their party was running a candidate they did not like or did not agree with. Only 48.2 per cent of the Stevencrats, on the other hand, are sufficiently detached from their party to indicate that they would behave in this fashion.

Summary and Conclusions. The heavy vote for Eisenhower in the south is described by those who cast the votes, as well as by popular commentators, as an endorsement of Eisenhower as a popular personality. But Eisenhower appears to have been admired by most Democrats in the south, including those who voted for Stevenson.[6] Those for whom "liking Ike" meant voting for him differed from fellow southern Democrats in several respects: they were from families of higher income levels and higher levels of education; while they did not differ from Stevencrats in terms of occupation, "working wives" were almost twice as prevalent among Stevencrat as Eisencrat families. Eisenhower support was also much more characteristic of voters having lived outside the south than of permanent southerners.

Eisencrats avoided the necessity of justifying a Republican vote by describing their decision in terms of the candidates. Most of them were unable to see any difference in what the parties stand for, but the minority who did perceive differences did so in Republican terms. Most Eisencrats still say they are Democrats in response to questions about party identification, although few of these think of themselves as "Strong Democrats." Just as Eisencrats as a group represent higher income levels than Stevencrats, within the Eisencrat group we find the greatest defection from the Democratic party at the upper income levels. Despite their Democratic registration, over a fourth of the Eisencrats describe themselves as something other than Democrats.

---

[6] A majority (60.3%) of the Stevencrats reported there was "nothing" they disliked about Eisenhower, and only 12.9 per cent offered criticisms that could be construed as reflecting upon him as a personality, with his "military background" ranking first and his "failure to take a strong stand" or "do-nothingness" second.

Our hypothesis appears, then, to be validated: the personality appeal of Eisenhower did not operate in a random fashion among southern Democrats; measures related to socio-economic status, migration patterns, issue orientation, and party identification reveal systematic differences between Eisencrats and Stevencrats. Rationalizing party differences out of existence was the psychological mechanism which permitted personality appeal to serve the function of weakening the southern one-party barrier to Republican voting and permitting these forces to operate.

Two-Party Prospects in the South. The question of the development of a two-party system in the south is, of course, beyond the scope of this study. But our limited conclusions can serve as a basis for somewhat better informed, if still speculative, consideration of two-party prospects in presidential elections in the south. Having been permitted two non-Democratic and "slightly Republican" votes by Eisenhower's personal popularity, the confirmed Eisencrat will presumably find it easier to vote Republican again when Eisenhower is not on the ballot. The Eisencrat's strength of identification with the Democratic party has been weakened even when he has not dropped that traditional label.

When asked whether they were "likely to vote for the Republican candidate or the Democratic candidate" in the 1960 presidential election, only 15.1 per cent of the Eisencrats as compared with 68.8 per cent of the Stevencrats said they expected to vote for the Democratic candidate (see Table VI). Only a few Eisencrats (4.7%) expected to vote Republican, but 80.2 per cent said they were undecided.

TABLE VI. 1960 VOTE INTENTION

	Per Cent Democratic	Per Cent Republican	Per Cent Undecided
Eisencrats	15.1	4.7	80.2
Stevencrats	68.8	0.9	30.3

Here appears to be the *avant garde* of Republicanism emerging out of the one-party system traditional to the south. Once having made the break from one-party voting, some of the Eisencrats found a natural home in the Republican party. While the total Republican vote in the south will undoubtedly drop in 1960 without Eisenhower on the ballot, Eisencrats from upper income levels and with a Republican view of party differences should offer a hard core of Republican voting strength in presidential elections.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1956–1957

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin

Two changes in the personnel of the United States Supreme Court occurred during the 1956 Term. Justice Sherman Minton, appointed by President Truman in 1949, retired on October 15, 1956, at the age of sixty-five, for reasons of health. Prior to his appointment to the Court, Justice Minton had served as U. S. Senator from Indiana and had spent eight years on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. To take his place President Eisenhower gave a recess appointment to William Joseph Brennan, Jr., who took the oath of office on October 16, at the age of fifty. A native of Newark and a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and of the Harvard Law School, he had served by appointment in 1949 on the New Jersey Superior Court, was advanced to the Appellate Division in 1950, and was appointed to the state Supreme Court in 1952. Justice Brennan was a Democrat, a Catholic, (the first since Justice Frank Murphy, who died in 1949), and the son of an Irish immigrant; and his appointment was announced just three weeks before the presidential election of 1956. The Senate did not confirm it until March 19, 1957, and then only after he had been pilloried by the late Senator McCarthy for having expressed in public some criticisms of some investigating committees for having indulged in what he had called "witch-hunting."

President Eisenhower made his fourth appointment when Justice Stanley Forman Reed resigned at the age of seventy-two on February 25, 1957, after nineteen years of service on the bench. Justice Reed had been appointed by President Roosevelt in January, 1938. He had held a number of important federal positions after coming from Kentucky to Washington in 1929, notably in the RFC and as Solicitor General for the three years just prior to his elevation to the Court, when most of the major New Deal cases were argued. Apparently with geography an important consideration, President Eisenhower on March 2, 1957, appointed Charles Evans Whittaker of Missouri to the place Justice Reed vacated. This nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 19, and he took his oath of office on March 25. Justice Whittaker was born on a Kansas farm, was graduated from the Kansas City School of Law, and had been a successful practitioner in Kansas City, Missouri. President Eisenhower had appointed him to the United States District Court for Missouri on July 19, 1954, and then to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on June 22, 1956. A Republican and a Methodist, Justice Whittaker was fifty-seven at the time of his promotion to the Supreme Court. He is the ninety-first man to sit on the Court since its establishment in 1789.

That the Supreme Court is inescapably a policy-making body was again dramatically emphasized by the uproar which greeted its disposition, in the spring of 1957, of cases involving such matters as subversion, the loyalty program, access to FBI files, and the authority of legislative investigating committees. Justice Brewer once wrote: "It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism. . . . True, many criticisms may be, like their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism at all."[1] It can be asserted with confidence that the Court did not suffer from any lack of criticism during 1957, much of it in very bad taste, to say the least. For many civil libertarians 1957 was something of an *annus mirabilis*. They praised the Court for restoring important American liberties, and for doing a "monumental" work in burying some of the fanaticisms engendered by the Cold War hysteria. On the other hand, the newspaper writer David Lawrence declared that the Court had wrecked its own historic principles. Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General of New Hampshire and president of the National Association of Attorneys General, asserted that the Court's decisions "have set the United States back twenty-five years in its attempt to make certain that those loyal to a foreign power cannot create another Trojan horse." Herbert R. O'Conor, chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on Communist Activities, complained that the federal courts were leaning "too far backward in the maintenance of theoretical individuals' rights," and that excessive zeal on their part may impair the nation's right of self-preservation, "the first law of mankind."[2] Senator Eastland came out for a constitutional amendment which would require Senate confirmation of Supreme Court Justices every four years.

The outstanding book in the constitutional law field to be published during the year was Professor Mason's monumental biography of the late Chief Justice Stone.[3] Our rapidly growing stock of judicial biographies was also enriched with the appearance of the first installment of Professor Howe's long-awaited life of Justice Holmes,[4] a scholarly life of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts,[5] and a popularly written but substantial history of Sir Edward Coke.[6] Other noteworthy books included an interesting volume of unpublished opinions of Justice Brandeis,[7] a splendid analysis of Holmes and Brandeis,[8] and a second volume of the late Charles Grove Haines' history of the Supreme Court.[9] Attention should also be directed to a number of books and essays dealing with various aspects of the judicial process,[10] and with phases of legal history.[11] Students of American constitutional law were especially glad to welcome the appearance in January 1957 of the new *American Journal of Legal History,* published quarterly for the American Society for Legal History by the Temple University School of Law.

---

[1] "Government by Injunction," *Nat. Corp. Rep.*, Vol. 15, p. 849 (1898), quoted in Felix Frankfurter, ed., *Mr. Justice Holmes* (New York, 1931), p. 239.

[2] *New York Times*, June 25, 1957, p. 1; July 26, 1957, p. 1.

[3] Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law* (New York, 1956). See also John P. Frank, "Harlan Fiske Stone: An Estimate," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 621–632 (May, 1957).

[4] Mark De Wolfe Howe, *Justice Holmes: The Shaping Years, 1841–1870* (Cambridge, 1957). See also Howe, "Oliver Wendell Holmes at Harvard Law School," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 401–421 (January, 1957).

[5] Leonard W. Levy, *The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw* (Cambridge, 1957).

[6] Catherine Drinker Bowen, *The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke* (Boston, 1957).

[7] Alexander M. Bickel, *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis* (Cambridge, 1957). See also: Paul A. Freund, "Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 769–792 (March, 1957); Comment, "Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness: A Dilemma Re-examined," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, pp. 69–96 (November, 1956).

[8] Samuel J. Konefsky, *The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis* (New York, 1956).

During the 1956 Term the Supreme Court disposed of 1,670 cases with finality, a slight increase over the 1,630 figure for the previous Term. At the end of the 1956 Term, however, 351 cases remained on the Court's dockets, a sharp increase over the 219 left at the end of the 1955 Term. Cases decided on the merits were 263 (as compared with 241 a year ago), of which 130 were with full opinion, the remainder by memorandum order. In all, there were 115 opinions of the Court, of which 15 were *per curiam.* (The discrepancy between this figure and the number of full opinion cases, as always, was due to the fact that several opinions covered more than one case.) Of the full opinion cases, 33 (or 29 per cent) were by unanimous vote, while of those disposed of by memorandum 114 (81 per cent) were by unanimous vote. This reflected a sharp increase in the number of dissents, for in the previous Term the Court had been unanimous in 41 per cent of the full opinion cases. In the 1955 Term 55 dissenting opinions had been filed; during the 1956 Term there were 83.

Of all cases decided on the merits, 44 came up from the federal district courts by appeal (of which 21 were affirmed), six from the federal courts of appeals by appeal (of which only one was affirmed) and 112 by certiorari (of which 34 were affirmed), 71 from the state courts by appeal (of which only six were affirmed and 56 were dismissed) and 25 by certiorari (of which four were affirmed), and five from specialized federal courts by certiorari (of which one was affirmed). Of the 263 cases decided on the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed only 67 and reversed 101.

---

[9] Charles G. Haines and Foster H. Sherwood, *The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1835–1864* (Berkeley, 1957).

[10] Robert G. McCloskey, ed., *Essays in Constitutional Law* (New York, 1957); Arthur E. Sutherland, *The Law and One Man Among Many* (Madison, Wisc., 1956); Sutherland, ed., *Government under Law* (Cambridge, 1956); Bernard Schwartz, *The Supreme Court* (New York, 1957); M. Ramaswamy, *The Creative Role of the Supreme Court of the United States* (Stanford, Calif., 1956); Loren P. Beth, "Technical and Doctrinal Aids to Constitutional Interpretation," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review,* Vol. 18, pp. 108–130 (Fall, 1956); Louis L. Jaffe, "Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact," *Harvard Law Review,* Vol. 70, pp. 953–985 (April, 1957). See also: Clement E. Vose, "Conservatism by Amendment," *Yale Review,* Vol. 47, pp. 176–190 (Winter, 1957).

[11] James Willard Hurst, *Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States* (Madison, Wisc., 1956); Felix Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review,* Vol. 105, pp. 781–796 (April, 1957); Wallace Mendelson, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter on Administrative Law," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 19, pp. 441–460 (August, 1957); Allan F. Westin, "John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southerner," *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 66, pp. 637–710 (April, 1957); Ralph L. Ketcham, "James Madison and Judicial Review," *Syracuse Law Review,* Vol. 8, pp. 158–165 (Spring, 1957); A. J. Beitzinger, "Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases," *Marquette Law Review,* Vol. 41, pp. 7–32 (Summer, 1957). See especially the symposium on "Studies in Judicial Biography," *Vanderbilt Law Review,* Vol. 10, pp. 167–413 (February, 1957). On various legal aspects of the Presidency see Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., *The Presidency in the Courts* (Minneapolis, 1957); Symposium on "The Presidential Office," *Law and Contemporary Problems,* Vol. 21, pp. 607–752 (Autumn, 1956).

The Court was unusually generous in granting certiorari in the 1956 Term, for on the appellate docket the writ was awarded in 170 cases, or 20.4 per cent of all petitions. This compares with 16.1 per cent the year before. On the miscellaneous docket certiorari was granted in 38 cases, or 6.1 per cent of all petitions, as contrasted with 2.7 per cent in the previous Term.

Justice Frankfurter filed dissenting opinions in 18 cases, Justice Harlan in 17, Justice Douglas in 14, and Justice Burton in 10. At the other extreme, Justices Black and Clark wrote dissenting opinions in seven cases, Justice Brennan in six, Chief Justice Warren in three, and Justice Reed in one. In all dispositions on the merits, whether by opinion or memorandum, dissenting votes totalled 271 (as compared with 192 a year ago), with Justice Frankfurter casting 49, Justice Harlan 45, and Justice Burton 44. Concurring opinions were filed in 18 cases, Justice Frankfurter again leading the Court in this regard with eight. The authorship of opinions of the Court was quite evenly divided: Justice Clark wrote 14, Justice Douglas 13, Chief Justice Warren 12, Justices Black, Brennan, Frankfurter, and Harlan eleven each, Justice Burton nine, Justice Reed five, and Justice Whittaker three.

I. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER

1. FEDERAL RIGHTS

The Federal Loyalty Program. The heavy emphasis in American public law upon civil liberties problems was reflected during the 1956 Term both in the flow of published writings,[12] and in the preoccupations of the Supreme Court.

---

[12] Milton Konvitz, *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People* (Ithaca, 1957); Edward Dumbauld, *The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today* (Norman, Okla., 1957); Roscoe Pound, *The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty* (New Haven, 1957); James Russell Wiggins, *Freedom or Secrecy* (New York, 1956); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787* (Lawrence, Kan., 1956); Paul G. Kauper, *Frontiers of Constitutional Liberty* (Ann Arbor, 1957); Alger Hiss, *In the Court of Public Opinion* (New York, 1957); Arnold J. Lien, *Concurring Opinion: The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment* (St. Louis, 1957); American Civil Liberties Union, *Liberty Is Always Unfinished Business* (Annual Report, New York, 1957); Henry S. Drinker, "Some Observations on the Four Freedoms of the First Amendment," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 1–69 (Winter, 1957); Robert G. McCloskey, "Useful Toil or the Paths of Glory? Civil Liberties in the 1956 Term of the Supreme Court," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 803–835 (October, 1957); F. D. G. Ribble, "A Look at the Policy Making Powers of the Supreme Court and the Position of the Individual," *Washington and Lee Law Review*, Vol. 14, pp. 167–185 (No. 2, 1957); Sanford H. Kadish, "Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey and Criticism," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, pp. 319–363 (January, 1957); Glanville Williams, "The Concept of Legal Liberty," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 56, pp. 1129–1150 (December, 1956); Detlev

So far as the federal loyalty program was concerned, perhaps the most important event was the appearance of the final report of the twelve-member Commission on Government Security, which had been authorized by a statute passed in August, 1955.[13] Submitted on June 21, 1957, the Report made many recommendations for improvement of the federal government's fidelity programs, such as the creation of an independent Central Security Office with centralized hearing and review machinery, the separation of loyalty from suitability considerations, the clarification of standards, and the improvement of procedures. Scholars will find especially useful the exhaustive factual surveys of the history and content of the various programs.

The only Supreme Court decision dealing with the federal loyalty program was *Service v. Dulles*,[14] and the point at issue was comparatively simple. Service was a Foreign Service Officer for some sixteen years, ten of them in China. His difficulties arose from his involvement in the Amerasia investigation. After four clearances by the State Department's loyalty security board, the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board, on a post-audit, directed the departmental board to hold still another hearing. After this hearing Service was cleared again, and the finding was approved by the Deputy Under-Secretary, acting pursuant to authority delegated to him by the Secretary. Once again the Loyalty Review Board, on post-audit, remanded the case to the departmental board for further consideration in the light of a more stringent loyalty standard recently established by the President.[15] This was in the best

---

F. Vagts, "Free Speech in the Armed Forces," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 187–218 (February, 1957); Wallace Mendelson, "A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 125–137 (December, 1956); Paul Brindel, "Zoning Out Religious Institutions," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 32, pp. 627–641 (August, 1957); Note, "Churches and Zoning," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 1419–1438 (June, 1957); John H. Allen, "Denial of Voting Rights to Reservation Indians," *Utah Law Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 247–256 (Fall, 1956). See also: Rolf Deppeler, *"Due Process of Law" Ein Kapitel Amerikanischer Verfassungsgeschichte* (Bern, 1957).

[13] *Report of the Commission on Government Security*, pursuant to Public Law 304, 84th Congress (Washington, 1957). See: John H. Schaar, *Loyalty in America* (Berkeley, 1957); Robert N. Johnson, "The Eisenhower Personnel Security Program," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18, pp. 625–650 (November, 1956); Robert J. Morgan, "Federal Loyalty-Security Removals, 1946–1956," *Nebraska Law Review*, Vol. 36, pp. 412–446 (May, 1957); J. Malcolm Smith and Cornelius P. Cotter, "Freedom and Authority in the Amphibial State," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1, pp. 40–59 (May, 1957); David Fellman, "The Loyalty Defendants," *Wisconsin Law Review*, Vol. 1957, pp. 4–39 (January, 1957).

[14] 354 U. S. 363 (1957).

[15] Executive Order 10241, 16 *Fed. Reg.* 3690 (1951). The original standard for refusing employment or for removal was that "on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." Executive Order 9835, 12 *Fed. Reg.* 1935, 1938 (1947). On April 21, 1951, President Truman changed the standard to "reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved." It is clear, as Seth W. Richardson, then Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, declared, that the purpose of this change in the standard was to lessen the degree of proof; it is easier to justify a doubt than to support a positive finding. See Richardson, "The Federal Employee Loyalty Program," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 51, p. 555 (May, 1951).

tradition of that perpetual jeopardy which seems to be lot of men and women who work for the government.

The departmental board again cleared Service, and the Deputy Under-Secretary approved once more. But on further post-audit the Loyalty Review Board decided to conduct a new hearing itself, and, concluding that there was reasonable doubt as to Service's loyalty, advised the Secretary to discharge him. Acting solely on the basis of the Review Board's finding, without reading the testimony himself, and without making any independent determination on the record, the Secretary forthwith fired Service. The Secretary recited that he was relying upon the authority vested in him by executive orders and by a statute, the so-called McCarran Rider, which provided that "notwithstanding the provisions of . . . any other law, the Secretary of State may, in his absolute discretion . . . terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States."[16] The Department's own Regulations, however, provided that "so far as possible" McCarran Rider removals should be made under the protection of the same rules that apply to other removals; and in actual fact, to the very end Service's case had been handled under the Regulations. And the Regulations made no provision for action by the Secretary himself, except following *unfavorable* action by the departmental board, after full hearing and approval of the board's action by the Deputy Under-Secretary.

It should be added that in reporting to a Senate investigating committee in 1950, the Department made it clear that even as regards removals under the McCarran Rider, the Department proposed to and did follow its Regulations. Furthermore, in a letter dated September 6, 1950, the President wrote to the Secretary approving this policy and directing him to follow the procedures designed to protect personal liberties under the controlling general statute.

The Court held, by unanimous vote, that on these facts the Secretary was bound to observe his own Regulations. In doing so, it rejected the argument which the District Court had accepted, that the Secretary was powerless to bind himself by these Regulations so far as McCarran Rider discharges based on loyalty or security grounds were concerned. Though Congress had been clearly advised that the Secretary had seen fit to limit his discretion by regulation, it continued to re-enact the Rider without change. Furthermore, there was no inconsistency between the statute and the effect of the Regulations upon the Secretary. It follows that under the Regulations the Secretary had no right to dismiss for loyalty or security reasons unless and until the Deputy Under-Secretary, acting on the findings of the departmental loyalty security board, had recommended such dismissal. If the action of the Deputy Under-Secretary was favorable to the employee, then such action was final. In addition, if the decision of the Secretary was favorable, then this was to be final, and no further action was to be taken by the Loyalty Review Board. The Secretary reserved the right to deal with such a case outside the Regulations, under his McCarran Rider authority, only where on the employee's appeal to the Loyalty Review Board, from an unfavorable decision by the Secretary, the decision of the Board was favorable to the employee. It follows that Service's discharge was contrary to the Regulations in effect at the time. It is an established rule of law, only recently reaffirmed in the *Accardi* case,[17] that executive and administrative officials are bound to observe their own proper rules.

---

[16] 65 Stat. 581, Sec. 103.

The Court's decision was grounded upon the 1949 Regulations, but it held that the same conclusion would follow if the 1951 Regulations were deemed applicable. For the standard of removal in the later Regulations recited that the Secretary's decision shall be reached "after consideration of the complete file, arguments, briefs, and testimony presented." Former Secretary Acheson had testified that he had made no attempt to comply with this section. The Court held that while the Secretary was not obliged under the McCarran Rider to impose upon himself these more rigorous standards, neither was he prohibited from doing so, and having done so, he was bound by them.

Congressional Investigations and the Rights of Witnesses. Without any question, *Watkins v. United States*[18] will take its place as a landmark decision on the scope of the investigative power of congressional committees. Watkins was testifying in response to a subpoena before the House Committee on Un-American Activities regarding his labor union activities, and while he testified freely about his own past, he refused, without pleading the Fifth Amendment, to say whether certain named persons had been members of the Communist Party. He said that he would answer questions about people who he knew were still members of the Party, but not about the others, on the ground that they were not relevant to the work of the Committee. Watkins was then convicted of contempt of Congress under a statute making it a crime to refuse to answer "any questions pertinent to the question under inquiry."[19] The Court held that as in all criminal cases the defendant is entitled to have a clear standard of criminality, and that since he is free to decline to respond to questions not pertinent, he is entitled to know just what the subject is to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent. Furthermore, since a committee acts for Congress, and must therefore be instructed by the House or Senate, it is the responsibility of Congress to make sure that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose. Congressional instructions to the committee therefore must spell out its jurisdiction and purpose "with sufficient particularity."

---

[17] U. S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See this REVIEW, Vol. 50, pp. 56–57 (March, 1956).

[18] 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Contempt citations were also set aside in Flaxer v. United States, 354 U.S. 929 (1957) and Sacher v. United States, 354 U. S. 930 (1957), which involved witnesses who had refused to answer questions put to them by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and in Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957), which concerned a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The *per curiam* opinions in these cases merely invoked the teaching of the Watkins case. See: Harold W. Chase, "Improving Congressional Investigations: A No-Progress Report," *Temple Law Quarterly*, Vol. 30, pp. 126–155 (Winter, 1957); Donald M. Cahen, "Congressional Investigations and the Privileges on Confidential Communications," *California Law Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 347–362 (July, 1957); Daniel H. Pollitt, "Pleading the Fifth Amendment Before a Congressional Committee: A Study and Explanation," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 32, pp. 43–84 (December, 1956); Note, "The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel Testimony," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 671–685 (February, 1957); Philip Wittenberg, *The Lamont Case: History of a Congressional Investigation* (New York, 1957).

[19] 2 U.S.C. §192.

The relevant statute authorizes the House Committee on Un-American Activities to investigate "Un-American propaganda activities" which attack "the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution. . . . " Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren declared: "It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the meaning of 'un-American'? What is that single, solitary 'principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution'?" Furthermore, he noted that the Committee itself had not limited itself to the subject of propaganda. No one, he said, can reasonably deduce from the Committee's legislative charter the kind of investigation that it was directed to make. Since the legislative standard controlling the Committee is altogether nebulous, the House of Representatives failed to exert its responsibility of control, and the Committee is left free to roam at will. This places the witness in an untenable position, since it is impossible to ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures sought.

The basic assumption of this decision is that no witness can be required to make disclosures on matters outside the legislative sphere, and that without some specific definition of the scope and purpose of an investigation, a witness cannot make an intelligent decision as to whether particular questions are pertinent. This in turn is based on premises regarding the nature of the investigatory power which the Chief Justice was apparently anxious to spell out. While he made it clear that the power to conduct investigations is "inherent in the legislative process," and is necessarily very broad, he insisted that it is by no means unlimited. "There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals," he wrote, "without justification in terms of the functions of Congress. . . . Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. . . . No inquiry is an end in itself; and it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible." Furthermore, while all citizens have a duty to cooperate with Congress and to respect its committees, so that the facts needed for intelligent legislative action may be secured, Congress must also respect the constitutional rights of witnesses. "The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action." Thus, investigating committees are bound, the Chief Justice pointed out, by the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, political belief and association. While an investigation is not a law, it is a part of law-making, and "it is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process."

The Chief Justice emphasized the serious implications of legislative investigations. A mere summons to testify is a measure of governmental interference with the individual. If unorthodox or unpopular matters are revealed, the effects upon the witness, derived from public stigma, scorn and obloquy, may be disastrous, and the broader effect may be the undue encouragement of general conformity. The Court's problem is to find a balance between public need and private rights. Certainly it cannot be assumed that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights which may be affected. "We have no doubt," Chief Justice Warren asserted, "that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." It cannot be "inflated into a general power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals."

A witness, in short, is punishable if he refuses to answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." In this instance Watkins had no way of knowing what "the question under inquiry" really was. The authorizing resolution of Congress was vague; the opening statement of the Committee chairman was equally vague; and the chairman's response to the witness' objections was that the Committee was investigating "subversion and subversive propaganda," a formulation as broad and as indefinite as the authorizing resolution, if not more so. The Government claimed that the topic of the inquiry was clearly the subject of Communist infiltration of the labor movement, but six out of nine witnesses had no connection with labor at all, and of thirty names Watkins was asked about, seven were entirely unconnected with organized labor. Thus it followed that Watkins had been denied Fifth Amendment due process of law.

Justice Clark dissented alone, arguing that the Court's opinion was a "mischievous curbing of the informing function of the Congress," that its requirements were both "unnecessary and unworkable," and that it violated the principle of the separation of powers, since it set up the judiciary as "the grand inquisitor and supervisor of congressional investigations." Pointing out that other congressional committees operate under equally broad enabling resolutions, he argued that if the charter of the Un-American Activities Committee is bad, so are many others; and the net result would be to cripple the investigative power. He insisted that the terms of the Committee's charter were "fairly well understood terms," and that the questions asked of Watkins were pertinent to a valid purpose. But the Chief Justice denied that the holding in this case would injure the investigative power of Congress, and insisted that "a measure of added care" on the part of Congress and its committees would suffice to meet the Court's objections.

Free Speech and Sedition. One of the novelties of the 1956 Term was that a number of Communists who had been convicted of violating the Smith Act won their appeals in the Supreme Court. In *Mesarosh v. United States*,[20] after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to five men so convicted in the federal district court of Pennsylvania, the Solicitor General himself filed a motion calling the Court's attention to the testimony given by one of the government's seven witnesses, a paid informer named Mazzei, and expressing serious doubt regarding his truthfulness. The only argument was over the question whether the case should be remanded to the district court for a determination as to the truthfulness of Mazzei's testimony, as the government and three Justices believed, or whether the Supreme Court should itself order a new trial. Speaking through Chief Justice Warren, five Justices ruled that since the disclosures of the Solicitor General wholly discredited Mazzei's credibility, "the dignity of the United States Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony." With only seven government witnesses, it would be impossible for any court to determine conclusively that the testimony of this particular one had been insignificant. Furthermore, the original finder of fact was the jury, not the judge, and it is therefore not for him to decide that the conviction could have been sustained by the other evidence. Without invoking any constitutional doctrine, but rather acting as the supervisor of justice in the federal courts, the Court ordered a new trial "to see that the waters of justice are not polluted." The three dissenting Justices argued that reversal of the convictions was "an unprecedented and dangerous departure from sound principles of judicial administration," for here the Court overturned the results of a complex, lengthy and expensive trial before any investigation had been made of the suspicions of the Solicitor General. They maintained that it was for the district court to decide, after a hearing, whether a new jury trial was warranted. Furthermore, they asserted, only the district court is equipped to make the necessary investigation, and it must be assumed that it will do its full duty.

Yates v. United States[21] involved appeals of fourteen persons who had been convicted in the southern California federal district court of violating the Smith Act. The indictment had charged, first, that the defendants had advocated and taught the duty and necessity of overthrowing the government of the United States by force and violence, and secondly, that they organized, as the Communist Party of the United States, a society which so advocates and teaches, all with the intent of overthrowing the government by force and violence as soon as circumstances would permit. Each defendant was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary and fined $10,000.

The Court held for all petitioners, ordering a new trial for nine of them, and directing the acquittal of the other five. Briefly, the Court held that the trial judge had instructed the jury incorrectly on both counts. It ruled that the term "organize" as used in the Smith Act refers only to acts relating to the creation of a new organization, and not to a continuing process which goes on throughout the life of an organization. Since the Communist Party was organized in 1945, and the indictment was returned in 1951, the three-year statute of limitations was also held to bar prosecution of this charge. Since the legislative history was by no means clear on this point, and other sections of the statute dealt with the continuing activities of the Communist Party, the Court leaned heavily upon the familiar rule that in the absence of revealing guides of congressional intent penal laws must be strictly construed. It also felt that it was ascribing to the word "organize" its normal and natural meaning.

---

[20] 352 U.S. 1 (1956).

[21] 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

As to the charge of advocating the unlawful overthrow of government, the Court held that the trial judge should have made it clear to the jury, as indeed he had been requested to do by all parties, that the statute does not forbid mere advocacy of abstract doctrine, but only incitement to action to accomplish the proscribed end. The opinion stressed that in previous free speech cases the Court had heavily underscored this distinction;[22] it should not be assumed "that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked." Actually, all the trial judge needed to have done, to avoid this reversal, was to give the instructions which Judge Medina had given in the first Smith Act prosecution, and which the Supreme Court had approved in the *Dennis* case.[23] It should also be noted that while for those five defendants for whom the Court ordered an acquittal it was held that mere membership or the holding of office in the Communist Party does not warrant a conviction under the Smith Act, this is no more than Congress said very explicitly in the Internal Security Act of 1950.[24]

The division of the Justices in this case was extremely complex. Only four held that the statute does not forbid mere abstract doctrine of forcible overthrow, but reaches only advocacy of action to this end. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground that in their opinion it is not constitutionally permissible to punish even advocacy of action, and on the other hand, Justice Clark thought that the trial court's instructions had been adequate on this point. Five Justices agreed that to "organize" means to start an organization, and that the statute of limitations had run, while on this point Justices Burton and Clark dissented. Justice Clark also dissented from the holding that granted an acquittal to five of the defendants because the evidence in the record was obviously insufficient to warrant a new trial. But Justices Black and Douglas thought the evidence was so palpably insufficient for all defendants that they were all entitled to directed acquittals. They also dissented from the holding that overt acts could be proved by participation in meetings of the Communist Party, even though participation is lawful in and of itself. All the Justices agreed that a determination in a former denaturalization proceeding that one of the defendants had not engaged in subversive activities before 1927[25] did not operate as an estoppel in the present proceedings.

---

[22] Especially in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), where the statute was nearly identical with the Smith Act.

[23] Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

[24] 64 Stat. 987, §4(f): "Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute *per se* a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other criminal statute."

Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas agreed, took his now-familiar absolutist position on the free speech issue. He said categorically: "The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government—one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us." On the other hand, Justice Clark thought that this case dealt with the same sort of conspiracy that had been involved in the *Dennis* case, except that the California people were in a lower echelon. In his opinion they served in the same army for the same mission. He also argued that the evidence was as persuasive here as it had been in *Dennis*. Furthermore he thought that the Court ought not to acquit anyone, since this usurps the function of the jury. He disagreed on the meaning of "organize," and could not find any material difference between the California trial judge's charge on the count of advocacy and that used in the *Dennis* proceedings.

Self-Incrimination. In the course of the trial of an attorney for conspiring to defraud the United States by preventing prosecutions for income tax evasions, the trial judge permitted the government, for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility, to cross-examine him with regard to his assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury. In his charge to the jury the judge said that the defendant's Fifth Amendment plea could be considered only with regard to the issue of his credibility, but that no inference regarding guilt or innocence could be drawn from it. In *Grunewald v. United States*[26] five Justices held that under the circumstances of this case it was reversible error for the trial judge to allow the cross-examination, since the assertion of the privilege was not inconsistent with this defendant's later testimony at the trial. An elementary rule of evidence allows prior statements to be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant or witness in a criminal trial, but only if the judge is satisfied that the prior statements were in fact inconsistent with the testimony given at the trial. Here it was held that the cross-examination should have been excluded because its probative value on the issue of the defendant's credibility was so negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible and impermissible impact on the jury. The other four Justices concurred, but stated that they could think of no special circumstances that would justify the use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person who has asserted it. This would seem to be the better view of the matter.

---

[25] Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).

[26] 353 U.S. 391 (1957). See: Sidney Hook, *Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment* (New York, 1957); Note, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Federal Courts," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 1454–1465 (June, 1957); Leonard G. Ratner, "Consequences of Exercising the Privilege against Self-Incrimination," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 472–511 (Spring, 1957); O. John Rogge, "The New Federal Immunity Act and the Judicial Function," *California Law Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 109–133 (May, 1957); Maxwell Brandwen, "Reflections on Ullmann v. United States," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 500–517 (April, 1957); J. A. C. Grant, "Federalism and Self-Incrimination," *UCLA Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 549–582 (June, 1957). See also: Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., "The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, pp. 477–491 (February, 1957); Note, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investigations," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 676–699 (May, 1957).

While it is settled law that a corporation or an unincorporated association, such as a labor union, is not protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, that a corporate officer may not withhold testimony or documents on the ground that his corporation would be incriminated, and that the custodian of corporate books or records may not withhold them on the ground that their production would result in his being incriminated personally, the Court ruled unanimously in *Curcio v. United States*[27] that the custodian cannot be compelled to testify orally as to the location of the books and records and to identify the people to whom he gave them, in the absence of adequate immunity. Curcio was the secretary-treasurer of a union local, called by a special federal grand jury in New York to testify in the course of an investigation of racketeering in certain labor unions. He received both a personal subpoena *ad testificandum* and a subpoena *duces tecum* addressed to him in his capacity as a union official. Though he appeared as commanded, he did not produce the books and records, testified that he did not then possess them, and refused on the ground of self-incrimination to answer any questions as to where the books were or who had them. At a later hearing before the district court, Curcio declined to answer some fifteen questions regarding the whereabouts of the books which were put to him pursuant to the personal subpoena *ad testificandum*, and the judge summarily held him in contempt and sent him to jail for six months. The Supreme Court held that while a custodian undertakes the obligation to produce the books in response to a rightful subpoena, he cannot lawfully be compelled to condemn himself by his own oral testimony. While he has a duty to produce the records themselves which overrides a claim to the privilege, there is not the slightest hint in the precedents that a custodian of corporate or association books waives his constitutional privilege as to oral testimony by assuming his office. Thus Curcio could have been proceeded against for his failure to produce the records demanded by the subpoena *duces tecum*. The Court rejected the government's contention, however, that it matters little whether the punishment is for this failure, or for refusing to testify about the location of the records. The production of records by the custodian is justifiable because he does not own them and has no legal interest in them; but forcing a man to testify orally requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind.

Confessions. Speaking for a unanimous Court in *Mallory v. United States*,[28] Justice Frankfurter served notice once more that the police are not free to disregard the rule that arrested persons are entitled to prompt arraignment before a magistrate, as required by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

---

[27] 354 U.S. 118 (1957).

[28] 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

Procedure and the *McNabb* case.[29] The Rule provides that when officers make an arrest they shall take the arrested person to a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay." It was devised by Congress, the Justice emphasized, to safeguard individual rights without hampering effective and intelligent law enforcement. The purpose of this requirement is spelled out in the Rule itself, for it goes on to provide that the commissioner shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and to a preliminary examination; the accused must be told that he is not required to make a statement, and that any statement he does make may be held against him; the commissioner must also give the accused a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel and must admit him to bail. Since the police may not arrest upon mere suspicion, but only on probable cause, the point in insisting upon getting the accused to a magistrate as quickly as possible is to make sure that he is properly advised of his rights, and to permit a prompt judicial determination of the issue of probable cause. While this rule does not call for mechanical or automatic obedience, and circumstances might very well justify a brief delay between arrest and arraignment, the delay must not be of a nature to give the police an opportunity to extract a confession.

This is just what happened in the case of Mallory, a nineteen-year old youth of limited intelligence who had been arrested in Washington, D.C., on the charge of rape, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, and then questioned on and off until midnight, when he finally signed a written confession. It was only after he made an oral confession around 10:00 P.M. that the police made a first attempt to reach a United States Commissioner, and after this failed to materialize, the accused agreed to be examined by a deputy coroner. All that afternoon the accused had been detained in a building in the vicinity of many committing magistrates. The police did not tell the accused about his rights to counsel and to a preliminary examination, and did not warn him of his right to remain silent. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Said Justice Frankfurter: "It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing magistrate on 'probable cause.' "

An old problem in the use of confessions as evidence was reviewed in *Paoli v. United States.*[30] Five co-defendants had been convicted in a federal district court of conspiring to violate the federal liquor tax laws. The trial court admitted in evidence a confession made after the end of the conspiracy by one of the co-defendants. The judge instructed the jury clearly that the confession was to be considered only in determining the guilt of the confessor and not that of the other defendants. A bare majority of five Justices held this to be proper, in effect reaffirming the established rule that a confession made by a conspirator after termination of the conspiracy may be used only against the declarant, under appropriate instructions to the jury. The four dissenting Justices objected that too often the admonition of the judge to the jury is "intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors." Thus the admonition becomes "a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should not tell." The reply of the majority of the Court was that unless we assume that the jury will apply the court's clear instructions the jury system makes little sense. And Justice Burton went on to say: "Based on faith that the jury will endeavor to follow the court's instructions, our system of jury trial has produced one of the most valuable and practical mechanisms in human experience for dispensing substantial justice."

---

[29] McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

[30] 352 U.S. 232 (1957).

Searches and Seizures. Three persons were convicted in a federal district court for assisting and harboring a fugitive from justice, the fugitive being one of the *Dennis* defendants who had been convicted in the first Smith Act prosecution in New York. The FBI found these three defendants at a secluded cabin in California. One defendant, for whom the FBI had a warrant of arrest, was arrested outside the cabin, and the other two, for whom there were no warrants, were apprehended inside. The individuals were then searched and documents found on their persons were seized. But in addition the agents searched the cabin exhaustively and seized its entire contents, without a search warrant, though the cabin had been under surveillance for some 24 hours. The seized property was taken to the FBI office in San Francisco some 200 miles away. The Court held that this seizure of the entire contents of the house, and the removal to such a great distance for the purpose of examination, went beyond the sanction of any precedents.[31] Justices Burton and Clark dissented on the ground that the validity of a seizure is not to be tested by the quantity of items seized.

Double Jeopardy and Speedy Trial. Two constitutional issues were involved in *Pollard v. United States.*[32] While still serving a sentence in a state penitentiary, Pollard was taken to a federal district court on October 3, 1952, following a plea of guilty on a federal criminal charge. The judge said in effect that he hoped the parole board would let the accused off, but he neither sentenced nor paroled him. Later that morning, and in the absence of Pollard, on the request of the district attorney, the judge ordered that the defendant be put on probation, with sentence suspended. Since this is contrary to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the government later conceded that because of Pollard's absence from the courtroom when probation was imposed, this procedure was invalid. But a month after Pollard was released from the state prison, he began to report to the United States probation officer. About two years later, on September 1, 1954, the trial judge issued a bench warrant for Pollard's arrest on the basis of the probation officer's report that the terms of probation had been violated. Pollard was arrested and on September 21 the court sentenced him to two years, setting aside the judgment and order of probation that had been entered in October, 1952. Now Pollard moved for vacation of the 1954 sentence as unconstitutional because imposed for violation of the invalid probation order. He claimed that the trial judge had determined in 1952 that no imprisonment or probation should be imposed, and that therefore the imposition of sentence in 1954 was double jeopardy.

---

[31] Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). In Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S 394 (1957), the Court held that an order for the suppression of evidence on the ground that there had not been probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrants, made by the federal district court upon a motion filed after indictment and in the district of trial, is not appealable either under general federal law or under the law of the District of Columbia. It was ruled that the order was not a final order, and was not sufficiently separable from and collateral to the criminal case itself. It was stressed that no specific statute authorizes such an appeal, and that in general appeals by the government in criminal cases are unusual, exceptional, and not favored. But an order for the suppression or return of illegally seized property is appealable at once where the motion is made *before* indictment, or in a *different* district from that in which the trial will occur. Where the motion to suppress, however, is made by the defendant after indictment and in the district of trial, the denial of such a pretrial motion in this posture is interlocutory in form and effect, and thus is not appealable by the defendant; since the rule operates equally where the motion is granted, it follows that the government cannot appeal. On the general subject see: Emmerich Handler, "The Fourth Amendment, Federalism, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter," *Syracuse Law Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 166–190 (Spring, 1957).

[32] 352 U.S. 354 (1957). See J.A.C. Grant, "Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons," *UCLA Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 1–37 (December, 1956); Note, "The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 846–867 (June, 1957).

Five Justices held that there was no violation of the double jeopardy principle since the trial court had *not* determined in 1952 that Pollard should *not* be subject to imprisonment or probation. The trial court, it was ruled, had not intended by implication to acquit or dismiss the defendant. The Court also held that there had been no violation of the Sixth Amendment guaranty of a speedy trial, since the delay had been neither purposeful nor oppressive. On the contrary, it concluded that the delay in this case had been accidental, and had been promptly remedied when discovered. The four dissenting Justices felt that an indigent, uncounseled defendant had been denied basic procedural rights, and especially they believed there had been too much delay in sentencing.

Bail. The Court ruled that even a gangster like Costello is entitled to bail where following conviction a serious legal question has been raised on the appeal.[33] Sitting as a Circuit Justice in another case,[34] Justice Frankfurter drew attention to the recent change in the Rule regarding bail pending an appeal. The old rule was: "Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court. . . . " The new Rule 46(a)(2), which took effect July 9, 1956, reads as follows: "Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. . . . " The Justice made it clear that this change greatly liberalized the basis for admission to bail in the federal courts pending an appeal from a conviction. It was also intended to shift the burden from the defendant, to prove eligibility for bail, to require the government instead to persuade the trial judge that the minimum standards for allowing bail have not been met.

---

[33] Binion v. United States, 352 U.S. 1928 (1957). See Edmund H. Feldman and Maurice C. Fleming, "*Considerations in the Granting of Bail Pending Appeal in the Federal Courts*," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 25, pp. 693–703 (June, 1957).

[34] Ward v. United States, 1 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1956).

Jury Tampering. Ben Gold, president of a union, was convicted in the District of Columbia of filing with the NLRB a false non-Communist affidavit. It turned out that during the trial an FBI agent who was investigating another case in which the falsity of such an affidavit was also charged telephoned or visited three members of Gold's petit jury or their families to inquire whether they had received any propaganda literature. The Court ruled that these FBI contacts with the jurors were so prejudicial as to require reversal; a new trial was granted "because of official intrusion into the privacy of the jury."[35] The fact that the intrusion was unintentional did not, in the Court's opinion, remove its effect. Three Justices dissented on the ground that the record showed support for the trial judge's conclusion that this accidental intrusion could not reasonably be anticipated to have any effect upon the jurors adverse to the defendant. They argued that in these cases there is only a presumption of prejudice which may be rebutted by the facts. Since normally the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate such facts, the teaching of this case seems to be that where the jury tampering is done by the government the presumption of prejudice is very strong.

Right to Counsel. Congress has provided in the judicial code for proceedings *in forma pauperis* on appeal, unless "the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith."[36] The Supreme Court held that while such a certification carries great weight, it is not necessarily conclusive, and is reviewable by the court of appeals.[37] Furthermore, under the rule of *Johnson v. Zerbst,*[38] it was held that the court of appeals must afford one who challenges such a certification the aid of counsel unless he insists upon acting *pro se.* Since the defendant or his assigned counsel must be able to show that the grounds for seeking an appeal from the conviction are not frivolous and do not justify the finding that the appeal was not sought in good faith, it follows that the government must supply some appropriate means of substantiating the claim that the district court had erred. While this does not require the government to furnish the defendant in every case a stenographic transcript of the trial, it is essential that he have some appropriate record, such as the judge's notes or an agreed statement by trial counsel.

Disbarment. The Supreme Court of Louisiana disbarred a lawyer in 1954 for misconduct (forgery) that had occurred in 1935, and for which both a criminal prosecution and disbarment had been aborted because he was then suffering from such a degree of insanity that he was committed to an insane asylum. Though he recovered, and had been practicing law very successfully for some six years, with no charge of misconduct, the state court held that it did not regard the mental deficiency at the time of the misconduct as a valid defense to disbarment. On the basis of this decision, the federal district court struck this lawyer from its roll of attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that "while a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route. The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included."[39] While the state decision to disbar "brings title deeds of high respect," it is not conclusively binding on the federal courts, and on the facts it was concluded that right and justice did not warrant this particular federal disbarment.

---

[35] Ben Gold v. United States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957). The Court relied entirely upon Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956).

[36] 28 U.S.C. §1915.

[37] Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).

[38] 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Fair Trial and Confidential Informants. Roviaro was convicted of violating the Narcotics Import and Export Act. He had been indicted on two counts, first, that he sold heroin to one "John Doe," and second, that he had knowingly transported the heroin knowing it to have been imported unlawfully. Before trial, Roviaro moved for a bill of particulars which, among other things, requested the name, address and occupation of John Doe. The government objected on the ground that John Doe was an informer and his identity privileged. Roviaro was convicted on both counts, and given two years on each, the sentences to run concurrently. The government did not defend the nondisclosure of Doe's identity with regard to the first count, since a sale to Doe was charged, but it argued that the conviction on the second count may be upheld since the identity of the informer had no real bearing on that charge and was therefore privileged. By a 6–1 vote the Supreme Court held that under these circumstances the nondisclosure of the informer's identity was prejudicial error.[40]

Speaking for the Court, Justice Burton wrote an interesting essay on the subject of confidential informers. What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege, he pointed out, is really the government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations to law enforcement officers. The purpose is to further and protect the public interest in effective law enforcement by encouraging people to tell what they know. But the scope of the privilege is limited. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of the informer, the contents are not privileged. Furthermore, once the identity of an informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. And, while no fixed rule can be framed to apply to all situations, the Court ruled that fundamental fairness requires that "where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way." Here the Court held that Doe's possible testimony was material with reference to the offense charged in the second count, for since he was faced with the burden of explaining or justifying his alleged possession of the heroin, he vitally needed access to the only material witness. Dissenting alone, Justice Clark lamented that this decision would have a destructive effect on the enforcement of the narcotics laws, and argued that since the defendant knew the informant's identity anyhow, disclosure would have been a fruitless gesture. It seems more reasonable to say that in this instance nondisclosure was an even more fruitless gesture.

---

[39] Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).

[40] Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).

Fair Trial and Access to FBI Reports. One of the cases that engendered a great deal of heated discussion in the press during 1957, and to which Congress reacted with alacrity by adopting new legislation, was *Jencks v. United States.*[41] Jencks, a union official, was convicted of falsely swearing when he filed his Taft-Hartley noncommunist affidavit with NLRB. The principal government witnesses were those accomplished givers of testimony, Harvey F. Matusow and John W. Ford, both members of the Communist Party paid by the FBI to make oral and written reports of Party activities. Both had made such reports in the past concerning Jencks. The trial judge refused to direct the government to produce these reports for inspection by counsel for Jencks for use in cross-examining Matusow and Ford. The government opposed the defendant's motion for an order requiring access to the FBI reports on the ground that no preliminary foundation was laid of inconsistency between the contents of the reports and the testimony of these two witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge had committed reversible error, pointing out that Jencks was not required to show inconsistency first: it was sufficient that these witnesses had made reports of events and activities concerning which they testified in court. Since the testimony of Matusow and Ford was crucial, its impeachment was singularly important to the defendant. The reports were especially valuable because the two witnesses admitted that they could not remember which reports had been oral and which written, and Matusow admitted that he could not recall what he had put into his reports two or three years before. "Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer," said Justice Brennan, "knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory." Furthermore, on the question of inconsistency Justice Brennan made the common sense observation that unless the witness himself admits conflict between his reports and his court testimony, the defendant cannot prove it without inspecting the reports. And Justice Brennan took this occasion to remind the government that its interest in a criminal case is not to win it, but to see that justice is done. The government is free to take the position that the protection of vital national interests militates against public disclosure of documents in its possession, but it can invoke its evidentiary privilege only at the price of letting the defendant go free.

Dissenting alone, Justice Clark asserted that the Court had fashioned "a new rule of evidence which is foreign to our federal jurisprudence," and that unless Congress changed the rule the federal law enforcement agencies might as well close up shop, since in his opinion every criminal was now afforded "a

---

[41] 353 U.S. 657 (1957).

Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national secrets." A hue and cry along this line promptly resulted, although the majority opinion was careful to point out that the demand must be for the production of specific documents supplied by informants actually offered as witnesses, and that no broad or blind fishing expedition would be permitted under the rule adopted by the Court. Nevertheless, the Justices did not agree as to how the decision should be made regarding the materiality of FBI reports, and Justices Burton and Harlan filed a separate concurring opinion to argue that the documents should be produced for examination by the trial judge *in camera* so that he might first determine their relevancy. The Brennan opinion held that the trial judge could rule on admissibility only after the defendant had had a chance to inspect the reports.

It was to clarify this point of procedure, and by no means to "repudiate" the Court's decision, as was widely alleged, that Congress enacted a statute on September 2, 1957, just before it adjourned, which merely provides that when reports of witnesses are demanded, the judge shall make a preliminary examination of them in private, and exclude those portions which do not relate to the subject matter of testimony of the witness.[42] If, after a finding of guilt, the defendant appeals his case, then the entire texts of the reports involved must be made available in the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the rulings of the trial judge. Finally, if the government elects not to comply with an order of the trial court to deliver reports to the defendant, as it is privileged to do, then the judge must strike the witness's testimony from the record, or if he thinks the interests of justice require it, he may in his discretion declare a mistrial. On the last day of 1957 the government dismissed the indictment against Jencks, saying that the available evidence (testimony of Harvey Matusow, by then in prison for perjury) was insufficient for prosecution, and denying that the move was dictated by a desire to preserve the secrecy of all FBI files.

Trial by Jury and Military Justice. At the very end of the 1955 Term, on June 11, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled, by a 5–4 vote, that under Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, civilian wives accompanying the armed forces outside the United States, if jurisdiction is authorized under any treaty or agreement, could be tried for murder of their soldier husbands by courts-martial.[43] On November 5, 1956, however, the four dissenters were joined by Justice Harlan, who had voted with the majority, and the newly appointed Justice Brennan, in a decision to reopen the case by granting a rehearing.[44] By a 6–2 vote the Court then ruled that civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas could not constitutionally be tried by courts-martial in time of peace for capital offenses committed abroad.[45] In separate opinions Justices Frankfurter and Harlan limited their concurrences to capital cases, but Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan took the broad position that military trial of civilians was not consistent with the Constitution in any case. Justices Clark and Burton dissented, adhering to the views expressed in the original opinion of the Court prepared the previous year. Justice Whittaker did not participate in the case.

---

[42] Public Law 269, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 Stat. 595. In reliance upon the *Jencks* decision, a defendant charged with murder in Delaware sought pretrial inspection of statements of prospective witnesses, reports which the police had made in the course of their investigations, and the results of various tests. The Superior Court of Delaware held that the *Jencks* rule required disclosure only for impeachment purposes when the credibility of a witness has become an issue during the trial. State v. Thompson, 134 A. 2d 266 (Del. Super. Crt. 1957).

[43] Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956). See this REVIEW, Vol. 51, pp. 169–171 (March, 1956).

Speaking for four Justices, Justice Black rejected the notion that when the United States acts against citizens abroad, it can do so free from the restraints of the Bill of Rights, since "the United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution." Basically, Justice Black's position was that trial by court-martial denied the specific guarantees of jury trial in Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution, which assures jury trial in "all" criminal trials, and in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which say that "no person" shall be deprived of jury trial, and that it prevails as of right in "all criminal prosecutions." He stressed for good measure that trial by jury was one of the most vital of all barriers against arbitrary government, so that of all constitutional limitations this fundamental right has a better claim to survival than most others, even if it is assumed that not all limitations apply to the government when it acts outside the continental limits of the country, an assumption which Justice Black rejected. The precedent of *In re Ross*,[46] which dealt with consular courts, and upon which the majority had relied in the original disposition of the case, was distinguished as having dealt with a peculiar setting, and indeed he suggested that it was highly unlikely a similar result would be reached today. "At best," said Justice Black, "the *Ross* Case should be left as a relic from a different era." As for the *Insular Cases*,[47] upon which the previous opinion had also relied, he simply dismissed them as involving an altogether different problem, the power of Congress temporarily to govern territories which had wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions.

The answer to the argument that the trial of dependents in military courts was sanctioned by executive agreements with foreign governments was that no such agreement can confer any power on Congress which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. Enthusiasts for the Bricker Amendment should find solace in Justice Black's assertion that to permit the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional limitations would be manifestly contrary "to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition. . . ."

---

[44] 352 U.S. 901.

[45] Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).

[46] 140 U.S. 453 (1891).

[47] Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).

The Court, he declared, has always recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty, and there is nothing in *Missouri v. Holland*[48] which disputes this. As for the power of Congress under Article 1 "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," Justice Black said that giving these words their "natural meaning" this clause does not extend to civilians, and that at most it is "only a narrow exception to the normal and preferred method of trial in courts of law." This view is reinforced by the Fifth Amendment provision that there must be indictment by grand jury "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces." Invoking the tradition of the subordination of the military to civilian authority,[49] and the hostility of the common law to the jurisdiction of military courts, Justice Black concluded that the Founders had no intention of permitting the trial of civilians in military courts. He did concede that the military has jurisdiction over civilians performing services for the armed forces "in the field" in time of war.

Justice Black examined the characteristics of military justice, noting that it is essentially a rough sort of justice which emphasizes summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties, in order to maintain obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks. At best courts-martial are *ad hoc* bodies, which give less attention than civilian courts to protecting the rights of individuals, and which as executive tribunals are always in the chain of command; their members lack the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges. The main deficiency of military courts is the absence of trial by jury before an independent judge after indictment by a grand jury. Furthermore, the military law which prevails in the courts-martial jurisdiction is different from ordinary law, harsher, often cast in sweeping and vague terms, and emphasizing the necessities of discipline. In short, the emphasis in the military courts is necessarily upon the security and order of the fighting group, whereas in civilian society the emphasis is on the value and integrity of the individual.

Finally, in the much talked-about case of *Wilson v. Girard*[50] the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that neither the Constitution nor subsequent legislation prohibited the government from carrying out a provision in a Security Treaty with Japan under which the government turned over to the Japanese courts for trial a United States soldier who killed a Japanese woman while she was retrieving expended cartridge cases in a firing-range area. The Security Treaty authorized the making of Administrative Agreements for the disposition of the armed forces of the United States in Japan. The Agreement made in pursuance of this Treaty provided that in any case where an American soldier commits an offense in Japan, the United States may waive jurisdiction. Among other things, the Agreement provided that where jurisdiction is concurrent, the military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the armed forces when the offense is solely against the property or security of the United States, or between Americans alone. In other cases the Japanese authorities were given primary jurisdiction. The Agreement also provided that the authorities of the state having the primary right to jurisdiction shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other state for a waiver of its right in cases where the other state considers such waiver to be of particular importance. In this instance the United States waived its jurisdiction through a decision of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, approved by the President.

---

[48] 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

[49] Justice Black stressed the following precedents of the Court: Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866), which held that military authorities were without power to try civilians not in military service by declaring martial law in an area where civil administration was functioning and the regular courts were open; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), which refused to sanction the military trial of civilians in Hawaii during the war although the government claimed it was necessary for defense; and U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), which held that a military court could not constitutionally try a discharged serviceman for an offense committed while in the armed forces. See this REVIEW, Vol. 51, pp. 167–169 (March, 1957).

[50] 354 U.S. 524 (1957). See Note, "Criminal Jurisdiction over American Armed Forces Abroad," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 1043–1067 (April, 1957). For an interesting account of what happened see John Hersey, "A Game on a Hill," *The New Yorker*, December 7, 1957, pp. 57–85.

In spite of the noisy hullabaloo in this country over a procedure which in the eyes of some people amounted to turning over a veritable flower of American manhood to trial by an aboriginal tribunal, Girard was given a perfectly fair and civilized trial in a Japanese court in the fall of 1957, was found guilty and given a three-year suspended sentence. It is a fair guess that the American court-martial to which he and his friends made such loud claim would not have been nearly so lenient. The Court thus upheld, in this decision, the opinion in which was extremely brief and uninstructive, the validity of the status-of-forces agreements under which we station troops in foreign countries.

Treatment of Aliens. In two cases[51] the Court reaffirmed the now familiar rule that since deportation is not a criminal proceeding, the *ex post facto* doctrine does not apply, and Congress may legislate retrospectively to provide for the deportation of aliens for committing offenses which were not deportable when committed. In another deportation case[52] the Court held that when the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 became operative on July 4, 1946, persons born in the Islands who were nationals of the United States became aliens, regardless of permanent residence in the United States on that date. The Court also ruled that the legality of an exclusion order under the Immigration Act of 1952 may be challenged either by a *habeas corpus* proceeding or by an action for a declaratory judgment under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.[53] It had been decided previously, in 1955, that an alien held for deportation under the 1952 Act may test the legality of the deportation order in a declaratory judgment action.[54] The Court held that the difference between the constitutional status of an alien in a deportation case and in an exclusion case, which in the former puts the burden of proof on the government, and in the latter on the alien, does not justify making a strait-jacket out of forms of judicial action.

---

[51] Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957).

[52] Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957).

[53] Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).

[54] Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 (1955). See this REVIEW, Vol. 50, pp. 54–55 (March, 1956).

2. THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER

In *Radovich v. National Football League*[55] the Court held by a 6–3 vote that the Sherman Act extends to professional football. The problem was to distinguish the previous cases which held that professional baseball was not within the scope of the statute. The Court first took this latter position in 1922,[56] and in 1953, in the *Toolson* Case,[57] reexamined and reaffirmed it. Since in 1955 the Sherman Act was extended to professional boxing[58] and to theatrical entertainment,[59] it may be said in the light of the football decision that the Court believes that the Sherman Act applies to all team sports except baseball. Why, then, is baseball different? Apparently it is altogether a matter of *stare decisis.* Justice Clark explained that the original baseball decision was made 31 years before it was reaffirmed in *Toolson,* that more harm than good would be done if the earlier decision were overruled, that vast efforts and enormous capital had been put into baseball in reliance upon these decisions, that during all these years Congress had not seen fit to change the rule, as it could have done at any time, and that repudiation of the rule would result in a flood of litigation and harassment. To remove all doubt, therefore, the Court proceeded to limit the rule of the two baseball cases specifically to the business of organized professional baseball. And Justice Clark added: "If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer, aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts." But where an industry has been allowed to develop over a long period of time in reliance upon a precedent of the Court, Justice Clark argued, the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if there be such, is by legislation rather than by court decision. For if the legislative road is travelled, the whole industry would be given hearings and it could help formulate the new rules. This would avoid the injustices of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action. The three dissenters, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Brennan, were unable to regard baseball as *sui generis,* could not distinguish between football and baseball, and could find no reason for believing that Congress intended to put baseball in a class by itself.

The big anti-trust case of the Term was *United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.*[60] This case involved an action by the government under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which forbids corporate acquisitions tending to create monopoly. The government alleged that Du Pont's dominant position as a supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics for General Motors was not achieved by competitive merit alone, but was due to its 23 per cent stock interest in General Motors. The district court dismissed the suit, but the Supreme Court, on a direct appeal, reversed. The Court held that the statute applies to vertical as well as to horizontal acquisitions where, as here, the effects condemned by the statute are probably the result of the stock acquisition. It also ruled that the unlawful result of the stock acquisition need not have appeared at the time of the acquisition, in 1917–19, it being sufficient if it existed at the time of the suit. Finally, the Court held that Du Pont had a monopoly position as a supplier of General Motors. This was a 4–2 decision, Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissenting on the ground that Section 7 does not apply to an acquisition by a corporation of stock in a noncompeting corporation. They also believed that what is controlling is not the time chosen by the government to bring its suit, but rather the time of the stock acquisition itself.

---

[55] 352 U.S. 445 (1957).

[56] Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).

[57] Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).

[58] United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236 (1955).

[59] United States v. Shubert, 248 U.S. 222 (1955).

[60] 353 U.S. 586 (1957).

Finally, in a dispute involving claims under a collective labor agreement, the Court held by unanimous vote that the Railway Labor Act applies to a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce.[61] It was noted that federal statutes regulating interstate railroads have consistently been held to apply to publicly owned or operated railroads even though the statutes do not specifically bring public railroads within their coverage. On the constitutional question the Court had no doubt of the proposition that state control over its enterprises and employees is exercised in subordination to the power of the national government to regulate commerce. By engaging in interstate commerce by rail the state subjects itself to the commerce power. If this is good law, as already established, for federal safety and rate requirements, it is also good law for employment relationships.

3. FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

Supreme Court Practice: Finality of Decision. After the Court of Claims held in favor of a taxpayer who had sued to recover an alleged overpayment of taxes, the Supreme Court denied the government's petition for certiorari as well as a first and then a second petition for a rehearing. Following all this, the Court *sua sponte* vacated the order denying rehearing so that this case could be disposed of consistently with two other cases which the Court later agreed to review.[62] The Court split 4–3, the minority Justices arguing that this was a violation of their own rules, since under Rule 58 this litigation was closed when the Court denied the government's first petition for a rehearing. This rule, they insisted, reflects the deep-rooted policy of the law that adjudication must at some time become final. On the other hand, the majority said that they have "consistently ruled that the interest in finality of litigation must yield where the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules."

Supreme Court Practice: Certification by Courts of Appeals. A court of appeals certified a law question to the Supreme Court which another panel of this same court of appeals had decided a year and half earlier. The Supreme Court dismissed, holding that it is primarily the task of the court of appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties.[63] Whatever procedure it follows, it was intimated that a court of appeals should strive for consistency at least in the more or less contemporaneous decisions of its several panels. Doubt concerning the respect to be accorded a previous decision of a different panel should not be the occasion for invoking so exceptional a jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as that on certification.

---

[61] California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).

[62] United States v. Ohio Power Company, 353 U.S. 98 (1957).

Avoidance of Constitutional Issues. Under Section 242 (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, an alien against whom a final order of deportation has been outstanding for more than six months is, until final deportation, subject to supervision under regulations of the Attorney General. The statute provides that the regulations shall require the alien to appear from time to time before an immigration officer for identification, if necessary to submit to medical examination, and to "give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper." Failure to reply or the giving of false answers is punishable by jail sentence up to one year, a fine up to $1,000, or both.

Witkovich, an alien who had been ordered deported for Communist activity, was indicted for refusing to answer a series of questions relating to membership in the Communist Party and to front organizations, and to his knowledge of a list of named individuals. The federal district court dismissed the indictment for failure to state an offense, and the Supreme Court, on direct appeal, affirmed by a 6–2 vote.[64] Speaking for the Court, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the words of the statute, legislative history and the doctrine of the avoidance of constitutional interpretation if at all possible, all support the construction that the statutory provision is concerned only with information which deals with availability for deportation. If the statute is construed to give the Attorney General unlimited powers of supervision over this class of aliens, there would be doubts as to its constitutionality. There is even doubt over the extent of administrative power to inhibit deportable aliens from renewing activities that subject them to deportation. For example, supervision of an undeportable alien may be a lifetime problem, and this raises issues touching liberties which the Constitution protects even for aliens. Thus the Court construed the statute as only authorizing questions reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney General advised about the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue. In dissent Justice Clark complained that this construction puts the alien who is under a final order of deportation in a more favorable position than one who is under no order at all, and insisted that Congress has a right to exert broad powers of supervision over the class of deportees who cannot be deported because no country will take them. In his judgment these are the people whom it is especially important to watch, since they may use their further residence in the country for the continuation of subversive, criminal or other undesirable activities.

---

[63] Sisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957).

[64] United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957). The same result was reached in Barton v. Sentner, 353 U. S. 963 (1957).

The Court also declined the opportunity to rule on grave constitutional issues in the case of a union which had been indicted for violating a federal statute which prohibits labor organizations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with" any election for federal office.[65] The indictment charged the union with having used union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select certain candidates for Congress in 1954. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it failed to state an offense under the statute, therefore refusing to rule on the constitutional question. The Supreme Court reversed, by a 6–3 vote, holding that the indictment was proper without ruling on the constitutional question either. After an excellent review of the history of corrupt practices legislation, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held that the activity in question was an "expenditure in connection with" a federal election. To hold otherwise would be "to deny the long series of congressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital." He concluded that the history of the present statute indicates that it was intended to embrace precisely the sort of indirect contribution alleged in the indictment, for Congress forbade "expenditures" as well as "contributions."

But the Court refused to pass on the constitutional question, and strongly defended the doctrine of avoidance as a wise practice. The refusal to anticipate constitutional questions, Justice Frankfurter argued, was peculiarly appropriate in this case, since it was before the Court unillumined by the consideration of a single judge. Only an adjudication on the merits, he maintained, could provide the concrete factual setting so necessary for a review by an appellate court. Furthermore, he noted that by remanding the case for trial it may turn out that the Supreme Court will not be called upon to pass on the constitutional question at all. The three dissenters, Justices Douglas and Black and the Chief Justice, took the position that the Court's decision made political speech a crime in violation of the First Amendment.

Judicial Piddling. The Supreme Court devotes a great deal of its valuable time piddling around with FELA and Jones Act cases which involve factual issues concerning liability for injuries sustained in the course of employment. During the 1956 Term the Court reviewed the evidence which supported a verdict for a worker who had been injured when he tried to avoid the flames from burning weeds along the track,[66] the case of a railroad brakeman who hurt himself by slipping on a large, partially covered cinder embedded in the roadbed,[67] the case of a railroad conductor who fell when the train on which he was employed stopped suddenly to avoid striking an automobile,[68] the case of a ship's baker who cut his hand trying to remove some ice cream from its container with a sharp butcher knife,[69] and the case of a railroad employee who was injured while answering an urgent call of nature in a loaded gondola car.[70] While several Justices dissented here and there on the merits, the chief interest in these cases lies in Justice Frankfurter's criticism of the Court's spending its time on such minor matters. He argued strongly that the Court should not review decisions in which the sole issue is the sufficiency of evidence for submission to the jury, and that in all these cases certiorari should never have been granted, and having been granted, should be dismissed as having been granted improvidently. The ordinary negligence case does not raise the "special and important" issues which under the rules justify the granting of certiorari. These cases merely involved questions of the sufficiency of evidence, all of which had already been reviewed by two lower courts. And he asked: "If the Court does not abide by its Rules, how can it expect the bar to do so? Standards must be enforced to be respected." Furthermore, by taking these cases, the Court is doing injustice to those significant cases that it ought to decide, and for which it needs ample time for study, reflection and preparation.

---

[65] United States v. International Union, United Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567 (1957). The statute is 18 U.S.C. §610.

[66] Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).

[67] Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 512 (1957).

[68] Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).

But it has long been argued by some of his colleagues that dismissing a writ of certiorari as having been granted improvidently impairs the integrity of the certiorari process and the rule of four. In rebuttal, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the initial decision to grant certiorari must necessarily be based on a limited appreciation of the issues in the case, and that the Court knows a great deal more after hearing the case and deliberating on it. The briefs on the merits and argument may disclose that certiorari was not warranted, though it seemed so on the surface facts alone. Furthermore, he reminded that the Court operates ultimately by majority rule. But he insisted that this does not make the rule of four a hollow one, and he would not change the practice. He thought it was appropriate for individual cases, but not when a class of litigation is given a special or privileged position, and when that litigation raises insignificant questions.

Nature of Federal Judicial Power. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama[71] presented legal issues which have long troubled the federal courts. The union and the company were operating here under a collective bargaining agreement which provided that the last step in the grievance procedure shall be arbitration. In this instance, having processed several grievances regarding work loads and work assignments through the various steps, the union finally requested arbitration, which the employer refused. The union then brought this suit in a federal district court to compel arbitration. This court held that it had jurisdiction and ordered the employer to comply with the grievance arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The court of appeals reversed, holding that although the district court had jurisdiction, the court had no authority founded either in federal or state law to grant the relief. The suit had been brought under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." The Section also provides that "any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States." It will, of course, be remembered that Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "the judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the United States. . . ." Absent both diversity and a federal question, the federal district court would not have jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional law. In what sense, then, is the suit in question a suit arising under the laws of the United States?

---

[69] Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957).

[70] Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 354 U.S. 901 (1957).

[71] 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The same issues were resolved in the same way in the following companion cases: General Electric Co. v. Local 205, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957). See Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H. Wellington, "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 71, pp. 1–39 (November, 1957).

In Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956) and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 153 (1956), the Court held that the exclusive remedy for filing a false non-Communist affidavit under Section 9 (h) of Taft-Hartley was the criminal sanction provided for in the statute. The Court held that the NLRB could not impose the sanction of denying the union its benefits under the statute.

Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas held that Section 301 is more than merely jurisdictional, that it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements, and that included within that federal law is specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements. Since the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the *quid pro quo* for an agreement not to strike, the legislation does more than merely confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over labor unions; it expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations, and that industrial peace can best be secured in this way. Leaning heavily on legislative history, the Court concluded that by implication Congress rejected the common law rule which is opposed to the specific enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. But what law, then, is to be applied to suits under Section 301? The answer, said Justice Douglas, is "federal law which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Some law is expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act; other law will have to be worked out by looking at the policy of the statutes. "The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . But state law, if compatible with the purpose of §301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights." It is not at all uncommon, Justice Douglas noted, for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned, and "there is no constitutional difficulty." Finally the

Court held that jurisdiction to compel arbitration was not withdrawn by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since failure to arbitrate was not one of the abuses against which that statute was aimed.

Justices Burton and Harlan concurred separately, arguing that while they agreed that the district court had jurisdiction over the action, they believed that the substantive law to be applied in the suit was not federal law. Dissenting alone, Justice Frankfurter took the position that legislative history did not support the view that Congress intended to authorize specific performance of collective bargaining arbitration clauses. He maintained that Section 301 was exclusively a procedural provision which merely made a federal forum accessible for suits of this sort, but that it did not enact federal law for such suits. He doubted whether the statute as construed confers on the federal courts "judicial power," since with no guide except "judicial inventiveness" the district courts are given the task of applying a whole industrial code "that is as yet in the bosom of the judiciary." He also doubted the constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over contracts that came into being entirely by virtue of state substantive law.

The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine. Three railroads sued in the Court of Claims to recover from the United States as shipper the difference between rates actually paid and those allegedly due on army shipments of steel aerial bombs filled with napalm gel, but without bursters and fuses and hence not self-igniting. The railroads billed the government for "incendiary bombs," which go at a much higher rate than the government was willing to pay, since it maintained that the proper rate was that for gasoline in steel drums. The Supreme Court reversed a Court of Claims decision in favor of the railroads, holding that both the question of tariff construction and the issue of the reasonableness of the tariff as applied were within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.[72] Like the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Justice Harlan noted, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with "promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties." The exhaustion rule applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone. The primary jurisdiction rule applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views." This doctrine, in the application of which there is no fixed formula, is designed to promote desirable uniformity and to utilize the expert and specialized knowledge of the agencies. But Justice Harlan insisted that it is more than a mere procedural time-table of a lawsuit; it is a doctrine which allocates the law-making power over certain aspects of commercial relations. On the facts of this case, in the light of the sheer bulk and conflicting nature of the evidence, where expert knowledge of many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable, the Court thought that the issues are best settled first by the ICC. But of course this does not mean that matters of tariff construction are never cognizable in the courts.

---

[72] United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). See also the companion case, United States v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 352 U.S. 77 (1956) which involved a dispute over an export rate for the carriage of military supplies. In this instance, instead of referring the case to the ICC, the Court remanded to the court of appeals so that a determination might be made whether the issue of tariff construction was within the primary jurisdiction of the administrative body, since the parties had not briefed or argued the factors working for or against the application of the rate in question.

Diversity Jurisdiction. A citizen of New York brought a stockholder's derivative suit against Warner Brothers, a Delaware corporation, based on alleged fraudulent wastage of assets through the making of a particular contract. Other defendants to the action were another Delaware corporation, and the directors of Warner Brothers, who were citizens of California. The suit was filed in the federal district court of California by reason of diversity. It was argued there that since the cause of action which the plaintiff sought to enforce belonged to Warner Brothers, and since the corporation was not antagonistic to the stockholder, the corporation should properly be aligned as a party plaintiff. Since this would put a Delaware corporation on both sides of the suit, there would be no diversity. After a fifteen-day hearing on the issue of whether there was antagonism between the plaintiff and Warner Brothers, the district court concluded that the contract in controversy had been made in good faith, that the corporation was not under the domination of those alleged to be in control, and that the management was not antagonistic to the financial interests of the corporation. In effect the district court held that since it could find no fraud on the part of the directors in making the contract, but only an exercise of independent business judgment, the management was not antagonistic to the financial interests of the corporation. Accordingly the district court realigned Warner Brothers as a party plaintiff and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. By a 5–4 vote the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issue the district court disposed of went to the merits, and not to the question of jurisdiction.[73]

Justice Douglas pointed out that there is antagonism whenever the management is aligned against the stockholder and defends a course of conduct which he attacks, and that it is not essential to show wrongdoing in the sense of fraud or misdeeds. In these cases the plaintiff always charges some sort of wrongdoing, and for the district court to stop and try the charge of wrongdoing is to delve into the merits. This is not a proper course of action, but is rather a time-consuming, wasteful exertion of energy on a preliminary issue. Not only is this a sort of preliminary trial, but under the *Tompkins* rule it would follow that while the law governing the merits of the case would be local law, federal law would have to govern the preliminary trial on the issue of wrongdoing since it goes to the question of federal jurisdiction. The Court held that in the absence of collusion, there is diversity of jurisdiction when the real collision of issues, the actual controversy, is between citizens of different states, and this is a practical and not a mechanical determination ordinarily resolved "on the face of the pleadings and by the nature of the controversy." In this case the Court thought it plain that the stockholder and the managers of the corporation were entirely and irrevocably opposed on a matter of corporate practice and policy. A trial may show that the stockholder was wrong and the management right, but this goes to the merits, and not to the question of jurisdiction. The four dissenting Justices maintained that since diversity jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts by the parties, it is the duty of the federal courts to look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to their proper sides in the dispute. In their view, the question to be determined is whether the corporation is "disabled from protecting itself" by the actions of the management.

---

[73] Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). A similar conclusion was reached in a companion case, Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957). See Comment, "Diversity of Citizenship and the Real Party in Interest," *UCLA Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 619–627 (June, 1957).

Another diversity action was brought in a federal court by the owner of U. S. government HOLC bonds, allegedly stolen, to recover their value from the person who presented the bonds for collection and from the bank which cashed them.[74] The Court held that state law governed the question whether the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show notice and lack of good faith on the part of the defendants, or on the defendants to show good faith on their part. In addition, the question whether the defendants acted in good faith was held to be governed by state law. This decision rested mainly on the fact that the litigation was purely between private parties and did not touch the rights and duties of the United States. The possibility that any federal interest in the transfer of such paper between private persons might be adversely affected by local law was regarded as far too speculative and remote to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground that there ought to be one set of rules for all parties to government paper, and therefore federal law should control. It should be added that on the issue of whether the bonds were overdue the Court held that federal law was controlling, since this involves an interpretation "of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds themselves."

Exhaustion of State Remedies. In *Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee v. Windsor,*[75] a unanimous decision made it clear that before an organization of state employees could seek relief in the federal courts against a state law forbidding public employees, with certain exceptions, to join labor unions, it would be necessary first to secure an adjudication in the state courts. There are good reasons why a federal court should decline to move before a definitive determination of all local law questions has been made in the state courts where suit is brought to restrain enforcement of a state statute on constitutional grounds. An authoritative interpretation of state law by the local courts may avoid the constitutional issues, as well as the presentation of abstract, hypothetical issues.

---

[74] Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).

[75] 353 U.S. 364 (1957).

II. QUESTIONS OF STATE POWER

1. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Control of Obscene Publications. For the very first time the Court considered at length in several cases the problem of legislative control of publications alleged to be obscene. The principal decision was in *Roth v. United States,*[76] which was a joinder of a federal case involving a New York bookseller named Roth, and a California prosecution of one Alberts, who conducted a mail order business in Los Angeles. Roth was convicted in a federal court of violating the federal statute which forbids the mailing of "every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print or other publication of an indecent character," by sending through the mails a publication called *American Aphrodite.* Alberts was convicted for advertising such books as *Sword of Desire, She Made It Pay,* and *The Business Side of the Oldest Business,* in violation of a California law which forbids the writing, publishing or selling of "any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book . . . ". No issue was presented in either case concerning the obscenity of the material involved. As Justice Brennan said in the opinion of the Court, "the dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press."

While the issue has never been squarely presented to the Court before, Justice Brennan pointed to numerous expressions in many opinions indicating that the Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press. This accords with long-standing doctrine in effect in most states even before the adoption of the Constitution which denied absolute protection for every utterance, as in the cases of libel, blasphemy, profanity and obscenity. It is therefore apparent, in the light of history, that the unconditioned phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance, since both obscenity and libel were outside the protection of law at the time the First Amendment was adopted. The purpose of free speech and press is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."

---

[76] 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court also upheld, without writing an opinion, an ordinance of Newark, New Jersey, which put burlesque shows out of business. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957). See Henry H. Foster, Jr., "The 'Comstock Load'—Obscenity and the Law," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science,* Vol. 48, pp. 245–258 (September–October, 1957); Godfrey P. Schmidt, "A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography from the Mails," *Fordham Law Review,* Vol. 26, pp. 70–97 (Spring, 1957); Richard McKeon, Robert K. Merton and Walter Gellhorn, *The Freedom To Read* (New York, 1957). For an important statement on the general problem of the suppression of obscenity, see the statement issued by the Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States, signed in their capacity as the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, *New York Times,* November 17, 1957, p. 88. An unusually brilliant essay on the whole problem will be found in Walter Gellhorn, *Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints* (Baton Rouge, 1956).

There is room for all ideas "having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion. . . . " But obscenity is outside the scope of the First Amendment because it is "utterly without redeeming social importance." This is but a reflection of a universal judgment, since fifty nations have agreed to suppress obscene literature, every state of the union has laws forbidding obscenity, and Congress has adopted some twenty laws on the subject since 1842. It follows that since obscenity is not protected speech, the clear and present danger standard does not apply, and therefore it is unnecessary for the government to prove that the particular literature on which a prosecution rests will perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct.

But what is the definition of obscenity? Borrowing a phrase from the Tentative Draft of the Model Penal Code recently worked out by the American Law Institute, Justice Brennan declared that "obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." And in a footnote he added, "i.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." But as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, there is a great deal of difference between "appealing to prurient interests," and "exciting lustful thoughts," and the latter test was expressly rejected by the Tentative Draft as "unrealistically broad for a society that plainly tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in literature, advertising, and art. . . . " The Court, said Justice Harlan, has merely assimilated the various tests or definitions "into one indiscriminate potpourri."

Nevertheless, the majority opinion sought to keep the thrust of its decision within reasonable boundaries. Justice Brennan made it clear that sex and obscenity are not synonymous, that the portrayal of sex in art, literature, etc., is not in itself bad, that sex is one of man's vital problems and has always been one of his most absorbing interests, that a publication should not be judged on the basis of isolated passages, and above all, that the test of obscenity is not the possible effect the publication might have upon the most susceptible person in the community. Thus the Court formally rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive the famous rule of the English courts in the *Hicklin* case,[77] and substituted for it what may be called the American rule, "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."

The Court rejected the argument that the statutes were void for vagueness, for while it agreed that the terms used were not precise, it has been held consistently that lack of precision is not itself offensive to due process, because the Constitution does not require impossible standards. It was held that the federal statute fell within the authority delegated to the national government by the postal clause of the Constitution, and that insofar as the California statute was applied to a man who ran a mail-order business, the state was neither burdening nor interfering with the federal postal functions, since it was punishing for "keeping for sale" or "advertising."

---

[77] Regina v. Hicklin, Law Reports, 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868). Here Justice Cockburn said: "I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."

While Chief Justice Warren concurred, he thought that the language of the opinion was too broad. He recalled that the history of obscenity statutes shows that the power of government can be invoked under them against great art or literature, or scientific treatises, or works exciting social controversy. He insisted that the central issue was the conduct of the individual defendant, since a person and not a book is on trial. Justice Harlan concurred in the state case, but on the theory that since little is really known about this subject, and the experts are divided, the legislature is entitled to its opinion, and the Constitution does not require a state legislature to accept as truth the most advanced and sophisticated psychiatric opinions. But he dissented in the federal case on the grounds that "Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality," and that federal censorship should be discouraged because, since it blankets the whole country and establishes uniform rules, it is likely to do more harm than state censorship. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in both cases since they believed that the standards invoked punish thoughts rather than overt acts or anti-social conduct. The test endorsed by the court, they insisted, gives the censor "free range over a vast domain," warning that "the test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress a literary gem tomorrow." We ought to have confidence, they argued, in the ability of our people to make up their own minds as to what they want to read or believe. Finally they maintained that we should be wary about such legislation since it is not at all certain that obscene literature as defined by the Court is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from the community standards, and that indeed there is ground for believing that delinquents do not read at all.

That the Supreme Court will not permit the states to roam at will in this area was reflected in a decision reached by unanimous vote earlier in the Term, *Butler v. Michigan.*[78] Butler was convicted of violating the Michigan obscenity statute by selling a copy of a paper-back reprint of John Griffin's *The Devil Rides Outside.* The statute defines as obscene any book or other publication which might tend "to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts," or which might tend "to the corruption of the morals of youth." Said Justice Frankfurter for the Court: "The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig. . . . We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free society."

---

[78] 352 U.S. 380 (1957).

Finally the Court disposed of an important procedural question in connection with the abatement of obscene literature in *Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,*[79] though by a 5–4 vote. The complaint charged the bookseller with displaying for sale some fourteen paper-back booklets having the general title "Nights of Horror." Pursuant to a recently adopted New York statute, which authorized municipalities to invoke a "limited injunctive remedy" against the sale and distribution of obscene literature, the state court granted an injunction *pendente lite* and this, the appellant argued, was unconstitutional as a prior censorship of literature. Pointing out that due process does not limit the state to the criminal process in seeking to protect its people against the dissemination of pornography, Justice Frankfurter maintained that the phrase "prior restraint" is neither "a self-wielding sword" nor "a talismanic test." Actually, he argued, this statute is not more restraining in its effect than the usual criminal statute, since instead of running the risk of a criminal prosecution without prior warning, this civil procedure assures the bookseller that he will not be punished criminally unless he ignores a court order specifically directed to him which leads to a prompt and carefully circumscribed determination of the issue of obscenity. In the case of both criminal enforcement and these civil proceedings, he pointed out, the book is interfered with at the same stage, since in both instances the law moves only after publication, and in neither is it necessary for the book to have passed into the hands of the public. In each case the seller is put on notice by the complaint, but in the one case he may be fined or jailed for violating a criminal statute, while in the other he may be punished for disobeying the temporary injunction. Furthermore, the Court thought that the New York criminal procedure was not essentially different from this new civil procedure; in New York criminal cases jury trial is discretionary, and of course it is established that due process does not require the states to have jury trials in misdemeanor prosecutions; and the consequences of a judicial condemnation for obscenity under the civil statute are no more restrictive of freedom of expression than a conviction for a misdemeanor. Finally, the Court held that the *Near* case,[80] which had condemned on constitutional grounds the imposition of prior restraints upon the publication of a newspaper as being the very essence of censorship, was glaringly different both in fact and law. For in that case Minnesota had authorized its courts to enjoin the dissemination of future issues of a publication because its past issues had been found offensive, and the proceeding did not deal with obscenity. The sole concern of the New York statute is with obscenity, and as construed it does not impose any restraint upon matters not already published and not yet found to be offensive.

The four dissenting Justices filed three different opinions. Chief Justice Warren made it clear that here the police first summarily seized the books which in their opinion were obscene, and then obtained a court order, and this "savors too much of book burning." Justice Douglas argued that the temporary injunction gives the state the paralyzing power of a censor, for the decree can be issued *ex parte*, without a hearing and without any ruling or finding on the issue of obscenity. In other words, here is power to restrain publication even before a hearing is held, and this is prior restraint and censorship at its worst.

---

[79] 354 U.S. 436 (1957).

[80] Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

Furthermore, he thought that the procedure for restraining by equity decree the distribution of all condemned literature, without taking the total context into consideration (for example, to whom the sales are made), violated the First Amendment. Justice Brennan thought that the absence in this statute of the right to jury trial was a fatal defect, especially since in such cases as these the jury is peculiarly well fitted to appraise the challenged publication "according to the average person's application of contemporary community standards."

One upshot of these cases is that the Supreme Court has added another word to the preexisting list of words which have traditionally been used to define obscene. The cases and statutes have always said that obscene means lewd or lascivious, but lewd and lascivious are defined as obscene. The same is true for such words as filthy or disgusting; the words have always been used to define each other. Now the Court has added another word, prurient. How this contributes to a clarification of the problem is something of a mystery, for all we know now is that obscene means prurient and prurient means obscene. It is precisely because the solution to this problem does not lie in the formulation of some fool-proof definition that the decision dealing with the procedural device recently worked out by the New York legislature is so important, and why the Court's formal commitment to procedural safeguards in the *Roth* case is likely to be far more significant in the future than the futile attempt to define the indefinable.

Picketing and Free Speech. When a union resorted to peaceful stranger picketing to induce a group of employees to join up, the Wisconsin courts granted an injunction under a state law which prohibited picketing in the absence of a "labor dispute." The state's highest court held that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose under a state law which makes it an unfair labor practice for workers to coerce or induce any employer to interfere with the right of any of his employees to join or not to join a union. By a 5–3 vote the Supreme Court affirmed.[81] It is now established, said Justice Frankfurter, that even peaceful picketing involves something more than merely the communication of ideas, and cannot be immune from all state regulation. It is also clearly established by the precedents that injunctions are permissible against peaceful picketing, even when arising in the course of a labor controversy, when the picketing runs counter to a valid state policy. While a blanket state prohibition of all picketing would be invalid, here the Court felt that the Wisconsin policy which the injunction was designed to enforce was a valid one. The three dissenters, Justices Douglas and Black and Chief Justice Warren, maintained that now, for all practical purposes, a state can actually bar all picketing. They insisted that absent violence, rioting, disorder, coercion and mass picketing, the activity in this case was within the protection of the free speech guaranty of the Constitution.

---

[81] International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).

State Legislative Investigations and Due Process. Sweezy v. New Hampshire[82] was a companion case to the *Watkins* decision. Having enacted a comprehensive statute in 1951 dealing with subversive activities and persons, the New Hampshire legislature in 1953 passed a joint resolution constituting the Attorney General of the state a one-man legislative investigating committee. Summoned by subpoena, Sweezy refused to answer questions regarding his knowledge of the Progressive Party of the state and regarding a lecture on socialism he had given in March, 1954, to a class at the state university on the invitation of the faculty, on the grounds that the questions were not pertinent and violated the First Amendment. After conviction by a court for contempt, the Supreme Court by a 7–2 vote decided to set the conviction aside. Speaking for himself and three other Justices, Chief Justice Warren concluded, following the line of thought developed in *Watkins*, that the authorizing resolution of the legislature failed to define adequately the purposes and scope of the investigation. The Attorney General was given too free a hand in "a sweeping and uncertain mandate," and since there were no indications that the legislature wanted the information that the Attorney General was trying to elicit, it must be concluded that he acted without authority, thus violating due process of law. The Chief Justice denied that he was interpreting the state's notion of what the separation of powers principle demands, and insisted that his ruling was based on the proposition that a state legislature cannot divest itself of its responsibility to direct the use of the investigatory power. While the Chief Justice argued that there had unquestionably been an invasion of Sweezy's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression, and while he expressed doubt that any legitimate state interests justified the infringement of such rights, he declined to base his opinion on such considerations since he could find nothing that connected the questioning with any fundamental state interest.

In a concurring opinion with which Justice Harlan went along, Justice Frankfurter maintained that whether the Attorney General had acted within the scope of the authority given to him by the legislature was for the state courts to decide. His point was that the state had invaded both the academic and political freedom of Sweezy, and he argued eloquently in favor of both. Justices Clark and Burton dissented, taking the position that the state's interest in investigating subversive activities outweighed Sweezy's First Amendment rights, and that the Supreme Court was bound by the state supreme court's determination that the questions were relevant to the legislative purpose.

Denial of Admission to the Bar. In two decisions with widely ranging implications, the Supreme Court served notice upon the states that while they may require high standards of qualification for admission to the bar, they may

[82] 354 U.S. 234 (1957). On the authority of this decision the Court reversed, without argument or opinion, a contempt conviction following the refusal of a witness to reply to questions put to him by the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, in Raley v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957).

not deny admission for reasons that have no rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law, or for discriminatory reasons, without running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. In *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico*[83] the Court by unanimous vote reversed the New Mexico courts on the following facts: After Schware applied for permission to take the bar exams late in 1953, on the basis of disclosures he made on his application form as well as information that reached the Board from a confidential source, a hearing was held. Schware testified that in 1932, at the age of eighteen, he had joined the Young Communist League in New York on account of the depression. He said that he had changed his name in order to help in union work and get a job, and because of anti-semitism. He also testified that he had been arrested twice during labor troubles on suspicion of criminal syndicalism in California, but was never formally charged or tried. He was once arrested on the charge of trying to persuade men to volunteer for duty in Spain, but was never tried and the charge was dismissed. He testified that he quit the Communist Party in 1940 because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He had served in the army during World War II and had an honorable discharge. His conduct during his law school years was apparently exemplary. The Dean had been informed of his background, and had advised him to put his past behind him and go on with his schooling.

On this record, the Court held, there was nothing which showed that Schware had engaged in any conduct during the past fifteen years which reflected adversely on his character. Even the state supreme court conceded that he presently enjoys good repute. The record shows, in fact, that this man has "high ideals" and "a deep sense of social justice." The mere fact of having been arrested has little probative value, Justice Black indicated, on the issue of misconduct, since it is merely evidence of someone's suspicion. Recruiting for the Spanish Loyalists was hardly an offense indicating moral turpitude. As for the applicant's membership in the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940, Justice Black pointed out that during this period it was a lawful political party with candidates on the ballot in most states. There was nothing in the record, he said, which indicated that Schware's association with the Communist Party was anything more than a political faith in a political party. During the depression many people joined it for various reasons, out of desperation or hope, because of the rise of fascism, or because of the popular front movement. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the record which indicated that the applicant had ever engaged in any actions to overthrow the government by force or violence or advocated doing so. Assuming that some Communists had this purpose at that time, Justice Black insisted that it cannot be inferred automatically that all members shared this evil purpose or participated in their illegal conduct. Thus it was concluded that there was no evidence in the record which rationally justified the finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law. In a separate concurring opinion three Justices stressed the fact that the controlling question was the significance attached by the state to early Communist affiliations, and that the state court's conclusion that past membership proved that the applicant had a questionable character was dogmatic and wholly unwarranted.[84]

---

[83] 353 U.S. 232 (1957).

In the other case, *Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,*[85] the applicant was denied admission to the bar largely because he declined on constitutional grounds to answer questions at his hearing regarding his political affiliations and beliefs. Dividing 6–2, the Court ruled that the evidence in the record did not support any reasonable doubts regarding Konigsberg's good character and loyalty. Even if one is guided by the definition of the term, good moral character, as spelled out in the California cases, Justice Black noted, the definition does not equate unorthodox political beliefs or memberships in lawful political parties with bad moral character. In this case 42 witnesses, including persons from many walks of life, had testified to the applicant's good character over a period of some twenty years. In addition he had a good record, free of crime, honorable service in the army overseas, good education, service as a social worker, and a good record at the law school.

But one ex-Communist testified that the applicant had attended meetings of the Communist Party in 1941 and in addition the state alleged that he had criticized certain public officials and their policies in 1950, when he wrote a series of newspaper articles severely criticizing our participation in the Korean War, the major political parties, "big business," racial discrimination, the *Dennis* decision, etc. While the ex-Communist's testimony was not, in Justice Black's opinion, very convincing, and was flatly denied by the applicant, he went on to say that even if it were assumed that Konigsberg had been a Communist in 1941, this alone would not support an inference of bad moral character, in the absence of any evidence that he ever engaged in any unlawful or immoral activities. Nor did the newspaper articles support the inference of bad character. "Citizens have a right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies." Finally, it was held that the state was not justified in drawing unfavorable inferences from the applicant's refusal to answer questions where his refusal was based on a belief that the Constitution prohibited the sort of inquiries the committee was making. While it is important to leave the states free to select their own bars, Justice Black concluded, it is equally important that the states should not exercise their power in an arbitrary or discriminatory way so as to impinge upon freedom of political expression and association. It is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms to secure a bar of lawyers of good character, and it is also important that lawyers should be unintimidated, free to speak, think and act as members of a truly independent bar. Justices Harlan and Clark dissented on the ground that the refusal of the applicant to answer the questions put to him justified the state's inference that he had failed to sustain the burden of proof. They thought that the Court's decision was "an unacceptable intrusion into a matter of state concern."

---

[84] Justice Frankfurter wrote: "History overwhelmingly establishes that many youths like the petitioner were drawn by the mirage of communism during the depression era, only to have their eyes later opened to reality. Such experiences no doubt may disclose a woolly mind or naive notions regarding the problems of society. But facts of history that we would be arbitrary in rejecting bar the presumption, let alone an irrebuttable presumption, that response to foolish, baseless hopes regarding the betterment of society made those who had entertained them but who later undoubtedly came to their senses and their sense of responsibility 'questionable characters'."

[85] 353 U.S. 252 (1957). See John T. McTernan, "Schware, Konigsberg and Independence of the Bar: The Return to Reason," *Lawyers Guild Review,* Vol. 17, pp. 48–53 (Summer, 1957).

Notice. A Kansas municipality having brought an action to condemn some property as part of a street-widening program, the court pursuant to statute appointed three commissioners to determine compensation. These commissioners were required by law to give at least ten days' notice of the time and place of their proceedings, either "in writing . . . or by one publication in the official city paper." The Kansas courts held that notice by publication in the official city paper was sufficient to meet the requirement of due process. By a 6–2 vote the Supreme Court disagreed.[86] There is no doubt, of course, that due process requires a hearing on the issue of just compensation, and as Justice Black said, "the right to a hearing is meaningless without notice." Furthermore, it was established in the *Mullane* case[87] that "if feasible, notice must be reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests." No rigid formula of notice is possible, since the kind of notice must vary with the circumstances, and often, as when people are missing or where their addresses are unknown, personal notice is not possible. But measured by the *Mullane* standard, the Court found that notice by publication in this case fell short of due process. "It is common knowledge that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of proceedings against his property." In this case there was no compelling or even persuasive reason why direct notice, at least by mail, could not have been given, since the property owner's name was known to the city and was on the official records. In short, where direct notice is possible, notice by publication does not suffice. Due process requires the best kind of notice that is possible under the circumstances.

Justice Frankfurter argued in his dissenting opinion that since the property owner had had a choice of remedies, and chose to restrain the city from trespassing upon his land, he could only raise the constitutional question whether failure to give adequate notice of the hearing on compensation invalidated the taking, apart from any claim of loss. That is to say, he maintained that the taking is permissible without notice, since notice is required only of the trial or hearing on value. Unless therefore the party claims more value than he was allowed, the lack of notice has not hurt him. Therefore the petition fails to state a cause of action because it nowhere claims that the land was worth more than the sum allowed. This would seem to be a very old-fashioned point of pleading that went out a long time ago with the reform of code pleading. If the objection is that the property owner asked for the wrong remedy, under modern pleading the party need only state the facts, the remedy being up to the court. Justice Burton dissented on the ground that notice by publication is within the constitutional discretion of the state legislature, and that it has been settled law since 1889[88] that notice by publication in condemnation proceedings satisfies due process.

---

[86] Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). See Note, "Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 1257–1271 (May, 1957); Comment, "Notice by Publication: Walker v. City of Hutchinson," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 553–561 (Spring, 1957).

[87] Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

A rather novel issue of notice was involved in a case where two parcels of real estate controlled by trustees were obtained by New York City on default judgments foreclosing liens for unpaid water charges, in *in rem* proceedings. Statutory notices had been mailed to the proper address of the estate, but the bookkeeper of the estate allegedly concealed the notices from the trustees. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the city could not be charged with responsibility for the misconduct of the bookkeeper in whom the trustees had misplaced their confidence.[89] Nor was the city responsible if the managing trustee was careless in overlooking the notices of arrearage. Nor could the city be held to the duty of determining why a taxpayer neglects to pay some taxes while paying others; the city is not constitutionally obliged to inquire because the much higher real estate taxes were paid. The Court also ruled that it was not a denial of equal protection that the city officials had available to them other remedies for collecting taxes which would not necessarily have resulted in forfeiture of the entire value of the property, since the decision to use this remedy was not arbitrary.

Right to Counsel. A number of cases decided in the 1956 Term dealt with the rights of defendants in state criminal cases.[90] Of special interest was the 5–4 decision of the Court in *In re Groban*,[91] which held that a person does not have a due process right to the assistance of his own counsel when giving testimony as a witness at a proceeding conducted by a state fire marshal to investigate the causes of a fire. After a fire on Groban's premises, the Ohio State Fire Marshal started an investigation, and refused to permit Groban's counsel to be present at the hearing, or what the statute called the "private" investigation. Groban refused to be sworn and to testify, and was summarily committed to jail. While due process undoubtedly guarantees a defendant the right to be heard through his own counsel in a state criminal trial, Justice Reed held that the right did not extend to an administrative investigation which was not a criminal trial, and where there could be no adjudication of the witness's responsibility for the fire, just as there is no constitutional right to counsel before grand juries or other investigating bodies. Until actual trial, he said, the witness's protection is the privilege against self-incrimination. He rejected the argument that since more people are present at a grand jury hearing, there is greater assurance against abuses; there is a presumption of fair and orderly conduct without coercion until facts establish the contrary, and if evidence is secured improperly, the situation can be corrected later by excluding its use. The Court majority could not say that the legislature's decision that private investigations of this sort will reduce injuries and losses due to fires was unreasonable.

---

[88] Huling v. Kaw Valley R. & Improv. Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).

[89] Nelson v. New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956).

[90] See: Walter V. Schaefer, "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 1–26 (November, 1956); R. A. Gustafson, "Have We Created a Paradise for Criminals?" *Southern California Law Review*, Vol. 30, pp. 1–34 (December, 1956); Bertram F. Willcox and Edward J. Bloustein, "The Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 43, pp. 1–26 (Fall, 1957); Louis H. Pollak, "Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, pp. 50–66 (November, 1956); David Fellman, "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19, pp. 34–45 (February, 1957); James F. Coakley, "Restrictions in the Law of Arrest," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 2–15 (March–April, 1957), Caleb Foote, "Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, *ibid.*, pp. 16–46, Fred E. Inbau, "Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions," *ibid.*, pp. 77–85, Samuel S. Leibowitz, "Safeguards in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions," *ibid.*, pp. 86–89.

[91] 352 U.S. 330 (1957).

In behalf of the four dissenters, Justice Black wrote at great length and with considerable eloquence. He strongly objected to compulsory secret examinations, and he maintained that the secret examination contemplated in this case was fraught with great dangers. The right to counsel accrues at the pretrial examination, he insisted, because what happens there may for all practical purposes assure a conviction. The privilege against self-incrimination is not enough, since the average witness doesn't know when or how to plead it, and under Ohio law officers are not required to inform the witness on the subject. To this point Justice Frankfurter replied in a separate concurring opinion that today the privilege has assumed the familiarity of a comic-strip.

Coerced Confessions. A 27-year old Negro who had started school at the age of eight and left at sixteen while still in the third grade, was convicted of burglary with intent to commit rape, mainly on the basis of two confessions, and sentenced to death. Three psychiatrists testified that he was schizophrenic and highly suggestible, and his mother testified that he had always been "thick-headed." He was arrested on suspicion, was given no preliminary hearing, contrary to Alabama law, and was questioned mornings and afternoons for several hours at a time on each of seven days. He was kept in isolation all this time at a state prison eighty miles from his home, and his father and a lawyer were denied permission to see him. After the police secured a first confession, the questioning ran into a second week, when a second confession was made, after some eleven days of questioning in all. Under these facts the Court held, 6-3, that the confessions were not voluntary.[92] "We hold," said the Chief Justice, "that the circumstances of pressure applied against the power of resistance of this petitioner, who cannot be deemed other than weak of will or mind, deprived him of due process of law." Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that no single factor would justify a reversal, but rather that it was the combination of circumstances that warranted the conclusion that this course of conduct fell below standards of civilized justice. Speaking for the three dissenters, Justice Harlan stressed the absence of brutality or physical coercion, the intermittent character of the interrogation during normal hours, the fact that the defendant's mental condition was before the jury and judge, and the fact that the absence of arraignment was not unusual in Alabama. He justified his conclusion on the premise that the corrective power of the Supreme Court over state criminal cases is narrower than its power over the lower federal courts.

---

[92] Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).

Search and Seizure. It will be recalled that in 1952, in *Rochin v. California,*[93] the Supreme Court held it a violation of due process to admit in evidence two capsules of morphine pumped out of the defendant's stomach by the police against his will. Six Justices were able, in *Breithaupt v. Abram,*[94] to distinguish for legal purposes between pumping the stomach and puncturing the skin with a hypodermic needle. While driving a truck in New Mexico, Breithaupt was involved in a collision with a passenger car, as a result of which three persons were killed. An almost empty pint whiskey bottle was found in the glove compartment of the truck. Breithaupt was seriously injured, and was taken to the hospital unconscious. Since a smell of liquor was detected on his breath, and while he was still unconscious, a doctor, on the direction of the police, withdrew a sample of blood by use of a hypodermic needle. On analysis it was found to contain about .17 per cent alcohol. At the trial for involuntary manslaughter, testimony regarding the blood test was admitted in evidence over objection, and this included the testimony of an expert that a person with .17 per cent alcohol in his blood was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Court found that the facts of this case were not comparable with those in *Rochin.* There was nothing "brutal" or "offensive" in the taking of a sample of blood under the protective eye of a physician. The Court also felt that the absence of conscious consent did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right, since even the most delicate person would not consider a test so administered to be offensive. Furthermore, the measure of due process is not the reaction of the most sensitive person, but the whole community's sense of decency and fairness. If one starts with this assumption, Justice Clark maintained, then the Court's conclusion is sound, for blood tests have become routine in everyday life. They are used for people getting into the military services, for marriage licenses, for admission to many colleges, and millions have gone through an even longer routine as blood donors. Furthermore, most states authorize this sort of test, and permit findings so obtained to be admitted in evidence. Far from shocking the conscience or offending the sense of justice, the blood test is admittedly a scientifically accurate method of detecting alcoholic content. Calling attention to the increasing slaughter on the highways, the Court said that as against this very slight intrusion upon the person of the individual must be set the interests of society in dealing with one of the mortal hazards of the road.

---

[93] 342 U.S. 165. See this REVIEW, Vol. 47, p. 164 (March, 1953).

[94] 352 U.S. 432 (1957). See Judson A. Parsons, Jr., "State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination," *Cornell Law Quarterly,* Vol. 42, pp. 346–373 (Spring, 1957); Virgil W. Peterson, "Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure," *Northwestern University Law Review,* Vol. 52, pp. 46–64 (March–April 1957); Monrad G. Paulsen, "Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure," *ibid.,* pp. 65–76.

Justices Black and Douglas concurred in Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion. They could not reconcile this decision with *Rochin*, since they thought that the essential elements of the two cases were the same. If it is true that most states would admit the blood test as evidence, they called attention to the fact that most states would have admitted the *Rochin* evidence. The Chief Justice argued that since there had not been affirmative consent, it was the nature of the invasion of the body that should determine the issue. He could not agree that physical resistance by the prisoner was a prerequisite to the existence of his constitutional rights. The fact that the technique is scientific and in common use, he maintained, does not justify extracting evidence from a criminal defendant without his consent. In a separate opinion Justice Douglas maintained that this was a police assault upon an unconscious man, and that the sanctity of the person is equally violated when the prisoner is incapable of resisting. He said it was repulsive to him that the police should be allowed to insert needles in an unconscious person in order to get evidence necessary to convict him.

Fair Procedure. Chessman was convicted in 1948 of a series of felonies, including kidnapping, and sentenced to death. In capital cases under California law there is an automatic appeal, the statute providing that in such cases "the entire record of the action shall be prepared." At the trial Chessman insisted upon acting as his own counsel, though a public defender sat at his table and acted as his legal adviser. About a month after the trial, the official court reporter died suddenly, having to that time dictated into a recording machine 646 out of 1810 pages of the trial transcript. At the instance of the deputy district attorney, and with the approval of the trial judge, a court reporter and former colleague of the deceased reporter completed the transcription of the short-hand notes, 1164 pages in all. In November, 1948, Chessman unsuccessfully sought to have the Supreme Court of California halt the preparation of the transcript on the ground that it couldn't be done with reasonable accuracy. In a hearing in June, 1949, in which Chessman was denied the opportunity of participating in person or by counsel, the trial judge settled the record, although he allowed about 80 of some 200 corrections listed by Chessman. At a second hearing a little later, at which Chessman was not present or represented by counsel, the record was finally settled. In October, 1955, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, and remanded to the district court Chessman's petition for habeas corpus for a hearing on the charge of fraud in the preparation of the state court record.[95] It was then shown in the district court that the substitute reporter was by marriage an uncle of the deputy district attorney in charge of the case, a fact not known when the record had been approved originally. Also unknown was the fact that in preparing the transcript the substitute reporter had worked in close collaboration with the prosecutor, and had gone over with two police officers the testimony they had given at the trial, including testimony regarding a confession.

---

[95] Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955). See this REVIEW, Vol. 51, p. 186 (March, 1957).

Under these circumstances the Court held, by a 5–3 vote, that the *ex parte* settlement of the state court record violated Chessman's constitutional right to procedural due process, since he was entitled to be represented throughout these proceedings either in person or by counsel.[96] If California chose to deny Chessman's request to be present in person, then it became incumbent upon the state to appoint counsel for him. Furthermore, it was held that Chessman's refusal to be represented by counsel at the trial was not a waiver of his right to counsel at the settlement proceedings. It was even regarded as doubtful whether as a matter of due process any such waiver would relieve the trial judge of the duty of appointing counsel, since the settlement of the record was a necessary and integral part of the compulsory appeal provided by state law in capital cases. Even though the district court's conclusion that there had been no fraud in the preparation of the record was accepted, the fact remained that Chessman had never had his day in court upon the controversial questions of fact and law involved in the settlement of the record. Indeed, the Court did not say that the record had been shown to be inaccurate or incomplete, but only that a seriously disputed record, the accuracy of which Chessman had no voice in determining, could not be allowed to stand. The Court acknowledged that this was a sorry chapter in the annals of delay in the administration of criminal justice, but said that it could not allow this fact to deter it from granting relief so clearly called for. Due process must be respected no matter how heinous the crime and how guilty the accused. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and the district court, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to hold it until California had had a reasonable time within which to take further proceedings in her own courts, since the task of settling the record was for the state courts.

Speaking in dissent, Justice Burton argued that the state had given Chessman due process of law. Justice Douglas said that while the general principle announced by the Court is right, it was misapplied in this case since Chessman had played an active part in settling the record. Since there was no showing of any actual prejudicial error in the record, he thought that Chessman was playing a game with the courts, stalling for time while the facts of the case grew cold. After nine years it was futile, he declared, to order a new record.

2. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

Racial Discrimination. In a case disposed of by a one-sentence opinion, the Court held unconstitutional a statute which required the privately owned intrastate bus company of Montgomery, Alabama, to segregate according to race.[97] In *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia*[98] the Court held unanimously, in a very brief *per curiam* opinion, that Girard College, which was administered by a municipal department of government, was bound by the decision in the *Brown* case[99] which forbids segregation of Negroes in the public schools. According to a will probated in 1831, Stephen Girard had left a fund for the operation of a college for "poor white male orphans." In 1869, pursuant to a state statute, the trust was turned over to the City of Philadelphia for administration by a municipal board. Since the board which operates the college is an agency of the state, the Court ruled that even though the board was acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit two Negroes otherwise qualified for admission was forbidden discrimination by the state.

---

[96] Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). See Kenneth Culp Davis, "The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 193–280 (December, 1956).

Regulation of Business. The Illinois Currency Exchanges Act requires all firms which sell or issue money orders in the state to secure a license and submit to regulation, but it exempts the American Express Company from its requirements. The Court ruled, by a 6–3 vote, that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[100] Reviewing the general law on the subject, Justice Burton called attention to the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment has always been construed as only forbidding classifications which are arbitrary and without reasonable basis, and that the states have always been conceded to have a wide discretion under the police power to classify the subjects of regulation. It is also settled law that a classification is not invalid merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, and that the burden of proof always rests upon those who assail a classification on constitutional grounds. The Court, however, rejected the state's contention that the American Express Company, being a world-wide enterprise of unquestioned solvency and high financial standing, could reasonably be excluded from the coverage of a statute aimed at local companies doing a local business. The discrimination in favor of this Company, Justice Burton argued, is based on the assumption that it will always retain its present characteristics. On the other hand, it is also assumed that competitors are subject to the statute even though they may in the future take on the characteristics of the American Express Company. Furthermore, it was held that the act did not take into account the use of local outlets by the American Express Company, and thus discriminated by extending advantages denied to competitors.

---

[97] Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See A. E. Papale, "Judicial Enforcement of Desegregation: Its Problems and Limitations," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 52, pp. 301–319 (July–August, 1957); Charles Fairman, "The Attack on the Segregation Cases," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 83–94 (November, 1956); William O. Douglas, "Interposition and the Peters Case, 1778–1809," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 3–12 (December, 1956); Note, "Effect of School Assignment Laws on Federal Adjudication of Integration Controversies," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 537–552 (April, 1957); Carl Brent Swisher, "Dred Scott One Hundred Years After," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19, pp. 167–183 (May, 1957). For current information about events on the desegregation front see the monthly issues of the *Southern School News* and the invaluable bi-monthly publication *Race Relations Law Reporter*. See particularly the following special studies in the *Race Relations Law Reporter:* "Class Actions: A Study of Group-Interest Litigation," Vol. 1, pp. 991–1010 (October, 1956); "Federal Jurisdiction: A Study of the Authorized Area of Action of United States Courts," Vol. 2, pp. 269–285 (February, 1957); "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," Vol. 2, pp. 561–582 (April, 1957); "The Eleventh Amendment," Vol. 2, pp. 757–766 (June, 1957).

[98] 353 U.S. 230 (1957). See Elias Clark, "Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, pp. 979–1015 (June, 1957); Hershel Shanks, "'State Action' and the Girard Estate Case," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 105, pp. 213–240 (December, 1956); Harold W. Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State Action' under the Fourteenth Amendment," *Southern California Law Review*, Vol. 30, pp. 208–221 (February, 1957).

[99] Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See this REVIEW, Vol. 49, pp. 96–99 (March, 1955).

[100] Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).

In his dissenting opinion Justice Black repeated his well known view that he was opposed to using general provisions in the Constitution to restrict narrowly the power of the state over domestic economic affairs. In a second dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that the regulation of banking is one of the oldest and most far-reaching powers of the state, and insisted that the Illinois legislature has a right to decide that the American Express Company does not need this sort of regulation. He conceded that it is true that the facts may change, but he felt that it will be time enough to strike down the legislation when the facts have actually changed.

3. STATE POWER AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The city of Opelika, Alabama, levies an annual privilege tax of $250 on any firm engaged in the wholesale grocery business which delivers in the town groceries at wholesale which are derived from points outside of it. A Georgia corporation engaged in the wholesale grocery business in Georgia solicits business in Opelika through salesmen; the orders are sent to the Georgia place of business, where they are accepted, and the groceries are then loaded on trucks and sent to Opelika. It has no place of business, office or inventory in Opelika, its only contact being the solicitation of orders and the delivery of goods. Under these circumstances the Court held that the tax, as applied to this business, was in violation of the Commerce Clause.[101] It has been established in recent cases,[102] the Court said, "that a municipality may not impose a flat-sum privilege tax on an interstate enterprise whose only contact with the municipality is the solicitation of orders and the subsequent delivery of goods at the end of an uninterrupted movement in interstate commerce, such a tax having a substantial exclusory effect on interstate commerce." Since, above all, there was no comparable tax on local merchants, it was clear to the Court that this was a discrimination against the free flow of trade over state boundaries which the Commerce Clause forbids.

---

[101] West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957). See the symposium on "State Taxation of Multistate Business" in *Ohio State Law Journal,* Vol. 18, pp. 3–104 (Winter, 1957).

[102] Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).

4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Federal Preemption. Once again a problem of federal preemption arose, as it has so often in the past, in the field of labor relations. Guss manufactures photographic equipment in Salt Lake City, buying some of his materials outside Utah, and sending some of his finished products outside the state. Pursuant to its own standards, the NLRB declined to take jurisdiction of a charge of unfair labor practices brought by a union against Guss, the regional director holding that under NLRB rules Guss's business was predominantly local. Then the union filed about the same charges with the state labor board pursuant to the state labor relations act, and over Guss's objections both the state board and the state's highest court ruled that the state authorities had jurisdiction. Under Section 10(a) of the national statute, the NLRB may formally cede jurisdiction to a state. In this case it was clear that Guss's business affected commerce within the meaning of the national act, that the NLRB had jurisdiction, that the national act expressly deals with the conduct involved here, and that the NLRB had not entered into any cession agreement with Utah. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court ruled that the state authorities lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, since the proviso in Section 10(a) was regarded as the exclusive means whereby states may be enabled to act concerning matters which Congress has entrusted to the NLRB.[103] The Court rejected the argument that where federal power has been delegated but lies dormant and unexercised, the state's power to act with regard to matters of local concern is not necessarily superseded. It is a question of congressional intent, and the Court concluded that Congress intended to preempt the field, a conclusion which is fortified by the proviso to Section 10 (a), with its "inescapable implication of exclusiveness." It may well be, as was argued, that to deny the state jurisdiction creates a vast no-man's land not subject to any regulation, or that to grant jurisdiction would create confusion and conflict, but in either case the decision is up to Congress, which is free to change the situation either way at will. Furthermore, it is always possible to reduce the no-man's land by the national board exercising jurisdiction or by its ceding jurisdiction under Section 10 (a).

The two dissenting Justices, Burton and Clark, took the position that the proviso was added merely to make it clear that the NLRB had the power to make specific agreements to cede jurisdiction to state agencies over certain labor disputes, but that it was not designed to terminate the state's pre-existing power to deal with labor matters over which the NLRB may choose to decline to exercise its full jurisdiction. They argued that where the NLRB has not taken jurisdiction, federal power lies dormant, and the states may then exercise jurisdiction if their action will not conflict with the NLRB's administration of the act. They pointed out that the proviso's requirements were so highly restrictive that no cession has ever been made. Accordingly they were apprehensive that the Court's decision created an extensive no-man's land within which no federal or state agency or court is empowered to deal with labor controversies. They found it difficult to believe that Congress intended *sub silentio* to take such a step backward in the field of labor relations. While the purpose of the proviso was to encourage state action, they believed there was no intention to wipe out by implication the state's recognized power to act when the NLRB declined to take jurisdiction. In any event, the dissenters thought that "due regard for our federal system suggests that all doubts on this score should be resolved in favor of a conclusion that would not leave the States powerless when the federal agency declines to exercise its jurisdiction."

---

[103] Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). In two companion cases, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957), and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957), the Court held that by parity of reasoning the proviso must also exclude action by the state courts as well as by administrative agencies.

Federal Supremacy. Pursuant to the Armed Services Procurement Act, a contractor's bid for the construction of facilities at an Air Force base in Arkansas over which the United States had not acquired jurisdiction was accepted, and he began work. Thereupon he was prosecuted by Arkansas for doing work as contractor without having first obtained a license under Arkansas law from a state board. The federal act provides that bids shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, and lists the considerations—as to financial resources, skill, organization and records, for example—which define a responsible contractor. Under Arkansas law the licensing board has to take into consideration like qualifications. The Supreme Court held for the contractor, ruling that there was a possibility here of conflict between the state and federal license requirements.[104] "Subjecting a federal contractor to the Arkansas contractor license requirements," the Court said, "would give the State's licensing board a virtual power of review over the federal determination of 'responsibility' and would thus frustrate the expressed federal policy of selecting the lowest responsible bidder." Under the rationale of the well known case of *Johnson v. Maryland*,[105] instrumentalities of the United States are not required to satisfy state requirements as to competence, since the federal agency determines the competence of the people it employs.

Another federal supremacy issue was before the Court in a case where a worker brought action against a railroad in a Texas state court under FELA for injuries sustained when, as a railroad employee, he was struck by a truck backing into a passageway while he was inspecting railroad cars. The jury returned a general verdict finding that the railroad had negligently contributed to the employee's injury, but it also made special findings on special issues which were favorable to the railroad. In accordance with state law the state appellate court held that the general verdict must yield to the inconsistent findings on the special issues. By a 5–4 vote the Supreme Court reversed.[106] The Court found that the jury's general verdict, that the railroad negligently contributed to the employee's injury, had support in the testimony of witnesses, and that the special issues did not bear on this central question. In addition it ruled that the findings on the special issues did not exhaust all of the possible grounds on which the main finding was based. Said the Court: "The petitioner having asserted federal rights governed by federal law, it is our duty under the Act to make certain that they are fully protected, as the Congress intended them to be. We therefore cannot accept interpretations that nullify their effectiveness," since it is established that "the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."

---

[104] Miller v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956).

[105] 254 U.S. 51 (1920). In this case the Court set aside the conviction in the Maryland courts of an employee of the Post Office Department for driving without a state license.

Again Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that certiorari had been granted improvidently. The other three dissenters thought that the findings on the special issues were wholly inconsistent with the jury's general verdict, and that state law should control. In fact, they argued that the Texas rule would have to be followed even if the case had been tried in a federal court.

Full Faith and Credit. No Term of the Supreme Court is quite complete without at least one decision which adds to the confusion surrounding the relationship between the granting of divorces by the states and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Once again the distinction between divorce and alimony was involved. In this case the husband and wife, who had been married in 1948, separated in 1952 while living in California. The wife moved to New York and had resided there since February, 1953. In March, 1953, the husband filed suit for divorce in Nevada, and the ever-obliging Nevada court granted a final divorce in June, 1953, the decree freeing both not only from the bonds of matrimony, but also from all of its "duties and obligations." The wife had not been served with process in Nevada, and did not appear before the divorce court. In April, 1954, she sued in a New York court for separation and alimony. The New York court did not have personal jurisdiction over the husband, but it did sequester his property in the state. The husband appeared specially, and as to the alimony question set up the defense of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The New York court held that on the subject of the divorce the Nevada decree was final, thus effectively dissolving the marriage, but it entered an order for support payments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, and by a 6–2 vote the Supreme Court affirmed.[107]

The Court pointed out that in the *Estin* case[108] it had been decided that a Nevada divorce court which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife had no power to terminate a husband's obligation to provide her support as required in a pre-existing separation decree granted by a New York court. The only difference the Court could find here was that the wife's right to support had not been reduced to judgment prior to the husband's *ex parte* divorce, but it felt that this difference was not material on this issue. Since the wife was never subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada court had no power, the Court decided, to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband. It is an old rule, the Court said, "that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." It therefore held that to the extent that the Nevada decree purported to affect the wife's right to support it was void and thus New York was not obliged by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give it recognition.[109] The proposition that the Nevada court may free the husband from the bonds of matrimony, but not from the obligation to pay alimony, is an interesting tidbit of economic determinism.

---

[106] Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Railway Co., 353 U.S. 360 (1957).

[107] Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).

[108] Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). See this REVIEW, Vol. 43, p. 308 (April, 1949).

In his dissenting opinion Justice Frankfurter maintained that the Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit both as regards the termination of the marital relation and as to the denial of alimony. The fact that in *Estin* there had been a prior support order of a New York court he regarded as crucial. The dissolution of marriage, he argued, is just as personal as the decision on alimony. It can hardly be assumed, he said, that absent spouses value their alimony rights more highly than their marital rights. He could see no good reason for splitting the cause of action to hold that a domiciliary state can terminate the marital relation *ex parte* but cannot deny alimony *ex parte*. Justice Harlan thought that the case should be remanded to the state court to reconsider the question whether the wife was domiciled in New York at the time of the divorce, since in his judgment this went to the heart of the question as to whether New York must respect the Nevada decree.

---

[109] Insofar as Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913) held that an *ex parte* divorce destroys alimony rights it was overruled.

COMMUNICATIONS

REPLY TO DEAN LOUIS M. HACKER

TO THE EDITOR:

I sincerely regret that Dean Hacker (in his December communication to the REVIEW) felt compelled to resort to *argumentum ad hominem.* I concede that the last sentence in my review (September 1957 issue, pp. 885–886) of his book was hard-hitting. But I do not feel that a comment that a book sometimes leaves one with the impression that it is pamphleteering for free enterprise is "gratuitously vulgar." I will leave to the judgment of the political science fraternity the propriety of my last sentence and the first paragraph of Dean Hacker's reply.

I may have disagreed with Dean Hacker but I don't think I disregarded or failed to understand his intention. May not a reviewer question whether "The honor and faith of government, *because* these are linked with both public and private credit—the sound management of money and banking; the creation of a climate in which free enterprise and innovation can flourish—are *the* foundations upon which we continue to build securely"? (Hacker's words, Preface, vii–viii; my italics.) What of other foundations? The protection of civil liberties, including the vital right of political opposition? What of federalism? What of protection against special interest legislation? If Dean Hacker was concerned in his book with the problems of a society seeking to assure freedom, justice, equity, and economic and social stability, is it not in order to criticize Hamilton's failings as well as his successes? And is it not fairly obvious that these failings become clear only when we compare Hamilton's theory with that of other creative thinkers and "real" statesmen who were also concerned with these problems but who may have disagreed with Hamilton's interpretation of freedom, justice, equity, and economic and social stability.

As for Dean Hacker's statement that he was "not juxtaposing Hamilton and Jefferson," I can only report that the internal evidence of his own book (*e.g.*, pp. 6–13; 251–256) strongly suggests a different conclusion to my mind.

In reviewing Dean Hacker's book I operated on the assumption that its title was *not* "Alexander Hamilton and New and Underdeveloped Countries." I confess, therefore, that I do not grasp the strange logic by which I and, by implication, other political scientists are to be indicted as "cavalier" and lacking in understanding simply because we may disagree with Dean Hacker's interpretation of *Alexander Hamilton in the American Tradition.* Furthermore, if Dean Hacker is now going to make the application of Hamilton's theory to underdeveloped countries the central theme of his book, may not even "young" political scientists challenge the relevance of Hamilton's stake-in-society theory to India, Israel, or Indonesia?

NEAL RIEMER

The Pennsylvania State University

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS 195

Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. Arnold J. Toynbee 195

von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century. C. B. Robson 198

Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today; *Berns,* Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment; *Chafee,* Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787; *McKeon, Merton, and Gellhorn,* The Freedom to Read: Perspective and Program. Charles R. Nixon 200

Haines and Sherwood, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1835–1864. Carl Brent Swisher 203

Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect. David Fellman 204

Schubert, The Presidency in the Courts. James Hart 207

Knorr, The War Potential of Nations. William T. R. Fox 208

Sprout and Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics. Rupert Emerson 210

Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. H. Field Haviland, Jr. 212

Sady, The United Nations and Dependent Peoples; *Toussaint,* The Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Norman J. Padelford 213

Pelling, America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan. Benjamin E. Lippincott 215

Hoffman et al., Le Mouvement Poujade. Roy C. Macridis 216

Morris-Jones, Parliament in India. Dorothy M. Spencer 218

Meissner, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union; *Niemeyer,* An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality. Alexander Dallin 220

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

American Government and Politics 223

Foreign and Comparative Government 236
International Law and Relations 245
Political Theory, Research, and Methodology 257
Other Books Received 268

BOOK REVIEWS

Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. BY KARL A. WITTFOGEL. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. xix, 556. $7.50.)

This is a queer book by a fine scholar. Professor Wittfogel, in his preliminary acknowledgments, tells us, as every author should do, what was the genesis of his book. His belief in human values caused him (to his great personal credit) to be interned in Hitler's concentration camps. "My final thoughts," he records, "go to those who, like myself, were passing through that inferno of total terror." Some of his fellow victims asked him, "if ever opportunity offered, to explain to all who would listen the inhumanity of totalitarian rule in any form. Over the years and more than I can express, these men have inspired my search for a deeper understanding of the nature of total power."

Here indeed is a strong incentive to research and writing. But what result would one expect Professor Wittfogel's experience to produce? Surely a full-dress study of the National Socialist regime in Germany, and this for at least three reasons. First, Professor Wittfogel has had direct experience of this regime; and even the most penetrating and imaginative scholar understands better something that he has been through himself than something that he has been able to study from documents only—as Professor Wittfogel has studied the regime of the Liao (Khitan) dynasty in medieval China. Secondly, the Nazi regime is the example of total power that is most easily comprehensible to Western writers and readers, because Hitler and his National Socialist movement are entirely home-grown products of our Western civilization. There is nothing "Oriental" or "hydraulic" about Nazi Germany (I will explain in a moment what Professor Wittfogel means by his rather quaint jargon). A third reason for beginning with the Nazi regime in the contemporary Western World if one is going to make a serious study of total power is that it is the best (*i.e.*, the worst) example of this atrocity so far known to us. Search all the surviving records of human behaviour all over the globe since the beginning of recorded history, and you will find nothing to equal this. The Nazis' cold-blooded murder of millions of people, their tortures, their espionage, their devilish policy of inciting children to denounce their parents—these leave the Assyrians and the Aztecs dead beat.

So one would expect Professor Wittfogel to begin with the Nazis, and to take them as the standard for his comparative study. But not a bit of it. After his illuminating reference in his acknowledgments, he hardly mentions the Nazis again. And, when he does mention total power in our Western World or in the Graeco-Roman World, it is always in general terms and nearly always in the form of an apologia for it: it was not really so bad after all, or at any rate it has never lasted very long.

The wielders of total power whom Professor Wittfogel is stalking in this book are not our Western Nazis; they are the Russian Communists; and I have a most uncomfortable suspicion that the book—beneath its load of authentic and massive learning—is really a political book and not a scientific one. At any rate, what it all leads up to is a common-form contemporary Western indictment of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. Of course, what is trite may nevertheless be true, and, from the standpoint of the minority in the Western World that believes in, and tries to practise, what we consider to be genuine democracy, Russian Communism is about the next-best target to German National-Socialism for a democratic Western attack on totalitarianism. Then why does not Professor Wittfogel attack the Russian Communist regime direct, on the basis of its, to our minds, glaring intrinsic demerits? The way is open, but he does not take it. Instead, he gets at the Russian Communists by the roundabout route of an attack on what he calls "Oriental or Asiatic hydraulic agromanagerial despotism."

Here I have three bones to pick with him. First, he is doing mankind a serious disservice in trying to resuscitate the propaganda myth—invented by European Greeks in the fifth century B.C.—of the antithesis between a good Europe and a bad Asia. Second, he is flying in the face of the considered opinion of his colleagues the Egyptologists, Assyriologists, and Indologists in trying to apply to the magically vicious soil of Asia—though not to the magically virtuous soil of Europe—the Marxian thesis that the means of production rigidly determine all other elements of social life. Third, he is barking up the wrong tree: for, when one makes even a cursory comparative study of total power, one finds that the worst cases of it have occurred, not in "hydraulic" societies, but in societies in which agriculture gets its water from the rainfall.

In my own association of ideas, the word "hydraulic" suggests drills, brakes, and elevators, but Professor Wittfogel uses it, rather oddly, to mean "irrigational." "Hydraulic" societies, in his parlance, are societies in which agriculture gets its water from the artificial tapping of lake water or river water by irrigation canals.

But, to get back to my three quarrels with Professor Wittfogel and, first, his attempt to revive the propaganda myth of good Europe versus bad Asia. We know all about this smear's origin and history. It was invented by European Greeks in the fifth century B.C. in their very natural animosity against the Persian Empire, which had made an aggressive, though unsuccessful, attempt to conquer them. Alexander the Great was brought up on this myth by Aristotle; but, when he made his own successful conquest of the Persian Empire, he discovered, to his astonishment, that the myth was a lie. As soon as he met the Persians, he recognised in them the qualities of character which had enabled them to give peace and unity to Western Asia for 200 years. His response was to take the Persians into partnership with the Macedonians and the Greeks in the management of the World. But for his premature death, Alexander would have carried this policy through, and that would have been the end of the lying myth. Unhappily, his insight and his policy died with him, and the myth lived on, unscotched, till it was borrowed from the Greeks, in recent times, by the modern Western conquerors of the World.

This myth of a magic contrast between European virtue and Asiatic vice is the ancient Greek and modern Western counterpart of the medieval Byzantine Greek propaganda myth that the Western Christians were misguided barbarians who were bound to come to grief very soon. This myth was borrowed from the Byzantines by the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophils, and from the Russian Slavophils by the Russian Communists. We know how much it irritates us to be told that Russia alone is holy and orthodox (whether in Christian or in Communist terms) and that we Westerners are erring and doomed schismatics or capitalists. It is just as irritating for the peoples who happen to live within the conventional boundaries of "Asia" to be told by us that, as an inescapable result of their geographical location, they are bound to languish under "Oriental" despotism of the "hydraulic agromanagerial" type. Away with both these propaganda myths! Both are lies, and both are heinous offences against the human race, because both of them are engines deliberately designed to stoke up those tribal animosities by which mankind has made itself so miserable.

I will now take up my third point before my second. I contend as against Professor Wittfogel, that all the worst cases of total power and an atrocious abuse of it have occurred in regions where agriculture depends on rainfall, not in regions where it depends on irrigation. National Socialist Germany: there was nothing "hydraulic" about her. Czarist Russia and her successor Communist Russia: there is nothing "hydraulic" about her either. Professor Wittfogel cannot deny that in Russia agriculture depends not on irrigation but on rainfall; but he still claims the Muscovite form of Russian despotism for his "hydraulic agromanagerial" type on the ground that the Muscovite despots *may* have learnt their trade, not from themselves or from the Byzantines, but from their Tatar overlords, and that the Tatars of the Golden Horde, at the western end of the great Eurasian steppe, *may* have learnt the tricks of the "hydraulic agromanagerial" trade from brother Tatars who had ridden off in the opposite direction to conquer "hydraulic agromanagerial" China. Professor Wittfogel cites no serious evidence in support of this surely very far-fetched piece of speculation; yet it is one of the key theses of his book.

Professor Wittfogel himself bears witness that, though the cultivators in "hydraulic" Oriental societies have no say in the government of their community, they are not slaves either. But plantation slavery has played a big part in mankind's economic history. Where has it been rife? In Roman Italy in the last two centuries B.C., and in the West Indies and the Americas since their conquest by West Europeans in modern times. The only Asiatic case that I can call to mind is the cultivation of the Tigris-Euphrates delta by African (Zanj) slave-labour in the ninth century of the Christian Era.

Finally, there is Professor Wittfogel's thesis that in China, India, Iraq, and Egypt, though not in Lombardy or the Netherlands, artificial water-control on a large scale has produced a uniform type of "agromanagerial" despotism. If the late Professor Frankfort were still alive, he would have a lance to break with Professor Wittfogel over that. The differences between the "Asiatic" societies whose agriculture is based on irrigation are much greater than their resemblances. I believe there is nothing more in Professor Wittfogel's thesis than the obvious truth that large-scale enterprises cannot be carried out without a unified and effective high command. This is certainly true of large-scale waterworks, but it is also true of armies and ships and industrial enterprises.

Here I will leave Professor Wittfogel to be dealt with by the Assyriologists and the Egyptologists. I seldom write a condemnatory review and dislike writing one of this book—not least because I much admire Professor Wittfogel's pioneer work in the economic, social, and political interpretation of Chinese dynastic histories. But his present book is, in my opinion, something of an aberration and still more of a menace. So I have said frankly what I think about it.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century. BY KLEMMENS VON KLEMPERER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xxvi, 250. $5.00.)

This "chapter in the history of an idea" is, according to the author, "the story of an extreme dilemma between the logic of conservatism and the politics of conservatism" (pp. 3 f.). Conservatism appeared in Europe in the struggle against the French Revolutionary idea that rational man could create a new order in his own image. The conservatives "aimed at discovering the order inherent in things. This faith in the firmness of the created order was the common ground of all conservatives." It is in the light of this origin that we must understand the "central attributes" of the logic of conservatism: change, freedom, irrationalism, and pessimism. These attributes can be comprehended only against the foil of the corresponding attributes of the liberalism that carried the French Revolutionary idea into the nineteenth century. The conservative concept of change was that of organic growth, which, in alliance with tradition, "appeared as a protection against arbitrary rule" (p. 24). Early conservatives, such as de Maistre and Haller, "made a good case for freedom by defending diversity against the encroachments of a leveling state" (p. 26). While conceding that "irrationalism is a double-edged sword," the author concludes that "the irrationalist premises of conservatism" stand for "what is higher than reason and theory" rather than what is "lower" (p. 28). The "nature of conservative pessimism" is revealed in the views that "no human effort, no politics could ultimately remedy the ills of the world. Politics had merely a limited function, it was the 'art of the possible' and an attempt to cope with an existing order" (p. 29). Thus "conservatism, like liberalism, was part of that '*hortus inclusus* of the nineteenth century,' a forward-looking century which believed in freedom and the dignity of man" (p. 31).

When we turn to the story of conservatism in Germany, we find that, under the influence of Hegel, reinforced by Stahl and Ranke, the acceptance of "the created order" required by the logic of conservatism was transmuted into "an acquiescence to the realities of the Prussian state" (p. 35) and ultimately resolved into subservience to the Bismarckian Reich. But conservatism received a new impulse from Nietzsche, who charged that in its "preoccupation with history and politics and in the exuberant identification of politics with progress, Germany had become an index for what was happening all over Europe. The European man. . . by an excessive trust in historical necessity and by turning to the state and society for the solution of his problems, surrendered his own individuality. He abdicated life while turning into a shallow mass man" (p. 38). Nietzsche also disclosed the dilemma of conservatism. In an age in which capitalism, industrialism, and imperialism had become actualities, conservatives could no longer maintain faith in an "order already inherent in things."

The "new conservatives" of the twentieth century appeared as dreamers of dreams, would-be architects of radical revisions in politics, economics, and the social order. This climax was foreshadowed by the conservative yet radical Youth Movement of the early years of the century. At the outbreak of the war and even in the "dreamland of the armistice period," moderate proposals such as Friedrich Naumann's "Middle Europe" and the "social economy" of Rathenau and Möllendorff could provide grounds for discussion among conservatives, who included men of the stature of Max Weber, Meinecke, Troeltsch, and Thomas Mann. But after the muted "revolution of 1918–19" there came the parting of the ways. The "elders," who "might be called German liberals as well as conservatives" (p. 93), accepted the Republic, albeit without enthusiasm; the "young ones" went on to a proliferation of organizations, plans, and schemes, all in the name of conservatism but in combination with one or more of the protean forms of nationalism and socialism, "unperturbed by the widening gap between what we have called the 'logic' of conservatism and their own policies" (p. 117).

The author selects for fullest discussion Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler, and Ernst Jünger. Although he succeeds in differentiating the "new conservatism" of these men and their associates from National Socialism, he points suggestively to the fact that their loss of awareness of the "logic" of conservatism prevented them from recognizing for what they were "the *terribles simplificateurs*" against whom Jakob Burckhardt had warned.

This reviewer finds that von Klemperer has fashioned, in his concepts of the "logic" of conservatism and the dilemma between this and its "politics" in the twentieth century, an instrument useful for *historical* interpretation. His case study also offers evidence that conservatism has limited value as a concept for political science. The historian whose task it is to describe and interpret the phenomena of human behavior as they appear in time and space, can consider, as in the present instance our author has done with great critical acumen, the claims of persons or movements that offer themselves as the standard-bearers of a respected tradition. The political scientist, who seeks the structures for meaningfully generalized descriptions of the behavior of men in politics, must be very cautious in his use of terms that can be defined with accuracy only in the context of a limited number of particular historical situations. This appears to the reviewer to be true with reference to "conservatism" and its running-mate "liberalism" as well.

C. B. ROBSON.

University of North Carolina.

The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today. BY EDWARD DUMBAULD. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 242. $3.75.)

Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment. BY WALTER BERNS. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 264. $4.00.)

Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787. BY ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. (Lawrence: Kansas Press. 1956. Pp. 245. $4.00.)

The Freedom to Read: Perspective and Program. BY RICHARD MCKEON, ROBERT K. MERTON, AND WALTER GELLHORN. (New York: R. R. Bowker Company for the National Book Committee. 1957. Pp. viii, 110. $2.50 cloth, $1.25 paper.)

John Stuart Mill's proposition that, however true an opinion may be, "if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth" has been a major tenet in the faith of civil libertarians. These volumes are evidence that it is a tenet they are prepared to practice on themselves as well as preach to others.

For the beginner who is just venturing into a discussion of the Bill of Rights and needs to know the basic facts of what it is all about, Edward Dumbauld's *The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today* is an excellent starting point. Here one can learn what was proposed for inclusion in the Bill of Rights, what was adopted, how the courts have interpreted its various provisions, and the classic arguments in defense of these rights. An appendix contains the English Bill of Rights of 1689, all the proposals made by the various State Conventions and Congressional Committees concerned with formulating our Bill of Rights, and a summary table which facilitates convenient reference to the sources for any of the ninety items proposed at one stage or another for inclusion in the Bill of Rights.

While Mr. Dumbauld is largely uncritical of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Bill of Rights, Walter Berns in *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment* attacks the whole philosophic framework within which the Court has dealt with it. This is a challenge to the school of thought that believes that the First Amendment is supposed to protect the inner life of man from legislative control and to guarantee to every man "freedom of conscience and freedom to express that conscience when it does not give rise to unlawful acts" (p. 238).

The main contentions are these. The Court has been confused, inconsistent, and by "the continued use of the traditional legal rules and principles has made a shambles of the law of the First Amendment" (p. viii). The real root of the difficulty lies in the liberal political philosophy and philosophy of law that the Court has been using in dealing with First Amendment cases. This philosophy assigns government a limited role and gives individuals rights against government, particularly the right to make their own moral judgments and their own moral mistakes, free from governmental interference. Such a philosophy denies to government and law what was once their principal purpose, "the problem of making men virtuous and deserving of freedom" (p. 229). This has led the Court to try to distinguish between the constitutionality of legislation and its wisdom (p. 183) and to attempt to consider the presence of a right apart from the use to which it is being put (p. 187). In short, the Justices try to avoid the question of whether the laws or actions before them are good or evil. The remedy Dr. Berns proposes is to abandon this liberal philosophy, which grew up in the seventeenth century, and return to the earlier conception of law and government as the promoters of virtue, as agencies that mold the characters of citizens and create good men. True liberty is the liberty to do what is good, just, and honest; it is not the liberty to do either good or evil as one pleases. Since the First Amendment doesn't read quite this way, "perhaps the best we can do is to interpret it to read: Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of *good* speech" (p. 251, italics his). The Court could then make its decisions openly on the basis of the worthiness of the speech that is under attack.

It should be clear that the basic charge here is not that the Court has misinterpreted the philosophy behind the First Amendment, but that this philosophy is wrong, that it can't work, and that its weakness is responsible for the difficulties the Court has had with the First Amendment. This is a provocative argument, to say the least, and Dr. Berns pursues it with great gusto.

Unfortunately the presentation of the argument is marred by repeated distortions of the liberal position. Liberals are charged with a refusal to make value judgments, when in fact their wish is to restrain the government from making their value judgments for them. They are also charged with making freedom more important than virtue, whereas liberal legal and constitutional theory need assert only that freedom from governmental control in the realm of morals is necessary, not because freedom is itself the highest value, but because it is a necessary condition if men are to be able to pursue what they believe to be the highest virtues.

Another weakness in the presentation is that Dr. Berns ignores completely the historic situation out of which the liberal philosophy arose. The ancient notion of government as having as its primary task the promotion of virtue and good character in its citizens presumed a moral and religious unity in society. This unity was shattered by the Reformation, however, and the experience of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries showed the impossibility of applying such notions of government and law in a society where there was moral and religious conflict. The liberal philosophy of limited government grew in part as a solution to the problem of how men with conflicting moral and religious notions could live at peace with each other in the same society.

Where Dr. Berns's study is an example of some of the dangers of ignoring the historical roots of our liberties, *Three Human Rights in the Constitution*, by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., is a brilliant example of the values of exploring them. He deals here, not with the Bill of Rights, but with three rights written into the Constitution by the Philadelphia Convention: the right of freedom of debate in Congress, the prohibition of bills of attainder, and the right of freedom of movement. Though there is some consideration of how these rights have been interpreted by the Supreme Court, the real focus of his attention is on incidents from the medieval period down to the close of the seventeenth century, when members of Parliament were punished for what they said, or when Parliament used its legislative and judicial powers to impose criminal penalties directly on persons they did not like. Here we see the hard, bitter struggles by which essential rights were won. Professor Chafee presents these events with a vividness and excitement that make the reader feel he is a part of them. Viewed in this detail, freedom of speech appears, not as an abstract philosophic principle, but as a concrete right which members of the Commons sought for themselves so that they could carry on their essential functions in the political process. Freedom of speech inside Parliament, however, was tied to freedom of speech outside Parliament. As the power base of British politics broadened, so the rights to speech were broadened with it. As Professor Chafee observes, "the scope of freedom of speech tends to be a function of the political power of those who want to talk" (p. 61). Members of Parliament fought, not merely for the right to make *good* speeches, but for the right to say what was on their minds free from the threat of punishment, even though kings and judges might consider their speech bad, unworthy, or irrelevant.

Of the three rights Professor Chafee considers, that of freedom of movement is least clearly stated in the Constitution, and it presents the most serious unresolved issues today. Related to it are the problems of test oaths and passport restrictions, which, he argues, are techniques for limiting a freedom that was important in developing the American colonies and in many ways was peculiar to them.

Understanding the basic philosophy on which our liberties rest and the historic roots from which they come is only part of what is needed if they are to be preserved. There must also be a persistent examination of some of the concrete problems to which our principles are to be applied. Richard McKeon, Robert K. Merton, and Walter Gellhorn in *The Freedom to Read* have undertaken to identify some of the crucial problems on which we need more knowledge if we are to protect our freedom to read from the pressures for censorship.

They recognize that the problem of censorship cannot be dealt with merely by applying legal formulas or by asserting a philosophy about the nature of freedom and of virtue. More often than many would suppose, the real dispute is over the empirical questions of what will be the consequences of censoring or not censoring particular works. Therefore they propose a series of studies into the actual effects of various reading matter on the personality and behavior of the reader, into the social psychology and economics of reading, and into the sociology of censorship. By canvassing the issues and identifying the gaps in our knowledge relevant to one of our liberties, they have drawn attention to ways in which the empirically minded social scientist can contribute to our tradition of liberty, as the lawyer, the philosopher, and the historian have done.

CHARLES R. NIXON.

University of California (Los Angeles).

The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics 1835–1864. By Charles Grove Haines and Foster H. Sherwood. (Berkeley: The University of California Press. 1957. Pp. 533. $7.50.)

In 1944 Professor Charles Grove Haines published what was to be merely the first of a series of volumes on the Supreme Court, each of which, except for dates, was to bear the title given above. That volume was primarily a study of the growth of judicial power in the United States down to the end of the John Marshall regime. Well documented from a wide variety of sources, it was highly critical of the institution of judicial review as used to support Federalist principles in American government. Professor Haines died in 1948 after accumulating part of the materials for his second volume and doing part of the writing. The materials demonstrated his intention of showing the Court as a continuing instrument of Federalism through the Taney period and of maintaining a somewhat critical attitude thereto. From a sense of loyalty to his former departmental chief, Professor Foster H. Sherwood undertook the completion of the second volume, saying in the preface that "I have tried to preserve in its pages his own point of view, whenever it was known to me, and to exclude my own" (p. v).

This volume as published under joint authorship is a comprehensive study of public law decisions of the Supreme Court from 1835 to 1864. In addition to importation of some outside historical materials, it quotes, and more particularly paraphrases, from large numbers of Court opinions of the period and from the arguments of counsel. It proceeds under the handicap of weighty and often non-literary materials and the further handicap that earlier histories have told enough of the story to eliminate from this one most of the tang of discovery which makes for good reading. It has still another handicap in Professor Sherwood's commitment to faithful presentation of the point of view of a man now deceased and to exclusion of his own. The Haines derogatory judgment on judicial review was already well known and hardly needed further illustration, whereas readers are here denied the creative judgments of the junior author that might have been expected to emerge from the task of synthesis.

The volume deals with the familiar topics of the interpretation of the commerce clause, the interpretation of the contract clause, the status of corporations, and the issues of slavery. It is indicative of the approach employed that it incorporates under headings of "State versus Federal Sovereignty" and "Protection of Vested Rights" a great deal of materials otherwise classified or omitted altogether by other authors. It expands the story of the judicial handling of boundary disputes between states, a matter of importance during the period, illuminating particularly the long struggle between Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Although leaving with the reviewer an unexplained sense of incompleteness, the book deals significantly with Abraham Lincoln, as politician and then as President, in his strategy with respect to statements on the nature and scope of judicial power and the selection of Republican personnel to replace retiring Democratic justices.

Perhaps because of its lack of public-law implications, the author largely omits discussion of the famous Gaines inheritance case, which came to the Court again and again and stirred some of the justices to ribaldry—which might have been used to lighten a bit several hundred pages of heavy materials. Treatment of the glamorous California land cases, which occupied much time for more than a decade, might have fulfilled the same purpose. Largely omitted also is biographical treatment of the justices, which might have been used to the same end. Lack of biographical concern, indeed, has resulted in inclusion of irritating errors. Without explanation, for example, Justice Story is given, in the table of contents and in the text, the middle initial of "P" (pp. vii, 17). Although Justice Story died in September, 1845, without ever submitting the resignation he had often threatened to submit because of lack of sympathy with the majority of the Court, he is here presented as having resigned in December, 1845 (p. 323). Justice Daniel, an ardent Democrat, is erroneously presented as an appointee of Whig President Harrison (p. 144), although an historic item in his career is the midnight confirmation at the end of the Van Buren administration. The statement that "Judge Davis accompanied him to Washington and was the president's constant adviser until Lincoln appointed him to the Supreme Court" (p. 450) ignores the fact that for months Davis was back at his judicial work in Illinois and writing long and anxious letters to a political friend in Washington in attempts to find out what was going on in Washington and who was likely to be appointed to the Supreme Court. These errors, it is true, are not central to the performance here undertaken, but they do indicate the limits of the concern of the authors for the biographical factors in the judicial history of the period.

In any event, without implying too much in the way of criticism of the present volume, the reviewer hopes that if Professor Sherwood brings out the third volume in the series he will permit his own creativity more fully to reveal itself, that more of the throb of dynamic history will make itself felt, and that the individual justices, to the extent of their importance in the history of the Court, will be presented in a more full-bodied fashion.

CARL BRENT SWISHER.

The Johns Hopkins University.

The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect. BY BERNARD SCHWARTZ. (New York: Ronald Press. 1957. Pp. 429. $6.50)

The author is Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the New York University School of Law. He is a member of the New York bar, served as special consultant to the second Hoover Commission in 1954, and lately suffered some notoriety as counsel for the Government Operations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. He edits the *Administrative Law Bulletin* of the American Bar Association, has written several books on American, French, and English law, and contributes many articles to the law reviews, notably on administrative law. Still young, Professor Schwartz has given solid evidence of remarkable industry and wide-ranging erudition.

These qualities are reflected in his book on the Supreme Court, for it reveals a broad knowledge of American constitutional law and an understanding of the teaching of the leading cases. The book's title, however, is not properly descriptive of its contents, since it is not really an analysis of the Court as an institution. Far more descriptive is the subtitle, *Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect*, for the book is in fact an analysis of the main tendencies of Supreme Court decisions since 1937. By common agreement the spring of 1937 marks the dividing point between the old constitutional law, which in the early 1930's dealt so harshly with leading New Deal statutes, and the new constitutional law, which at least as regards economic regulation takes into account the possibility that there may be a rational basis for the legislative judgment and assigns great weight to this possibility in the course of judicial review.

The author arranges under convenient and rather conventional chapter headings the main elements of the constitutional law of the past twenty years. In addition to introductory and concluding chapters, he devotes separate chapters to Congress, the President, the administrative agency, the courts, the states, the individual, the war power, and the cold war. He discusses under each heading the pertinent Supreme Court decisions since 1937. Some cases are analyzed more fully than others, of course, but adequate space is devoted to the truly leading cases. Those not entirely familiar with the Court's leading decisions of the past two decades will learn much of a purely factual nature by studying this book. But the author also tries his hand at criticism and analysis, and here I think this book fails to come off.

This book is written in a curiously discursive style, many of its observations and evaluations seeming altogether haphazard. I suspect that this book was written in a very short time. A book is not necessarily bad because it was done quickly; nevertheless, I cannot escape the feeling that Professor Schwartz would have done a much better job if he had pondered more and analyzed with greater care and within some consistent pattern of values.

For it is really difficult to make out just what this lengthy analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions adds up to in his mind. On some pages he seems to welcome the new decisions as a vast improvement over those of the 1920's. On other pages he seems to lament over the drift of the Court's opinions in many crucial areas of our public law. While he seems to believe that the nationalization of power is essential in our kind of world, he sheds far more tears over states' rights than this commitment would seem to admit. He complains of too much delegation of power, in modern government, to administrative bodies and seems to argue that the executive power is growing too great, but he does not even suggest that the legislature can do the job adequately by itself, and nowhere does he seriously analyze the true dimensions of the problem as a whole. In fact, at one point he actually seems to yearn for the great old days of the mid-1930's when the Court declared legislation invalid on the ground that it delegated too much lawmaking power to executive agencies. Such a position, I submit, reflects a shallow understanding of the great problems of modern legislation and government.

The carelessness of a great deal of this writing is reflected in many pages.

To cite only one example, the two-page discussion of the relationship between insurance and the Commerce Clause (pp. 42–43) is full of errors. Thus he begins by asserting that *Paul v. Virginia,* 8 Wall. 168 (1869) held that insurance was not commerce "and was, as such, subject only to state regulation." Of course the Court said no such thing: it did not even purport to rule on the scope of federal control over interstate insurance, because no such issue was before it. The Court did uphold state regulation of interstate insurance, but not on the ground that this was an industry that Congress could not regulate. The author then says that "the immediate and practical effect" of the Court's decision in *United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,* 322 U.S. 533 (1944), was "to withdraw from the states . . . the regulation of insurance and to confer it on the Congress." This is simply not true, and the possibility of its occurring was specifically denied by the author of the majority opinion. Then Professor Schwartz goes on to say that this dire consequence did not come to pass "only" because Congress passed a law repudiating the Court's decision. This is inaccurate on at least two counts. First, the statute did not even purport to repudiate the Court's decision. Second, one of the two cases, subsequent to the *Underwriters* case, that reaffirmed the amplitude of state power over interstate insurance was decided without regard to the McCarran Act, since the events in the case occurred before the Act was adopted.

This book, I am sorry to relate, is replete with dubious bromides. Thus the author repeats the notion that Montesquieu completely misconstrued the nature of the eighteenth-century English constitution (p. 104). But the English constitution of the eighteenth-century was a separation of powers constitution, and this was the standard constitutional theory of the English themselves. He laments the "wholesale delegations" of power to administrative agencies that have taken place since 1937 (p. 106), whereas in fact they have been going on since the birth of the government under the Constitution. Government would not be possible at all without wholesale delegations. He observes that "dissents and five-to-four decisions are not recent inventions on the part of law professors" (p. 343). Who ever said they were? He also assures us that "like the report of Mark Twain's death, the predicted demise of the Supreme Court has been grossly exaggerated" (p. 368). While it is comforting to be thus reassured, I wonder who ever suggested that the Court's demise was a serious possibility.

The author makes much of the currently popular argument that property rights are as important as First Amendment rights and that, while judicial self-restraint is the outstanding feature of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court since 1937, every argument for judicial self-restraint in the economic field is equally persuasive for judicial self-restraint in the civil liberties field. But I think there is a significant difference between the two situations, for after all the Constitution does specifically forbid interference with freedom of speech and freedom of religion, and does specifically guarantee trial by jury, the right to counsel, *et cetera.* There are no equally specific clauses relating to the immunity of property from regulation by law. Furthermore, early in the book he insists rather eloquently that judicial review is the very palladium of our liberties. If judicial review is essential to our liberty, and the Court defers to the legislative will in civil liberties cases in the same full measure as in economic cases, then why get so excited about judicial review? What has the author left for the Court to review?

David Fellman.

University of Wisconsin.

The Presidency in the Courts. By Glendon A. Schubert, Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1957. Pp. xi, 391. $5.50.)

Among the many books on the Presidency this one is unique in two respects. It is, first of all, the only one that examines the whole of the case law on the subject. Its scope is not limited to Supreme Court pronouncements but embraces decisions of the lower federal and the state courts as well. Many questions, it is pointed out, never reach the Supreme Court, while the rulings of lesser courts may become authoritative through age or create patterns the highest tribunal may be loath to disturb. Literally hundreds of cases are covered; and it is not surprising that the volume "has been worked on and worked over for almost a decade." In the second place, this comprehensiveness of coverage has enabled the author to ask, for the first time on the basis of the whole record, whether the courts can and do exercise any effective check upon the Presidency.

The cases are arranged under the four main headings of the President as chief administrator, as chief of state, as commander in chief, and as chief magistrate. Under the first three of these comes consideration of various areas of presidential authority: public personnel, the public domain, foreign relations, the tariff, military necessity, the fifth column, the seizure power, and emergency regulation. Under the fourth heading there are taken up the following among other general questions: legal sources of presidential power; the format of presidential legislation; whether the President must cite the sources of his authority; when his legislation takes effect; judicial notice of executive law; the legal effect of executive interpretation; the presumption that the President acts legally; his personal and official immunity from judicial orders; executive discretion; political questions; statutory mandates and presidential compliance; and the conclusiveness of presidential fact-finding.

The volume is pretty heavy reading in detail; but that is scarcely avoidable and will not prevent its important use for ready reference. On the main question the conclusion is that "the most significant aspect of judicial review of presidential orders is its ineffectiveness." They have been held invalid in only thirty-eight cases, by the Supreme Court in only thirteen, a number that is raised to fourteen by the addition of Taney's opinion on circuit in *Ex parte Merryman.* The author discounts, too, the importance as precedents of several of these adverse decisions. Like the *Milligan Case, United States v. Lee* "appears to be an aberration rather than a norm of our constitutional law." The hot oil and sick chicken cases "remain today isolated and unique"; the former "is something of a judicial sport." It is "altogether likely that the future will find the *Youngstown* decision being confined to its very special facts, something to be reprinted in casebooks for the enlightenment of students of constitutional law but not a precedent which the Court is obliged to take seriously in a moment of national crisis."

This does not disturb the author, who thinks it unreasonable and anti-democratic to expect the courts to settle the great issues of constitutional law that each generation must face anew. Deciding constitutional questions is one mode of law-making; law-making is the formulation of public policy; and public policy belongs to the elected representatives of the people, the President and Congress.

From the reduction of the problem to such logic the reviewer dissents. He finds himself prepared, moreover, to challenge numerous particular statements of the author and suspects that both men would profit by an exploration of the conflicting assumptions upon which these differences seem to rest. These assumptions relate to the nature of value-judgment as well as the way to handle legal materials.

Of the points worthy of special commendation, only one can be mentioned. In Professor Schubert's view, the judiciary has the function in this field of requiring the political departments to comply with the law they themselves have made; and it is to be hoped that he will pursue this line of inquiry further. He hints that in this task the courts might develop standards for the use of presidential power at the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy to which it is often delegated and subdelegated. Perhaps he will explain the consistency of this proposal with the position that executive discretion is both necessary and necessarily delegated.

JAMES HART.

University of Virginia.

The War Potential of Nations. BY KLAUS KNORR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 310. $5.00.)

This is a timely book, much more timely in fact than is suggested by the slightly defensive assertion in the introductory chapter that "actually, the concept can be adapted to the conditions of the nuclear age." If Professor Knorr had used in the title of his book one of the following phrases, "military potential," "defense potential," "security potential," or even "power potential," in place of "war potential," the relevance of his analysis to the present era of protracted high-level mobilization, multiple systems of deterrents, cold war and possible renewed limited war would have been more clearly indicated. He does, on the last page of his book, declare that the concept of war potential may be applied to defense in the "cold war." With very little change of text, he could have explicitly applied it in this fashion throughout the analysis.

Although the United States for most of its history depended on the European balance of power and a degree of naval preparedness to guarantee against defeat in a short war and on its war potential to guarantee victory in a long war, the concept did not receive much analysis. Paradoxically, it is only when the United States can no longer count on a big war's being protracted and can no longer rely to the same extent on its unmobilized potential that it is being pressed near the limits of its mobilization capabilities and so forced to examine in detail the elements of its defense potential.

Professor Knorr's expanded conception of war potential to include willingness to sacrifice, and administrative and political skill in evoking that sacrifice and organizing the mobilization process, is particularly important in the present decade when the stakes of foreign policy seem so high and the motivation for sacrifice is so much less than it would be in all-out war. Although there is discussion of scientific and technological potential for winning what Sir Winston Churchill called "the wizard war" (pp. 277–281), this key element in war potential (or deterrent potential) may possibly have deserved more emphasis. It is largely the dizzy pace of progress in military technology that has kept the cost of mobilization so high. The focus of competition has shifted swiftly from production of A-bombs to production of H-bombs and finally to production of low-yield atomic weapons; it has shifted from the manufacture of weapons to development of systems for their delivery, whether *via* SAC or *via* guided missile; this in turn has led to concern for protection, through a complex and incredibly expensive system of continental air defense, of the bases from which the planes or missiles would rise.

Colonel George A. Lincoln and his associates at the United States Military Academy pioneered in the general area of war potential with their *Economics of National Security*. This straightforward and largely factual analysis is now valuably supplemented by the more theoretical and analytical work of Klaus Knorr. *The War Potential of Nations* draws most of its data from the experience of the major belligerents in World War II. The data, however, are used for illustrative purposes; and because the information for the 1939–45 period is so much more complete, it probably provides better illustrative data than those for more recent periods.

The bifurcation of the study of international relations into "the foundations of national power" on the one hand and "the adjustment of interstate disputes" on the other has always seemed a little unnatural. Together with the growing body of research on national security policy, this new and more analytical interest in power potential may help to bridge the gap and bring a new unity to the study of international relations.

Particularly useful reminders to political scientists and other students of international relations are Professor Knorr's warnings against overemphasis on natural resource deficiencies (and underemphasis on manpower and industrial capacity deficiencies) (p. 154), against an easy assumption that peacetime self-sufficiency at any price is the best preparation for wartime self-sufficiency (pp. 209 ff.), and against using the gross national product (GNP) as an index of war potential (pp. 222 ff.). The almanac and atlas are still indispensable reference works, but they are no substitutes for the analysis in which this valuable monograph is leading the way.

Professor Knorr makes perfectly clear that a particular country's war potential ought to be separately calculated for each type of war situation in which it may find itself. It ought also to be separately calculated for each time-span before a prospective crisis of war or threat of war. What a country can mobilize in two years differs greatly from what it could mobilize if its leaders could be sure the crisis was five years away. Thus there are degrees of potentiality. Doubtless the assertion that "leaders of nations can act to increase this potential" (p. 305) really means that what might otherwise be possible in a longer period can by "increasing potential" become possible in a shorter period. In the era of possible two-way thermonuclear war and spasmodic violence on the Asian frontiers of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds, the period may be very short indeed.

William T. R. Fox.

Columbia University.

Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. (Princeton: Center of International Studies. 1956. Pp. 101.)

The aim of this study, as the authors state it in the Introduction, is to examine in the context of international politics "several general hypotheses regarding the relations between human behavior and other states of human affairs, on the one hand, and the environment, or milieu, in which these occur." The purpose of this examination is to evaluate the hypotheses as analytical tools for calculating the capabilities of states and explaining and predicting state actions and reactions. In simpler terms, the authors protest that, although there is general agreement that foreign policies and military strategies, among other things, are connected with their setting or environment, very little systematic work has been done in political science to establish the character and mechanisms of this connection.

After a series of carefully worked out definitions, which start with international politics and end with the concept of relationship, the authors turn to five general hypotheses, the examination of which constitutes the heart of the study.

Environmental determination, which assumes man to be the passive instrument of the active and decisive milieu, they regard as having properly been relegated to the discard in the social sciences, even though deterministic rhetoric often lingers on when it is no longer seriously meant. They suggest, however, that a baby may have been thrown out with the bath, since in some instances—the effect of climate is particularly cited—there does appear to be a certain range of human behavior that is to be explained in deterministic terms. The second category, mild environmentalism, embraces a variety of less specific and precise relationships in which the environment continues to be active but operates rather as an influence than as a strictly determining factor. The essential criticism that Mr. and Mrs. Sprout make of this position is that those who speak of the influence of the environment rarely indicate how it works to affect the decisions of statesmen or the relations of states. Environmental possibilism, which wins a larger measure of favor, they present as a reversal of the deterministic doctrine. Where the latter presents the milieu as the controlling element, which perhaps even appears as a teleological Nature setting tasks for man, possibilism merely presents the opportunities and limitations that are contained in the milieu. The initiative and the choice remain with man; the environment sets the stage within which he must act. The authors rightly point out that collections of physical data by themselves have no intrinsic political meaning and acquire political relevance only when it is known who wants what and how he proposes to get it. The fourth hypothesis presented is probabilism, defined as "explanation or prediction, by means of a generalized model, of the average, or typical, person's reaction to a given milieu." Although this system of predicting actions and reactions has obvious shortcomings, Mr. and Mrs. Sprout suggest that where even the identity of foreign decision-makers is unknown, the best that can be done is to reason from general assumptions as to their probable behavior in their physical and social environment. The last hypothesis with which the authors deal is one that they call cognitive behaviorism and identify as the hypothesis that the milieu to which people react is the one that they perceive and interpret in the light of their previous knowledge. At the extreme, the "real world" vanishes and what is left is the environment as it is regarded by the actor or decision-maker; but an earlier chapter has already demonstrated that the environment not infrequently imposes itself on man quite apart from his perception of it.

The several chapters commented on and the concluding chapter, in which the authors seek to establish a more integrated frame of reference for their theme, have all been meticulously and systematically worked out and the positions taken are carefully guarded and judicious. When this has been said, however, this reviewer finds himself wondering whether the effort that has been expended is justified in terms of hypotheses that can actually be turned to significant use in the analysis of international politics. On at least one occasion, it seemed to him that the approach under discussion produced a result so self-evident as to verge on being silly. After listing a number of positions taken by American policy-makers in the years following the Revolution, the authors comment that "Historical evidence confirms the hypothesis that all these inter-related positions were derived from contemporary conditions as perceived and interpreted by the men who took and implemented foreign-policy decisions in the name of the United States." In heaven's name, what else could they derive from?

RUPERT EMERSON.

Harvard University.

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By BERNARD C. COHEN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 294. $6.00.)

John Foster Dulles felt that he had good reason to be proud of the negotiations he directed that resulted in the Japanese Peace Treaty, and there were many others who agreed with him. Whether or not all political scientists share this estimate, they should all be grateful that Mr. Dulles feels the way he does because it has obviously made it easier for Bernard Cohen to accomplish what few have attempted and even fewer have carried off with success: an intensive case study of a significant episode in the making of contemporary United States foreign policy. Everything was done to help Mr. Cohen, as well as his three colleagues (Frederick S. Dunn, Percy E. Corbett, and Burton M. Sapin) in the Princeton Center of International Studies, to obtain as much relevant information as possible about this experience.

Mr. Cohen recognizes that not every slice of history is a case study. A good case study is history seen through an experienced theoretical eye that is trying to build a body of general observations based on the systematic comparison of a number of comparable cases. One of the most interesting parts of the volume is Mr. Cohen's challenging, though all too brief, prescription for a useful methodological approach. The main points he makes are that: the objective should be "the systematic comparison of the factors and the relationships comprising the over-all political processes covering a wide range of political issues arising in a variety of different circumstances"; the "comparisons should be specific, however, which means that the classifications employed in the analysis of different issues should be standardized and detailed"; " . . . in the present state of knowledge about foreign policy-making the most useful technique is to examine all the major elements that might help to shape policy . . . so [that] the chances of missing important relationships are minimized"; the major factors he used as the basis of his analysis were the general "climate of opinion," "articulate private citizens and political interest groups," "the media of mass communication," "specific agents and agencies in the Executive Branch," and "specific committees of the Congress, informal political groupings in the Congress, and the two Houses themselves."

The organization of the book follows this list of factors rather closely. A brief chronological survey of the experience (Chapter 2) is followed by analyses of the broad climate of opinion (Chapter 3), the impact of articulate political interest groups (Chapters 4 and 5), coverage in the press (Chapter 6), the activities of the chief executive agent, Mr. Dulles (Chapter 7), the role of the Senate (Chapters 8 and 9), the interaction between public opinion and governmental behavior (Chapter 10), bipartisanship and executive-legislative relations (Chapter 11), and the negotiation of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention (Chapter 12). The gist of the story the author tells can be summed up as follows. Public and Congressional interest and involvement in this matter were shallow. The "forceful personality [of Mr. Dulles] with an extraordinary political sensitivity made the most of these circumstances in a skillful exercise of policy-making initiative. The result was the Japanese Peace Settlement: rapidly devised, widely admired, briefly debated, and scarcely criticized."

The strong points of the study are that it makes a solid contribution to the development of a useful analytical approach and that it engages in some very interesting and original observations regarding certain aspects of the experience, especially the activities of specific interest groups, the press coverage, the role of Mr. Dulles, and the deliberations of the Senate.

There are also certain limitations, many of which the author himself is frank to recognize. One is the nature of the particular case selected for this painstaking analysis, a case that is not very characteristic of the main stream of foreign affairs, especially because Mr. Dulles bypassed the normal Department of State channels—with, it should be added, the consent and support of Secretary of State Dean Acheson—and the legislative process centered on the treaty device, involving neither authorization nor appropriation legislation. Furthermore, although the book is entitled *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* . . . , it omits large chunks of the process, including the negotiations with other governments. Presumably these aspects were to be dealt with in other studies by the author's colleagues. Finally, the analysis the book does contain is limited by a shortcoming that hampers all works of this kind: the inadequacy of the basic data available regarding who did what, both inside and outside the government, why they did it, and how.

H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR.

The Brookings Institution.

The United Nations and Dependent Peoples. BY EMIL J. SADY. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1956. Pp. viii, 205. $1.50.)

The Trusteeship System of the United Nations. BY CHARMIAN EDWARDS TOUSSAINT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1957. Pp. xiv, 288. $7.50.)

Since the appearance of an international crisis over some question of colonialism has become a virtually habitual accompaniment of the annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, it is opportune to have two carefully prepared studies on the United Nations and the affairs of dependent areas come so closely together.

These volumes are complementary to a considerable extent. Mrs. Toussaint's book is a meticulous juridical study, emphasizing points of international law and Charter interpretation. It contains a painstaking study of the formulation of the Charter provisions relating to Trusteeship and a thoughtful analysis of their application in practice. The author is more concerned with the Trusteeship system than with the arrangements regarding non-self-governing territories. An internship at the United Nations gave her an opportunity to gain familiarity with the problems as seen from inside the world organization. Mr. Sady's volume deals with the grist and moil of day-to-day politics concerning dependent areas. It breathes the air of political realism and addresses itself to the on-going problems of the United Nations' handling of Trusteeship and non-self-governing territories' affairs. Like the other monographs on the United Nations prepared under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, this brief volume goes to the heart of the substantive issues that have arisen before the United Nations during its first eleven years. In making this study, the author draws upon a wide range of experience in the United States government and in matters relating to political development in Puerto Rico and Alaska.

Dr. Toussaint believes that by bringing problems of colonial rivalry within the United Nations a contribution has been made to the maintenance of international peace and security. Mr. Sady's case-by-case examination of the record of the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee, and the General Assembly reveals, on the other hand, that some members of the world organization have been so preoccupied with raising emotional temperatures and engaging in bloc politics over questions of dependent areas that the effectiveness of the United Nations has at times been threatened and the welfare of the dependent peoples themselves obscured. Mr. Sady does not question that the United Nations has been instrumental in furthering changes within the non-self-governing and Trusteeship territories. But he insists that there is no way of appraising this with precision. And he argues that a larger measure of credit should be given to the efforts of local leaders in the territories themselves and to the voluntary policies of the administering governments than many Members of the United Nations have been willing to concede within the halls of the world body. Taken as a whole, he regards the record of the United Nations under Chapter XI of the Charter as more one of conflict than of accomplishment on behalf of the dependent peoples. And time and again, he feels, national and regional interests have overshadowed the constructive role which the agencies of the United Nations were intended to play.

Both volumes consider, from quite different points of view, the policies of the United States on affairs of dependent areas. Dr. Toussaint is critical of the United States for submitting the agreement for the Pacific Islands before the treaty of peace had been concluded with Japan. Mr. Sady is apprehensive, on the other hand, whether Washington may be moving fast enough in evolving a policy for the next stages of the political growth of these islands. Fearing that this country could be caught as the last to terminate a Trusteeship status, he urges that serious attention be given to devising a suitable commonwealth status for these islands.

The powers of the United Nations to fulfill the objectives of the Trusteeship system are not found seriously wanting by either author. But Mr. Sady does vouch that the General Assembly and its Fourth Committee have shown themselves to be defective instruments in practice and so dominated by political motivations as to lose sight of the larger objectives. The Trusteeship Council, on the other hand, he finds to have become so influenced by the states administering the Trusteeships as to have fallen short in the exercise of its supervisory functions. He constructively suggests a return to the older practice, used by the League of Nations, of establishing committees of non-governmental specialists to inspect the trust territories and to explore bases of reconciliation and accommodation where disputes existed or might arise in the future. He believes that such specialists would be better judges of where progress was being made and, by being under less pressure of national representation, would be able to exercise mediatorial and constructive roles. Certainly the author is correct in saying that all Members of the United Nations need to recognize what the administering states have bound themselves to acknowledge: that the interests of the dependent peoples themselves should be paramount in the handling of all questions of this nature in the organs and committees of the United Nations.

The two studies are a welcome addition to the literature of international relations. It is to be regretted only that the Brookings volume does not contain, for the benefit of students and practitioners, a bibliography to match the excellent one at the end of Mrs. Toussaint's book.

NORMAN J. PADELFORD.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan. BY HENRY M. PELLING. (New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 174, $3.50.)

At no time has it been more important for Americans to learn how others view us and our policies. We have been thrust forward as the most powerful nation of the democratic West. If we are to explain ourselves to the world, it is essential to see how our actions are looked upon abroad. Our allies will consider our conduct from a framework of values somewhat different from our own, and our enemies from a point of view almost totally different from ours. Peoples in other lands, even in countries which share the democratic tradition, will judge events in terms of their own geographical, historical, and cultural background and will frequently come to different conclusions on the basis of the same facts.

Mr. Pelling, in his *America and the British Left,* has sought to show how Radicals, Liberals, Labour, and others on the Left have looked upon the American record from the time of the Civil War until the present. He shows how the fund of Radical goodwill for America and its institutions, which made such a contrast with the prejudices of the "educated" classes in the middle of the nineteenth century, was gradually dissipated in the succeeding decades, until by the middle of the twentieth century the bulk of the so-called "anti-American" feeling was to be found among the adherents of the Left in British politics. The radicals of other countries, he observes, to some extent at least came under the same spell of enthusiasm for America and went through the same stages of disillusionment.

Many causes, as the author suggests, enter into any explanation of the change in view of the British Left. Among them are the rise of large-scale industry, the increasing participation of the United States in world politics, the increasing restrictions placed upon immigration, and the growth of Socialist influences among the Radicals and in the Labour movement, which gave rise to a suspicion of any country whose economy was founded on capitalist premises.

The author points out, of course, that leaders on the Left in Britain became more sympathetic to American policy during President Truman's term of office, especially after the launching of the Marshall Plan, but reverted to an antagonistic view as a result of McCarthyism. The book apparently went to press prior to the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, at which time many of the Left applauded Eisenhower's intervention.

The author has given us within a short compass—and he does not intend to do more—a useful essay on the changes of attitude of the British Left with respect to America over the past century. Without detracting from its essential value, one may suggest that the author could have deepened his background here and there. He somewhat over-simplifies history when he says that it was "with labour and radical votes that Roosevelt secured his triumphant re-election in November 1936." Surely the farmers played a part, and the many unemployed in the middle class, not to speak of the role of the big city machines of the Democratic Party, and the "solid South" whose leaders prize their seniority in Congress.

It was not long ago that a review appeared in the *Times Literary Supplement* of London in which the writer pointed out that Labor in the United States had achieved an extraordinary degree of maturity and sophistication. The author held that this was expressed not only in the ability of American Labor to make large economic gains, but also in its understanding of political movements, such as the Communist, where it was quick to grasp its reactionary nature. Whether or not Mr. Pelling would accept this view, to take account of such considerations would enrich his presentation of the outlook of American Labor, *vis-à-vis* Labor abroad.

Mr. Pelling has written a scholarly and disinterested work, which will enable Labor and its supporters on both sides of the Atlantic better to understand each other. Although the reviewer does not believe that Laski's *American Presidency* can be described as a *great* book, there are few judgments with which he can take issue in this writing. It is to be hoped that Mr. Pelling will favor us in the future with a volume on *Britain and the American Left.*

BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT.

University of Minnesota.

Le Mouvement Poujade. BY STANLEY HOFFMAN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MICHEL DES ACCORDS, SERGE HURTIG, JEAN DU ROSTU, JEAN-MICHEL ROYER. (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin. 1956. Pp. xxvi, 417.)

This work of Professor Stanley Hoffman and his associates represents without any doubt one of the best publications in what already is a rather impressive series of research monographs published under the auspices of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques of the University of Paris. It is a solid, scholarly analysis of the growth of the Poujadist movement from what was originally a professional organization for the "defense" of the taxpayers in general, and the artisans and the merchants in particular, to a political movement that won about 2,500,000 votes in the elections of January 2, 1956, and 52 seats in the National Assembly. It gives a detailed account of the internal organization of the movement, its repeated efforts to shed its professional character and become political, its successive drives to penetrate the various social classes and regions of France—the artisans and the merchants, the farmers, the intellectuals, and the workers—the village, the small town, the larger urban centers—and, ultimately, the desperate effort to "conquer" Paris itself.

Each stage corresponding to an increased politicization of the movement carried with it, according to the author, the inescapable dialectic of its demise. In fact, in a by-election held in the first sector of Paris in January 1957, Poujade received less than seven per cent of the total vote. In no by-election has the Movement fared any better, and the recent direct appeal of the Poujadist Congress to General de Gaulle to do away with "the system" and to prosecute the "guilty" before "the High Court" may well be an indication that Poujade is losing rapidly the popularity he seemed to have two years ago.

Professor Hoffman's book consists of three parts. In the first, on the origins of the Movement, he discusses rather sketchily the economic and fiscal reasons for the appearance of the UDCA (Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans); the second, on the "internal life" of the Movement is a long and meticulously documented analysis of its development, its organization, its ideology, and the character of its leader; the third is a comprehensive study of the relationship between the Movement and the various professional organizations and political parties. In each case, the source materials on which the author bases his observation and conclusions are reproduced with a painstaking care for detail and chronology. Indeed, if there were any criticism at all to be made, it would be that the author has done more in this direction than his analysis and interpretation required and that many of his more important insights are often lost from sight because of the accumulation of much detail that could have easily been relegated to an appendix.

Professor Hoffman's observations are worth our attention. First, there is no similarity between the extreme right wing movements of the 30's—the PSF and the PPF—and Poujadism; secondly, there is no evidence to associate Poujadism with the "traditional right" or with the RPF; thirdly, the electoral *clientèle* of the Movement is, generally speaking, inversely proportionate to the industrial development of the electoral districts (the Departments): the more backward the Department the stronger the Movement; finally, Poujadism has been unable to gain a foothold among the workers and has not been much more successful among the farmers. Being primarily a movement of protest, it has been spearheaded by the merchants and the artisans of the provinces, by the "little man," for whom, in accordance with the canons of Alain's radicalism, the Republic has been equated with an anti-state, anti-Parliament, anti-bureaucracy, anti-Party posture tempered only by total individualism and nationalism. It is the industrial development of the country that has triggered the movement of protest represented by Poujadism. By endangering the most antiquated sectors of the national economy, it has provoked their antagonism against the Republic. Thus Poujadism is the genuine revolt of the "radicals." It reflects the temporary alienation from the Republic of those groups that constituted its staunchest supporters. It has swelled temporarily the movement of protest against the Republic—but by its very nature it is bound to be short-lived. Thus, for the author, Poujadism is a symptom of progress and economic development. It is a reflection of the last agony of the social classes in France whose resistance to industrialization is doomed to failure.

Such a conclusion has, of course, the double merit of optimism. The diagnosis of the sickness is clear and the inevitable burial is something to cheer us all. But it would be extremely misleading to assume that the author is not aware that there are possibilities other than the solemn burial ceremony of the Movement. The political system in France is so much exposed to virulent interest groups, so much at the mercy of what David Riesman calls the "veto groups," that the politicization of a professional movement represented by Poujadism constitutes a powerful force in favor of the preservation of the antiquated structures. In a country where economic progress and industrialization depend so much upon the government, such a political movement cannot but have serious repercussions upon the decision-making centers of government—the National Assembly and the Cabinet. Would it not be an equally tenable hypothesis to suggest that the Poujadist movement may well be one of the most spectacular cases of the politicization of interest groups—a politicization of interest which, if followed by other interests even in less spectacular terms (and there are indications that this may be the case), will lead to a situation where the various veto groups will stalemate each other and thus aggravate the *immobilisme* at the higher levels of the political process?

Roy C. Macridis.

Washington University (*St. Louis*).

Parliament in India. By W. H. Morris-Jones. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 1957. Pp. xii, 417. $8.50)

The core of Mr. Morris-Jones's book on the Indian Parliament consists of a detailed and comprehensive description of the structural features of the contemporary institution. The first of two introductory chapters is devoted to a discussion of the nature of Indian politics; the second, to a brief history of parliamentary institutions in India, the provisions for Parliament under the present constitution, and the election of members in 1951–52. For those who are not specialists in the field of Indian politics, these chapters provide essential background. In "The Nature of Indian Politics" the author considers the problems created by regional, religious, caste, and other differences in the population, touches upon the important, perhaps crucial, question of attitudes towards authority, and discusses the significance of the land-gift movement as a kind of political activity independent of and, it may be, ultimately opposed to parliamentary government. The development of parliamentary institutions in India belongs of course to the story of British impact, and it is part of Morris-Jones's argument that the present strength of the Indian Parliament is in a measure due to the foundations laid down in the British period.

The study is focussed on the Parliament of 1952–57, which has now passed into history. As a result, the very interesting material, presented in tabular form, on the membership of the two Houses is already out of date. Nevertheless, the data, under such headings as age, education, previous legislative and local government experience, and occupation of the members, are of considerable value, particularly for comparative purposes, and it seems likely that the overall picture presented by the newly elected legislators is not markedly different. Similarly, other generalizations made on the basis of this material no doubt still hold true today.

An excellent section of the work sets forth the relations between the parliamentary parties and the political party organizations. Inevitably, greater attention is paid to the Congress than to other parties, but the author discerns a "general trend": "for the parties, for political life as a whole, Parliament has become the focus of attention" (p. 185). We are given also a full description of the organization of the Congress Party in Parliament and, while there is less to observe with regard to the opposition parties, these too are covered. Matters of procedure and privilege, officers and committees are discussed at length; approximately one-third of the book is devoted to topics under these general headings. Morris-Jones makes clear at various points that, as might be expected, there is considerable correspondence between British and Indian systems with, at the same time, some notable differences: for example, the Ministers, in the Indian Parliament, are privileged under the Constitution to speak in and participate in the proceedings of either House; and "in the nature of the committees established as well as in the scope and tone of their work the system goes beyond that of Britain and in some respects comes near to that of the Continent" (p. 153).

It should be pointed out that, although there is no attempt to include in this work a systematic study of the State Legislative Assemblies, there is considerable material on legislative institutions at this level. There is a degree, apparently increasing, of uniformity of procedure and organization between the Central Parliament and the State Assemblies, but in many other respects the overall situation is very different. While the author takes an optimistic view of the future, he admits that "a survey of parliamentary institutions which looked at the States alone would at the moment present a less happy picture than the one given here" (p. 332).

As the last sentence indicates, the Indian Parliament, in Morris-Jones's opinion, does sufficiently meet the tests. In a final summing up he discuss the achievements of Parliament in terms of what he defines as the central functions of any parliament. His conclusions with regard to one of these are of special interest in view of the fact that they are at variance with what is often said to be the case. The question at issue is the extent to which Parliament controls the government. "It is an error . . . ," he writes, "to imagine that the Government of India is uncontrolled. From two directions—the party and the parliamentary committees—come criticisms and suggestions which cannot too easily be brushed aside; and there is every indication that both these channels of control are being steadily improved" (pp. 324–25). Morris-Jones brings out, in his valuable account of the parliamentary committees, the fact that these serve as watchdogs; and while he remarks of the Public Accounts Committee that "it is easier to give this record of the work done than to assess its importance and value" (p. 294), he also states that "it is the opinion of the committee and of officials alike that the administration does pay attention to recommendations" (p. 295). The absence of an effective opposition is of course important in the whole question of parliamentary control, and in this connection the author's remarks on the role of the committees are of great interest. He writes, after considering the work of the Estimates Committee: "To a very real extent this type of committee . . . achieves a special political significance as a substitute for a real Opposition. Indeed, it may well be that in an underdeveloped country—in which there is a wide measure of agreement not only on goals but also on methods—this kind of arrangement may be more suitable. In the immediate future, at any rate, it is if not the only source of constructive opposition at least a most important component of such an opposition" (pp. 307–08).

Students of Indian politics and of comparative political institutions will find this book a welcome addition to the literature.

DOROTHY M. SPENCER.

University of Pennsylvania.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. BY BORIS MEISSNER. EDITED BY JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. iv, 276. $5.00.)

An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality. BY GERHART NIEMEYER WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. 113. $2.75.)

Both volumes under review are part of the publication series of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* is perhaps narrower in scope than the title suggests; conversely *An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality* is broader in range of subject-matter.

The former study is a translation of the most recent work of Boris Meissner, the remarkably well-informed young German scholar and diplomat. It is, in substance, a systematic and thorough analysis of the changes in Party organization and personnel since the Nineteenth Congress in the fall of 1952. Largely documentary in nature, the volume includes a comparison, article by article, of the new (1952) and the old (1939) Party statutes; a listing of all members of the Central Committees of the CPSU and the Union Republics' parties, and changes in their compositions; and the essence of Stalin's last opus, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*

Since Dr. Meissner's paper covered only the aftermath of the Nineteenth Congress, Dr. Reshetar has added a chapter on the Twentieth Party Congress of January 1956 and its effects on Party structure and ideology. Both parts are closely reasoned and based on thorough research. They strive for no sensational re-interpretations and stick to the available evidence. If the result is something short of novel, it is none the less a most useful compendium. Most regrettable perhaps—and typical of the handicaps under which Soviet studies labor—is the fact that the text of the Khrushchev speech "denouncing Stalin" did not become available in time for inclusion among the documents or even for consideration in the analysis of the Twentieth Congress.

One is tempted to suggest that the volume was produced at a time when it was still too early to gauge the full impact of the Congress on the temper and atmospherics of Soviet life, particularly as regards the intelligentsia. In retrospect it appears to have been—willy-nilly—far more significant a watershed than was obvious when the study was produced.

One of Dr. Meissner's most controversial conclusions is that "despite the emphasis on the predominance of the Party, the state has gained rather than lost in importance under Stalin's successors"—a thesis that is surely contradicted by the role of the Khrushchev machine, the perfunctory part played by the heads of state and cabinet, and the dismantling of part of the central state (but not Party) apparatus. He is unquestionably on safe ground, however, in insisting that the "collective leadership" was a passing phase, with "forces at work to strengthen the monocratic element."

Dr. Reshetar soundly shows the oft-neglected elements of continuity between the eras of Stalin and of his successors. As he soberly traces the gyrations of the post-Stalin period (rather unfortunately, he considers Malenkov's resignation to have been prompted by the inclusion of West Germany in NATO), the reader realizes with what speed recent events have moved, for already a different constellation occupies the Soviet apex. His conjecture that "Communist ideology has become a mere adjunct of engineering and technology" seems at least premature.

Such hypotheses are exceptional. The body of the volume is consistently matter-of-fact, and in this it contrasts sharply with the discursive and provocative essay by Dr. Niemeyer. The latter seems suspended in a cloudland in which all brands and forms of Communism are merged into one undistinguishable and unpalatable amalgam, which is "tested" (by a somewhat intuitive method) and found wanting in what the author calls "rationality." The unfortunate thing is that the author shifts his ground several times when it comes to defining "rationality," and as a result what might have been a most helpful line of inquiry becomes a somewhat embittered exercise intended to demonstrate that one can never trust the Communists. At one point, the Communists are shown to be irrational because they are not "reasonable" men; at another, Dr. Niemeyer acknowledges that "rationality is also used as a term of approval"; further, he recognizes "rationality" to be a "subjective" concept; and finally, he considers "irrational" a person whose behavior "does not make sense." This reader at least fails to go along with the facile and, it would seem, misleading description of the Communist world as unpredictably "mad." There is an internal logic and consistency in Soviet actions that Dr. Niemeyer does not acknowledge, largely because he writes off what appears to be "rational" as mere "rationalizations."

The purpose of the study would seem to be a plea for "non-communication" with the Soviet Union, since it could not be expected to act or react "rationally" to any message or abide by any agreement. Yet the essay does not give full cognizance to the one overriding element of "irrationality"—the impact of a Stalin or Khrushchev with their personal unpredictability. Perhaps the unknown of the Soviet equation lies in the interplay between their own parts and the more "rational" long-range trends. Unfortunately, this often very thoughtful and erudite essay fails to come to grips with this issue.

ALEXANDER DALLIN.

Columbia University.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Dark Missouri. BY HENRY C. HART. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1957. Pp. xvii, 260. $6.00.)

However judicious a reviewer tries to appear, he usually winds up taking sides—he always does, indeed, if he earns his fee; for he has studied the book he is writing about and such readers as he may attract rightly expect him to tell them what he has learned about it. Let me come, therefore, directly to the point of this review: in my opinion, Henry Hart has written a first-class book.

What is good about it? Well, nearly everything. First, it covers its subject well. Indeed it more than covers its subject; for Mr. Hart, having learned well the lesson of the importance of environment for government administration (probably from John Gaus as student, as I did as friend) devotes seventy-six pages—almost exactly a third of the substance of the book—to setting. They are pages well spent, too. Until I had read the whole of the book, I thought he had spent too much time on background; but on reflection I revised this judgment, for the first third provides a necessary foundation for the superstructure of the remaining two-thirds.

From Chapter V on, the author recounts in detail the efforts to harness the Missouri—first the Pick Plan, then the Sloan Plan, then the Pick-Sloan Plan (the noun has less validity when the adjective is hyphenated), then finally (for this section) the results of the marriage—the "legitimate offspring," as Mr. Hart puts it. This is good reading, but it is in no wise reassuring reading, for it relates a sobering story of frustration and futility. I wish the author had found the facts to be otherwise, but I am indebted to him nevertheless for his very effective shedding of light on "the dark Missouri." The four chapters on Pick, Sloan, Pick-Sloan, and progeny are followed by the introduction of a newcomer with a water-bucket in the person of the Department of Agriculture with its small watershed. The concluding chapter offers a knowing analysis of the problems of government in the river basin and proposes an ingenious arrangement for the administration of the water resources of the Missouri Basin.

The book is good, then, in content, which is where any book ought to begin being good. Its second strong point results from the author's native equipment, which includes ability to write, an instinct for the right word or phrase, a willingness to adopt a philosophical tone and even to editorialize a bit here and there, and unfailing good humor. Mr. Hart's prose does not move like the wagon through the sandy streets of frontier Omaha mentioned on page 2, but on the contrary goes along at a good clip. The writing is further enlivened by a number of illustrations (both maps and photographs), which are employed quite effectively.

This would not be a REVIEW review without a couple of "buts." I do not mean to disqualify my piece for publication: there are two or three buts, none of which, if I may judge from recent personal experience, is to be laid at the door of the author. There are the usual half-dozen typographical errors which the publisher should have caught, but no more than are par for the watercourse. There is some trick type-setting (in the form of variable margins) from p. 144 to p. 150 that I was not able to fathom, though I dare say there was some reason for what strikes me as an oddity. The lack of a bibliography is more than offset, to my way of thinking, by the careful and detailed system of footnoting employed.

But to get back into the main channel, which Mr. Hart has made readily navigable. *The Dark Missouri* is a good book about an important subject. We need a new *Rivers of America* series, with more emphasis on thoughtful analysis this time and less on romance. It may be that such a series is in fact in the making, what with Leuchtenburg's study and now Hart's. In any case, Henry Hart (my commission does not cover the other book) has set a high standard for the rest of us to shoot at.—ROSCOE C. MARTIN, *Syracuse University.*

Fundamental Liberties of a Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly. BY MILTON R. KONVITZ. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 420. $5.00.)

Fundamental Liberties of a Free People is devoted to a critical analysis of the meaning of "the forty-five words that comprise the first amendment." Professor Konvitz insists that the book does not pretend to an exhaustive scholarship, but the hundreds of careful notes tucked away at the end of the book belie the author's too modest claim.

His value system is established in the following sentence from the opening paragraph of the Preface: "Taken together the guaranties of the First Amendment freedoms of religion, speech, press and assembly and the guaranty of the writ of habeas corpus are the bedrock of American Freedom."

All the topics which civil libertarians cherish are reviewed: Part I, Freedom of Religion; Part II, Freedom of Speech, Press, and Assembly, including the Freedom Not to Speak, The Freedom Not to Listen, and The Right to Be Let Alone; and Part III, The Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly: The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine. While the material is not new, the author's capacity for realistic appraisal and penetrating analysis justify the continued consideration of the problems posed. In Chapter Nine, on the principle of separation of church and state, he says:

> . . . while the principle of separation of church and state tends to declare itself as an absolute, it is in fact limited by the police power and other constitutional powers (e.g., the war power), and by practices that have become widely accepted as national symbols or tradition, as well as by practices that appear to be beyond effective legal challenge.

He follows this with an analysis of the three leading points of view on Separation of Church and State: A) The Principle Rejected, B) The Principle as Absolute, C) The Principle as a Rule of Reason or Cooperative Separation. In the last section of this chapter (Cooperative Separation), he presents the mass of inconsistencies and absurdities which for historical reasons have become "The Sunday Rest Laws."

Perhaps Professor Konvitz's most trenchant prose is saved for the chapter entitled "The Freedom Not to Speak," in which he reconsiders the Flag Salute cases and Justice Frankfurter's doctrine of "judicial restraint" and "reasonable legislators." Mr. Konvitz says about this:

> If Frankfurter's view were sustained, the Bill of Rights would be greatly emasculated in the interests of the broad legislative principle of majority rule; for it is practically impossible to prove the negative proposition that the legislators could *not* in reason have enacted a specific law, that the statute is *not at all* justified in reason; for a show of some "reason" on behalf of a statute is almost always possible. The doctrine of presumptive constitutionality could become in fact legislative absolutism.

He concludes his argument with the remark: "In his dissenting opinion (Barnette Case) Justice Frankfurter counselled *judicial humility*. But humility practiced by judges on the wrong occasion may be judicial abdication."

Mr. Konvitz returns to a critique of the Frankfurter doctrine of judicial moderation in an elaborate analysis of the involved reasoning of the Dennis Case, which is considered in "Doctrine Reduced to a Phrase." He says:

> Justice Frankfurter, as we have seen, makes a distinction between wisdom and constitutionality—an act of Congress may be unwise and yet constitutional. I feel sure that no matter how many times Frankfurter may repeat this proposition, American citizens will tend to think that what is constitutional is wise and that what is wise is constitutional. And this feeling cannot and ought not to be brushed aside as one based on ignorance or foolishness; for a constitution ought to be an expression of the wisest political thought of the people.

Still another chapter, "The Right to Be Let Alone," includes a section on Group Libel Laws. While the reviewer agrees with Professor Konvitz that the arguments against the group libel laws are stronger than those in favor of them, the chapter would make a stronger impression if the arguments in support were spelled out.—RUTH G. WEINTRAUB, *Hunter College of the City of New York.*

Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment. BY SIDNEY HOOK. (New York: Criterion Books. 1957. Pp. 160. $3.00.)

Since Professor Hook directs his shafts primarily at Dean Erwin N. Griswold's widely distributed and influential *The Fifth Amendment Today* (Cambridge, 1955), this review must necessarily be concerned with both books. Hook's materials were first published in a series of articles in *The New Leader;* this second round includes a rebuttal to Grisold's rejoinder, also published in *The New Leader.*

Viewed narrowly, the differences between them go to a relatively small point. What use may properly be made outside the courtroom, especially in determining professional qualifications, of the fact that a witness has refused on the grounds of self-incrimination to tell a Congressional investigating committee about alleged Communist political activities? Griswold argues that we should go slow in imposing extra-legal sanctions: the witness may not be a Communist; he has exercised a constitutional privilege intended to protect the innocent as well as the guilty; if its exercise is construed as a confession of guilt, its usefulness becomes seriously restricted. Apparently Griswold's position is that a university, for example, may legitimately require a professor who has claimed the privilege to account for his conduct—but with the presumption that he is not a Communist. He should not be dismissed merely because he has invoked the Fifth Amendment. Hook, while conceding that such a witness may not be a Communist and agreeing that he should not be dismissed automatically, argues that the logical inference is that the witness is probably a Communist and that he should be dismissed if he can not overcome this presumption. In fact, Hook seems in some passages to argue that the mere invocation of the Fifth Amendment is incompatible with the professional obligations of teachers and other public servants and justifies dismissal even without evidence of Communist activity.

Viewed within a wider context, the differences go considerably beyond an argument whether such witnesses are probably, or only possibly, Communists. Griswold argues that the self-incrimination clause reflects a basic constitutional principle that the government can not use coercive powers to force an accused to contribute to his own conviction. Disturbed by the Congressional assumption of the powers to prosecute and persecute, he emphasizes the legislative context in which the privilege has been claimed. Congressmen "indict" men and force them to defend themselves against charges of wrong-doing. Witnesses—in effect, defendants—often do not know in advance the precise nature of the charges and have no opportunity to prepare their own defense; they have no right to cross-examine their accusers; there is no independent judge to insure fair treatment; there are no rules of evidence. Under these circumstances, although an innocent witness might be able to avoid conviction in subsequent judicial proceedings, he may properly invoke the privilege because of the fear that, without a full opportunity to explain his conduct, his answers may lead to prosecution. Thus Griswold holds that the privilege, properly understood, plays a valuable role in safeguarding civil liberties.

Hook attacks these several positions. He doubts the usefulness of the privilege. He emphasizes that guiltless men normally rush to proclaim their innocence. Without proposing that witnesses be denied the right to invoke the privilege, he would restrict its coverage to protection against inference of guilt in a court of law. He is critical of "ritualistic" liberals who sometimes make heroes of persons who claim the Fifth Amendment, whereas most such witnesses are conspiratorial Communists who use it to deny Congress information. Agreeing that some criticism of Congressional investigations of subversion is merited, he nevertheless argues that, on the whole, Congressmen have done a good job and have not abused their authority. He stresses the serious threat to civil liberties presented by the Communists and apparently thinks that this necessitates the use of Congressional forums for exposure and public information.

Dean Griswold has raised an important problem: namely, the dangers inherent in substituting Congressional for criminal proceedings to determine guilt; but his concentration on the possible innocence of those who claim the privilege is the weakest link in his argument. As presently construed, the privilege in non-criminal cases extends only to answers that may lead to incrimination. Hence, it is difficult to gainsay Hook's argument that an inference of *probable* guilt is the logical conclusion. But to agree with Hook on the narrow point does not answer Griswold's broader proposition that the use of Congressional investigations to charge and try persons for criminal or unethical conduct raises serious questions.

However, it is doubtful whether the privilege against self-incrimination, whatever the Supreme Court may decide, can be made into a major safeguard for Congressional "witness-defendants." Of the few provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments that extend to such witnesses, it is, perhaps, the one that gives them the least protection and also most interferes with legitimate investigations. If recent history is our guide, this privilege has served best those Congressmen who are interested in prosecution rather than investigation. It may be that the privilege against self-incrimination, originally restricted to defendants in criminal prosecutions, is the wrong right to right the wrongs of Congressional investigations.

Whatever one concludes, one will find much profit in this well-reasoned and, on the whole, moderately stated argument between two learned scholars and devoted civil libertarians. —Jack W. Peltason, *University of Illinois.*

The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw. By Leonard W. Levy. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 383. $6.50.)

The 1948 gathering of the American Political Science Association included; one program feature that attracted considerable attention among students of the American legal system: under the chairmanship of Charles Fairman, a number of lawyers and political scientists addressed themselves to "The Writing of Judicial Biography." In one sense, the discussions marked the coming-of-age of this scholarly line of endeavor; in another sense, the symposium was an inventory of things yet to be done. One glaring deficiency noted by several of the speakers was the lack of biographical writing on judges of the state appellate court system. Willard Hurst declared that it was a "measure of our deficiencies . . . that we have no significant study of even so towering a figure as Shaw."

Professor Levy has now given us a study of Chief Justice Shaw and its significance is by no means confined to the full exposition of Shaw's role as a moulder of the law. This is a "legal biography" and as such it provides a case study in the peculiar difficulties that attach to the writing of judicial biography. One learns here little of Shaw the man. To be sure, there is a brief narrative of the Chief Justice's pre-judicial life and career, but his personal life is wholly submerged in the principal portions of the book. Here Dr. Levy proceeds by legal topics, providing detailed expositions, based on careful research, of the key cases, explaining their factual backgrounds and historical settings, and quoting at length though without tedium from Shaw's opinions. One almost needs to turn back to the frontispiece illustration of a fiercely scowling man of expressive features to be reminded of the *person* of Lemuel Shaw.

To say this is not a reflection on this book; it is a reflection on the task of judicial biography, which is at bottom always an undertaking of ambivalence. "Biography" *means*, quite literally, writing about a life; when we add the word "judicial," is it as a limiting adjective or a descriptive qualifier? The question cannot be answered by the rules of syntax alone: it involves as well a basic matter of the author's conception of the judge's role. The judicial biographer who shares the ideas and presuppositions of the legal realists will approach his subject totally differently from a person who, say, accepts the picture of judicial work described by Mr. Justice Roberts in the *Butler* case.

Political scientists are wont to impress upon their students that men do not divest themselves of their human characteristics when they don judicial robes. The judicial life, the implication runs, is not to be separated from the personal. But if men (and women) who become judges *believe* that their new offices affect their behavior—and we have no evidence to reject the assertion that this belief is, in fact, being held—then there is such a thing as a "judicial life" distinct from the purely personal, and hence it is possible to write judicial biography in this limited sense.

Professor Levy's difficulty was compounded by the existence of an earlier biography of Shaw of the "personal" type; one cannot quarrel with his decision not to duplicate this material, especially in the light of the excellence of his treatment of the legal phases of Shaw's career. Indeed, the title is felicitously worded: the law of the Commonwealth, the common law of Massachusetts and of mid-nineteenth-century America, occupies the center of the stage; Shaw is the craftsman, the stage director rather than the primary actor.

This, of course, raises further questions, mostly of historical causation: was *Commonwealth v. Hunt,* for instance, inevitable at the time or was Shaw uniquely perceptive of coming trends? Professor Levy has not remained entirely immune from the biographer's occupational disease: he sees few faults in Shaw and many merits. There are a few instances where, to this reviewer at least, *critical* appreciation might have rounded the picture. But Shaw rates a high place in our legal history and Professor Levy has provided us with an able (and highly readable) marshalling of his credits.—FRANCIS H. HELLER, *University of Kansas.*

A History of Presidential Elections. By EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1957. Pp. viii, 568. $8.50.)

Years of diligent research, not only by Professor Roseboom but also by the students in his course on the history of American party politics, have gone into this book. It begins with some digging for the roots of our parties, to be found in the colonial and Revolutionary periods. The outcome of the struggle to get the Constitution framed and validated put the "rich and well born" in charge of the national government for a dozen years, in what came to be called the Federalist party. But popular resentment against Federalist domestic and foreign policies stimulated the counteraction of the inland agrarians and frontiersmen under the somewhat reluctant leadership of Thomas Jefferson, who was to become the enduring personal symbol of American democracy. A dozen years after the Constitution had gone into operation, Jefferson became President and the founder of the Virginia dynasty of Republican Presidents.

The War of 1812 was followed by an outburst of rampant nationalism that, in a dozen years, split the Jeffersonian party into National and Democratic Republicans. The latter signified the rallying of the little agrarians of the Mississippi valley together with the eastern urban workers under General Jackson and the consequent overthrow of the governing class of the "rich and the well born." King Andrew's imperious exercise of presidential prerogative induced the National Republicans, combined with their allies, to play the part of "his majesty's opposition" under the appropriate title of the Whigs, the avowed champions of Congress. When the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 shattered party alignments, the new Republican party was born and the Democratic party was demoralized for most of a generation.

The realignment of parties immediately after Sumter brought the spontaneous emergence of the Union Party, which replaced the Republican party during most of the 1860's. Reconstruction is characterized by Roseboom as "the politics of vengeance," but the Hayes-Tilden disputed election is treated temperately. However, it is hardly an objective appraisal of the Republican party and its platform in 1872 to brush it off with the observation, "The apple was rotten at the heart." Republican platforms and campaign practices seem to get a rather more thorough airing than those of Democrats, and the whiskey drinking at the Republican Convention of 1860 is certainly adequately publicized. Partisans of Theodore Roosevelt might protest his being denominated a "rabble rouser," if Bryan were not bracketed with him in the same phrase.

No historian has gone further than Roseboom in reevaluating the statesmanship of McKinley and Hanna and divesting Hanna of the last vestige of his traditional character as a conventional ogre. Concerning the 1896 campaign, Roseboom observes, "Ugly aspects appeared, for which Hanna had no direct responsibility." The tribute to Hanna as a campaigner on the stump is unqualifiedly favorable. But there is considerable evidence that McKinley did not "look complacently on the capitalist-political partnership" in government and that only his assassination prevented a speaking tour to warn the public against the growth of monopoly. To say that President Taft "had little liking for the income tax" is simply contrary to the facts. His shrewdest maneuvering as President was to force the issue of the income tax and he courageously led the movement for the Sixteenth Amendment.

It is to be regretted that the rising cost of publishing required the omission of all citations of authorities as well as the drastic condensation of the original manuscript. Nevertheless, here is an invaluable interpretation of our presidential campaigns.—WILFRED E. BINKLEY, *Ohio Northern University*.

Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812–1952. BY PERRY H. HOWARD. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1957. Pp. xix, 231. $3.75.)

In the period of time covered, this revised doctoral dissertation represents the most ambitious of the recent studies, appearing in *Social Forces* and other sociological journals, in the "political ecology" of Louisiana. This type of voting behavior investigation is closely associated with Professor Rudolf Heberle of the Department of Sociology at Louisiana State University, who authored or co-authored the journal articles and who supervised and contributed a preface to the present study.

Dr. Howard is only moderately successful in his attempt to supplement statistical analysis of voting behavior by a variety of historical, political, and legal materials. These materials frequently remain extraneous to the main current of analysis and interpretation and serve to distract even the reader familiar with Louisiana politics who can establish the relevance of the materials for himself.

The principal value of the study derives from the utility of the ecological approach to discovering uniformities and regularities in mass voting behavior. One puzzled query may be raised, however, not with regard to the merits of this approach (of which this reader is persuaded), but with reference to the alleged distinctiveness of the approach when applied to voting behavior. The ecological emphasis is placed on underlying social structure, group characteristics and behavior, and geographic determinants. As it works out in practice, however, Professor Heberle is correct in observing that "the technique of these [ecological] studies consists mainly in the comparison of election returns in various socially and culturally differentiated regions and in the attempt to correlate differences in voting behavior to differences in the sociocultural characteristics of those regions" (Preface, p. viii).

Such a technique, at least as applied to Louisiana politics in the writings of Professor Heberle and Dr. Howard, bears a very close resemblance indeed to the time-honored pursuit in political science of correlating county election returns with various demographic variables and then drawing appropriate inferences therefrom. The independent variables singled out for attention in this study, for example, turn out to be ones very congenial and traditional to political science research; such as differentials between urban and rural residents, planters and farmers, employers and laborers, religions, nationalities, and races. If this be the ecology of voting behavior, then it is pleasant to be able to report that political scientists no less than sociologists have made the most of it.—ALLAN P. SINDLER, *Yale University.*

God and Caesar in Nebraska: A Study of the Legal Relationship of Church and State, 1854–1954. BY ORVILLE H. ZABEL. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska. 1955. Pp. xii, 198. $2.50.)

Originally presented as a doctoral dissertation, this volume, covering the period from territorial days to the present, contains a rather detailed description of provisions of the Nebraska constitution, judicial decisions, and rulings of attorneys-general that pertain to church-state relations. Among topics covered are privileges accorded to religious groups, Sunday laws, religion and the public schools, regulation of parochial schools, and tax exemptions. As the author concludes, "comparison would indicate that Nebraska practices in the area of church-state relationships are not very different from those of other states." His study of Nebraska experience also indicates that the people of that state have tended to interpret the principle of "separation of church and state" as requiring no preference or privileges to particular churches rather than governmental indifference toward organized religion. Although in places the author makes some jumps in his presentation which are not supported or justified by his data—for example, that the expansion of federal jurisdiction "promises to reduce the area of religious freedom by imposing national uniformity at the expense of local solutions"—on the whole he sticks to describing legal action. This he does very well.

President: Office and Powers. BY EDWARD S. CORWIN. (New York: New York University Press. 4th ed. 1957. Pp. xiii, 519. $6.50.)

This new edition of the author's standard work follows the previous edition very closely. Dated material is deleted, and new material brings the study up to date. Judgments expressed in earlier editions remain largely unchanged. A relatively brief new section entitled "The Institutionalized Presidency" is added. Professor Corwin there states his belief that "there is a long-term trend at work in the world that consolidates power in the executive departments of all governments, first in the person of one individual, then in an 'administration'" (p. 304). He concludes, none the less, that it is too early to measure Eisenhower's impact on the presidency and that the office remains a highly personal one.

Congressman Abraham Lincoln. BY DONALD W. RIDDLE. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 230. $4.50.)

Shortly after taking his seat in Congress on December 8, 1847, Abraham Lincoln confidently assured William H. Herndon that he planned "to distinguish himself . . . before long." On leaving Washington fifteen months later, the Prairie State politician found himself unable to get elected "to any office, not even Justice of the Peace or constable." Professor Riddle gives a detailed account of Lincoln's "political eclipse," the Whig scramble for patronage, and the major issues: slavery, internal improvements, and the Mexican War. Accepting the position that the war was "not occasioned by a proslavery plot," Dr. Riddle views Lincoln's opposition as an "opportunistic means of discrediting" the "remarkable" achievements of James K. Polk. Though demonstrating "praiseworthy industry and much better than average ability," Lincoln nevertheless jeopardized his political future by failing to heed the cynical advice of one of his Whig rivals. "I opposed one war [1812], and it ruined me," said ex-Federalist Justin Butterfield. "From now on I am for war, pestilence, and famine."

Our Nation's Water Resources—Policies and Politics. BY BEN MOREELL. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Law School. 1956. Pp. 266. $3.50.)

This is a series of five lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1956. The author is, of course, the former chairman of the Second Hoover Commission task force on water and power. His lectures follow very closely the report of that task force. The only material in these lectures that did not appear in the much more exhaustive task-force report is the author's statement of his political philosophy. The character of that philosophy may be estimated from these words; "when the tide veered away from Liberalism and toward Socialism, the 'new look' in social theory was sold to people *as a means of increasing their freedom*. Only a few perceptive critics correctly pointed out that the progress toward Socialism meant the return of servility" (p. 230).

Immigrants and Their Children, 1850–1950. By E. P. Hutchinson. (New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall. 1956. Pp. xiv, 391. $6.50.)

This monograph is a technical, comprehensive, and up-to-date demographic study of the foreign-born members of our society and their descendants. Detailed statistical tables, utilizing all the evidence accumulated over the past one hundred years, and a thorough documentation combine to produce an authoritative analysis of the immigrant section of our population. After describing the changing composition of the foreign stock in the U. S. from 1920 to 1950 and analyzing its geographical distribution during the same period, the author turns to a consideration of the occupational characteristics of the group. Each decade between 1870 and 1900 is the subject of a separate chapter in this field. One can find between the covers of this exhaustive work the answers to practically any question relating to immigrants and their children. There are five appendices and thirty-one pages of appendix tables.

The Impact of Puerto Rican Migration on Governmental Services in New York City. Edited by Martin D. Dworkis. (New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. 74. $2.50.)

This little book evaluates the impact of Puerto Rican migration on such governmental services in New York City as housing, employment, welfare, education, health and hospital services, and crime and delinquency. The year-long inquiry was carried out by a group of graduate students of New York University's School of Public Administration. It is well documented, indexed, and complete with statistical tables. In a final chapter the group presents some sobering conclusions, which point to increased migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City with corresponding pressures on municipal government to meet the specific needs of the migrants.

Government in America. By Stephen K. Bailey, Howard D. Samuel, and Sidney Baldwin. (New York: Henry Holt. 1957. Pp. ix, 586. $6.50.)

This text begins by examining the values we accept as a nation "on the assumption that our political institutions reflect our moral inheritance" (p. vii). Public policy and government institutions on the national, state, and local levels are considered in order. The organization of the book recommends it, as does the clear and interesting manner of presentation. It is, however, much shorter than most texts on the subject and is addressed to an audience that is less mature than many college groups.

American Democracy in Theory and Practice: Essentials of National, State, and Local Government. By Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, Donald H. Morrison, and Joseph E. McLean. (New York: Rinehart and Company. 1957. Pp. xxvii, 736. $6.50.)

This "essentials edition" resembles closely the longer 1955 edition. The authors have tried to retain their emphasis on principles and on the significance of arrangements and events described. The same subject matter is covered. This edition is, however, less than three-fourths as long as the preceding edition and makes use of developments through the presidential election of 1956.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Dietze, Gottfried. Madison's Federalist—A Treatise for Free Government. *Georgetown Law Journal.* Fall, 1957.

Douglas, Paul H. The Filibuster. Walter J. Shepard Foundation, Ohio State University. 1957.

Heubel, Edward J. Congressional Resistance to Reform: The House Adopts a Code for Investigating Committees. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

State Government

Action by the Legislatures, 1957. *State Government.* December, 1957.

Constitutional Revision in Texas. [Symposium.] *Texas Law Review.* October, 1957.

Gatlin, Douglas S. State Administration of Natural Resources in Maryland. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland. 1957.

Harmston, Floyd K. Improving and Sharing State Statistics. *Public Administration Review.* Autumn, 1957.

Maloon, James H., and Clinton V. Oster. State Sales Tax Administration Costs. *National Tax Journal.* September, 1957.

Marshall, Natalie J. A Note on State Reserve Plans in Operation. *National Tax Journal.* September, 1957.

Penniman, Clara. Science and State Governments. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

Reapportionment in the Indiana Legislature: Judicial Compulsion of Legislative Duty. *Indiana Law Journal.* Summer, 1957.

Sanders, John L. The North Carolina Department of Administration. *Popular Government.* December, 1957.

Spencer, Richard C. Highest Score Sheet [Nebraska Unicameralism]. *National Municipal Review.* November, 1957.

Local Government

Balmer, Bert A. Fringe Benefits in Washington Cities. Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington. 1957.

Bell, George A. The Michigan Municipal League: An Analysis of Policies and Services. Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1957.

Benson, John B., Jr. Highway Needs Studies for Counties. *County Officer.* December, 1957.

Bentz, Donald R. Industrial Zoning to Exclude Higher Uses. *New York University Law Review.* November, 1957.

Bigger, Richard, Eugene P. Dvorin, and Judith Norvell Jamison. Branch Civic Centers. *National Municipal Review.* November, 1957.

Blawie, James and Marilyn. The Michigan Township Board. Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University. 1957.

Elkins, Eugene R., and Todd H. Bullard. Manual of West Virginia Municipal Government. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. 1957.

Greene, Lee S., and Daniel R. Grant. Metropolis: Texas Style. *National Municipal Review.* December, 1957.

Guide for Establishing a Representative Town Meeting. Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts. 1957.

Gulick, Luther. Do It for Yourself [in Metropolitan Home Rule]. *National Municipal Review.* December, 1957.

Iverson, Evan B. Action in Utah [Local Government Survey Commission]. *County Officer.* December, 1957.

Kerstetter, John R. 1957 State Legislation Affecting Cities. Part I. *Public Management.* October, 1957. Part II. *Ibid.* November, 1957.

Management Perspectives. [Symposium.] *Public Management.* December, 1957.

Metzenbaum, James. The History of Zoning—"A Thumbnail Sketch." *Western Reserve Law Review.* December, 1957.

Meyerson, Martin, Barbara Terrett, and Paul N. Ylvisaker, editors. Metropolis in Ferment. [Symposium.] *Annals.* November, 1957.

Municipal Debt Administration in a Period of Rising Interest Rates. [Symposium.] *Municipal Finance.* August, 1957.

Northern Virginia Fiscal Survey. 5 parts. Northern Virginia Regional Planning and

Economic Development Commission, Alexandria, Va. 1957.

Philadelphia Home Rule and City-County Consolidation under the Pennsylvania Constitution. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* November, 1957.

Reining, Henry, Jr. Are Counties Meeting Their Responsibilities? *County Officer.* November, 1957.

Special Accounting, Auditing, Revenue and Subsidy Problems. [Symposium.] *Municipal Finance.* November, 1957.

Wager, Paul W. Townships on Way Out. *National Municipal Review.* October, 1957.

Intergovernmental Relations

Durham, G. Homer. WICHE: An Experiment in Interstate Co-operation and Regional Planning. *Western Political Quarterly.* September, 1957.

Leach, Richard H. The Interstate Compact, Water, and the Southwest: A Case Study in Compact Utility. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* December, 1957.

Mushkin, Selma. Federal Grants and Federal Expenditures. *National Tax Journal.* September, 1957.

Sady, Emil J. Research in Federal-State Relations. Brookings Institution. 1957.

Weibel, Eugene A. Problems of Federalism in the Air Age. Part I. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce.* Spring, 1957. Part II. *Ibid.* Summer, 1957.

Williams, G. Mennen. Federal-State Relations. *Public Administration Review.* Autumn, 1957.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Bartholomew, Paul C. The Supreme Court of the United States, 1946–56. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* December, 1957.

Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work. *Columbia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication. *Indiana Law Journal.* Summer, 1957.

The Effect of Overruling Prior Judgments on Constitutional Issues. *Virginia Law Review.* December, 1957.

Federal Loyalty-Security Programs. [Symposium.] *Ohio State Law Journal.* Summer, 1957.

Fellman, David. The Censorship of Books. University of Wisconsin Press. 1957.

Foster, Henry H. The "Comstock Load"—Obscenity and the Law. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science.* September–October, 1957.

Hennings, Thomas C., Jr. "Equal Justice under Law." *Georgetown Law Journal.* Fall, 1957.

Keeffe, Arthur John. Comments on the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Bill of Rights in the October 1956 Term. *Fordham Law Review.* Autumn, 1957.

McCloskey, Robert G. Useful Toil or the Paths of Glory? Civil Liberties in the 1956 Term of the Supreme Court. *Virginia Law Review.* October, 1957.

McKay, Robert B. "With All Deliberate Speed": Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development 1956–1957. *Virginia Law Review.* December, 1957.

Meiners, Robert G. Fair Employment Practices Legislation. *Dickinson Law Review.* October, 1957.

Millis, Walter. Individual Freedom and the Common Defense. Fund for the Republic. 1957.

O'Brien, F. William. Justice Cushing and State Sovereignty. *South Carolina Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1957.

Parks, Wallace. The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know under the Constitution. *George Washington Law Review.* October, 1957.

Pasley, Robert S. The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts. *Virginia Law Review.* October, 1957.

Robinson, James A. Newtonianism and the Constitution. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

Schwartz, Bernard. The Supreme Court—October 1956 Term. *New York University Law Review.* November, 1957.

The Supreme Court, 1956 Term. *Harvard Law Review.* November, 1957.

Willcox, Bertram F., and Edward J. Bloustein. The Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Fall, 1957.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

The Admission in Evidence of Pleadings under the Codes and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* November, 1957.

Black, Herbert A., II, *et al.* Mandamus in New England. *Boston University Law Review.* Fall, 1957.

Cantey, Robert C. The Law of Search and Seizure. Institute of Law and Government. University of Georgia. 1957.

The Conference of Chief Justices, 1957. *State Government.* October, 1957.

Contempt by Strangers to a Federal Court Decree. *Virginia Law Review.* December, 1957.

Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts. *Indiana Law Journal.* Summer, 1957.

Disclosure of Prior Statements of a Government Witness in Federal Criminal Prosecutions. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* November, 1957.

Doyle, Meredith H. The Administrative Officer of the Courts: His Role in Government. *State Government.* December, 1957.

Eminent Domain: Compensation for Partial Taking of Farm Land in Constructing Limited-Access Highways. *Minnesota Law Review.* November, 1957.

Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses. *Yale Law Journal.* November, 1957.

Federal Courts' Control of Illegal Conduct of State Officers Who Aid in Enforcement of Federal Law. *Minnesota Law Review.* November, 1957.

Garcia-Mora, Manuel R. Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study. *Indiana Law Journal.* Summer, 1957.

Hinkle, Van R. The Interstate Compact on Juveniles. *State Government.* December, 1957.

Hyde, Laurance M. The Missouri Method of Choosing Judges. *Journal of the American Judicature Society.* October, 1957.

Leiman, Joan Maisel. The Rule of Four. *Columbia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Marrow, Arnold M. Eminent Domain: The Problem of Damages Where Land Has Been Adapted to a Special Use. *Boston University Law Review.* Fall, 1957.

The McNabb Rule: Upshaw through Mallory. *Virginia Law Review.* October, 1957.

Murphey, Arthur G., Jr. The Law of Criminal Arrest in Georgia. Institute of Law and Government, University of Georgia. 1957.

Mutter, H. B. Probation in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. *Maryland Law Review.* Fall, 1957.

Report on an Administrative Survey of Virginia's Training Schools. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia. 1957.

Ryu, Paul Kichyun. Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts. *New York University Law Review.* November, 1957.

Scigliano, Robert G. The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury. Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University. 1957.

Strodtbeck, Fred L., Rita M. James, and Charles Hawkins. Social Status in Jury Deliberations. *American Sociological Review.* December, 1957.

Thompson, John T. City Traffic Law Enforcement in Texas. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1957.

Williams, John B. Entrapment—A Legal Limitation on Police Techniques. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science.* September–October, 1957.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Angoff, Jules E. The Federal Tort Claims Act: A General View. *Boston University Law Review.* Fall, 1957.

Baumgartel, Howard. Leadership Style as a Variable in Research Administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly.* December, 1957.

Boyer, William W., Jr. Changing Salaries of Incumbent Public Officers in Pennsylvania —A Perplexing and Recurring Issue. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review.* Summer, 1957.

Cornog, Geoffrey Y. The Personnel Turnover Concept: A Reappraisal. *Public Administration Review.* Autumn, 1957.

Davy, Thomas J. The Administrative Policy-Making Officer. *Public Management.* November, 1957.

Dorsey, John T., Jr. A Communication Model for Administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly.* December, 1957.

Dotson, Arch. Fundamental Approaches to Administrative Responsibility. *Western Political Quarterly.* September, 1957.

Honey, John C. Research in Public Administration: A Further Note. *Public Administration Review.* Autumn, 1957.

McInnis, H. Donald. Death of a Program [for Naval Personnel Classification]. *Public Personnel Review.* October, 1957.

Orrick, Andrew Downey. Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities Laws. *Minnesota Law Review.* November, 1957.

Ratcliff, J. D. Builder for the Future [Port of New York Authority]. *National Municipal Review.* December, 1957.

Schechter, Joseph. Personnel Management in the City of New York. *Public Personnel Review.* October, 1957.

Slesinger, Jonathan A. A Model for the Comparative Study of Public Bureaucracies.

Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1957.

Smith, Edmund Arthur. Bureaucratic Organization: Selective or Saturative. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. December, 1957.

Smith, Lincoln. Engineers as Regulatory Commissioners. Part I. *Public Utilities Fortnightly*. November 7, 1957. Part II. *Ibid.* November 21, 1957.

Stogdill, Ralph M. Leadership and Structures of Personal Interaction [in Naval Organizations]. Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University. 1957.

Veillette, Paul T. The Impact of Mechanization on Administration. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1957.

Wengert, Egbert S. Case Studies as Tools of Administrative Analysis. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. July, 1957.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Cooke, Edward F., and G. Edward Janosik. Guide to Pennsylvania Politics. Henry Holt and Co. 1957.

Douglas, Paul H. The Right to Vote. *Atlantic*. December, 1957.

Epstein, Leon D. Party Activism in Wisconsin. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1957.

Essays on Political Behavior. [Symposium.] *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. August, 1957.

Fisher, Marguerite J. That Sense of Belonging. *National Municipal Review*. November, 1957.

Kneier, Charles M. Misleading the Voters. *National Municipal Review*. October, 1957.

Lederle, John W., and Rita Feiler Aid. Michigan State Party Chairmen: 1882–1956. *Michigan History*. September, 1957.

Mackey, David R. The Development of the National Association of Broadcasters. *Journal of Broadcasting*. Fall, 1957.

Mass Communications. [Symposium.] *Atlantic*. December, 1957.

Miles, Edwin A. "Fifty-four Forty or Fight"—An American Political Legend. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. September, 1957.

Nixon, H. C. The South and Integration: The Political Context. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1957.

Povlovich, Charles A., Jr. Senate Qualifications and Contested Elections. Public Affairs Press. 1957.

Scammon, Richard M. Voting for President in the Larger Metropolitan Areas, 1952–1956. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1957.

Schulze, Robert O., and Leonard U. Blumberg. The Determination of Local Power Elites. *American Journal of Sociology*. November, 1957.

Sjoberg, Gideon. The Interviewee as a Marginal Man. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Socolofsky, Homer E. The Development of the Capper Farm Press. *Agricultural History*. October, 1957.

Sorauf, Frank J. The Public Interest Reconsidered. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1957.

Thornbrough, Emma Lou. The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. December, 1957.

Tiffin, Jay H., *et al.* Unincorporated Associations in New England. *Boston University Law Review*. Summer, 1957.

Vose, Clement E. The National Consumers' League and the Brandeis Brief. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1957.

Weeks, O. Douglas. Texas One-Party Politics in 1956. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1957.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Hubbell, Robert L. Concealed Subsidies in the Federal Budget. *National Tax Journal*. September, 1957.

Potomac River Basin: Research—Planning—Development. Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Maryland. 1957.

River Basin Development. [Symposium.] *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Spring, 1957.

Should Utilities Be Reimbursed for the Cost of Relocating Their Facilities Incident to Federal-Aid Highway Construction? [Symposium.] *County Officer*. October, 1957.

Steger, Wilbur A. The Taxation of Unrealized Capital Gains and Losses: A Statistical Study. *National Tax Journal*. September, 1957.

The Tax Burden in Relation to National Income and Product. Tax Foundation. 1957.

Agriculture

Pearman, J. R. New Approaches to Agricultural Policy. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. October, 1957.

Toward a Realistic Farm Program. Committee for Economic Development. 1957.

Business and Labor

Attempts to Secure State Legislative Restraints of Competition as a Violation of the Antitrust Laws. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* November, 1957.

Bickel, Alexander M., and Harry H. Wellington. Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case. *Harvard Law Review.* November, 1957.

Bowman, Ward S., Jr. Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem. *Yale Law Journal.* November, 1957.

Bunn, Charles. Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements. *Virginia Law Review.* December, 1957.

The Close Corporation. [Symposium.] *Northwestern University Law Review.* July—August, 1957.

Ericson, William L., and Irving M. Freedman. Publication in Lieu of Patents: Defensive Patenting and the Welfare of the Patent System. *Goerge Washington Law Review.* October, 1957.

Ezrine, Ivan A. Nadir of the No-Strike Clause. *Labor Law Journal.* November, 1957.

Feinsinger, Nathan P. Enforcement of Labor Agreements—A New Era in Collective Bargaining. *Virginia Law Review.* December, 1957.

Feldman, Eddy S. Arbitration Law in California: Private Tribunals for Private Government. *Southern California Law Review.* July, 1957.

Fiduciary Responsibility in Labor Relations. [Symposium.] *Labor Law Journal.* December, 1957.

Forkosch, Morris D. An Analysis and Reevaluation of Picketing in Labor Relations. *Fordham Law Review.* Autumn, 1957.

Frey, Alexander Hamilton. Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* November, 1957.

Joslin, G. Stanley, and Arthur S. Miller. Public Utility Rate Regulation: A Re-examination. *Virginia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Katz, Harold A. Two Decades of State Labor Legislation: 1937–1957. *Labor Law Journal.* November, 1957.

Lahne, Herbert J. The NLRB and "Willful Idleness." *Labor Law Journal.* October, 1957.

Robbins, W. David. Is Competitive Pricing Legal? *Harvard Business Review.* November–December, 1957.

Robinson, W. Clyde. Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* September, 1957.

Rose, Joseph R. "Cost of Capital" in Public Utility Rate Regulation. *Virginia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Samoff, Bernard, and Harold X. Summers. The Effect of Collective Bargaining Provisions on NLRB Action. *Labor Law Journal.* October, 1957.

Should It Be Illegal to Require Union Membership as a Condition of Employment? [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* October, 1957.

Single Act Statutes and Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations. *Virginia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Teple, Edwin R. A Closer Look at "Right to Work" Legislation. *Western Reserve Law Review.* December, 1957.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Coping with Suburban Sewage Disposal Problems. Conference of Municipal Public Health Engineers, Pittsburgh. [1957.]

Cram, Margaret. Mental Health in Kansas: Hospital Treatment and Community Services. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1957.

Krislov, Joseph. Extension of OASDI to State and Local Government Employees. *Public Personnel Review.* October, 1957.

Maloney, Frank E., and Sheldon J. Plager. Florida's Streams—Water Rights in a Water Wonderland. *University of Florida Law Review.* Fall, 1957.

Papale, A. E. Judicial Enforcement of Desegregation: Its Problems and Limitations. *Northwestern University Law Review.* July—August, 1957.

Pitkin, Francis A. Water, Water Everywhere? *Public Management.* October, 1957.

The Question of Federal Financial Aid for School Construction. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* November, 1957.

Society's Stake in Mental Health. Social Science Research Center, Graduate School, University of Minnesota. 1957.

State Administration of Water Resources. Council of State Governments. 1957.

Teacher Supply and Demand in Colleges and Universities. Research Division, National Education Association. 1957.

tenBroek, Jacobus. California's Welfare Law—Origins and Development. *California Law Review.* July, 1957.

Wolman, Abel, John C. Geyer, and Edwin E. Pyatt. A Clean Potomac River in the Washington Metropolitan Area. Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin. 1957.

Wyman, George K. California's Services for Children Who Need Adoption. *State Government.* October, 1957.

Military Affairs and National Security

Disarmament and Defense. [Symposium.] *Current History.* October, 1957.

Jones, William K. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative Discharges. *Columbia Law Review.* November, 1957.

Moses, Robert. The Civil Defense Fiasco. *Harper's Magazine.* November, 1957.

Parks, Wallace. Secrecy and the Public Interest in Military Affairs. *George Washington Law Review.* October, 1957.

The Question of Foreign Jurisdiction over U. S. Forces Abroad. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* December, 1957.

Government Documents

Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. Barter and Stockpiling Policy. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Food Marketing Costs. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Forest Service Administration. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Jurisdiction of Packers and Stockyards Act. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Standardization of Technical Manuals. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Financial Institutions Act of 1957. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Air Force and Navy Rocket Procurement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Army-Interior Reservoir Land Acquisition Policy. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 1185. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. False and Misleading Advertising (Filter-Tip Cigarettes; also: Weight-Reducing Preparations). Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on House Administration. Proposed Investigation and Study of the Operation and Enforcement of the Hatch Act, the Corrupt Practices Act, and Other Federal Regulations Governing Elections. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Findings and Recommendations of the Special Subcommittee on Coal Research. House Report No. 1263. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Authorizing Abbreviated Records in Reviewing Administrative Agency Proceedings. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Organized Professional Team Sports. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Public Works. River and Harbor-Flood Control Act of 1957. Hearing. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Investigation of Communist Penetration of Communications Facilities. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921, as Amended. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Tax Withholding. Hearing. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. A Case Study of a Procurement by the Atomic Energy Commission. House Report No. 1277. 85th Cong., 1st Ses. 1957.

——— ———. Interlocking Directors and Officials of 135 Large Financial Companies of the United States. House Report No. 1278. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Policies and Operations under Public Law 480. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Military Pay. Hearing before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. National Stockpile. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Area Redevelopment. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Control and Reduction of Armaments. Senate Report No. 1167. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Supply Waste and Excesses in the Northeast Air Command. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Providing for the Admission of the State of Alaska into the Union. Senate Report No. 1163. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Providing for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union. Senate Report No. 1164. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ——— and Committee on Public Works. Missouri Basin Water Problem. Joint Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Automobile Marketing Practices—Finance and Insurance. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Sale of Ships from Reserve Fleet. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Administered Prices. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Communism in the Mid-South. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Rapid Amortization in Regulated Industries. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Amending the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937. Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Committee on Rules and Administration. Proposed Amendments to Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate (Relating to Cloture). Hearings before Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Tax Problems of Small Business. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

——— ———. Trucking Mergers and Concentration. Hearings. 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1957.

Other Federal

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Governments Division. Detail of State Tax Collections in 1957. 1957.

——— ——— ———. Property Tax Assessments in the United States. 1957.

——— ——— ———. State and Local Government Indebtedness. 1957.

National Science Foundation. Graduate Student Enrollment and Support in American Universities and Colleges, 1954. 1957.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service. By Morroe Berger. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 231. $4.75.)

Professor Berger, a sociologist associated with Princeton's Special Program in Near Eastern Studies, has contributed a pioneering study of public bureaucracy in a non-Western country. It is not only valuable in itself, but should serve as a model for similar efforts elsewhere to provide a more satisfactory basis for comparative analysis. The bureaucracies of transitional countries such as Egypt are of increasing concern to students of sociology and administration and to practitioners of both public and private administration: they provide objects for comparative study in the social sciences and may constitute the margin between success and failure in technical assistance undertakings. Since this study of the relationships between bureaucracy and society in modern Egypt concentrates on the higher civil service, it is possible to compare its results with those of a few similar studies of the higher civil service in some Western countries.

The data were drawn from historical research and from a questionnaire survey conducted in 1954 among 249 higher civil servants in Egypt. The combined approaches have produced more satisfactory results than either could have produced alone: a revealing picture of the chronological development and current status of "man's oldest recorded bureaucracy." The historical treatment emphasizes the period of Western penetration from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The survey data are analyzed to discover the differences between the public bureaucracy of Egypt and that of most Western States and to make comparisons among groups of Egyptian civil servants.

The questionnaire was designed to develop two aspects—bureaucratic behavior and professionalization—of the degree of conformity of Egyptian civil servants to presumed Western norms. Three related components of bureaucratic behavior were distinguished—rationality and universalism, hierarchy, discretion—and a Bureaucratic Scale was devised to measure the degree of conformity. Similarly, professionalism was broken down into three related components—skill, self-protection, service—and a Professionalism Index constructed to measure the degree of conformity. Professor Berger found that "high bureaucratic predisposition is more characteristic of older respondents, of those in the higher grades, of those in administrative posts, of those whose fathers had lower socio-economic status than they themselves had achieved, and of those who are more satisfied with their jobs" (p. 53). He found the factors influencing professionalism less marked. Moreover, the factors that seemed most influential with respect to bureaucratic predisposition were relatively weak with respect to professionalism. The only factor markedly affecting professionalism was function, men in technical posts ranking higher on the Professionalism Index than those in administrative posts. Factors such as exposure to the West, age, grade, social mobility, and job-satisfaction, all closely related to bureaucratic orientation, had little effect upon professionalism. Thus, whereas in the West bureaucracy and professionalism have generally been regarded as closely related, this relation does not seem to characterize Egypt. Presumably the same finding might come from similar studies in other non-Western countries.

These somewhat unanticipated results have led Professor Berger to express in this volume and a subsequent article ("Bureaucracy East and West," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 4, March, 1957) distinct reservations as to the adequacy of Western bureaucratic theory for the study of non-Western bureaucracies. He suggests that bureaucratic and professional predispositions may not be such unitary tendencies as has been assumed; rather, each may consist of several components. If so, further analysis and refinement will assist not only the planning of future studies of non-Western bureaucracies, but also a better understanding of Western bureaucracies.

Numerous other matters explored in this book include the social origins of civil servants, the attraction of the bureaucracy to educated men, and the "atmosphere" in which it functions. Altogether, it is an admirable contribution to our knowledge of non-Western bureaucracies and raises theoretical questions deserving further consideration.—FERREL HEADY, *University of Michigan.*

The Ideas of Arab Nationalism. BY HAZEM ZAKI NUSEIBEH. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 227. $4.00.)

Arab nationalism is one of the most vital moving social forces in the world today, while at the same time one of the least understood. Much, indeed, has been written on the subject but, since most of this has come from strongly partisan viewpoints, it has not always contributed to a clear understanding of the nature of Arab nationalism. Accordingly, any work that attempts a balanced, scholarly approach is most welcome, for there is a decided lack of such works in the field. At first glance, it would appear that Dr. Nuseibeh, bringing to bear familiarity with the untranslated works of generations of Arab social thinkers and the scholarship of modern political science, was making such a contribution in his *Ideas of Arab Nationalism.* Despite the inclusion of some very interesting material not readily available to the scholar who does not read Arabic, the work does not live up to these expectations. It fails because of the author's inability to achieve the dispassion necessary in such an effort.

The chief weakness of the work is to be found in the frequent dogmatic and uncritical assertions regarding the nature of Arab nationalism. Thus, for example, in dealing with the question of Communism and Arab nationalism, the author writes on page 177 that "the [Communist] program makes no serious attempt to accommodate itself to Arab nationalism" and that "no Arab can embrace this kind of ideology and retain his Arabism." Missing is any analysis of the interaction of Arab nationalism and Communism that would lead one to the foregoing conclusions or that could conceivably contribute to an understanding of the recent Communist inroads in Egypt and Syria. The author's treatment of the question of Arab unity is open to similar question. There is no critical analysis. In fact, on this subject the author at times fails to distinguish between analysis and pleading. In the last chapter, he pleads the cause of the "unification of the Arab-speaking world under one political organization," accepting this as the ultimate goal of the Arab peoples without question. Nowhere in the book is there to be found either an analysis or even an uncritical discussion of the factors contributing to or detracting from the attainment of this goal. On the contrary, the idea of Arab unity is stated as a categorical imperative.

In contrast, the author's treatment of the important phenomenon of the impact of western culture and civilization on Arab nationalism is considerably more satisfactory, for the subject receives fuller and more critical treatment. Despite its shortcomings, this book makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the philosophical bases of Arab nationalism. The substantial references to the writings of Arab social and political thinkers are helpful in gaining an insight into the development of political thought in the Arab Near East.—BENJAMIN RIVLIN, *Brooklyn College.*

Satellite Mentality: Political Attitudes and Propaganda Susceptibilities of Non-Communists in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. BY SIEGFRIED KRACAUER AND PAUL L. BERKMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. 194. $4.00.)

Satellite Mentality is an intelligent quantitative analysis of some three hundred interviews with escapees from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The interviews were conducted by International Public Opinion Research in 1951–52, at the request of the United States Government. The analysis itself took place under the auspices of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.

It is a great virtue of the study that the authors, while holding distinct and often strong views, in effect let the interviews "speak for themselves." What they present is a body of systematized materials, with an incisive commentary about its implications. Such sections as "Totalitarian Propaganda: Its Strengths and Weaknesses," "Strong Points of the Regime," and "Responses to Western Communications" are indicative of the range of subject-matter. The authors are well aware of the shortcomings of the interview data they were given to analyze—shortcomings due in part to the method employed and the inevitable flattery and compliance bias, and in part to the nature of the sample itself. Given these limitations, the analysis is a masterful job.

In the light of more recent developments in Eastern Europe—and more recent interviews with Hungarians and Poles—several findings will need re-examination. Perhaps the most significant of these is Kracauer's and Berkman's conclusion that the young—because of their ignorance of alternatives and their greater exposure to propaganda—are more likely to be made into convinced and loyal Communists. Likewise, the image that emerges from this book is that of a highly atomized society, fear-ridden, and in some respects paralyzed. All of these conclusions, unquestionably dictated by the interview material, conform to the "classical" pattern of totaliterianism as it was accepted a few years ago. More recent events—and a different, more numerous, and probably more representative sample—indicate that the image of totalitarian effectiveness and pervasiveness has been, fortunately, overwrought.

The other findings, however, still hold up—such as the meaningful distinction between "nominal" and "convinced" Communists and the finding of a deep-seated quest for security, comfort, and elbow-room. Equally shrewd are the comments on the general similarity of responses within the three satellite countries examined—similarities which are not allowed to obscure significant variations which might have presaged the differential evolution that Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia experienced in 1956.—ALEXANDER DALLIN, *Columbia University.*

Marxism and French Labor. BY LEON A. DALE. (New York: Vantage Press. 1957. Pp. 273. $4.50.)

This volume raises only one substantial question: Why was it written? Perhaps the answer lies in the author's hope to justify the labor philosophy of his erstwhile superior, the AFL's free-wheeling European expert, Irving Brown. If so, the effort fails. More charitably it might be said that this disorganized polemic does throw some light on the motivations of the itinerant Mr. Brown. Possibly this judgement is unfair to Mr. Brown, but it certainly is not to Mr. Dale.

The title notwithstanding, there is little about Marxism in this book. In fact, it is almost completely overlooked save for a whirlwind and rather superficial tour through some of the more elaborate Marxist theses in an introductory chapter. In its place the author has substituted the "Red-Plot" interpretation of political dynamics—a theme which he threads into virtually every turning of the modern history of French labor. Such a method not only distorts, but also necessitates glossing over or completely ignoring some of the principal *idées forces* of syndicalism: e.g., unity of the working class and distrust of central leadership.

Unfortunately Mr. Dale has used his impressive bibliography so selectively that he succeeds in skirting the more sophisticated interpretations of Collinet, Lorwin, and Ehrmann. To do him justice, he quite correctly insists throughout that the French labor movement has suffered from an overdose of politics, but there his analysis ends. One gets the impression that Mr. Dale is so captivated with the vision of imposing the American type of unionism on the French that he has never considered the possibility that there are deep-seated (and not necessarily Communist) reasons why this would be not only unfeasible, but probably ineffective.

The author does not escape the difficulties he has made for himself. At one point (page 132), he makes the startling revelation that the "CGT-FO has become France's major labor organization in the past few years. . . ." The balance of the book is largely devoted to a detailing of the tactics by which the CGT retains its stranglehold domination over the labor movement. Where distortion fails, inaccuracy and innuendo are used to fill the breach, as in most emotional polemicizing.—E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR., *Williams College.*

The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III. BY SIR LEWIS NAMIER. (London: Macmillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press. 2nd ed. rev., 1957. Pp. xvii, 514. $10.00.)

No student of comparative politics should be unacquainted with Namier's classic study of the anatomy of the House of Commons in a period whose "political life . . . could be fully described without ever using a party denomination." While the general pattern of the second edition remains that of the first (1929), many details have been revised and some parts substantially expanded to incorporate further evidence.

The Challenge of Soviet Education. BY GEORGE S. COUNTS. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. Pp. xi, 329. $6.00.)

The author, a specialist in Soviet education, describes the various ways in which the school in Russia has become an instrument of political and moral education, charged not only with the inculcation of loyalities to country and Party, but also with the fixing of beliefs regarding the nature of man and the universe. This grim and fascinating tale shows how the campaign is carried on at every educational level. Such a system, the author believes, challenges the West in that it constitutes "the most comprehensive and sustained effort in history to reach distant social goals by employing all the agencies and processes of 20th century society for molding and training the minds of all the elements composing a vast population of many nations and peoples." In his conclusions, Dr. Counts takes a dim view of the premise that an educated Russia will grow increasingly restive under Communist rule. Rather he predicts that, because of their peculiar type of education, the Soviet people will become not less but more obedient to state authority.

A History of Soviet Russia. BY GEORG VON RAUCH. TRANSLATED BY PETER AND ANNETTE JACOBSOHN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. xiii, 493. $6.75.)

This well written, scholarly, and compact volume is probably the first general history of the Soviet Union on a scholarly level. It is based on the multitude of recent Soviet studies made in Britain, the United States, and Germany. The author is Professor of Russian History at the University of Marburg. He builds his work against a background of thorough knowledge of pre-Soviet Russian history. The German edition (1955) has been edited, revised, and brought up to date by the author. Professor von Rauch rejects all deterministic interpretations of Russian history; his own approach is pluralistic, cautious, and well balanced. Soviet Communism as a "social structure," he believes, "owes its origin to a curious amalgam of rational Western Marxism and the secularized Messianic bent of Russian political thought." But he does not assert that Bolshevism was the only possible development in Russia.

Empire of Fear. BY VLADIMIR AND EVDOKIA PETROV. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 351. $5.00.)

The memoirs of two members of the Soviet MVD: their early life, training, and activities in Russia, Sweden, and Australia. Their eventual defection in 1954 in Australia grew into an international incident. The book abounds in revelations, contributing evidence, e.g., on the ultimate fate of Radek, the careers of Burgess and MacLean, and the murder of Trotsky. Its reliability has become a matter of controversy among experts on Soviet affairs.

Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan. By Robert N. Bellah. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 249. $5.00.)

In an effort to explain how it was possible for Japan to evolve rapidly from a feudalistic to a modern industrial nation without great social dislocation or the disruption of her traditional value system, the author focusses on the contribution of the "rationalizing tendencies" in Japanese religions toward easing this transition. Thus the pre-industrial religious values, though particularistic in a formal sense, none the less contained social beliefs capable of being universalized and directed toward the modernization of other areas of life. In sociological terms, "goal attainment" was stressed rather than "system maintenance"; the religions reinforced commitment to national rather than class values, and the Japanese were provided with an ethic that encouraged a high level of accumulation coupled with great personal sacrifice—a basis for economic modernization that Weber saw in the "Protestant ethic" and that has figured prominently in the strategy of the Soviet Union. This excellent study goes over familiar ground with a newer set of hypotheses, many of them derived from Parsons.

The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874. By Mary Clabaugh Wright. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 426. $7.50.)

The T'ung-Chih Restoration describes the efforts of Prince Kung and other conservatives to abate the rapid deterioration of China's domestic and international situation after the Treaty of Tientsin (1860). Prince Kung developed a "Co-operative Policy" to enlist the sympathy of the Powers and introduced important administrative and economic reforms within China. Only after the establishment of the *Tsungli-yamen* as a modern foreign office in 1861 did China develop a true foreign policy, which accepted the possibilities of negotiating with the foreigners. Mrs. Wright's study is a prime work of sound historical scholarship, which suggests how strongly the attitudes and policies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang after 1927–1928 were influenced by the conservative restorationists of the Sixties.

The Colombo Plan and Other Essays. By Frederic Benham. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1956. Pp. viii, 89. $1.50.)

Using the economic development of the underdeveloped countries of the Far East for a central theme in his five essays, the author competently discusses some of the major economic problems of the area. His critical examination yields useful conclusions about such inter-related subjects as industrialization, the scope of social services, deficit financing, protective tariffs, price stabilization on primary products, the standard of living, and over-population.

Governments of Latin America. By William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1957. Pp. vii, 514. $6.50.)

Teachers in the field of Latin American government and politics will welcome this new text on the subject. The authors have adopted the topical approach for their analysis of the political process in Latin America, rather than a detailed examination of each country. Special attention is paid to the opinions of Latin American writers on the basic political problems of the area. Surprisingly few factual errors can be found in the book. The pitfalls of easy generalizations have been avoided and a good factual, comparative picture of Latin American politics and administration has emerged. Chapters on The Church and State, Individual Rights, Citizenship and Justice, Dictators and Revolutions and First Governments and Constitutions are particularly good and useful.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT
Washington, D.C.

General

Agricultural Policies of Foreign Governments, Including Trade Policies Affecting Agriculture. U. S. Foreign Agricultural Service Handbook No. 132. Washington, G.P.O., 1957.

Bard, E. W. Higher Civil Servants. A Symposium. *Les Cahiers de Bruges*. No. 2, 1957.

Britnell, G. E. Under-developed Countries in the World Economy. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. November, 1957.

de Jouvenel, B. From Political Economy to Political Ecology. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1957.

Trade Unions and Democracy: a Comparative Study of U. S., French, Italian, and West German Unions. National Planning Association Pamphlet No. 100. Washington, 1957.

United Kingdom and Commonwealth

Beer, S. H. Party Government in Britain Today. *World Politics*. October, 1957.

Blood, H. A Crown Colonial Council. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1957.

Boulton, W. W. The Legal Profession and the Law: the Bar in England and Wales. *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*. Autumn, 1957.

Gladden, E. N. Parliament and the Civil Service. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1957.

Hanson, A. H. The Labour Party and House of Commons Reform—I. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Herington, S. D. The Control of Public Road Transport in Great Britain. *Public Utilities Fortnightly*. November 7, 1957.

Jones, E. G. and Nevin, E. The British National Debt: Part I. *Economica*. August, 1957.

Lewis, D. W. P. Selection of Candidates to the Administrative Class of the British Civil Service. *Les Cahiers de Bruges*. No. 2, 1957.

Newman, F. C. Money and Elections Law in Britain—Guide for America? *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Paul, H. Public Health Administration in the United States and England—Baltimore and Birmingham Compared. *American Journal of Public Health*. November, 1957.

Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries. London, H.M.S.O., 1957. (Comd. 218).

Sharma, S. R. A General Election in Great Britain. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*. January-March, 1957.

Three Questions on Defence. *The Round Table*. September, 1957.

United Kingdom Political Parties. *Commonwealth Survey*. October 15, 1957.

Walker, P. C. Labour's Policy for Smaller Territories. *New Commonwealth*. September 2, 1957.

Weitzman, D. Crown Privilege. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Wheeler, H. The Conservative Crisis: England's Impasse of 1931. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956.

Western Europe

Blaber, D. The Recruitment and Training of Higher Civil Servants in France. *Les Cahiers de Bruges*. No. 2, 1957.

Bodin, L. and Touchard, J. L'Élection Partielle de la Première Circonscription de la Seine. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1957.

Campbell, P. French Party Congresses. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Colby, R. Denmark's Dilemma. *Quarterly Review*. October, 1957.

Constitutions de la Belgique, du Luxembourg et des Pays-Bas. Bruxelles, Service de Législation Etrangère, 1957.

Diamant, A. Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918–1934: a Study in Antidemocratic Thought. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Dogan, M. and Campbell, P. Le Personnel Ministériel en France et en Grande-Bretagne. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. April-June, 1957.

Eckes, W. The Recruitment of Higher Public Officials in Germany. *Les Cahiers de Bruges*. No. 2, 1957.

Fauvet, J. Tragic "Circus"—France's Parliament. *The New York Times Magazine*. November 17, 1957.

Grosser, A. La Difficile Politique Française. *Internationale Spectator*. October 8, 1957.

Helde, T. T. Academic Freedom and German Politics: The Göttingen Incident. *The Yale Review.* Autumn, 1957.

Hennis, W. Meinungsforschung und Repräsentative Demokratie. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.

Hirsch, F. E. Adenauer's Third Term. *International Journal.* Autumn, 1957.

I Partiti Socialisti in Europa. A Symposium. *Civitas.* August-September, 1957.

Lerner, M. After the Miracle—What? *Midstream.* Autumn, 1957.

Löfberg, O. The Recruitment of Civil Servants in the Swedish Administration. *Les Cahiers de Bruges.* No. 2, 1957.

Meyer-Arndt, L. Rechtsfragen der Grundgesetzänderung. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts.* October, 1957.

Meyriat, J. L'Espagne Comtemporaine. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* April-June, 1957.

Mosich, E. Was Entscheidet die Wahl? *Politische Studien.* August-September, 1957.

Muhlen, N. The New Army of a New Germany. *Orbis.* Fall, 1957.

Pierce, R. The French Election of January 1956. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1957.

Ritter, G. The Military and Politics in Germany. *Journal of Central European Affairs.* October, 1957.

Robin, M. Essai sur la Représentation des Intérêts dans l'Organisation des Entreprises Publiques. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique.* September-October, 1957.

Salomon, J. Les Opérations Préparant les Élections devant le Juge de l'Excès de Pouvoir. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique.* July-August, 1957.

Salvadori, M. Italian Democracy in 1957. *Orbis.* Fall, 1957.

Schneider, C. J. Political Parties and the German Basic Law of 1949. *Western Political Quarterly.* September, 1957.

Schuster, H. Die Heerschau der Parteien. *Politische Studien.* August-September, 1957.

Schwarz, W. Nach Bunderswahlrecht—Volksgewählt und Parteiernannt. *Politische Studien.* August-September, 1957.

Von Friesen, H. La Vie Politique en Suède depuis 1956. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* April-June, 1957.

Wolff, S. Background to French Government Crisis: an Agrarian Economy in Transition. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* November, 1957.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Avtorkhanov, A. The Khrushchev Coup: Its Prospects. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* July, 1957.

Baczkowski, W. The Chimera of a Soviet Thermidor: A Historical Analysis. *Orbis.* Fall, 1957.

Barghoorn, F. C. Travelers' Impressions of Post-Stalin Russia. *Confluence.* Fall, 1957.

Berman, H. J. Soviet Law Reform—Dateline Moscow 1957. *The Yale Law Journal.* July, 1957.

Brzezinski, Z. Poland—A Political Glimpse. *Problems of Communism.* September-October, 1957.

The Cross and the Party—I. *East Europe.* December, 1957.

Dallin, D. J. Soviet Postwar Foreign Policy. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* August, 1957.

Danowitz, E. F. Party Control of the Soviet Army. *Marine Corps Gazette.* September, 1957.

Dobrin, S. Forty Years of Soviet Legal Thinking. *Survey.* November-December, 1957.

Dziewulski, S. and Jankowski, S. The Reconstruction of Warsaw. *Town Planning Review.* October, 1957.

Galay, N. The Role of the Soviet Army in the Crisis of the Collective Leadership. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* August, 1957.

Grzybowski, K. Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe. *The American Journal of Comparative Law.* Winter, 1957.

Grzybowski, K. Polish Workers' Councils. *Journal of Central European Affairs.* October. 1957.

Ignotus, P. The AVH: Symbol of Terror. *Problems of Communism.* September-October, 1957.

Jacobs, D. N. Slogans and Soviet Politics. *American Slavic and East European Review.* October, 1957.

Jurczenko, A. The June Plenary Session and Its Aftermath. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* September, 1957.

Jurczenko, A. The Legal Aspect of the Changes in Soviet Industrial Administration. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* July, 1957.

Kommunist on Question of Expelling Party Members. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* September 11, 1957.

Kuhn, D. and Kuhn, F. The Cardinal Who

"Co-exists." *Harper's Magazine*. November, 1957.

Loeber, D. A. The Soviet Procuracy and the Rights of the Individual against the State. *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*. Autumn, 1957.

Marin, Y. Khrushchev and the Satellites. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. September, 1957.

Meier, V. New Report on Hungary. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. November, 1957.

Meier, V. Slovakia under the Prague Regime. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. September, 1957.

Party Theses on 40th Anniversary of 1917 Revolution. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. October 23, 1957.

Pelczynski, Z. A. Parliamentarism in Poland. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Poland. *Atlantic*. November, 1957.

The Quest of Polish Lawyers for Legality. *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*. Autumn, 1957.

Rigby, T. H. Social Orientation of Recruitment and Distribution of Membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *American Slavic and East European Review*. October, 1957.

Rush, M. The Rise of a Secretary. *Problems of Communism*. September-October, 1957.

Salisbury, H. The Red Revolution after Forty Years. *The New York Times*. November, 3, 1957.

Solovey, D. Fresh Light on the Nationality Policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. *Ukrainian Review*. No. 4, 1957.

Souvarine, B. "October": Myths and Realities. *New Leader*. November 4, 1957.

Stjepanovic, N. Judicial Review of Administrative Acts in Jugoslavia. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*. Winter, 1957.

Stolper, W. F. The Labor Force and Industrial Development in Soviet Germany. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. November, 1957.

Tarr, V. The Communist Party and the Peasantry. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. July, 1957.

Urban, P. The Twentieth Party Congress and the National Question. *Belorussian Review*. No. 4, 1957.

Ward, B. Workers' Management in Yugoslavia. *Journal of Political Economy*. October, 1957.

Wheeler, H. Problems of Stalinism. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Yakemchuk, R. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress. *Ukrainian Review*. No. 4, 1957.

Yowev, S. National Communism. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. May, 1957.

Yurchenko, A. Questions of Governmental Organization and Administration at the Twentieth Party Congress. *Ukrainian Review*. No. 4, 1957.

Zawodny, J. K. Grievance Procedures in Soviet Factories. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1957.

Middle East and Africa

Baxter, G. H. and Hodgens, P. W. The Constitutional Status of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. *International Affairs*. October, 1957.

Chejne, A. G. Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism. *The Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1957.

Engholm, G. F. Kenya's First Direct Elections for Africans, March 1957. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Etzioni, A. Agrarianism in Israel's Party System. *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1957.

Flugel, R. R. Egypt: Reform at Home or Adventure Abroad? *Social Studies*. October, 1957.

Foster, B. Tunisian Problems. *The Contemporary Review*. September, 1957.

Gardiner, G. The Treason Trial in South Africa. *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*. Autumn, 1957.

Gellner, E. Independence in the Central High Atlas. *The Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1957.

Gutteridge, W. F. The Debate on Central African Federation in Retrospect. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1957.

Israel. *Atlantic*. November, 1957.

Kenya: African Elections. *The Round Table*. September, 1957.

Kilson, M. L., Jr. Land and Politics in Kenya: an Analysis of African Politics in a Plural Society. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Laqueur, W. Z. Syria: The New Storm Center. *Commentary*. November, 1957.

Livingston, W. S. Court and Parliament in South Africa. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Lybia. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1957.

Morrow, J. H. and Berrian, A. H. Challenge and Response in French and British Colonial Relations. *Journal of Human Relations*. Summer, 1957.

New African State in the Making: Somaliland: a Trust Territory in Transition. *United Nations Review*. July, 1957.

Nigerian Background: The Approach to Independence. *The Round Table*. September, 1957.

Omari, T. P. The Rebirth of Ghana. *Journal of Human Relations*. Summer, 1957.

Partner, P. Bourguiba: a Different Kind of Arab. *Harper's Magazine*. October, 1957.

Servoise, R. Die Politik Frankreichs im "Schwarzen Afrika." *Europa-Archiv*. July 20, 1957.

Sherman, A. V. The Social Roots of Nasser's Egypt. *Commentary*. November, 1957.

The System of Taxation in Israel. Ministry of Finance. Jerusalem, 1957.

Wiseman, H. V. The Gold Coast: The Transition to Self-Government II. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1957.

Zweig, F. Socialism: Israeli Model 1957. *Judaism*. Fall, 1957.

South and Southeast Asia

Brimmell, J. H. A Short History of the Malayan Communist Party. Singapore, Donald Moore, 1956.

Dean, V. M. India's Politics: Middle Course or Polarization? *Foreign Policy Bulletin*. October 1, 1957.

Fryer, D. W. Economic Aspects of Indonesian Disunity. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1957.

Gokhale, B. G. The Communist Party of India and the Ballot Box. *Asian Studies*. Summer, 1957.

Hafter, R. Indonesia Today. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. November, 1957.

Hammer, E. J. Progress Report on Southern Viet Nam. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1957.

Kogekar, S. V. The Study of Public Opinion in India. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*. January-March, 1957.

Merdeka: Malaya Becomes the Tenth Dominion. *The Round Table*. September, 1957.

Narain, I. Some Aspects of the Management of Public Enterprises. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1957.

Pakistan: The Prime Minister's Travels. *The Round Table*. September, 1957.

Pitkanen, A. M. and Riis, J. A. The Geopolitical Pattern of Indonesia. *Social Studies*. October, 1957.

Parmer, J. N. Constitutional Change in Malaya's Plural Society. *Far Eastern Survey*. October, 1957.

Public Law Problems in India. A Survey Report. Stanford, Calif., School of Law, Stanford University, 1957.

Purcell, V. Malaya after Independence. *Internationale Spectator*. November 8, 1957.

Purcell, V. After Merdeka—The Constitutional Outlook in Malaya. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1957.

Sharma, R. P. Democracy and Public Opinion in India. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1957.

Sinha, S. K. State and Industrial Enterprise in India. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*. April-June, 1957.

Streiff, E. India and Pakistan—a Decade of Independence. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. September, 1957.

Sucharitkul, S. The Rule of Law in Thailand. *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists*. Autumn, 1957.

Thomson, J. S. The AFPFL—Continuity in Burmese Politics. *Antioch Review*. September, 1957.

Van der Kroef, J. M. Indonesia's "New Life" Movement. *Eastern World*. November, 1957.

Van der Kroef, J. M. The Jungschlaeger Case in Indonesia: a Review. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1957.

Vlekke, B. H. M. Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economic Aspects. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957.

Far East

Borsa, G. Il Comunismo Cinese e Stalin: Rapporti Storici ed Ideologici. *Il Politico*. September, 1957.

Chen, T. H. Communist China and the Kuomintang. *Current History*. December, 1957.

Chinese Communist Party Policy and "Contradictions." *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. December 4, 1957.

Clubb, O. E. Manchuria—Communist Keystone. *Military Review*. November, 1957.

Higgins, B. Development Problems in the Philippines: a Comparison with Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*. November, 1957.

Nature of Communism in Occupied China;

a Documentary from the Record of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, first session. Washington, G.P.O., 1957.

Nemenzo, F., Jr. The Press and the Government Reorganization of 1954–1956. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration.* July, 1957.

Pacis, V. A. Philippine Democracy and the Press, Radio and Television. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration.* July, 1957.

Soberano, J. D. The In-Service Training Program: The First National Conference of Government Training Officers. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration.* July, 1957.

Yowev, S. Chinese "Revisionism" and Soviet "Orthodoxy." *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* August, 1957.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia: Defence of the Commonwealth. *The Round Table.* September, 1957.

The Australian Social Security Programme. *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association.* June, 1957.

Crisp, L. F. Centenaries of the Australian States. *Parliamentary Affairs.* Spring, 1957.

Hughes, C. A. Party and Parliament in Queensland. *Parliamentary Affairs.* Autumn, 1957.

Rydon, J. The Relation of Votes to Seats in Elections for the Australian House of Representatives, 1949–1954. *Political Science.* September, 1957.

Canada

A Canadian Monarchy. *The Economist.* October 19, 1957.

Beck, J. M. The Canadian Parliament and Divorce. *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.* August, 1957.

Canada. *Atlantic.* November, 1957.

Canada: Fall of the Liberals. *The Round Table.* September, 1957.

Fox, P. W. Canada—A New Parliament with New Rules. *Parliamentary Affairs.* Autumn, 1957.

LeDain, G. E. The Supervisory Jurisdiction in Quebec. *Canadian Bar Review.* August-September, 1957.

McEntyre, J. G. The Development of Federal Income Tax in Canada. *Tax Executive.* October, 1957.

Ward, N. Parliamentary Bilingualism in Canada. *Parliamentary Affairs.* Spring, 1957.

Wrong, D. H. Ontario Provincial Elections, 1934–55: A Preliminary Survey of Voting. *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.* August, 1957.

Latin America and West Indies

Colombia. *Atlantic.* December, 1957.

Delorenzo Neto, A. As Novas Tendências da Administração Municipal. *Revista do Serviço Público.* October-December, 1956.

Diederich, B. Haiti—Behind the Turmoil. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* October 1, 1957.

Do Nascimento e Silva, G. E. Organização Diplomática Brasileira. *Revista do Serviço Público.* October-December, 1956.

Facio, G. J. Latin American Democracy. *Colorado Quarterly.* Autumn, 1957.

Farman, C. H. Social Security in Central America. *Social Security Bulletin.* November, 1957.

James, D. Seven Days that Shook Guatemala. *New Leader.* November 25, 1957.

Lott, L. B. The 1952 Venezuelan Elections: a Lesson for 1957. *Western Political Quarterly.* September, 1957.

Nigro, F. A. Personnel Administration in Latin America. *Personnel Administration.* November-December, 1957.

Sedgwick, P. The Island Republics of the Caribbean. *The Contemporary Review.* September, 1957.

Symposium on Mexican Law; Inter-American Law Issue. *Miami Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1957.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. V, Grand Strategy, August 1943–September 1944. By John Ehrman. (New York: British Information Services; London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1956. Pp. xvii, 634. $7.82.)

History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. VI, Grand Strategy, October 1944–August 1945. By John Ehrman. (New York: British Information Services; London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1956. Pp. xvi, 422. $5.60).

These two volumes provide a comprehensive account of British participation in the Allied strategy of victory, in Europe and in the Far East, with some reference to its political implications. They are based on official sources to which there is at present no public access, on private diaries, and on interviews, as well as on published material. They open with the first Quebec Conference in August 1943, held at a time when Allied successes in all theatres of the war made possible the definition of plans for the final assault on the continent of Europe ("Overlord"), then timed to open on 1 May 1944. These plans remained substantially unchanged, and Volume V describes their implementation up to the point where, in September 1944, the failure of the Arnhem expedition ended all hope of victory in Europe in that year. This led to the postponement of the plans formulated in the same period for the Far Eastern war; equally important, it meant that the British had now passed the peak of their effort, and the strength of their position in the alliance thereafter declined. Volume VI completes the account to the Potsdam Conference, the decision to drop the atomic bomb, and the conclusion of the war in the Far East. Attention is given throughout to the structure of the British and American command, to divergencies in their strategic plans, and, more striking, to the way in which they were reconciled.

The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918. By James William Morley. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 395. $6.00.)

In August, 1918, troops of the four allied powers, the United States, Japan, France, and Great Britain, landed at Vladivostok, the key to Russian Siberia, thereby giving rise to one of the most controversial incidents of the First World War. Following hard upon the heels of the event came a series of claims and counterclaims. Soviet spokesmen, and subsequently historians as well, charged that the expedition was an attempt on the part of the imperialist powers to establish a counterrevolution and at the same time a Japanese effort to secure control of the potentially wealthy Amur River Basin. Officially, the Allies claimed that the expedition had been sent merely to aid the Russian people in the crisis they were undergoing and to rescue the stranded Czech troops. Japan, supplying most of the troops, was taking part only at the request of her allies. Subsequent events, however, tended to suggest that the Russians were correct in their evaluation of the situation, and this in turn significantly modified Russia's relations with the four powers in the period between the wars.

Dr. Morley's work is by far the most successful of recent attempts to present the actual Japanese motives for the expedition. With great clarity and through Japanese documents hitherto unused he shows how the Japanese took the lead in pressing for an expedition that they could command and that they hoped would eventually result in control over the Amur River Basin. In describing the process by which the Japanese leaders made the decision to send an expedition, Dr. Morley also illuminates the struggle for power among the various groups within the Japanese political structure: a struggle, of course, "not fully resolved until the greater cataclysm of the Second World War." This work has thus given us some clear insights into Japanese political as well as international behavior prior to World War II.

Canada in World Affairs: September 1951 to October 1953. By B. S. Keirstead with the assistance of Muriel Armstrong. (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 518. $4.25.)

One of a projected series of studies carried out under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and dealing with the foreign policy of Canada, this volume focuses attention on the events of the two-year period between September 1951 and October 1953. An introductory chapter sets forth the scope and method of the study and another examines the internal forces that have helped to shape Canada's foreign policy and states the fundamental principles of this policy. In a major chapter subdivided into five parts, Professor Keirstead examines in turn Canada's relations with each of the following: The United Nations, NATO, The Commonwealth, the United States, Latin American and other nations. The defense and economic policies form the subject matter of two other lengthy chapters. A final chapter summarizes the author's views of the principal issues and problems that faced Canada in the period under consideration and, in the author's own words, is an attempt "to suggest the general lines of policy that emerged as a result of the series of *ad hoc* decisions that policy makers took, and to raise . . . questions, the further discussion of which by the public might assist in the continuing process of making policy decisions, formulating the broad lines of policy, and determining the values to be served."

Revision of the United Nations Charter: A Symposium. Sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs. (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs; New York: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 145. $1.70.)

This book consists of thirteen contributions by academic and public figures from member countries of the United Nations, plus Japan, with Yugoslavia as the only Communist country represented. Eight of the articles have previously been published in *India Quarterly.* The discussion was provoked originally by the then forthcoming discussion of revision under Article 109 of the Charter. Nearly all the contributors state or imply the obvious: that the United Nations Organization has not fulfilled the hopes placed in it; that it was based on assumptions of Great Power unity, which have not been realized; but that Charter revision would for that very reason be difficult to achieve and would not meet the problem if it were achieved. Most point out the dangers to the Organization of a discussion that is likely to accentuate differences and sharpen divisions. Within its limitation, the Symposium provides a useful discussion of the main points at issue: namely, qualification for membership, abuse of the veto, domestic jurisdiction, human rights and trusteeship questions.

The United States and Japan. By Edwin O. Reischauer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rev. ed., 1957. Pp. xvi, 394. $5.50.)

This is a much needed revision of Dr. Reischauer's excellent introduction to the problems of modern Japanese society and the nature of its transformation under the impact of the United States since World War II. The previous edition of *The United States and Japan* was published in 1950, and much has occurred since then to alter Japan's position in the Far East. The Korean War and the reemergence of a stable economy in Japan are just a few of the events that have affected Japan's position and in turn our relationship with Japan.

With his usual clarity Dr. Reischauer has presented the reader with an analysis of the course that the reforms introduced by the occupation have taken since 1950; in doing so, he leaves us with a feeling of cautious optimism. He has also brought up to date the political, social, and economic developments that have taken place in Japan and has skillfully related them to the events in the Far East and to the foreign policy of the United States. The book ends with a sound and careful appraisal of the problems present today in United States-Japanese relations and some pertinent suggestions as to how these problems might be solved.

Collective Defence in South East Asia: The Manila Treaty and Its Implications. Report by a Chatham House Study Group. (London, New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1957. Pp. xiv, 197. $2.25.)

The Chatham House report on the Manila Treaty comprehensively reviews the policies of the signatories, of China, and of the states of the South East Asia area, and surveys the political, economic, and strategic problems related to the implementation of the SEATO concept. While accepting in a realistic spirit the necessity for action to contain the spread of militant Communism, the Study Group strongly criticizes the inflexibility of American policies relating to Communist China. "No permanent South East Asian collective defence organization will be fully effective unless it enjoys the support of the more important South East Asian Powers and of India." Meanwhile, the West is in "the invidious position of wishing to defend countries, which do not wish to be defended, from dangers the existence of which their governments deny in public" (p. 166). The report pleads the necessity for greater Western understanding of characteristic Asian viewpoints.

India's Economic Relations with the Far Eastern and Pacific Countries in the Present Century. By B. N. Ganguli. (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longmans; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. 348.)

This interesting account of India's economic relations (primarily, of foreign trade) with countries of South and South East Asia, the Far East, the Pacific and North America, is useful for those interested in the growing significance of Asia. Economic and political factors, rather than geographical contiguity, the author states, justify this particular choice of countries. He discusses the impact of the West on some Asian economies, the transition from "mercantile imperialism" to "colonial economic development" which resulted in non-complementary primary producing economies, the "decolonization" of this region, the abortive attempt of Japan to initiate a new pattern of diversified colonial development, and the emergence of newly independent national states. Sources of most tables are missing. Footnotes and references leave something to be desired. Discussion on most countries is well-informed though at time sketchy.

The Winter War: Finland against Russia, 1939–1940. By Väinö Tanner. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1957. Pp. x, 274. $5.00.)

An account of the foreign relations of Finland, from Russia's first tentative suggestions (in April 1938) for Finnish cooperation against possible German attack, through the war, to the conclusion of peace in March 1940, including the abortive negotiations for German mediation and for Swedish assistance in the dispatch of Western aid. The author was Foreign Minister during the war. An invaluable source book, and an impressive account—the more so because of its modesty—of diplomacy conducted with cool nerves and a clear sense of objectives and of the possibility of achieving them.

Daring Diplomacy: The Case of the First American Ultimatum. By Andor Klay. (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 1957. Pp. 246. $5.00.)

Klay describes for the first time the background of an episode in American diplomatic history: the intervention of American authorities in 1853 on behalf of the Hungarian exile, Marton Koszta, who was kidnapped and imprisoned in an Austrian warship in Smyrna Bay.

An Introduction to International Law. By Wesley L. Gould. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xx, 809. $7.50.)

After a brief introduction on the nature of law and the idea of an international community, this book provides a comprehensive survey of international law, both in its historical development and in current practice, including an account of the legal aspect of international institutions. The introductory section is the least well expressed, but the argument throughout the book is scholarly and supported by extensive reference to cases; it has the added virtue that it relates the law to the political and economic circumstances in which it developed. The leading commentaries on international law, from the Middle Ages to the present, are noted and analyzed in the text, and a very full bibliography is provided.

International Relations: The World Community in Transition. By Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 2nd ed., 1957. Pp. xxxvi, 870. $7.00.)

The second edition of this now well known text is a considerable condensation of the original work, which appeared in 1953 and was about 400 pages longer. The present volume includes events up to November, 1956. The condensation has been achieved largely through the elimination of the strictly historical chapters. Even though this text has been characterized by comprehensiveness on the basis of a sound eclecticism, it does not seem to lose through its more compact size; on the contrary, it becomes more usable.

International Government. By Clyde Eagleton. (New York: The Ronald Press. 3rd ed., 1957. Pp. xxi, 665. $6.50.)

The new edition of this well-known standard text (the last edition appeared in 1948) is considerably larger as a result of the considerable developments in international organization in the past nine years. The basic philosophy and plan of the book remain the same, but the chapters on the United Nations and on the "Control of War" have been greatly expanded. The reputation of the author assures accuracy and scholarly caution. It seems more useful for a specialized course in International Organization or for graduate study than for general or introductory courses in international relations.

The Relations of Nations. By Frederick H. Hartman. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1957. Pp. xvi, 637, xi. $6.25.)

This book sets out to be a comprehensive survey of the subject. It offers comments on such "Fundamentals" as power, sovereignty, nationalism (the growth of which is traced from the Roman Empire); it describes the machinery of foreign policy and of international organization; it analyzes the problems of security, disarmament, and world government. The second half of the book provides factual surveys in recent diplomatic history, in case studies, and in the record of the foreign policies of the Great Powers. It is difficult to think of anything else that might have been included, equally difficult to find any one topic that is well treated in so summary a form, and easy to discover avoidable errors of fact.

Principles of Political Geography. By Hans W. Weigert, Henry Brodie, Edward W. Doherty, John R. Fernstrom, Eric Fischer, and Dudley Kirk. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. Pp. xiv, 723. $7.95.)

A full-fledged political geography of the world by six Washington geographers of renown, under the general editorship of Hans W. Weigert. In the first two parts of the book ("The Spatial Factor in Political Geography," "The Human and Cultural Factor in Political Geography") a functional approach was followed, while in the last part ("The Economic Factor in Political Geography") regional groupings were stressed. Although the emphasis is definitely on the "political," the authors are sharply critical of the philosophy of traditional *Geopolitik*. Not an encyclopedic compilation of geographical facts, but an attempt to "sharpen our . . . 'geographical sense' of the world's scene." A useful volume for students of international relations.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Berkner, L. V. Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

Blackett, P. M. S. Technology and World Advancement. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* November, 1957.

Calvocoressi, P. The Diplomat. *Political Quarterly.* October–December, 1957.

La Conferenza di Bruges sulla Comunità Atlantica. *Relazioni Internazionali.* September 28, 1957.

Davis, K. The Political Impact of New Population Trends. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

Economic Aid for Underdeveloped Countries. New York, International Review Service, 1957.

Earls-Earle-Drax, R.A.R.P. The Prevention of War. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* August, 1957.

Hinchy, R. A. Political Economy in War. *Military Review.* October, 1957.

Kovacs. A. F. The Balance of Power. *Thought Patterns,* 1957.

Leifer, W. Panideen im Afro-Asiatischen Bereich. *Aussenpolitik.* November, 1957.

Luthy, H. Fin des Empires de l'Europe. *Preuves.* November, 1957.

Pächter, H. Atomabrüstung und Atomdiplomatie. *Aussenpolitik.* November, 1957.

Rees, E. Century of the Homeless Man. *International Conciliation.* November, 1957.

Schwarzenberger, G. Formen und Funktionen Übernationaler Integrationen in der Heutigen Welt. *Europa Archiv.* November 20, 1957.

Schütz-Sevin, B. Commonwealth—Atlantisch-Pazifische Gemeinschaft. *Aussenpolitik.* October, 1957.

Sondermann, F. H. The Study of International Relations: 1956 Version (Review Article). *World Politics.* October, 1957.

Von Schack, A. Auflösung der Komplexe. *Aussenpolitik.* September. 1957.

Zehnder, A. Politique Extérieure et Politique du Commerce Extérieur et Politique Extérieure et Relations Culturelles. Paris, Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales, 1957.

Military and Functional Questions

Adams, H. B. The Challenge to Military Thinking Today. *Military Review.* October, 1957.

B. B. S. The Case for Sea Power in the

Nuclear Age. *British Survey*. September, 1957.

Bjelajac, S. N. The Balkans in European Military Strategy. *Military Review*. October, 1957.

Brazier-Creagh, K. R. "Limited War." *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Bretscher, W. The Defense of the West. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. October, 1957.

Brodie, B. More About Limited War (Review Article). *World Politics*. October, 1957.

Centurion. Defence: A New Look for Nuclear War. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Dash, S. C. Implications of Disarmament. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April–June, 1957.

Denny, M. M. The Atlantic in a World War. *Military Review*. September, 1957.

Dickens, G. The Commonwealth and Sea Power. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Disarmament and Defense. Symposium. *Current History*. October, 1957.

East, C. H. A. Guerrilla Warfare. *Military Review*. September, 1957.

Eliot, G. F. Less-than-Total Solutions. *Military Review*. October, 1957.

Graham, M. Grand Strategy. *Quarterly Review*. October, 1957.

Green, A. Order or Anarchy under the Atomic Umbrella? *Military Review*. November, 1957.

Gunston, W. T. Guided Missiles. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Hobson, V. W. Keeping Pace with the Future—Development of Doctrine at USA CGSC. *Military Review*. November, 1957.

L'Inspection Aérienne dans le Desarmement. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1957.

Kleinman, F. K. The Pied Piper of Modern Military Thought. *Military Review*. November, 1957.

Knorr, K. The Concept of Economic Potential for War. *World Politics*. October, 1957.

On Limiting Atomic War. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957.

Luis Borrero, F. Problemas de Política Militar. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September–October, 1957.

Mitrani, N. Les Mythes de l'Énergie Nucléaire et la Bureaucratie Internationale. *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*. December, 1956.

Murphy, C. J. V. The Polar Watch. *Fortune*. December, 1957.

Pickett, G. B. The Impact of Philosophy on National Strategy. *Military Review*. September, 1957.

Rabinowitch, E. About Disarmament. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1957.

———. After Missiles and Satellites—What? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. December, 1957.

Revol, J. Possible Aspects of World War III. *Military Review*. October, 1957.

Saundby, R. Defence in the Nuclear Age. *Brassey's Annual*. 1957.

Sauvaigo. Réflexions sur la Défense Aérienne. *Forces Aériennes Françaises*. November, 1957.

Schoffield, B. B. Foreign Navies. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Simpson, M. H. The Race for Missiles. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1957.

Sokol, E. Atom Bombs and Seapower. *Military Review*. October, 1957.

Yool, W. M. The Evolution of Strategic Bombing. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

United States

The Air Force Ballistic Missile. Symposium. *Air University Quarterly Review*. Summer, 1957.

Barnett, V. M., Jr. Changing Problems of United States Representation Abroad. *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1957.

Basic Research—A National Resource. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. December, 1957.

Brown, H. How Vulnerable are We? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1957.

Eliot, G. F. American Seapower and the Indian Ocean. *Marine Corps Gazette*. December, 1957.

Fitzsimons, M. A. The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy. *Review of Politics*. October, 1957.

Forbes, W. H. The Role of Science Attachés. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1957.

Herter, C. New Dimensions in Diplomacy. *Department of State Bulletin*. November 25, 1957.

International Stability and Progress. United States Interests and Instruments. Symposium. New York, American Assembly, Columbia University, 1957.

Johnston, B. Farm Surpluses and Foreign Policy. *World Politics*. October, 1957.

Kerber, E. S. Government Foreign Assistance in 1956. *Survey of Current Business*. April, 1957.

Knorr, K. The Crisis in United States De-

fense. Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1957.

McInnis, E. The English Speaking Triangle: Some Considerations. *International Journal.* Autumn, 1957.

Massenet, M. L'Évolution des Principes de la Diplomatie Américaine. *Monde Nouveau-Paru.* April–May, 1957.

Norman, J. MacArthur's Blockade Proposals against Red China. *Pacific Historical Review.* May, 1957.

Oppenheimer, R. An Inward Look. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

Reiss, J. George Kennan's Politik der Eindämmung. Berlin, Colloquium Verlag, 1957.

Stourzh, G. Charles H. Beard's Interpretation of American Foreign Policy. *World Affairs Quarterly.* July, 1957.

Teller, E. Alternatives for Security. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

What Should U. S. Do in a Changing World? Symposium. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1957 (Headline Series No. 126).

Canada

Aitchison, J. H. Canadian Foreign Policy in the House and on the Hustings. *International Journal.* Autumn, 1957.

Gibson, J. A. Canadian Foreign Policy. *Current Affairs for the Canadian Forces.* November 1, 1957.

United Kingdom

Barreau, P. Britain and European Free Trade. *International Journal.* Spring, 1957.

Brügel, J. W. Die Koexistenzthese im Kräftefeld der Britischen Politik. *Europa Archiv.* September 5, 1957.

Frankland, N. Britain's Changing Strategic Position. *International Affairs.* October, 1957.

Fyvel, T. R. The New Look at the Foreign Office. *Western World.* December, 1957.

Gibbs, N. Die Britische Verteidigungspolitik. *Aussenpolitik.* October, 1957.

Hughes-Hallett, J. Thoughts on the New British Defense Policy. *Brassey's Annual,* 1957.

La Nouvelle Politique Militaire Britannique. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* June, 1957.

Three Questions on Defence: A Commentary on the White Paper. *Round Table.* September, 1957.

Woodhouse, C. M. Great Britain's European Policy since the Second World War. *International Journal.* Autumn, 1957.

Western Europe

Benvenuti, L. Politique Occidentale vis-à-vis de l'U.R.S.S. et des Pays Satellites. *European Yearbook,* 1957.

Delmas, C. La France et sa Défense Nationale. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* October, 1957.

François-Poncet, A. L'Europe en Péril. *Revue des Deux Mondes.* April, 1957.

Fraser, J. F. French Attitudes toward American Problems. *Vital Speeches of the Day.* December 1, 1957.

Mende, T. L'Occident en Face de l'Islam Contemporain. *Revue Économique et Sociale.* January, 1957.

Mission et Organisation de la Défense Aérienne de l'Occident. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* November, 1957.

Zeller, A. Armée et Politique. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* April, 1957.

Central Europe

Eschenburg, T. Das Problem der Deutschen Einheit nach den Beiden Weltkriegen. *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte.* April, 1957.

Herman, K. The Organization of the Federal German Armed Forces. *Brassey's Annual,* 1957.

La Réunification, Problème No 1 de l'Allemagne. *Documents (Cologne).* April, 1957.

Thierfelder, F. Auslanddeutschtum und Internationale Kulturpolitik. *Aussenpolitik.* October, 1957.

Vocke, K. Politische Gefahren der Theorien über Deutschlands Rechtslage. *Europa Archiv.* October 5, 1957.

Wagner, W. Die "Kulturdiplomatie" der Bundesrepublik: Leistungen und Lücken. *Aussenpolitik.* November, 1957.

Wiss-Verdier, A. L'Allemagne et les Pays Sous-développés. *Documents.* October, 1957.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Allen, R. L. The Soviet and East European Foreign Credit Program. *American Slavic and East European Review.* December, 1957.

Brzezinski, Z. Communist Ideology and Power: from Unity to Diversity. *Journal of Politics.* November, 1957.

Cottrell, A. J. Hungary and the Soviet Idea of War. *Russian Review.* October, 1957.

Crankshaw, E. Russia's Imperial Design. *Atlantic.* November, 1957.

Dallin, A. Soviet Policy toward Eastern Europe. *Journal of International Affairs.* No 1, 1957.

Dinerstein, H. S. The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

George, F. H. Brain-Washing and the Control of the Individual. *Quarterly Review.* October, 1957.

Guarni, C. Politica Sovietica contro l'Europa. *Civitas.* March, 1957.

Kenney, C. D. Contemporary Soviet Foreign Policy. *World Affairs Quarterly.* October, 1957.

Lee, A. The Communist Air Forces. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Letiche, J. M. Die Sowjetische Aussenwirtschaftspolitik: Handel und Hilfsprogramme. *Aussenpolitik.* September, 1957.

Marczewski, J. Die Bemühungen im Ostblock um ein Neues System der Wirtschaftslenkung. *Europa Archiv.* November 20, 1957.

Schram, S. R. Doctrines et Réalités dans la Politique Soviétique envers les Pays Coloniaux. *Christianisme Social.* May–June. 1957.

Soviet Foreign Policy Propaganda. *East Europe.* May, 1957.

Soviet Russia and the Underdeveloped Countries. *World Today.* May, 1957.

Strobel, G. W. Die Wirtschaftliche und Machtpolitische Bedeutung der Polytechnisierung von Schule und Wissenschaft der Sowjetunion. *Europa Archiv.* October 20, 1957.

Yakemchuk, R. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of Resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress. *Ukrainian Review.* No. 4, 1957.

Middle East and Africa

Arabia and the West: Need for Anglo-American Concert. *Round Table.* September, 1957.

Badeau, J. S. The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

Chaudhai, M. A. New Egypt and the West. *Pakistan Horizon.* September, 1956.

Dupriez, H. L'Équilibre Mediterranéen et le Mond Asiatique. *Nouvelle Revue Française d'Outre-Mer.* February, 1957.

Geilinger, E. Nasser's Plans for the Middle East. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* September, 1957.

Giniewski, P. Tendances de la Politique Asiatique et Africaine d'Israël. *Politique Étrangère.* No. 4, 1957.

Glubb, J. Britain and the Middle East. *Royal Central Asian Journal.* July–October, 1957.

Gordon-Finlayson, J. R. Defence Problems of Aden. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Grubbe, P. Das Ringen um Afrika. *Aussenpolitik.* September, 1957.

Hahn, L. Last Chance in North Africa. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1958.

Massigli, R. New Conceptions of French Policy in Tropical Africa. *International Affairs.* October, 1957.

Menken, J. After Suez in the Middle East. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

The Middle East and Free World Security. *Social Science.* October, 1957.

O'Ballance, E. Israel and the Arab World. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Packman, M. Soviet Threat in Middle East. *Editorial Research Reports.* No. 13, 1957.

Pearson, L. B. The Crisis in the Middle East, January–March, 1957. Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1957.

Peretz, D. What are the Prospects for Arab Unity? *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* October 1, 1957.

Psomiades, H. J. Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East. *Middle East Journal.* Autumn, 1957.

Regional Development for Regional Peace: A New Policy and Program to Counter the Soviet Menace in the Middle East. Washington, Public Affairs Institute, 1957.

Sands, W. Requirements for Middle Eastern Political Stability. *Social Science.* October, 1957.

Sharp, S. L. The Soviet Position in the Middle East. *Social Science.* October, 1957.

Simpson, D. J. Impact of the Oil Industry on the Middle East. *World Affairs Quarterly.* April, 1957.

Taylor, B. Middle East Challenge. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* November, 1957.

The Turks and Central Asia. *Royal Central Asian Journal.* July–October, 1957.

Wheeler, G. Russia and the Middle East. *Royal Central Asian Journal.* July–October, 1957.

South and Southeast Asia

Bechtoldt, H. Indien und der Ostblock. *Aussenpolitik.* September, 1957.

Levi, W. Nepal in World Politics. *Pacific Affairs.* September, 1957.

Llewellyn, B. Background to Kashmir. *Contemporary Review.* March, 1957.

Mehling, J. Aspects Généraux du Problème Asiatique. *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa.* January–March, 1957.

Nair, K. Where India, China and Russia Meet. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1958.

Report on the India-Pakistan Question. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July–October, 1957.

Trager, F. N. Burma's Foreign Policy, 1948–56. *Journal of Asian Studies*. November, 1956.

U. S. National Commission for UNESCO. Indonesia; a Case Study in Asian American Understanding. Washington, GPO, 1957.

U. S. National Commission for UNESCO. Paths of Action toward Asian-American Understanding. Washington, GPO, 1957.

Van der Kroef, J. M. The Jungschlaeger Case in Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*. September, 1957.

Wolf, C., Jr. Soviet Economic Aid in Southeast Asia. *World Politics*. October, 1957.

XXX. De Quelques Problèmes Posés par l'Exécution des Accords de Genève sur le Vietnam. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Yoder, A. Patterns of Foreign Investment in Thailand. *Far Eastern Survey*. November, 1957.

Far East and Pacific

Akira, D. Communist China as we See it. *Japan Quarterly*. October–December, 1957.

Australia: Defence of the Commonwealth. *Round Table*. September, 1957.

Australian Foreign Policy in a Changing World. *Australian Outlook*. March, 1957.

Clubb, O. E. Manchuria—Communist Keystone. *Military Review*. November, 1957.

Communist China's Foreign Policy. Symposium. *Current History*. December, 1957.

Cunningham, J. K. New Zealand as a Small Power in the United Nations. *Political Science*. September, 1957.

Eki, S. Future Policy toward Communist China. *Japan Quarterly*. October–December, 1957.

Eltham, E. Suez Crisis Spurs Hunt for New Energy Sources. *World Petroleum*. November, 1957.

Étienne, G. Pression Démographique et Expansion Économique en Asie Orientale. *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1957.

The Foreign Policy of the Chinese People's Republic. *World Today*. April, 1957.

Riond, G. Présence Française au Pacifique. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. December 1. 1957.

International Economic Policy and Relations

Britnell, G. E. Under-Developed Countries in the World Economy. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. November, 1957.

Jack, D. T. Some Current International Economic Problems. *South African Journal of Economics*. March, 1957.

Manning, J. American Investment in Canada. *Colorado Quarterly*. Autumn, 1957.

Sinclair, S. Canada and Wheat in International Trade. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1957.

United States Business Performance Abroad: The Case Study of STANVAC in Indonesia. Washington, National Planning Association, 1957.

White, E. W. Achievements of GATT and Prospects for the Future. *United Nations Review*. March, 1957.

International Law

Andrews, B. Suez Canal Controversy. *Albany Law Review*. January, 1957.

Bedjaoui, M. Jurisprudence Comparée des Tribunaux Administratifs Internationaux en Matière d'Excès de Pouvoir. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Briggs, H. W. Towards the Rule of Law? *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1957.

Boucher, G. V. Crimes of U. S. Servicemen Overseas: Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? *University of Detroit Law Journal*. October, 1957.

Cavaré, L. La Notion de Jurisdiction Internationale. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Cocca, A. A. Verfahren zur Erforschung der sich aus der Eroberung des Weltraums Ergenbenden Rechtsprobleme. *Zeitschrift für Luftrecht*. April, 1957.

de Smith, S. A. The Independence of Ghana. *Modern Law Review*. July, 1957.

Domke, M. American Protection against Foreign Expropriation in the Light of the Suez Canal Crisis. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. June, 1957.

Efron, R. The Common Market and Euratom Treaties. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1957.

Fischer, G. Droit International et Expérimentation des Armes Nucléaires. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Foscanéanu, L. Les "Cinq Principes" de Coexistence et le Droit International. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Gervais, A. Les Armistices Palestiniens, Coréen et Indo-Chinois et leurs Enseignements. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Glazer, J. H. A Functional Approach to the International Finance Corporation. *Columbia Law Review*. December, 1957.

Guettard, J. Les Ballons Météoroliques. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Guill, J. H. The Regimen of the Sea. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. December, 1957.

Hallier, H-S. Die Vertragsschliessungsbefugnis der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. June, 1957.

Haug, H. Restraints upon Warfare. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. November, 1957.

Healy, G. W. The Question of Jurisdiction: American Military Personnel in the Philippines. *Phillippine Studies*. September, 1957.

Heydte, F. A. Öffentliche Meinung und Völkerrecht. *Internationales Recht und Diplomatie*, 1956.

Howell, J. M. Delimiting "Domestic Jurisdiction." *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Johnson, D. H. N. Recent Developments in International Law Studies in England. *Journal of Legal Education*. No. 1, 1957.

Lacharrière, R. Jugements du Tribunal Administratif de l'O.I.T. sur Requêtes contre l'U.N.E.S.C.O. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Lachs, M. Les Conventions Multilatérales et les Organisations Internationales Contemporaines. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Lefebure, M. The Application of International Law in the English Courts. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. June, 1957.

MacChesney, B. The Altmark Incident and Modern Warfare. *Northwestern University Law Review*. July–August, 1957.

McC., J. F. The Law of International Waterways: an Approach to a Suez Canal Solution. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. March, 1957.

Meron, T. Some Reflections on the Status of Forces Agreements in the Light of Customary International Law. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1957.

Mosler, H. Zur Anwendung der Grundsatzartikel des Vertrages über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahle. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. June, 1957.

Münch, F. Zum Saarvertrag vom 27. Oktober 1956. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. October, 1957.

Oda, S. New Trends in the Regime of the Sea (I). *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. October, 1957.

Pépin, E. Legal Problems Created by the Sputnik. *McGill Law Journal*. Autumn, 1957.

Pinto, R. L'Affaire de Suez, Problèmes Juridiques. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Ridder, H. La Guerra y el Derecho de Guerra en el Derecho Internacional y en la Doctrina Internacionalista. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March–April, 1957.

Rolin, H. L'Heure de la Conciliation comme Mode de Règlement Pacifique des Litiges. *European Yearbook*, 1957.

Scelle, G. La Nationalisation du Canal de Suez et le Droit International. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Schwartz, W. The International Court's Role as an Adviser to the United Nations. *Boston University Law Review*. Fall, 1957.

Seim, H. B. The Transgressor Concept. *Marine Corps Gazette*. December, 1957.

Spetzler, E. Kriegsrechtliche Probleme des Atomwaffeneinsatzes. *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, 1957.

Stone, J. International Law and Contemporary Social Trends. *Rocky Mountain Law Review*. February, 1957.

Sturges, W. A. The Legal Status of the Red Cross. *Michigan Law Review*. November, 1957.

Valentine, D. G. The First Judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community. *Modern Law Review*. November, 1957.

Von Hannover, W. H. Prince. Recht im Weltraum? *Politische Studien*. November, 1957.

Von Puttkammer, E. Vorgeschichte und Zustandekommen der Pariser Verträge vom 23. Oktober 1954. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. June, 1957.

Walther, H. Le Statut International de la Navigation du Rhin. *European Yearbook*, 1956.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Assembly's General Debate Surveyed. *United Nations Review*. November, 1957.

Barclay, C. N. United Nations Forces. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

Bödigheimer, W. Die Herbstkrisen von 1956 vor der Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen. *Europa Archiv*. September 5, 1957.

Colonialism and the United Nations. New York, International Review Service, 1957.

Drago, R. La Pondération dans les Organisations Internationales. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

The Fortieth Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 1957. *International Labour Review*. September, 1957.

Frye, W. R. Disarmament Comes Back to the General Assembly. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1957.

Goodrich, L. M. The United Nations Emergency Force. *International Organization*. Summer, 1957.

Gorove, S. Humanizing the Atom: Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. *New York Law Forum*. July, 1957.

Gross, E. A. The New United Nations. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1957 (Headline Series No. 125).

Hoffman, S. Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United Nations, Egypt and Hungary. *International Organization*. Summer, 1957.

The International Atomic Energy Agency. *United Nations Review*. December, 1957.

Jackson, E. The Developing Role of the Secretary-General. *International Organization*. Summer, 1957.

Maslow, W. The Afro-Asian Bloc in the United Nations. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. November, 1957.

Mezerik, A. G. Colonialism and the United Nations. New York, International Review Service, 1957.

Pal, K. C. The Problem of Disarmament and the Role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. *Indian Journal of Political Science*. April–June, 1957.

The Partial-Measures Approach to Disarmament. *United Nations Review*. December, 1957.

Representation of China in the United Nations. New York, International Review Service, 1957.

Reuter, P. Le Droit au Secret et les Institutions Internationales. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Seward, F. H. The Changing Balance of Power in the United Nations. *Political Quarterly*, October–December, 1957.

The United Nations Emergency Force. *United Nations Review*. November, 1957.

Virally, M. La Valeur Juridique des Recommandations des Organisations Internationales. *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1956.

Wadsworth, J. J. The United Nations: an American View of the World Organization. *American Bar Association Journal*. November, 1957.

Wright, Q. International Conflict and the United Nations. *World Politics*. October, 1957.

Regional and Collective Security Organizations

Cornides, W. Problems of European Policy in the Cultural Field. *European Yearbook*, 1957.

Cottrell, A. J. A New Strategy for Europe. *Yale Review*. Autumn, 1957.

Darwall, L. The Future of N.A.T.O. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

A Defence Brief for NATO. *Economist*. December 7, 1957.

Delmas, C. The Historical Origins of the Atlantic Civilization. *Western World*. December, 1957.

Fraser, G. Que Reste-t-il de l'Alliance Atlantique? *Année Politique et Économique*. January–February, 1957.

Giersch, H. Einige Probleme der Kleineuropäischen Zollunion. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. No. 4, 1957.

Goedhuis, D. The Role of Air Transport in European Integration. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. Summer, 1957.

Grosser, A. Suez, Hungary and European Integration. *International Organization*. Summer, 1957.

Haas, E. B. Regional Integration and National Policy. *International Conciliation*. May, 1957.

Haines, C. G. What Future for Europe? New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1957 (Headline Series No. 124).

Heydte, F. A. Europa y la Cuestión Alemana. *Archivo de Derecho Público*, 1955.

Hoag, M. W. NATO: Deterrent or Shield? *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1958.

Jaspar, E. J. E. M. H. Réalisations dans le Domaine de la Coopération Benelux. *European Yearbook*, 1956.

Jones, D. The European Monetary Agreement, The European Payments Union, and Convertibility. *Journal of Finance*. September, 1957.

Landheer, B. Sociological Aspects of European Integration. *European Yearbook*, 1957.

Marchal, L. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Political Problems of European Defense. *European Yearbook*, 1956.

Meyer-Lindenberg, H. Die Friedenssicherung im Amerikanischen Regional-system. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. June, 1957.

Mille, J. Marché Commun. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. April, 1957.

Nuclear Dilemma. *Economist*. October 26, 1957.

Un Objectif pour Euratom. *Notes et Études Documentaires*. May 9, 1957.

Patterson, G. NATO, a Critical Appraisal. Princeton, Princeton University Conference on NATO, 1957.

Rieben, H. L'Euratom; une Nécessité Vitale et Urgente pour la France et pour l'Europe. *Revue Économique et Sociale*. January, 1957.

Robertson, A. H. The Creation of Western European Union. *European Yearbook*, 1956.

Schütz, W. W. Neuregelung der Europäischen Verhältnisse. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1957.

Tagliamonte, F. C.E.C.A.: Anno Quinto. *Civitas*. March, 1957.

Travis, M. B., Jr., The Organization of American States. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1957.

Wandycz, P. S. Regionalism and European Integration. *World Affairs Quarterly*. October, 1957.

Wyndham, E. H. NATO and the European Scene. *Brassey's Annual*, 1957.

DOCUMENTS

General and Miscellaneous

OEEC. Problems of Scientific and Technical Manpower in Western Europe, Canada and the United States. Paris, OEEC, 1957.

Pan American Union. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Washington, Pan American Union, 1957 (Treaty Series No. 8).

———. Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1948–1956. Washington, Pan American Union, 1957.

United Kingdom. Overseas Information Services. London, H.M.S.O., 1957 (Cmd. 225).

———. The United Kingdom's Role in Commonwealth Development. London, H.M.S.O., 1957 (Cmd. 237).

United Nations

All entries under this heading bear the imprint of the United Nations (New York) unless a different place is shown.

ECOSOC. ECAFE. Inland Transport Committee. Official Records. Sixth Session, 15–21 February 1957. (Doc. E/CN.11/TRANS/129; June 12, 1957.)

———. ECLA. Annual Report to the Economic and Social Council, Covering the Period 15 May 1956–29 May 1957. (Doc. E/2998, E/CN.12/451; May 29, 1957).

———. Interim Co-ordination Committee for International Commodity Agreements. 1956 Review of International Commodity Problems. (Doc. E/2893; June 7, 1957.)

———. TAC. Regional and Inter-Regional Projects. Report of the Technical Assistance Board. (Doc. E/TAC/66; June 24, 1957).

———. ———. Report of the Technical Assistance Committee. (Doc. E/3041; July 29, 1957).

General Assembly. Fourth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. (Doc. DC/112; August 1, 1957).

———. Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. (Doc. DC/113; September 11, 1957).

Secretariat. Background Paper on Chapter XI of the Charter Concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories. (Doc. ST/DPI/SER. A/73/Rev. 1; April 1. 1957).

Security Council. Repertoire of the Practice of the . . . , Supplement 1952–1955. (Sales No. 1957. VII. 1).

UNREF. Executive Committee. Future Arrangements for the UNREF Programme. (Doc. A/AC. 79/81; June 14, 1957).

———. Report on the Fifth Session of the UNREF Executive Committee. (Doc. A/AC. 79/78; June 17, 1957).

United States

Unless otherwise indicated, all entries under this heading bear the imprint: "Washington, Government Printing Office."

Congress.

House. Committee on Agriculture. Subcommittee on Consumers Study. Food Stockpiling Within the United States and Abroad for Future Emergencies. Hearings. June 12 and 13, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Appropriations. Atomic Energy Appropriations for 1958. Hearings before Subcommittee. July 10. . . . August 8, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Status of Forces Treaty and Related Agreements. Report. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. ———. Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. Building a World of Free Peoples. Hearings. March 1–April 9, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Government Operations. State Department Public Opinion Polls. Hearings before Subcommittee. June 21–July 11, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. International Communism, the Communist Trade Offensive. Staff Consultations with Joseph Anthony Marcus, Christopher Emmet and Nicolas de Rochefort. June 26, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

Senate. Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 47. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Policies and Operations under Public Law 480 (83rd Cong.). Hearings on the Operation and Administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, and its Relationship to Foreign Policy. June 11 . . . July 19, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Operation of Art. VII NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of a Subcommittee to the . . . S. Rep. 1162. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Department of State Passport Policies. Hearings. April 2 and 11, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. ———. The Middle East and Southern Europe. Report of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on a Study Mission. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. ———. A Collection of Excerpts and a Bibliography Relative to United States Foreign Aid Prepared at the Request of the . . . by the Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. S. Doc. 62. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. The International Patent System and Foreign Policy. Study No. 5. S. Doc. 63. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program. Foreign Aid Program; Compilation of Studies and Surveys Prepared under the Direction of . . . S. Doc. 52. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation. Participation Act for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearings. July 2, 1957. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. Soviet Economic Growth: a Comparison with the United States. A Study Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. 85th Cong., 1st sess.

Executive Departments.

Atomic Energy Commission. Nuclear Powered Ships for American Ship Operators. Symposium held at Washington, D. C., July 30, 1957. Technical Information Service Extension, 1957.

Department of State. American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955; Basic Documents. (Dept. of State Publ. 6446).

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences. Edited by Mirra Komarovsky. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press and the Falcon's Wing Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 439. $6.00.)

This is, from first to last, an interesting and useful book. The "common frontiers" are those of history, sociology, and economics; and, despite the fact that political science is left out, a large proportion of the contributions bear closely upon that field.

Like most collections, this one hangs only loosely together. The editor has done a valiant job of tidying up in her lengthy introduction, but it is no disparagement of either her or the book to say that her attempt at weaving the multi-colored strands into a harmonious pattern is not altogether successful. But then, one has no right to ask for unity in a book of this sort.

A brief comment on a few of the articles will illustrate what the reader can expect to find and profit from in this volume. In the opening essay, two sociologists, Leo Lowenthal and Marjorie Fiske, examine the growth of popular culture in eighteenth-century England and the reactions this phenomenon produced. If one is under the illusion that "mass culture" is either novel or American, one would do well to read this essay. In England in the eighteenth century there was a tremendous proliferation in media and a dazzling growth in both the supply of and the demand for the written word. Popular magazines displaced religious and political tracts; modern newspapers essentially began after the lapse of the Licensing Act of 1695; this, too, was the period of the coffee house, which invariably stocked all periodicals available (until by 1730 coffee-house owners complained that it was no longer possible to do so, there were now so many); middle-class women joined book clubs; circulating libraries flourished. The existence of a mass audience freed the writer from dependence on a wealthy patron only to subject him to a new and perhaps equally tyrannical patron, the public. To please the new patron, writers appealed to the kinds of sentiments exploited by modern forms of entertainment—sex, crime, violence, sadism, lust. It was perhaps natural that what had seemed at the beginning of the century to foreshadow a rapid extension of the literary and moral standards of the elite to the great masses had by the end of the century already begun to provoke the hand-wringing and head-shaking that have continued unabated down to the present day.

In the essay that political scientists may find the most pertinent, Lee Benson, a reconstructed historian at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, makes a critical and devastating study of some explanations furnished by historians of standing for the outcome of certain American elections. Specifically, he discusses Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the election of 1824; Morison and Commager on the role of the German-Americans in the election of 1860; Allan Nevins on the election of 1884; and William Diamond on the election of 1896. In each case Benson demonstrates that the historians in question have little or no evidence to substantiate their interpretations, that they have often misinterpreted the evidence they do have, and that a cautious use of additional but easily available evidence shows that their interpretations are demonstrably false. In the process, Benson opens up a whole line of research that political scientists are well equipped, both actually and potentially, to exploit.

I do not have space to discuss all the contributions. Russell E. Planck uses data from the Institut Française d'Opinion Publique to compare the characteristics of the followers of the principal French parties during the period 1944–49. Paul Lazarsfeld discusses the possible contributions of the pollster to a future historian and provokes a sceptical reply from an historian and a more sympathetic one from an economist. Clark Kerr and Lloyd Fisher mount a strong attack against the "plant sociologists" of the Mayo school who would make the plant or factory the city-state, church, neighborhood, and tribe, all rolled into one, and would have the plant-managers act as the philosopher-kings. A rejoinder by Conrad Arensberg and Geoffrey Tootell did not altogether convince me that Kerr and Fisher were amiss in their critique. There are some articles on Keynes that deal with the problems for empirical research that he created but did virtually nothing to solve, and there is a concluding essay by S. M. Lipset and Martin Trow on reference-group theory and trade-union wage policy.—ROBERT A. DAHL. *Yale University.*

Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. BY HERBERT A. SIMON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 2nd ed., 1957. Pp. xlviii, 259. $5.00.)

Models of Man: Social and Rational. BY HERBERT A. SIMON. (New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall. 1957. Pp. xiv, 287. $5.00.)

Herbert Simon certainly is one of the most exciting social scientists writing today. His prolific pen has inked the pages of journals in such diverse fields as Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy, Economics, and Statistics. The common thread in Simon's multi-disciplined cloth of analysis is the process of decision making, particularly decision making in the institutional setting of a goal-oriented organization.

For Simon an organization is a group of individuals cooperatively seeking certain ends, organizing because they can achieve these ends more effectively through cooperation than through independent action. Within such an institutional framework how do individuals make decisions? How should individuals make decisions? To these questions *Administrative Behavior* is directed. The 1957 edition of *Administrative Behavior* is unchanged from the first (1945) edition save for the inclusion of a very useful introduction, which nicely summarizes Professor Simon's *Weltanschauung.* Since the first edition of this book was reviewed in this REVIEW (December, 1947), it suffices to say here that *Administrative Behavior* is a significant contribution to a number of disciplines: a statement that cannot be made about many books.

Simon's *Models of Man* is not so successful, although it is a very provocative and interesting book. In *Administrative Behavior,* Simon discusses verbally such concepts as authority and action *caused* by authority, decision premises and the role of an individual within an organization, and decision making based on a dynamic concept of aspiration level—which Simon calls "satisficing." Since *Administrative Behavior* was written, Simon has been exploring these concepts, and others, mathematically. *Models of Man* is a collection of these mathematical essays and is presented as a showcase of the usefulness of mathematics in the social sciences. This, the reviewer believes, it is not. Many of the essays are fascinating, and in some of the essays mathematics plays an integral and vital role in the development of the argument; but in the essays dealing with social science rather than philosophy or statistics the reviewer feels that the use of mathematics contributes disappointingly little.

Mathematics is a language. It is a language admirably suited for expressing the structure of a quantitative model in which numbers are obtained for the parameters of the model sometimes by experiment, sometimes by the fitting of the equations to data by statistical techniques, sometimes from other knowledge. It is also a language far superior to English for cranking out the implications of a set of assumptions. When mathematics is used in this way a theory must first be formulated in the language of mathematics, then the mathematical crank must be turned, then the implications that come out of the mathematical hopper must be translated back into English. The last step is vital.

In *Models of Man,* Simon has translated several models from the fields of political science and sociology, as well as economics, into the language of mathematics. Perhaps his most interesting models are mathematical translations of Homans' analysis of the relationships between group activity, group interaction, and friendliness (*The Human Group,* New York, 1950) and Festinger's analysis of the relationships between group cohesion, uniformity of opinion with respect to an issue, and relevance of the issue to the group ("Informal Social Communications," *Psychological Review,* 1950, pp. 271–282). Other essays include a mathematical formulation of the concept of authority and an analysis of the behavior assumptions of economic theory and "organization theory." Simon's analysis is interesting and original, but the reviewer believes that in these essays the more high-powered the mathematics used, the less the value of the conclusions derived. Simon's geometrical analysis of the Homans and Festinger models is much more interesting than his stability analysis using "characteristic equations," where his mathematical conclusions seem untranslatable into English.

In several of the models Simon derives his conclusions by mathematical manipulations that are illegitimate, given his stated assumptions. In particular, he differentiates functions that he states are ordinal and then makes use of differences in the magnitudes of the derivatives. This sounds like a trivial slip, but actually it is quite important. Many social scientists might be willing to admit that such concepts as friendliness and group cohesion can be measured ordinally ("greater than" and "less than" relationships), but few would be willing to argue that these quantities can be measured on a cardinal scale (indexes attached to friendship levels meaningfully added and subtracted).

Simon has written an interesting book, but the reviewer is not sure whether this is because of his use of mathematics or despite it.—RICHARD R. NELSON, *The RAND Corporation.*

Perspectives on Administration. BY DWIGHT WALDO. (University: University of Alabama Press. 1956. Pp. 143. $2.50.)

The Pattern of Management. BY LYNDALL F. URWICK. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 100. $2.50.)

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these two series of lectures on the theory and philosophy of administration in the 1950's is their common emphasis upon its intellectual, social, and political contexts. The contrast to that elaboration of technical concepts and techniques that characterized the 1930's is really very striking. Broadly speaking, both authors take the "broad constructionist" view that a science of administration exists as a more or less systematic body of theoretical knowledge about systems of cooperative human organization for collective transformation and control of the environment. They proceed to discuss the connection of this knowledge with contemporary society, government, and trends in the physical and social sciences.

Apart from this explicit shift of emphasis, Colonel Urwick's book is a substantial revision of his *Elements of Administration* (1943). The most newsworthy change is his expansion of the scheme for arranging and presenting the Principles of Management Knowledge from three to four dimensions. The fourth dimension results from the recognition that administration consists not only of industrial engineering, personnel management, organization as a technical problem of grouping and coordinating tasks, but also of the politics (leadership) function, which includes the definition and adjustment of organization goals, the creation of incentive, discipline and morale, and the external-internal problems of the relations of labor, public, and government.

Dwight Waldo's relaxed, penetrating excursion through the recent literature of administration is itself an original contribution to that literature. While Urwick reflects a prevailing trend in the climate of professional thought about management and provides a convenient manual of mental pigeon-holes to help the student to label and classify management operations, Waldo gives us a critical overview of some central problems of administrative theory and research and offers an extremely suggestive inventory of untapped resources for administrative study in political theory, history, literature, and the social sciences. This redirection of our attention to the linkages between administration and its humanistic and scientific foundations would alone be a valuable bridge-building operation. Waldo does more, however. His analysis of the uses and limitations of "conceptual models" in the contemporary discussion of bureaucracy and administration is something of a pedagogical model of: (a) how to communicate to practical, concretely-minded persons, who disavow and disclaim theory, the realization that they have been theorizing for a long time, and (b) how to suggest ways of doing it better.—Avery Leiserson, *Vanderbilt University.*

American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities. Edited by Harvey Goldberg. (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1957. Pp. x, 308. $5.00.)

These sixteen short essays on figures from the American past are generally uncommon in viewpoint and skillful in execution. Their authors, academics and journalists, speak as contemporary radicals. Their subjects, joined here under the radical label, vary from John Jay Chapman to Daniel De Leon and cover a range more disparate, I suspect, than that of the essayists.

As the editor acknowledges, the studies are for the most part purely expository. But even when they cover familiar ground, as with Debs, La Follette, or Veblen, most do so with a coherence and perception that make them more than mere retreads. Thus Alfred Maund's simple retelling of old John Brown's long journey to Harper's Ferry has feeling and dramatic unity that add something to a much-told tale. Richard Sasuly's essay on Vito Marcantonio is often uncritical, but it reveals this little-explored politician as more than "just" a party-liner.

A book about radicals by avowed heirs of the tradition suffers, to some extent, from an inevitable parochialism. Russell Fraser's Altgeld is a little taller than life: "The platform he wrote in 1896 . . . was embodied in the New Deal platform of 1932." And while a Marxist perspective sometimes sheds light, it sometimes (as in Herreshoff's essay on De Leon) seems only anachronistic.

While these studies are useful as biography, they tell us little about "radicalism" itself. The exceptions, and the most interesting chapters, are Harvey Goldberg's thoughtful introduction on the nature and problems of radicalism, Russell Fraser's challenging and belligerent dissection of "The Renegade," and William Preston's "The Ideology and Techniques of Repression, 1903–33," which combines original research and original thought. These three essays show an awareness, curiously lacking through most of the volume, of the broader context of American history, thought, and values within which radicalism has fought its fight. They are the richer for their historical awareness.

For the rest, this volume, though a welcome expression of opinions worth hearing, leaves implicit some further characteristics of radicalism. It conveys a sometimes humorless preoccupation with the abstract "rightness" of dead radicals and with the virtue of refusing to temper ends with means. There is, too, a pervasive animus against the course of twentieth-century American foreign policy and world involvement that suggests again the common roots of the left's neutralism and the right's nationalism. Those roots, I think, go deeper than either Lubell's ethnic isolationism or the formularized indictment of "pro-Soviet" can explain.—WILLIAM H. BRUBECK, *Washington, D. C.*

Edgar Quinet: A Study in French Patriotism. BY RICHARD HOWARD POWERS. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 207. $4.00.)

The name of Edgar Quinet is hardly a household word outside France. The majority of educated Frenchmen, however, hold him in high honor as one of the most, if not the most, important of the intellectual founding fathers of the Third Republic. Which is the same as saying that the other, older France, submerged by the successive floods of revolution and briefly re-emerging as Vichy France, probably loathes the memory of the man who preached the lay state and the demolition of the clerical strongholds in French education long before that feat was accomplished, twenty years after the founding of the Third Republic, by the "Dreyfus revolution." It is interesting to note that Quinet, like so many key figures of modern France, was a protestant, descending from the religious minority suppressed by Louis XIV. Louis's historic decision was, in Quinet's mind, responsible for many, if not all, of the ensuing miseries and errors of French politics. France, if it was to remain great, should have become protestant! Professor Powers, in his careful study, does not quite dare to suggest that the nineteenth-century triumph of the Quinets was a belated *revanche* of the defeated Huguenots, another brand of religious intolerance turned secular. Instead, he portrays Quinet as a sincere liberal and is then bothered by Quinet's discovery that the liberal reformer, if he is to be successful, has to contradict himself and become intolerant. But he brings out very well another point. Ranking his hero among the modern Frenchmen "who missed greatness," he concedes that Quinet was no De Tocqueville, no Renan. Yet, his influence, we are told, went much further if not deeper than theirs. Indeed! One could write an entire book showing that it is the impact of persuasive second-raters that "makes history," while the giants, such as Plato or Hobbes, stand aside or try to swim against the stream.—JAMES H. MEISEL, *University of Michigan.*

The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. BY J. G. A. POCOCK. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 262. $5.50.)

In this lucid, precise, and subtle analysis of historical concepts in seventeenth-century England, Pocock first shows how the study of comparative law, which was an early stimulus to awareness of historical change on the continent and in Scotland, was inhibited in England because of the unique English achievement of the common law, which fortified and was fortified by the myths of its immemorial origin and of the changeless continuity of "the ancient constitution." Pointing out that an understanding of the role of feudalism in the English past was the only possible solvent for the system of myths in which most of the legal and political thought of the century was imbedded, he traces the beginnings of such understanding in the work of the antiquarian Spelman and others and emphasizes its delayed and limited influence in a period in which the issues posed by constitutional debate continued to be discussed largely in terms of an unhistorical appeal to history. Narrowed and hardened by the successive demands of controversy and somewhat battered by the feudalists' insistence on specific instances of change, the stubborn myth of the ancient constitution had produced, by 1688, a series of theoretical dilemmas from which the only way of escape was either the non-historical rationalism presented by Locke or the rethinking of the meaning of change and continuity in history foreshadowed by Sir Matthew Hale and ultimately appearing in the theory of Burke. Though Pocock's focus is on historiography, his fascinating story of the seventeenth-century interplay of myth, polemic, and scholarship continually illumines the presuppositions and issues of the seventeenth-century political debate: revealing, for example, the common ground of belief that was basic to controversialists as diverse as Coke, the Levellers, and Filmer. Students of political thought may also be particularly interested in his sharp definition of the meaning of Harrington's agrarian theory; examined in the context of the historical concepts available to Harrington and the questions with which he was concerned, his interlocking of land and power is shorn of its supposed significance as a reflection of current class-movements or as a general insight into the relation of economics and politics, while remaining, perhaps, no less interesting as "a Machiavellian meditation on [a somewhat misapprehended] feudalism."

Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte. By FRIEDRICH MEINECKE. EDITED BY WALTHER HOFER. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. 1957. Pp. xxx, 528. DM 24.50.)

This classic study in intellectual history, first published in 1924 (see this REVIEW, XXV (1931), 1064–69) has now been reprinted as the first of six projected volumes of Meinecke's works under the auspices of the Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut. In his introduction, Dr. Hofer discusses briefly Meinecke's important role in modern German historical scholarship and the relation of the *Staatsräson* to Meinecke's other principal writings and to his general conception of history. He remarks properly that Meinecke's *Staatsräson*, while it is an anti-Machiavellian book, is "above all" anti-Hegelian (p. xxv). It might also be called, he adds, a book on "the demonic nature of power."

Mazzini. By GAETANO SALVEMINI. TRANSLATED BY I. M. RAWSON. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1957. Pp. 192. $3.75.)

Those who are concerned with modern political theory generally, as well as those who are particularly interested in the *Risorgimento*, will welcome this English translation of Professor Salvemini's well-known book. First published in Italian in 1905, republished in 1925, it now appears in translation, with some changes, though "in the main . . . the book stands in its original form."

Vitality in Administration. By HERBERT MORRISON, BASIL SMALLPIECE, SIR ALEXANDER FLECK, SIR WILFRID NEDEN, A. D. BONHAM-CARTER, AND G. N. RUSSELL. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 78. 8/6.)

In the spring of 1956, a number of well-qualified administrators from British industry, nationalized enterprises, and the civil service delivered lectures on this theme for the Royal Institute of Public Administration. These short pieces are about what might have been expected: common sense observations on the success of and the need for a humanly-oriented approach to administration rather than a catalogue of techniques. Students of administrative theory will find little of value here, for the big and sophisticated questions are not raised, but the book has some interesting passages for the practitioner.

The I. W. W.: A Study of American Syndicalism. By PAUL F. BRISSENDEN. (New York: Russell and Russell. 2nd ed., 2nd printing, 1957. Pp. xxii, 438. $7.50.)

This is a second printing of the second edition of the standard scholarly account of the movement that once caused periodic disruption on the left and fearful consternation on the right in America. Except for the addition of a short preface referring briefly to recent literature, the book is unchanged. The author reports in his preface that the most recent convention of the I. W. W. was held in June 1955 and that the once powerful organization now claims "about two thousand members in good standing."

The Political Economy of Growth. By PAUL A. BARAN. (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1957. Pp. x, 308. $5.00.)

This is a disappointing book; from so distinguished an author one would expect more significant work. Professor Baran is one of America's outstanding Marxist social scientists and, as one would expect, for him the process of economic growth is basically the process of generating and utilizing economic surplus. The discussion of potential economic surplus (the capital, labor, and resources potentially available to create additions to the capital stock) is one of the brighter facets of the book, but even here Baran sings a very familiar song. The relationship between economic structure and socio-political structure and ideology is rightly stressed but is given the standard Marxian oversimplification: through Professor Baran's glasses, almost all aspects of American foreign policy are viewed as the forwarding of business interests in foreign trade. The writing is usually clear, often colorful, but degenerates much too often into polemic.

Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. EDITED BY HEINZ EULAU, SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, AND MORRIS JANOWITZ. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 421. $7.50.)

This is a useful collection of previously scattered materials. Complete agreement on questions of inclusion and exclusion is unlikely. Some may question particularly the decision to exclude almost completely the relevant work in social psychology. However, this collection should be popular and certainly fills a gap. The editors briefly introduce succeeding sections of the book.

Demographic Analysis: Selected Readings. Edited by Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 819. $9.50.)

An interesting and many-sided contribution to the growing literature of population studies. Useful as collateral reading for an introductory course in Demography, it also supplies good chapters for the student of general international relations. The volume includes many tables and graphs and concludes with an extensive bibliography.

The Frederic William Maitland Reader. Edited by V. T. H. Delaney. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1957. Pp. 254. $3.50 cloth, $1.00 paper.)

About a fourth of the book consists of memoirs and appreciations; many of the selections from Maitland's writings are too fragmentary to be very meaningful in themselves; the usefulness of the book as an anthology of some of the great passages and famous epigrams is somewhat impaired by the absence of an index.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
POLITICAL THEORY

CECELIA M. KENYON

Smith College

Albrecht, Erhard. Der dialektische Materialismus und seine westlichen Kritiker. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.* 5/4 (1957).

Apter, David E. Theory and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review.* September, 1957.

Arnáiz, Aurora. El eidos de las formas políticas. *Cuadernos Americanos.* November–December, 1957.

Berve, Helmut. Dion, der Versuch der Verwirklichnung platonischer Staatsgedanken. *Historische Zeitschrift.* August, 1957.

Bhave, S. G. Satyagraha and Democracy. *Gandhi Marg.* October, 1957.

Bolton, Charles D. Sociological Relativism and the New Freedom. *Ethics.* October, 1957.

Borsa, G. Il comunismo cinese e Stalin Rapporti storici ed ideologici. *Il Politico.* September, 1957.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Communist Ideology and Power: From Unity to Diversity. *Journal of Politics.* November, 1957.

Buranelli, Vincent. Historical and Political Thought of Boulainvilliers. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* October, 1957.

Cherno, Melvin. Locke on Property: A Reappraisal. *Ethics.* October, 1957.

Cobb, Richard. The Revolutionary Mentality in France, 1793–1794. *History.* October, 1957.

Curti, Merle. Woodrow Wilson's Concept of Human Nature. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* May, 1957.

Dirks, Walter. Der Christ und die politische Demokratie. *Dokumente.* October, 1957.

Dürr, Wolfram. Liberalismus im Angriff. *Schweizer Monatshefte.* October, 1957.

Fellner, Ernest. Nieztsche and the Philosophy of Power. *The European.* October, 1957.

Filler, Louis. John Chamberlain and American Liberalism. *The Colorado Quarterly.* Autumn, 1957.

Flechtheim, Ossip K. Die politischen und juristischen Hauptformen der Diktatur. *Zeitschrift für Politik.* 4/2 (1957).

Fromm, Erich. El problema ético del hombre contemporáneo. *Cuadernos Americanos.* November–December, 1957.

Gellner, Ernest. Contemporary Thought and Politics. *Philosophy.* October, 1957.

Giannantoni, G. Il primo libro della Repubblica di Platone. *Revista Critica di Storia della Filosofia.* April–June, 1957.

Gibson, A. Boyce. Change and Continuity in Plato's Thought. *Review of Metaphysics.* December, 1957.

Grabowsky, Adolf. Die Lehre von den zwei Freiheiten. *Zeitschrift für Politik.* 4/2 (1957).

Gropp, Rugard Otto. Über Hegels "Geschichte der Philosophie." *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.* 5/4 (1957).

Gross, F. Sciopero e revoluzione. *Il Politico.* September, 1957.

Guidotti, G. L'ideologia comunista ed il problema politico dei rapporti fra l'Unione Sovietica ed i paesi satelliti. *Studi Politici.* Luglio-Settembre, 1957.

Guins, G. C. Law and Morality: The Legal Philosophy of Lev Petrazhitsky. *The Russian Review.* October, 1957.

Hancock, Roger. Ethics and History in Kant and Mill. *Ethics.* October, 1957.

Harbison, E. Harris. The Intellectual as a Social Reformer. *Rice Institute Pamphlet.* October, 1957.

Harris, Errol E. Political Power. *Ethics.* October, 1957.

Hook, Sidney. Socialism and Liberation. *Partisan Review.* Fall, 1957.

Hudspeth, C. M. A Telescopic View of Political Ideologies. *Rice Institute Pamphlet.* October, 1957.

Jones, Harry W. Edwin Wilhite Patterson: Man and Ideas. *Columbia Law Review.* May, 1957.

Kamenka, E. The Primitive Ethic of Karl Marx. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy.* August, 1957.

Kariel, Henry S. The Normative Pattern of Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom. *Journal of Politics.* November, 1957.

Kessler, Martin. Power and the Perfect State: A Study in Disillusionment as Reflected in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Huxley's *Brave New World. Political Science Quarterly.* December, 1957.

Ketcham, Ralph L. Notes on James Madison's Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* May, 1957.

Leonhard, Susanne. Auguste Comte. *Deutsche Rundschau.* September, 1957.

Livingston, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the American Tradition. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

Livingston, William S. Emigration as a Theoretical Doctrine During the American Revolution. *Journal of Politics.* November, 1957.

Long, Norton E. Aristotle and the Study of Local Government. *Social Research.* Autumn, 1957.

McDonald, Lee Cameron. Voegelin and the Positivists: A New Science of Politics? *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

Matossian, Mary. Two Marxist Approaches to Nationalism. *The American Slavic and East European Review.* December, 1957.

Mineka, Francis E. (editor). John Stuart Mill: Letters on the French Revolution of 1830. *Victorian Studies.* December, 1957.

Morgenthau, Hans. The Dilemmas of Freedom. *American Political Science Review.* September, 1957.

Murray, John Courtney. The Freedom of Man in the Freedom of the Church. *Modern Age.* Fall, 1957.

Naville, Pierre. Marxistes, Marxiens et Marxologues. *Critique.* November, 1957.

Norris, John M. The Influence of British Nineteenth-Century Liberalism on Woodrow Wilson. *World Affairs Quarterly.* October, 1957.

Polin, Raymond. La Politique et la Force. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* July–September, 1957.

Pross, Harry. Lenins aussenpolitisches Konzept. *Deutsche Rundschau.* November, 1957.

Quaroni, P. Le ideologie politiche e lo sviluppo dei popoli afroasiatici nei loro rapporti con occidente ed oriente. *Studi Politici.* Luglio-Settembre, 1957.

Riker, William H. Dutch and American Federalism. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* October, 1957.

Robinson, James A. Newtonianism and the Constitution. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* November, 1957.

Rogow, Arnold A. Comment on Smith and Apter, or Whatever Happened to the Great Issues? *American Political Science Review.* September, 1957.

Röpke, Wilhelm. Liberalism and Christianity. *Modern Age.* Fall, 1957.

Ruiz-Giménez, Joaquín. La política, deber y derecho del hombre. *Revista de Estudios Políticos.* July–August, 1957.

Sartori, G. La teoria dello stato in Benedetto Croce (II). *Studi Politici.* Luglio-Settembre, 1957.

Schubardt, Wolfgang. Revolution und Philosophie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.* 5/5 (1957).

Schwartze, Heinrich. Über die "Christliche und marxistsche Ethik" von Emil Fuchs. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.* 5/3 (1957).

Smith, David G. Political Science and Political Theory. *American Political Science Review.* September, 1957.

Smith, J. Malcolm and Cotter, Cornelius P. Freedom and Authority in the Amphibial State. *Midwest Journal of Political Science.* May, 1957.

Sorauf, Frank J. The Public Interest Reconsidered. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1957.

Sparshott, F. E. Plato and Thrasymachus. *University of Toronto Quarterly*. October, 1957.

Spitz, David. On the Abuses of Power in Democratic States. *Midwest Journal of Politics*. November, 1957.

Symposium. The Achievement of Ortega y Gasset. *Modern Age*. Summer, 1957.

Urdánoz. Fr. Teófilo. La justicia del buen gobierno en la concepción teológica de Santo Tomás. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. Julio-Agosto, 1957.

Verdu, Pablo Lucas. El horizonte iusnaturalista del derecho constitucional occidental. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. Julio-Agosto, 1957.

Vigneau, Jean. L'idéologie de la révolution égyptienne. *Politique Étrangère*. 22/4 (1957).

Waldman, Theodore. A Note on John Locke's Concept of Consent. *Ethics*. October, 1957.

Watson, Richard L., Jr. Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters 1947–1957. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. September, 1957.

White, Howard. Comment on Morgenthau's "Dilemmas of Freedom." *American Political Science Review*. September, 1957.

Wilhelmsen, Frederick. History, Toynbee and the Modern Mind. *Modern Age*. Summer, 1957.

Wollheim, Richard. The New Conservatism in Britain. *Partisan Review*. Fall, 1957.

Zanfarino A. Potere e legalità nel pensiero politico di Benjamin Constant. *Studi Politici*. Luglio-Settembre, 1957.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

JAMES G. MARCH

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

Brillouin, L. Mathematics, physics, and information. *Information and Control*, 1957, *1*, 1–5.

Merton, R. F. Priorities in scientific discovery: a chapter in the sociology of science. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 635–659.

Nelson, J. O. The confirmation of hypotheses. *Philosophical Review*. 1958, *67*, 95–100.

Research Methods and Organization

Luszki, M. B. Team research in social science—major consequences of a growing trend. *Human Organization*, 1957, *16*, 21–24.

Masling, J. H. The effect of warm and cold interaction on the interpretation of a projective protocol. *Journal of Projective Techniques*, 1957, *21*, 377–383.

Selvin, H. C. A critique of tests of significance in survey research. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 519–527.

Motivation and Personality

Cohn, T. S. The relation of the F scale to intelligence. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 207–217.

de Charmes, R. Affiliation, motivation, and productivity in small groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 222–226.

Lichtenberg, P. Reactions to success and failure during individual and cooperative effort. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 31–34.

Rosen, S. An approach to the study of aggression. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 259–267.

Tannenbaum, A. S. Personality change as a result of an experimental change of environmental conditions. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 404–406.

Opinions and Attitudes

Richardson, A. Some psycho-social characteristics of satisfied and dissatisfied British-immigrant skilled manual workers in Western Australia. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 235–248.

Siegel, A. E. and Siegel, S. Reference groups, membership groups, and attitude change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 360–364.

Trent, R. D. The relation between expressed self-acceptance and expressed attitudes toward

Negroes and Whites among Negro children. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1957, *91*, 3–24.

Cognitive Processes and Individual Decision-Making

Anderson, N. H. and Grant, D. A. A test of a statistical learning theory model for two-choice behavior with double stimulus events. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1957, *54*, 305–317.

Anderson, S. B. Problem solving in multiple-goal situations. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1957, *54*, 297–303.

Arkoff, A. Resolution of approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance conflicts. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 402–404.

Birch, H. G., and Korn, S. J. Place-learning, cognitive maps, and parsimony. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1958, *58*, 17–35.

Crandall, V. J., Solomon, D., and Kellaway, R. The value of anticipated events as a determinant of probability learning and extinction. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1958, *58*, 3–10.

Festinger, L. Sur quelques manifestations de dissonnances cognitives. *Psychologie Française*, 1957, *2*, 129–145.

Himmelstein, P. Goal setting rigidity as a function of anxiety and task-ambiguity. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1958, *58*, 69–73.

Leventhal, H. Cognitive processes and interpersonal predictions. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 176–180.

Maier, N. R. F., and Lansky, L. M. Effect of attitude on selection of facts. *Personnel Psychology*, 1957, *10*, 293–304.

Marx, M. H. Some suggestions for the conceptual and theoretical analysis of complex intervening variables in problem-solving behavior. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1958, *58*, 115–128.

Milton, G. A. The effects of sex role identification upon problem-solving skill. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 208–212.

Rose, A. M. A study of irrational judgments. *Journal of Political Economy*. 1957, *65*, 394–402.

Samuelson, F. Conforming behavior under two conditions of conflict in the cognitive field. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 181–187.

Simmel, M. L. and Counts, S. Some stable thinking, and learning: a study based on the analysis of a single test. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1957, *56*, 3–157.

Watson, W. A. Contrast, assimilation, and the effect of central tendency. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1957, *70*, 560–568.

Interpersonal Influence

Barch, A. M., Trumbo, D. and Nangle, J. Social setting and conformity to a legal requirement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 396–398.

Dexter, L. A. The representative and his district. *Human Organization*, 1957, *16*, 2–13.

Fox, W. M. Group reaction to two types of conference leadership. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 279–289.

Grace, H. A. Blood donor recruitment: a case study in the psychology of communication. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 269–276.

Hovland, C. I., Harvey, O. J. and Sherif, M. Assimilation and contrast effects in reactions to communication and attitude change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 244–252.

Hyman, R. and Cohen, E. G. Water-witching in the United States. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 719–724.

Menzel, J. Public and private conformity under different conditions of acceptance in the group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 389–402.

Schein, E. H., Hill, W. F., Williams, H. L. and Lubin, A. Distinguishing characteristics of collaborators and resistors among American prisoners of war. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 197–201.

Stanley, J. C. and Klausmeier, H. J. Opinion constancy after formal role playing. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 11–18.

Tannenbaum, R. and Massarik, F. Leadership: a frame of reference. *Management Science*, 1957, *4*, 1–19.

Group Behavior, General

Berkowitz, L. Effects of perceived dependency relationships upon conformity to group expectations. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 350–354.

Berkowitz, L., Levy, B. I., and Harvey, A. R. Effects of performance evaluation on group integration and motivation. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 195–208.

Burridge, K. O. L. Disputing in Tangu. *American Anthropologist*, 1957, *59*, 763–780.

Chapman, L. J. and Campbell, D. T. An attempt to predict the performance of three-

man teams from attitude measures. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 277–286.

Cleveland, S. E. and Fisher, S. Prediction of small group behavior from a body image schema. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 223–234.

Exline, R. V. Group climate as a factor in the relevance and accuracy of social perception. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 382–388.

Maier, N. R. F. and Maier, R. S. An experimental test of the effects of "developmental" vs. "free" discussions on the quality of group decisions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1957, *41*, 320–323.

Schneider, D. M. Political organization, supernatural sanctions and the punishment for incest on Yap. *American Anthropologist*, 1957, *59*, 791–800.

Smith, E. E. The effects of clear and unclear role expectations on group productivity and defensiveness. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 213–217.

Stone, P. and Kamiya, J. Judgments of consensus during group discussion. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 171–175.

Strodtbeck, F. L., James, R. M. and Hawkins, C. Social status in jury deliberations. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 713–719.

Tagiuri, R. The perception of feelings among members of small groups. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 219–227.

Tagiuri, R. and Kogan, N. The visibility of interpersonal preferences. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 385–390.

Taylor, F. K. Display of dyadic emotions. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 257–262.

Thomas, E. J. Effects of facilitative role interdependence on group functioning. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 347–366.

Torrance, E. P. What happens to the sociometric structure of small groups in emergencies and extreme conditions? *Group Psychotherapy*, 1957, *10*, 212–220.

Organizational Behavior

Argyle, M., Gardner, G. and Cioffi, F. The measurement of supervisory methods. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 295–314.

Axinn, G. H. The milieu theory of control. *Public Administration Review*, 1957, *17*, 97–105.

Baldamus, W. A sociological theory of economic administration. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1957, *8*, 256–262.

Baumgartel, H. Leadership style as a variable in research administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957, *2*, 344–360.

Brayfield, A. H. and Wells, R. V. Interrelationships among measures of job satisfaction and general satisfaction. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1957, *41*, 201–205.

Brown, W. H. Innovation in the machine tool industry. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1957, *71*, 406–425.

Cohen, E. The effects of members' use of a formal group as a reference group upon group effectiveness. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1957, *46*, 307–309.

Dorsey, J. T. A communication model for administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957, *2*, 307–324.

Freeman, H. E., Novak, E. and Reeder, L. G. Correlates of membership in voluntary associations. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 528–533.

Georgopoulos, B. S. and Tannenbaum, A. S. A study of organizational effectiveness. *American Sociological Review*, 1957, *22*, 534–540.

Gouldner, A. W. Cosmopolitans and locals: toward an analysis of latent social roles—I. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957, *2*, 281–306.

Herbst, P. G. Measurement of behaviour structures of means of input-output data. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 335–346.

Kaberry, P. Primitive states. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1957, *8*, 224–234.

Kipnis, D. M. Interaction between members of bomber crews as a determinant of sociometric choice. *Human Relations*, 1957, *10*, 263–270.

Neisser, H. Oligopoly as a non-zero-sum game. *Review of Economic Studies*, 1957, *25*, 1–20.

Ross, I. C. and Zander, A. Need satisfactions and employee turnover. *Personnel Psychology*, 1957, *10*, 327–338.

Smith, E. A. Bureaucratic organization: selective or saturative. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957, *2*, 361–375.

Tannenbaum, A. S. and Georgopoulos, B. S. The distribution of control in formal organizations. *Social Forces*, 1957, *36*, 44–50.

Thompson, J. D. and Bates, F. L. Technology, organization, and administration. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1957, *2*, 325–343.

Veillette, P. T. The impact of mechanization on administration. *Public Administration Review*, 1957, *17*, 231–237.

Culture and Institutions

Barry, H., Bacon, M. K. and Child, I. L. A cross-cultural survey of some sex differences in socialization. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957, *55*, 327–332.

Coser, L. A. Social conflict and the theory of social change. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1957, *8*, 197–207.

Lynn, R. A. Installment credit before 1870. *Business History Review*, 1957, *31*, 414–424.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Heald, M. Management's responsibility to society: the growth of an idea. *Business History Review*, 1957, *31*, 375–384.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Beatty, Ilene. *Arab and Jew in the Land of Canaan*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1957. Pp. 108. $2.50.

Caldwell, John C. *South of Tokyo*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1957. Pp. 160. $3.50.

Chaumont, Charles. *L'Organisation des Nations Unies*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957. Pp. 128.

Clarke, Helen I. *Social Legislation*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 2nd ed. rev., 1957. Pp. xiv, 665. $6.90.

Crosser, Paul K. *Economic Fictions: A Critique of Subjectivistic Economic Theory*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xxii, 322. $4.75.

Dinwiddie, Joseph. *Aid to Nationalist China*. New York: Vantage Press. 1957. Pp. 177. $2.95.

Duncan, Otis Dudley, and Beverly Duncan. *The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. xxiv, 367. $6.00.

Dunner, Joseph. *Baruch Spinoza and Western Democracy: An Interpretation of his Philosophical, Religious and Political Thought*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xiii, 142. $3.00.

Ellis, David M., James A. Frost, Harold C. Syrett, and Harry J. Carman. *A Short History of New York State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 705. $7.75.

Fireman, Peter. *Justice in Plato's Republic*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. 52. $2.00.

France, Royal W. *My Native Grounds*. New York: Cameron Associates. 1957. Pp. 255. $3.75.

Friedrich, Carl J., and Charles Blitzer. *The Age of Power*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp. ix, 200. $1.75 paper.

Green, Constance McLaughlin. *American Cities in the Growth of the Nation*. New York: John de Graff. 1957. Pp. xii, 258. $6.50.

Heath, Spencer. *Citadel, Market and Altar: Emerging Society*. Baltimore: Science of Society Foundation. 1957. Pp. xix, 259. $6.00.

Hertz, Frederick. *The Development of the German Public Mind: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspiration and Ideas—The Middle Ages; The Reformation*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1957. Pp. 524. $6.00.

Hirschfeld, Gerhard. *An Essay on Mankind*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xii, 114. $3.75.

Hulme, Harold. *The Life of Sir John Eliot*. New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. 423. $6.75.

Kraft, Julius. *Von Husserl zu Heidegger: Kritik der phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag "Öffentliches Leben." 1957. Pp. 148. DM 9.80 cloth, 7.50 paper.

Lambarde, William. *Archeion, or, a Discourse upon the High Courts of Justice in England*. Edited by Charles H. McIlwain and Paul W. Ward. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. ix, 176. $5.00.

Leibenstein, Harvey, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth: Studies in the Theory of Economic Development*. New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall. 1957. Pp. xiv, 295. $6.75.

Little, I. M. D. *A Critique of Welfare Economics*. New York and London: Oxford University Press. 2nd ed., 1957. Pp. x, 302. $4.80.

Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*. New York: John Wiley and Sons;

London: Chapman and Hall. 1957. Pp. xix, 509. $8.75.

Macdonald, H. Malcolm, Wilfred D. Webb, Edward G. Lewis, and William L. Strauss. *Outside Readings in American Government.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 3rd ed., 1957. Pp. xii, 884.

Moloney, James Clark. *Fear: Contagion and Conquest.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xii, 140. $3.75.

Montague, M. F. Ashley. *Anthropology and Human Nature.* Boston: Porter Sargent, Publisher. 1957. Pp. x, 390. $6.00.

Muller, Herbert J. *The Uses of the Past: Profiles of Former Societies.* New York: Oxford University Press. Reprint, 1957. Pp. xi, 394. $2.25 paper.

Nef, John U. *Industry and Government in France and England, 1540–1649.* Ithaca: Great Seal Books, Cornell University Press. Reprint, 1957. Pp. x, 162. $1.45 paper.

Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci, Percy H. Tannenbaum. *The Measurement of Meaning.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1957. Pp. 342. $7.50.

Perlo, Victor. *The Empire of High Finance.* New York International Publishers. 1957. Pp. 351. $5.50.

Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson, Jr. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 180. $4.00.

Reznikoff, Charles (Ed.). *Louis Marshall, Champion of Liberty: Selected Papers and Addresses.* Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. 1957. 2 vols. Pp. xlii, 1196.

Rickett, Allyn and Adele. *Prisoners of Liberation.* New York: Cameron Associates. 1957. Pp. xii, 288. $4.75.

Robinson, Blackwell P. *William R. Davie.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1957. Pp. xiii, 495. $6.00.

Seeley, J. R., B. H. Junker, R. W. Jones, Jr., et al. *Community Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xi, 593. $7.50.

Sen, S. R. *The Economics of Sir James Steuart.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1957. Pp. vii, 207. $5.00.

Snapp, R. B. *Dynamic Democracy: An Answer to Communism.* New York: Vantage Press. 1957. Pp. 90. $2.50.

Somerset, H. V. F. (Ed.). *A Note-Book of Edmund Burke.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 120. $3.50.

Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1957. Pp. xvi, 1045. $3.50.

Sztankay, Zoltan. *Christianity, Democracy, and Technology.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xiii, 182. $3.75.

Taubman, Joseph. *The Joint Venture and Tax Classification.* New York: Federal Legal Publications. 1957. Pp. xvii, 493. $15.00.

Thorne, Florence Calvert. *Samuel Gompers—American Statesman.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. xi, 175. $3.75.

Tokoi, Oskari. *Sisu: The Autobiography of the First Premier of Finland.* New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1957. Pp. 252. $6.00.

Turberville, A. S. *English Men and Manners in the Eighteenth Century.* New York: Oxford University Press. Reprint, 1957. Pp. xx, iii, 539. $2.95 paper.

Van Riessen, H. *The Society of the Future.* Translated and edited by David Hugh Freeman. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 1957. Pp. 320.

Vella, Walter F. *Siam under Rama III.* Locust Valley, N. Y.: J. J. Augustin for the Association for Asian Studies. 1957. Pp. ix, 180. $5.00.

Webb, Herschel. *An Introduction to Japan.* New York: Columbia University Press. 2nd ed., 1957. Pp. ix, 143.

Wesley, Edgar B. *NEA: The First Hundred Years.* New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. x, 419. $5.00.

Wilson, Ruth Danenhower. *Here is Haiti.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. 204. $3.50.

Wriston, Henry M. *Wriston Speaking: A Selection of Addresses.* Providence: Brown University Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 263. $3.50.

Zupnick, Elliot. *Britain's Postwar Dollar Problem.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1957. Pp. xv, 256. $5.50.

RESEARCH NOTE

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

GABRIEL A. ALMOND, *Rapporteur*
Princeton University

The first research planning session of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council was held on April 5–10, 1957 at the Center for Advanced Study of the Behavior Sciences at Stanford, California. The participants included some of the recipients of SSRC grants for field studies of political groups, as well as a number of other scholars planning field research on these problems.[1] The purpose of the Committee in sponsoring planning sessions among its grantees and other interested scholars is to enhance the cumulative value of research efforts now under way or planned for the near future. As a result of the SSRC program, as well as of a number of other organized and individual efforts, we can anticipate in a few years an extensive monographic literature dealing with political groups and processes in a great many foreign countries and a variety of different culture areas. Systematic information on this scale may not only fill in "areas of ignorance," but offers an opportunity for significant advances in the general theory of politics. Our present theories of interest groups, political parties, and public opinion are based on American and to a lesser extent European experience. We can now look forward to a situation in the near future in which theories of interest groups, parties, and public opinion can be built up on the basis of a rich collection of intensive studies.

The likelihood of a significant theoretical product resulting from this fairly large group of individual efforts may be enhanced by the discussion of hypotheses and research approaches prior to field work, as well as by the pooling and exchanging of information and hypotheses during the course of research and the subsequent analysis. The purpose of the five-day planning session at Palo Alto was to explore the possibilities of agreement about research objectives and methods, and to codify the conclusions of the participants in the form of a research program statement. The planning session proceeded by plenary discussions and the presentation of specific reports by work groups concerned with special problems. The conclusions reached in the general discussions and the reports of the work groups are summarized in the present statement. The topics discussed during the session were as follows: (1) the general objectives of the comparative study of interest groups; (2) general description of the interest group system; (3) the selection of specific interest groups; (4) interest groups and public opinion; (5) interest groups and political parties; (6) interest groups and the legislature; (7) interest groups and the bureaucracy; and (8) the inclusion of non-Western countries in the comparative study.

I. THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES

Comparative analyses of political institutions have thus far been confined to formal governmental institutions, and to political party and electoral systems. Dissatisfaction with these formal comparisons is widespread in view of the generally appreciated fact that formally similar governmental and party systems often function in radically different ways. And the search for explanation of the formally similar but differently functioning political systems has turned to vague residual categories such as "social structure," "national character," "consensus" or its absence, and "public opinion." In Duverger's study of political parties he concluded:

> The development of parties has burst the bonds of the old political categories inspired by Aristotle and Montesquieu. The classic contrast between parliamentary, presidential, and National Convention regimes can henceforth no longer serve as the pivot for modern constitutional law. Kemalist

---

[1] The personnel of the session and the areas represented were as follows: France, Henry Ehrmann, University of Colorado; United Kingdom, Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin; Germany, Sigmund Neumann, Wesleyan University and Gabriel A. Almond, Princeton University; Italy, Joseph La Palombara, Michigan State University; Belgium, Val Lorwin, University of Oregon; Spain, Juan Linz, University of California (Berkeley); Burma, Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; India, Myron Weiner, University of Chicago; Latin America, George Blanksten, Northwestern University and Bryce Wood, Social Science Research Council.

> Turkey, Soviet Russia, and Hitler Germany were profoundly similar because each was a single-party state, although the first practised the National Convention regime, the second a semi-parliamentary regime, and the third a semi-presidential regime. In spite of their common attachment to the parliamentary regime, Great Britain and the Dominions, under a two-party system, are profoundly dissimilar from Continental countries under a multi-partist system, and in certain respects are much closer to the United States in spite of its presidential regime. In fact the distinction between single-party, two-party, and multi-party systems tends to become the fundamental mode of classifying contemporary regimes.[2]

In Duverger's subsequent remarks it becomes clear that even his distinctions between single-party, two-party and multi-party systems are inadequate as principles of explanation of the functioning of political systems. He and other scholars have noted the fact that the multi-party systems of France and Italy differ from those of the Scandinavian and Low Countries, and that the one-party system of Spain is rather different from those of Russia and Nazi Germany. To understand the differences between the multi-party systems of France and Italy and those of the Scandinavian countries we would have to look "below" the levels of the party systems into the "interest group" systems of these countries and into basic popular attitudes toward political authority, partisanship, and interest—their "political cultures" in other words. The differences between the one-party regimes of countries such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany on the one hand and Spain on the other are to be accounted for largely by the different goals and practices of the groups controlling the authoritative governmental institutions.

In our search for types of polities and the principles governing their behavior it would be a mistake simply to go one or two steps beyond Duverger, and say not the party system, but the interest groups and political culture ". . . become the fundamental mode of classifying contemporary regimes." The mistake arises out of the search for some single "crucial institution" or principle of explanation. In other words we turn to the comparative study of interest groups not with the hope that these rather than parties or governmental institutions will yield *the principles* of discrimination between types of political systems, but rather with the expectation that the systematic examination of interest groups in their complex interrelations with public opinion, political parties and formal governmental institutions will enable us to differentiate more accurately between political systems as *wholes*. In other words, the growing concern among scholars with interest groups and public opinion is the consequence of a search for a more complete and systematic conception of the political process as a whole, rather than a search for an approach which is an *alternative* to the present emphasis on formal governmental institutions.

As Truman[3] and other scholars have pointed out, interest groups may be articulate or inarticulate, manifest or latent, formally organized, or simply a condition of like-mindedness and informal communication about issues. A comparison of Western and non-Western political systems brings out sharply the "latency" of the typical non-Western political system in contrast to the overtness of Western politics.[4] How different are the problems of public policy-making in a society where there are no effective mechanisms for the articulation of political demands, from one in which there is an elaborate set of structures for the formulation of demands, and the transmission of these demands into the party and governmental systems? The kinds of interest groups which are present in a society, the specificity or diffuseness of their demands, their conceptions of the political arena and of the "rules of the game," the ethos which they bring with them into the political process—these are the "raw materials" of politics—the unaggregated demands—which some set of mechanisms must transform into political personnel and public policy.

These general observations about interest groups not only suggest their importance as a subject of study, but set certain specifications in research design if the maximum value of a comparative study is to be attained. A good research job on interest groups in a particular country which may make possible meaningful comparisons with other countries, must examine the interest group system in its relations with the social structure and culture on the one hand and the other parts of the political structure on the other. In identifying the interest group system in any particular country this broad functional approach will prevent us from identifying interest groups with any particular kind of structure. The function of articulating and transmitting group interests may be performed in one system typically by the well organized and bureaucratized "pressure groups" familiar in the West, or it may be performed in another system typically through an informal and intermittent process of communication between and among class and status groups such as large landholders or businessmen, and cliques of bureaucrats and/or army officers. If it is possible to state the theme of the comparative study in the form of a single question it might be: What form does the articulation of political interests take in various societies, and how are these interests transmitted to other parts of the political and governmental structure, and translated into choices of political personnel and public policy?

---

[2] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1954), pp. 392–93.

[3] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), pp. 14 ff.

[4] Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton, N. J., 1956), pp. 346 ff.

II. THE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM

It was the general conclusion of the planning session that each of the participants in the comparative study would attempt a general survey of the system of interest groups in his country, describing the kinds of interest groups which are present, their membership size in relation to potential, their financial resources, activities, patterns of coalition and interaction among them, and internal patterns of organization and decision-making. The usefulness of such a descriptive census was defended on the ground that many of the most significant differences among interest group systems will come out sharply through such description. Thus, three of the distinguishing characteristics of American interest groups—the large number of civic and ethnic interest groups, and the relatively high degree of membership participation in decision-making within interest groups—would come out clearly in such a comparative description. A comparison of the structure, the membership and the financial resources of the trade unions on the European continent will tell us a great deal about the differences between the political systems of France and Italy as compared with Germany, the United Kingdom, the Low Countries, and the Scandinavian countries. The predominance of functionally specific, bureaucratized, associational types of interest groups in the West, and of kinship groups, status groups, and of informal cliques in the non-Western areas is one of the most crucial distinctions between these types of political systems. Again the clearer distinction between the functions of parties and interest groups in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, than obtains on the European continent and the non-Western areas, is a major clue to the special properties of Anglo-American politics.

The planning session was in full agreement on the desirability of such a general survey and appraisal of the interest group system as a whole. At the same time the discussion pointed up clearly the radically different conditions of research in the areas represented which might make such a general survey a full-time problem in one area, and an easier task in another. For example, in a country such as Germany, the high degree of formal organization of interest groups, the availability of directories, of interest group publications, and of monographic studies by German scholars, would make such a survey a relatively simple problem and quite consistent with a major allocation of research time to the characteristics and functioning of a limited number of selected groups. In India on the other hand even an attempt at an accurate survey of the kinds and characteristics of interest groups might very well constitute a full-time research operation. Even on the European continent the search for comprehensiveness of coverage and accuracy of detail in some countries might seriously conflict with other research purposes.

A review of the range of problems which might confront the participants in the comparative study in making such general surveys and appraisals led the group to the conclusion that these would in every case be ranked as a research goal, secondary to the more intensive analyses of the characteristics of specific, selected interest groups. They would be carried on primarily as a by-product of the documentary research and interviewing programs of the participants. It was recognized that this would make some of these general appraisals less well documented and more speculative than others. It was also agreed that the general descriptive material gained from such surveys, and the general hypotheses about the characteristics of interest group systems as wholes, would be reported by each participant in the form of a general introductory chapter or chapters in his monographic report. It was also agreed that these general appraisal chapters would be exchanged by the participants as early as possible in order to have included in the individual country studies propositions about similarities and differences between the interest groups of the particular country studied and those of the other countries.

III. THE SELECTION OF SPECIFIC INTEREST GROUPS

While all the participants in the planning session had expressed the intention of studying interest groups in their particular countries, considerable variation emerged in the kind of group or groups which had been selected for emphasis. The original preferences were based on prior research interests and the salience of particular kinds of groups in the countries studied. The planning session brought out the point that while the choice of group or groups differed from one country to the next, all the studies had in common a concern with the political function of articulating and transmitting demands into the political process. The different choices of types of groups was largely due to the fact that different kinds of interest groups performed these functions in the various countries. Thus in the Western European countries, the job of translating the interests of different segments of the society into political demands, and bringing these demands to bear in the policy-making process was largely performed by the trade union movements, the agricultural federations, business groups and trade associations, and church groups of one kind or another. On the other hand, in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America two major classes of interest groups were in operation, one typical of the more modern, industrialized and westernized sectors of these societies, and the other typical of that part of the society less affected by change. Hence, a study of interest groups in the non-Western countries would have to sample both the older and the newer types of structures. It would have to look into the activities of the emerging trade union, business, and student movements in the modernized, primarily urban parts of these societies, and the status groups, kinship and lineage, religious and ethnic groups of the village and the countryside. The problem of interest group research in these areas is not only that of describing the characteristics and functioning of these two types of interest group systems, but also examining their relations with one another.

In the course of the discussions it was agreed that, while each participant might give greater emphasis to research on a particular class of groups, some attention would be given to the activities of the other significant groups. The argument here was that a study which, for example, concentrated on the political activities of trade unions would be incomplete without some attention to business groups and trade associations, agricultural organizations, and religious groups. Hence, those concerned with the European countries agreed that some attention would be paid to each of the major classes of interests. Specific decisions about the allocation of emphasis and methods would have to be made by the researcher in the field, in the light of the availability of information, the relative importance of these groups, and his special interests. Those concerned with the non-Western areas agreed on the desirability of sampling the "modern, urban" type of interest groups, the interests operating within governmental agencies including the army, and the traditional groupings. Here again the specific selections would have to take into account the special characteristics of the political system in the area, as well as the conditions of research.

The general conclusion was that by being concerned with the "function" of interest in the political process, rather than certain kinds of structures, and by being concerned with sampling the interest group universe, a significant step toward comparability and cumulativeness of theory would be accomplished.

IV. INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC OPINION[5]

One of the most challenging opportunities presented by the comparative study was that of systematically introducing public opinion data into the study of political interests. One of the central problems in interest group theory is the relation between manifest and latent interest. To what extent can organized, overt interests be taken as reflecting the interest tendencies of the general population? The phenomena of the mob in non-Western countries, of riots in totalitarian countries, of "Caesarism," "Poujadism," and "incivisme," in the European area suggest that popular attitudes and tendencies are a separable factor in the political process, the properties of which cannot be inferred from the existing organized tendencies and from electoral behavior. Any characterization of a political system would be incomplete if it was confined solely to a description of current organizational patterns and processes. Latent interest may not only result in future changes in organization and process, it establishes an atmosphere which affects the contemporary operations of the political process.

---

[5] This discussion was led by Seymour M. Lipset of the University of California and Gabriel A. Almond, Princeton University.

It was agreed that the relations between interest groups and public opinion would be an important dimension of the comparative study. One of the main, but by no means the only, source of information about public opinion, would be the accumulations of public opinion data available in many of the European countries. In the course of the discussions of the kinds of polling material which were available it became clear that while there was much that might be useful there was relatively little that dealt directly with the problems of legitimacy and consensus, that is, popular attitudes toward governmental authority, and the attitudes of groups in the population toward one another. Thus, certain basic hypotheses about the relations between the condition of political opinion and the functioning of political systems in the European area had never been directly investigated, but were now in the form of inferences from the behavior of groups and institutions. The question put before the session was: Would it be possible through a survey of comparative political opinion to establish (1) that the British political process with its moderate interest groups, and its effectively functioning two-party system, is related to a homogeneous, secular, and loyal public opinion; (2) that the French and Italian political processes with their fragmented party and interest-group systems, are related to fragmented, only partly secularized, and largely alienated political cultures; and (3) that the political systems of the Scandinavian and Low Countries with their "working multi-party systems," and their relatively moderate interest group systems were related to political communities in which the "consensual bond" was stronger than in France and Italy, and in which the great majority of the population viewed governmental authority as having a useful and constructive function in relation to their interests?

All the participants agreed to examine the accumulations of public opinion data in their countries and to use whatever information they could get from these sources on attitudes toward interest, party, and state. In addition they agreed to consult and advise in the planning and execution of a comparative opinion survey which might deal more directly with these phenomena, if such a survey should be undertaken as a part of the program.

A second aspect of the relations between interest groups and public opinion was discussed, the propaganda and information activities of interest groups. The ways in which interest groups conceive of their audiences, and the ways in which they represent their interests to the public should throw light on the functioning of the political system as a whole. For example, French business associations are different from the American in that they do not engage openly and on a large scale in public "informational" activities. This may reflect a general condition of fragmentation in political communication in France, a condition of distrust and alienation among interests. The general proposition was advanced that certain patterns of interest communications activity are associated with certain basic conditions of the political community.

It was agreed that the "public relations" of interest groups would be examined with the following questions in mind: (1) How does the interest group conceive of its audience? (2) How is the public relations function organized and what is the magnitude of the public relations effort? (3) How are interest groups related to the specialized communications system of the society (*e.g.*, press, radio, educational system and the like)?

V. INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES[6]

In the discussions and conferences of the Committee on Comparative Politics over the last three years, and in papers prepared by Committee members and other participants in the Committee's work, the broad outlines of a theory of comparative political systems has slowly developed.[7] In part, this theory has been concerned with the development of models of the various forms of the political process in existence today. During the planning sessions in Palo Alto these models were again discussed; they influenced much of the research design which is reported below. It may be useful to summarize these characterizations of the Anglo-American systems, the varieties of non-Western political systems, the French-Italian "crisis" system, and the "working multi-party" systems of the Scandinavian and the Low Countries.

---

[6] The report on this topic was presented by Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University and Val Lorwin of the University of Oregon.

[7] Kahin, Pauker, Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," this REVIEW (Dec., 1955), pp. 1022 ff.; Almond, Cole, Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," *ibid.*, pp. 1042 ff.; Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* (August, 1956), pp. 391 ff.; Francis X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," (unpublished paper); Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this REVIEW (March, 1956), pp. 1 ff.; Dankwart Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, March, 1956; Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics* (July, 1957); Sigmund Neumann, "Comparative Politics, A Half Century Appraisal," *Journal of Politics* (August, 1957); Gabriel Almond and Myron Weiner, "A Comparative Approach to the Study of Political Groups," Agenda Paper for the Dobbs Ferry Seminar of the Committee on Comparative Politics, June, 1956

In the Anglo-American type of political system the functions of political parties and interest groups are sharply differentiated. Interest groups articulate political demands in the society, seek support for these demands among other groups by advocacy and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personnel, and the various processes of public policy-making and enforcement. Political parties tend to be free of ideological rigidity, and are aggregative, *i.e.*, seek to form the largest possible interest group coalitions by offering acceptable choices of political personnel and public policy. Both the interest group systems and the party systems are differentiated, bureaucratized, and autonomous. Each unit in the party and interest group systems comes into the "market," so to speak, with an adjustive bargaining ethos. Furthermore, the party system stands between the interest group system and the authoritative policy-making agencies and screens them from the particularistic and disintegrative impact of special interests. The party system aggregates interests and transforms them into a relatively small number of alternative general policies. Thus this set of relationships between the party system and the interest group system enables choice among general policies to take place in the legislature, and assures that the bureaucracy will tend to function as a neutral instrument of the political agencies.

We might take as our second type a model summarizing the properties of the political systems which are to be found in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America in which neither parties nor interest groups are fully differentiated. Associational interest groups such as trade unions and business associations may exist in the urban Westernized parts of the society, but in the village and the countryside interest organization takes the form of lineage, caste, status, class and religious groups, which transmit political demands to the other parts of the political structure by means of informal communication. In one version of this class of systems parties tend to be *ad hoc* coalitions without permanent bureaucracies, and without grass roots organization. They exist primarily in election periods and in effect cease to exist in the intervals between. Given such weak and non-aggregative party systems the capacity of the legislatures to formulate alternative policy choices may be seriously impaired, as is their capacity to control the bureaucracies. In many of these political systems the significant political groups are neither the parties, nor the associational interest groups, but elements or cliques within the bureaucracy, and the army; and cliques, informal groupings and powerful families formed within such non-associational interests as religious communities, the large landowners, the business community, and the like. The political process consists of the informal communication and flow of influence between these informally organized interests, and groups within the bureaucracy and the army.

The instabilities of this type of political system arise out of the fact that the agencies for the articulation, communication, and aggregation of interests are incomplete and unrepresentative, as well as out of the fact that the demands transmitted into the political system from interest groups are vague, diffuse, and of radically unlike content and intensity. Latent interests, lacking overt and organized channels of expression may suddenly break into the political arena. The information available to influential groups and individuals about the expectations and attitudes of the various interests in the society cannot be complete or accurate. Hence, calculation is impossible, and the flow of political interaction involves under-reaction and over-reaction, violence and apathy, alternations of periods of political latency, with sudden and violent shifts in power.

Given the basic instability of this general class of political systems, authoritarian stabilizations are a frequent event. Indeed, in many of them the developmental pattern is one of a shift from an unstable pluralism to authoritarianism, and then back again, or a shift from the authoritarianism of one clique to that of another. Authoritarianism may be based on control of the army either by a clique of army officers, or a clique of bureaucrats controlling the army, or by a coalition of both. Still another pattern is one in which the desire on the part of a controlling group to secure its own power and destroy opposition, or to mobilize the society for industrialization and national expansion, leads to the formation of an authoritarian party which actually penetrates the countryside. In some cases as in Turkey and in India the objectives of the ruling groups and of the dominant party are tutelary. That is, the function of the party is not only control and mobilization, but also political acculturation, the preparation of the ground for the emergence of a Western-type associational system and of a Western-type party system with a coherent, responsible, and loyal opposition.

Thus, it should be quite clear that there are many kinds of non-Western political systems. They all appear to have in common (1) a fragmented political culture as a consequence of Westernization, in many cases added on to an indigenous cultural heterogeneity, (2) poor political communications and a high degree of interest latency which renders political calculation difficult if not impossible, and (3) a party system which is incapable of aggregating and synthesizing interest demands into a small number of political alternatives either of personnel or of public policy. On a scale of political differentiation one would have to say that certain kinds of structures such as associational interest groups, the mass media of communication, and the kind of party system common in the West and essential for the functioning of a modern mass-suffrage parliamentary system, are present at best in only a limited degree. On a scale of functional specialization one would have to say that in the absence of fully developed associational interest groups, party systems, and modern media of communication, the functions of interest articulation, aggregation, communication and transmission are largely performed by bureaucratic or army cliques, traditional structures such as lineage or status groupings, and by mobs, street demonstrations and the like, which serve as one of the agencies by means of which latent interests are articulated and transmitted.

A third type of political system is exemplified by France and Italy and by the Germany of the Weimar Republic. Contemporary Germany appears to be moving in the direction of an autonomous interest group system and an aggregative two-party system; toward the Anglo-American model, in other words. In the French and Italian political systems parties and interest groups are organized and bureaucratized, but they are not autonomous systems. They interpenetrate one another and consequently fail to realize the two-stage pattern of the political process characteristic of the English and American systems. There are some parties which more or less control interest groups (*e.g.*, the Communist party and the Communist-dominated trade unions, and to a lesser extent the Socialist parties and the Socialist trade unions). There are some interest groups which more or less control other interest groups and parties (*e.g.*, the Church, the Catholic trade unions, and the Catholic parties, business interest groups, and the center and right wing parties, and the like).

When parties control interest groups they inhibit the capacity of interest groups to formulate pragmatic specific demands; they impart a political-ideological content to interest group activity. When interest groups control parties they inhibit the capacity of the party to combine specific interests into programs with wider appeal. What reaches the legislative process from the interest groups and through the political parties thus are the "raw," unaggregated demands of specific interests, or the diffuse, uncompromising, or revolutionary tendencies of the Church and the movements of the extreme right or left. Since no interest group is large enough to have a majority, and the party system cannot aggregate different interests into a stable majority and a coherent opposition, the electoral and legislative processes fail to provide alternative, effective choices. The result is a legislature penetrated by relatively narrow interests and uncompromising ideological tendencies, a legislature which can be used as an arena for propaganda, or for the protection of special interests, by veto or otherwise, but not for the effective and timely formulation and support of large policy decisions. And without a strong legislature, special interests and ideological tendencies penetrate the bureaucracy, and undermine its neutral, instrumental character.

A fourth type of political system is exemplified by the Scandinavian and Low Countries. These systems appear to differ from the French and Italian in two respects. First, the party systems tend to be aggregative (*e.g.*, the Scandinavian Socialist parties, the Belgian Socialist and Catholic parties). Second, the relations between parties and interests appear to be more consensual, which makes stable majority and opposition coalitions possible. Thus, though the party systems fail to aggregate interests as thoroughly as in the British case, the public policy-making function of the legislature is not undermined to the same extent as in the French and Italian cases. What appears to happen in the Scandinavian and the Low Countries is that the function of interest aggregation and general policy formulation occurs at both the party and parliamentary levels. The parties are partly aggregative of interests, but "majority-minority" aggregation takes place finally in the coalition-making process in the legislature. This coalition-making process may be organized by parties in the formation of cabinets and the enactment of legislation or it may take the form of interest coalitions organized around issues of public policy. The capacity for stable majority-minority party coalitions and for relatively flexible issue-oriented interest coalitions is dependent upon the existence of a basic political consensus which affects both parties and interest groups. These appear to be the properties of the so-called "working multi-party systems."[8]

These simplified models of political systems represent some of the general theory of political groups shared by the participants in the planning session. It represents a set of hypotheses about the characteristics and consequences of the main types of interest group systems to be found in the countries in which field research is planned. The problem of research tactics, of how to test, elaborate, and develop our theories further remains to be specified.

The discussion stressed that the relation between political parties and interest groups could be viewed as a continuum with substantial autonomy at one limit and sub- and super-ordination at the other. The relationship patterns which exist in historical political systems always involve two-way flows of influence, which differ from one another in the dominant direction of the flow and the different patterns which are occasioned by different kinds of issues. Thus the extreme case of the Communist Party-Communist trade union dominance still involves a flow of information and influence from trade union to party, but the dominant direction of the flow is from party to trade union. In the case of the church and Catholic parties the flow of influence varies from country to country, and even among regions within countries. In addition, in certain areas of policy Catholic parties may be relatively free of church influence, or may even influence the church to take a position consistent with or supportive of that of the party. In Germany, for example, the fact that the CDU has both Protestant and Catholic support seriously limits the power of the Catholic church to intervene in party policy-making. In other legislative fields, the freedom of Catholic parties may be sharply circumscribed by a rigid church position, as in the field of educational subsidies and the like. In other policy areas, *e.g.*, social-economic, there may be more give and take in the relations between church and Catholic party.

These considerations suggested that analysis of the flow of influence between parties and interest groups would require not only an examination of the interconnections through financing, interlocking memberships and directorates, sharing of ideological beliefs and the like, but would also require a judicious use of case study methods to discover the way in which different kinds of legislative issues affected the flow and pattern of influence between interest groups and parties.

It was generally agreed that a first task in analyzing parties and interest group relationships would involve a study of the history of these organizations and of their interrelations. In some cases parties formed or were influential in the forming of interest groups (*e.g.*, the Communists and the "Red Unions," the Socialists and the *Force Ouvrière*); in many others interest groups formed or influenced the formation of parties (*e.g.*, some labor parties by trade unions, Catholic parties by the church and/or elements of Catholic Action, and agrarian parties by agrarian interest groups). Whatever the history of the relationship may be, it will provide an important body of evidence on the relationship between the two and changes in the relationship through time.

A second major research task would involve a careful analysis of the structure, internal politics, activities, and ideologies of specific interest groups and parties as they relate to the flow of influence. (1) What is the relative financial strength of interest group and party? To what extent does the interest group finance the party, or *vice versa?* What is the special pattern of election financing? (2) What is their relative manpower potential? *E.g.*, does the party depend on the interest group for personnel during elections as is the case for Catholic and labor parties, or does it have a man-power reserve of its own? (3) What is the relative effectiveness of the grass roots organizations of parties and interest groups? *E.g.*, is the party organized primarily at the center and dependent on interest groups for the penetration of local areas, or does the party have an autonomous local organization of its own? (4) To what extent is there overlapping in membership and officers as between interest group and party? (5) What are the factional and ideological characteristics of interest groups and parties, and how do they affect the pattern of influence?

---

[8] See Dankwart Rustow, "Scandinavia: Working Multi-party Systems," in Sigmund Neumann (Ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 169 ff.

VI. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS[9]

Interest groups tend to seek out the important points of access in the legislative process; the points where legislative policy is initiated, and where revision, vetoing, and favorable action are possible. Hence, the constitutional separation and distribution of powers, legislative organization and procedure, the characteristics of the electoral system and the parliamentary party organization, set the problem of interest group access in the legislative process. Thus, the American system of federalism, and separation of powers, creates a different interest group "target structure" than does the British parliamentary-cabinet system. The American federal system produces a party structure with its center of gravity at the state level. This kind of decentralized party organization limits the possibilities of congressional party discipline and hence opens the legislative process to interest group penetration. The susceptibility of the legislature to interest group penetration is enhanced by the American single-member district electoral system which frequently exposes the legislator to the effective pressure of interests which may be especially concentrated in his constituency. In addition, the American separation of powers system grants a powerful and independent role in legislation to both the House and Senate. And since relatively large collegial bodies are, other things being equal, less able to aggregate interests and protect themselves against interest penetration than Cabinet-dominated parliaments, this aspect of American constitutional structure contributes significantly to interest group action in the legislative process. If we consider this constitutional and statutory structure on the one hand, and the economic, regional, ethnic, and religious composition of the American population on the other, it is hardly surprising that the penetration of the legislative process by interest groups in the United States is greater than in the United Kingdom. There, a unitary constitution, and a Cabinet-dominated parliament make possible a disciplined parliamentary party system which protects the legislative process from effective interest group penetration. The main targets of interest groups are the upper levels of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party structure where power is concentrated, and the bureaucracy. And because of the cohesion of the party system and the concentration of legislative power in the Cabinet, the impact of any single interest group—with the exception of the trade unions—is quite limited.

France presents yet another problem of interest group access. In the United States aggregation and synthesis of interests is performed by the party system and a powerful presidency responsible to a national constituency. France has neither a powerful executive nor an aggregative party system. A culturally and politically fragmented society choosing its legislators by means of proportional representation produces a legislature capable of producing only weak and unstable coalitions. The standing committees of the *Assemblée* are in many cases colonized by powerful interests.[10] The net effect of this situation is a legislative process which can only rarely enact significant "national-interest" legislation, but which regularly and characteristically protects and subsidizes special interests. Still a fourth type of legislative interest group pattern is to be found in the Scandinavian countries where a stronger executive and a more aggregative party system limits the impact of interest groups in the legislative process.

These characteristics of constitutional, legislative, and party structures affect not only the tactics of interest groups, but the very goals and objectives which they can reasonably attain. A disciplined party system and a powerful executive forces interest groups to direct their energies to the upper levels of the executive and the bureaucracy where only moderate claims, well supported with technical information, become possible. A non-aggregative and undisciplined party system as in France opens up the legislative process to covert interest group domination of legislative committees and agencies, or to propagandistic interest group maneuvers of which "Poujadism" is only an extreme instance.

---

[9] The report to the planning session on this topic was presented by Leon Epstein and Henry Ehrmann.

[10] Henry W. Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957), ch. V.

These hypotheses about patterns of interest-group-legislative relations in the European area suggest the importance of a careful analysis of the functioning of the constitutional, legislative, electoral, and party systems as they relate to interest group access. In other words, the aim of research in interest-group-legislative relations will be to determine the extent to which the parliamentary parties, or extra-parliamentary legislative institutions such as the American Presidency, are able to maintain independence of interest groups and relative freedom to legislate or influence legislation (a) by combining several interest groups in their support, and (b) by establishing and maintaining the discipline of the parliamentary party as a means of withstanding interest group pressures.

The discussions in the planning session turned on the question of how to test these hypotheses economically and effectively. It was agreed that research here would concentrate on four problems.

1. The first of these is the analysis of the "target structure" itself. This would involve an examination of the distribution and location of legislative power as between the parliament, the executive, and the bureaucracy; the internal organization and procedure of the parliament; the organization and operations of the party system in the parliament; and the effect of the electoral system on the party system and on the position of the individual parliamentarian. This phase of research would also include an examination of the various devices for formal interest group representation such as "economic councils" and advisory committees and groups of one kind or another.

2. Closely related to this first task is a study of how interest groups perceive and appraise the "target structure" of the legislative process. Such analysis would bring out significant differences between the interest groups in particular countries as well as between countries. If our general impressions are correct we would expect to find that British interest groups would share the same picture of legislative reality, and that it would tend to be a relatively accurate picture. In France, we would expect to find quite different conceptions of constitutional and legislative reality among interest groups. Thus, the different pictures of constitutional reality characteristic of the church and the Communist trade unions would be the consequence of basically different ideological presuppositions and political experience. The C.G.T. would view the French legislative process as incapable of realizing working class objectives. Consequently, their primary objective *vis-à-vis* the French Constitution would be to immobilize it, and to destroy it. The Church, on the other hand, would view the French legislative process as more amenable to pressure through access to the M.R.P. and right-wing parties, and through sympathetic elements in the bureaucracy. In many non-Western countries we would expect to find relatively new and inexperienced interest groups with highly inaccurate or vague pictures of political reality.

3. A third task involves study of the objectives of interest groups in the legislative process. Thus, in the United Kingdom we would expect to find interest groups entertaining moderate, secular objectives in the legislative process; in France we would expect to find interest groups seeking extreme, incompatible, and rigid objectives; in non-Western countries we would expect to find many interest groups seeking "expressive" rather than "instrumental" objectives.

4. A fourth area of study is of the means or techniques employed by interest groups to attain their objectives—what we might call the interest group style. Here, we would be concerned with whether or not the techniques are overt or covert, whether propaganda, negotiation, bribery, or demonstration and riot are the preferred means. In the United Kingdom we would expect to find an overt style, with propaganda, negotiation, and bargaining the favored means of interest groups. In France, we should find that much interest group activity is covert, and that demonstration and bribery occur with some frequency. In many non-Western countries the style of interest groups may be largely covert, and the techniques heavily on the riot, demonstration, and bribery side.

VII. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY[11]

The ideal of a neutral, instrumental bureaucracy, responsible to the political arm, comes closest to being realized in political systems where the political culture tends to be secular and rational, and where the functions of political choice—that is, the articulation and aggregation of interests and the making of public policy—are performed by specialized agencies. If the interest group system fails to articulate and communicate the demands of significant sectors of the population, or if the political demands which it transmits are irreconcilable, then the capacity of the party system to aggregate and to compromise demands and facilitate political choice in the legislative process is undermined. If the parliament and the "political executive" fail to perform the functions of interest articulation and aggregation, then the problem gravitates to the bureaucracy, and its capacity for neutral, responsible administration is weakened. Under these circumstances the bureaucracy tends to be multi-functional. It articulates and aggregates interests, makes public policy and administers it. To be sure the so-called "neutral bureaucracies" in the West do these same things, but only to a limited extent and under control, and in situations where there are effective political agencies outside the bureaucracy.

---

[11] The report on this topic was presented by Juan Linz and Joseph La Palombara.

For purposes of the planning session four types of interest group-bureaucracy relationships were discussed. The first of these is illustrated by the situation in the United Kingdom where moderate interest groups, representative of the significant interest tendencies in the population, are aggregated by disciplined parties. Both of these conditions make possible an effective organization of the legislative process, and an effective political control over the bureaucracy. The second is illustrated by the Scandinavian countries where aggregation of interest is less thorough-going than in the United Kingdom. In the Scandinavian countries aggregation occurs both in the party system and in the coalition-making process in the parliaments. Nevertheless an effective parliamentary process makes possible a neutral, instrumental bureaucracy. The third type is illustrated by the situation in France where effective aggregation of interests and policy making does not occur in the party system, the parliament or the bureaucracy. The net result is a political system in which the agencies of political choice fail to function, and in which basic policy decisions cannot be made. It tends to be a government of "protection and maintenance" in which the effective agencies are the interest groups and the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy cannot be a neutral, responsible instrument under these circumstances. It is "colonized" by interest groups, and penetrated by incompatible ideological tendencies.

The non-Western areas present a variety of interest-group-bureaucracy relationships. In one quite common pattern parties and associational interest groups are only in their beginnings, and the political process operates primarily within the bureaucracy itself. The bureaucracy is a congeries of interests—family, religious, status, class, professional, ideological, and the like. A bureaucratic or army clique makes informal coalitions of these interests and maintains contact through them with their counterparts outside the bureaucracy. The political process may take the form of an unstable pluralism, or in a second variety, a particular clique or individual may establish authoritarian control and operate with the backing of the army. Another non-Western pattern is one in which an authoritarian party is formed, one of its main functions being to mobilize groups in the society, articulate their interests and bring them to the support of the ruling groups. If the tendency of the authoritarian leadership is conservative, then traditional interests—status, economic, religious—will have favored access to the bureaucracy. If the tendency is toward modernization then urban, professional, industrial and labor interests may have favored access to the bureaucracy, and the traditional interests may be in a disadvantaged position.

The planning sessions agreed on the following specifications for research on interest group-bureaucracy relationships: (1) Each study would have to appraise the substantive areas of economic and social life affected by the bureaucracy. This would indicate the kinds of interests which were being affected by bureaucratic activity, and the ways in which they are being affected. (2) Each study would have to examine the organizational and influence pattern of the bureaucracy. To what extent and by what means is the bureaucracy controlled by extra-bureaucratic agencies such as the cabinet and/or the parliament? To what extent is the bureaucracy internally cohesive and subject to central control? Or put the other way around, to what extent are specific agencies and sub-agencies independent? Needless to say both the external political, and internal control patterns would set some of the problems of access of interest groups to the bureaucracy. (3) What are the characteristics of the members of the bureaucracy—particularly its higher echelons? From what social groups are they recruited? What are the training patterns, and what kinds of skills do they possess? What are their ideological and partisan characteristics? All of these attributes would affect their susceptibility to interest group pressures. (4) What are the goals and tactics of the various interest groups *vis-à-vis* the bureaucracy? Are they primarily concerned with gaining specific family, status group, class, or professional advantages, or do they advocate diffuse ideological objectives, or both? What methods of influence do interest groups employ in relation to the bureaucracy? Is bribery or violence a common pattern? Or is propaganda, negotiation, and the provision of information about the consequences of bureaucratic action for specific interests the typical pattern? (5) To what extent do interest groups actually penetrate the bureaucracy? Here we are not only concerned with formal provision for interest group representation in specific agencies in advisory capacities, or with the special relations between administrative agencies and their particular constituencies (*e.g.*, labor ministries, economic ministries, agriculture ministries, and the like), but also with the direct control over specific bureaucratic functions, in other words the "colonization" of the bureaucracy by interest groups.

VIII. COMPARISON OF WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN INTEREST GROUPS[12]

One of the most challenging questions confronting the planning sessions was the problem of comparing Western and non-Western political systems. Are they so different in culture and practice as to constitute basically different political species? Was the approach of political science scholarship in the study of Western and non-Western politics so different as to rule out effective collaboration? Did the group participating in the discussions and planning field studies share a common theory of politics which would make collaboration possible? The discussions led to the conclusion that Western and non-Western political systems have much in common, and that the particular group of scholars present shared a common approach and theory of politics.

The basis of this common outlook might be called the "functional" approach. The participants in the comparative study agreed that they were concerned with the functions of political choice, and with the ways in which these functions were performed in different societies. Every independent society makes political choices, *i.e.*, broad policy decisions which are backed up by severe sanctions. In making and enforcing these political decisions all societies have some way of articulating and communicating political demands, aggregating these demands, translating them into choices of political personnel and public policy, executing these decisions in specific cases, and testing the appropriateness of these specific actions. In studying interest groups comparatively the participants in the study are primarily concerned with the structures, institutions and processes by means of which these functions are accomplished. Research conclusions as to which structures and processes perform which functions in different societies, and how they perform them, will provide the basic materials for comparative analysis.

Not only are these functions performed in all independent political systems—Western and non-Western—but the structures and processes which perform them in both areas overlap to a considerable extent. The West is more like the non-West than we sometimes think. Even in the most differentiated and specialized political systems in the West, such interest groups as families, status groups, and religious communities affect the political process. And in most of the non-Western countries—however "underdeveloped"—the beginnings of functionally specialized political parties, and associational interest groups such as trade unions and trade associations, may be found. Even in the field of political communication the highly elaborated mass communication systems of Western societies should not obscure the fact that informal and face-to-face communication is still a political factor of enormous importance.

In still another respect Western and non-Western systems are alike. While it is true in general that Western political structures are more specialized than the non-Western, there is much "multi-functionalism" in the West. Thus in a country such as France political parties and interest groups are not sharply differentiated from one another. And in all countries the structural specialization of policy-making and administration is by no means complete, nor can it ever be complete. If it is peculiar to non-Western countries that bureaucracies are penetrated by interest groups and ideological tendencies, this situation differs only in degree from the Western pattern where rationality, responsibility, and neutrality are only partially realized at best.

---

[12] Reports on this problem were presented by Myron Weiner, Lucian Pye, George Blanksten and Bryce Wood.

The comparative study of interest groups will include a number of cases in Asia and Latin America. In particular it is anticipated that there will be studies of Malaya, Burma, India, and Indonesia in Asia; and of Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and Peru in Latin America. The non-Western specialists at the planning session agreed to follow much the same pattern as the European specialists. This would include a general appraisal of the kinds of interest groups to be found in these countries, their composition, size, goals, methods of influence, and the like. It would also include more detailed investigations of selected interest groups. These intensive studies are likely to include trade unions, peasant groups, student groups, religious and tribal or ethnic groups. Some attention would be paid to the "mob" as an "anomic" interest group phenomenon, resulting from lack of effective access of some social groupings to politics, and generally poor political communications.

The planning session at Palo Alto was followed by another held in June, 1957 at Michigan State University for a number of scholars about to undertake research on political groups in Latin America. A third is planned for the late Spring in 1958 for recipients of grants for field research on political groups during the present year. By setting common questions and discussing common approaches the Committee on Comparative Politics hopes to introduce greater coherence in the research efforts under way. More recently it has begun to plan a series of comparative analyses which will draw the findings of these and other research efforts together.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Carl M. Frasure served as chairman of the Committee-in-Charge of the Pre-Legislative Conference sponsored by West Virginia University at the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia on November 15 and 16, 1957. In attendance were members of the State Legislature, The Board of Public Works, Supreme Court of Appeals, Congressional Delegation, and sixty invited guests representing the political, economic and educational life of the state. Subjects under discussion included renewable natural resources, equalization and revaluation of general property and taxation and finance, with particular reference to schools and roads.

The Pre-Legislative Conference was financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

The first annual fall meeting of the Missouri Political Science Association was held at Fulton on October 25, 1957. William Yandell Elliott delivered the opening address, "Meeting the Political Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Bloc in the Post-Stalin Period." United States Senator Stuart Symington addressed the group at luncheon. The afternoon was devoted to a general discussion of the beginning course in political science. At the evening program Martin L. Faust, University of Missouri, presented a paper on "The Need for Constitutional Reform in Missouri; subsequent discussion was led by Carl A. McCandless of Washington University, Henry Schmandt of St. Louis University, and Dean William L. Bradshaw of the University of Missouri. Officers elected for 1958 were David C. Scott of Southwest Missouri State College, president, Paul G. Steinbicker of St. Louis University, vice president, and Robert F. Karsch of the University of Missouri, secretary-treasurer (re-elected). Jerzy Hauptmann of Park College and Laura Ellen Wadsworth of Flat River Junior College were elected to the executive council.

On December 7, 1957, the District of Columbia Political Science Association held its Third Annual Conference on the campus of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. The chairman of the committee on Program and Arrangements was G. Lyle Belsley, Assistant Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration. Others involved in the planning and conducting of the conference were the following: President, Ward Stewart, U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; first vice president, Charles J. Zinn, House Committee on the Judiciary; second vice president, Vincent W. Browne, Howard University; executive council members, Karl Cerny, Georgetown University, Charles A. H. Thompson, Brookings Institution, and S. McKee Rosen, International Cooperation Administration; secretary-treasurer, Martha K. Trytten, legislative assistant to Senator Thomas C. Hennings; also William H. Roberts, Catholic University, and Paul T. David, Brookings Institution.

The conference had the largest registration and the largest attendance of any sponsored by the D. C. Association to date. The speaker at the opening general session was Robert K. Carr, Professor of Law and Political Science at Dartmouth College, now on leave as general secretary of the American Association of University Professors, who spoke on "The Courts, Civil, and Academic Freedom."

The round tables and participants were as follows:

"Federal Responsibilities in Metropolitan Areas"; chairman, Franklin L. Burdette, professor and director, bureau of governmental Research, University of Maryland; principal speaker, Robert H. Connery, professor of political science, Duke University, consultant, Governmental Affairs Institute; participants, Robert E. Merriam, assistant director, Bureau of the Budget; Louis Brownlow, former director, Public Administration Clearing House; Mrs. Kathryn H. Stone, member of the House of Delegates of Virginia; Paul T. David, director, governmental studies, Brookings Institution.

"Treaty Power and Executive Agreements"; chairman, Charles J. Zinn, law revision counsel, House Judiciary Committee; participants, Loftus E. Becker, legal adviser, Department of State; Col. Howard S. Levie, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General U. S. Army; Richard W. Van Wagenen, dean, graduate school, American University.

"The Courts and School Desegregation: Status and Prospects"; chairman, Don Shoemaker, executive director, Southern Education Reporting Service; participants, Walter E. Hager, president, District of Columbia Teachers College; James M. Nabrit, secretary, Howard University; Alfons J. Beitzinger, assistant professor of politics, Catholic University; Edmund D. Campbell, attorney and former member of Arlington County Board; B. M. Miller, the Constitution Party, Arlington, Virginia.

"The Determination of Fiscal Policy"; chairman, Dr. Gerhard Colm, National Planning Association; participants, Joseph Pechman, Committee for Economic Development; Norman Ture, staff, Joint Economic Committee; Edwin L. Dale, financial correspondent, *New York Times*.

"Defense Policy—The Next Ten Years"; chairman, Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, Brookings Institution, consultant to Department of Defense; participants, William Y. Elliott, Professor of Government, Harvard University; consultant to the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Department of State; Roger Hilsman, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; James E. King, Jr., research associate, Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University James D. Atkinson, assistant professor of government, Georgetown University; Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, U.S.A. ret., military analyst, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*.

"The Congress and Its Politics"; chairman, Max M. Kampelman, attorney and former Counsel to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota; participants, Ernest S. Griffith, Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress; dean designate, School of International Service, American University; Gerald W. Siegel, counsel, Majority Policy Committee, U. S. Senate; Robert A. Forsythe, administrative assistant to Senator Edward J. Thye of Minnesota; Colonel J. Donald Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps., legislative assistant to the Commandant; Michael B. Deane, vice president, American Watch Association.

The program included an informal luncheon and concluded with the annual business meeting. The new officers elected for 1958 are: president, Charles J. Zinn; first vice president, Wolfgang H. Kraus, George Washington University; second vice president, Robert E. Goostree, American University; executive council, G. Lyle Belsley.

The International Institute of Administrative Science will hold a round-table in Liege, Belgium 27 June–3 July 1958. Themes for discussion include Automation and the Public Service, Deconcentration (or Decentralization), and Public Consultation in Administrative Decision-Making. The discussions will be intimate and informal, since this is a limited meeting, not a congress. Persons interested in being included in the U.S. delegation may obtain further details from Mr. Robert Matteson, executive director, ASPA and secretary of the International Committee of IIAS, 6042 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The XXIVth Congress of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning will be held in Liege, Belgium 31 August–3 September 1958. The theme is "Planning in the Region: The Home, The Community, The Region." This is an open congress that should attract nearly 1,000 delegates from over 30 countries. Americans interested in participating may obtain further details from the U.S. member of the executive board, Mr. Dennis O'Harrow, American Society of Planning Officials, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The Southern Political Science Association held its 29th annual meeting at Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November 21–23, 1957. Professors V. O. Key and Robert Cushman were special guests of the Association, and the following officers were elected to serve during 1958: Professor Lee S. Greene of the University of Tennessee, president; Robert Highsaw of the University of Alabama, vice-president, and Richard H. Leach of Duke University, recording secretary. Peter Fleiss, Louisiana State University; Charles Lerche, Emory University, and Robert Gill, Morgan State College, were elected to membership on the executive council.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will hold its annual meeting at the University of Michigan on April 24–26, 1958. Featured speakers will include G. D. H. Cole, V. O. Key and John M. Blum. Inquiries concerning the schedule, program, housing or other arrangements may be addressed to A. LeRoy Bennett, secretary, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.

Indiana University's bureau of government research held a planning conference on November 25 and 26 with representatives of 18 counties of the State of Indiana for setting up a system of records of county highway operations which are to be centrally analyzed to provide management information to the County Highway Department of the state. Professors John E. Stoner and York Willbern of the department of government led the conference.

The Southern California Political Science Association held its fall meeting at U.C.L.A. on November 8, 1957. The topic under consideration was: "The Political Impact of Little Rock." Panelists included: Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; William Buchanan, University of Southern California; and James Coleman, University of California (Los Angeles).

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Duke University has been awarded a grant of $90,000 for a number of projects designed to promote research in the relationship between Christianity and politics. The grant was made by the Lilly Endowment, Inc., for a three year period. Director of the program will be John H. Hallowell.

Indiana University will hold a regional American Assembly Conference in April 1958 on the subject of "International Stability and Progress."

A Southern California Slavic Group was organized at a meeting held at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, on November 1, 1957.

On November 22nd and 23rd the school of government and public administration of The American University held its annual inter-institutional meetings for the representatives of 80 colleges and universities that participate in the Washington Semester Program. These representatives meet at The American University annually to see the program in action and to establish and revise policy which governs the program. Dean Catheryn Seckler-Hudson is the director of the Washington Semester, and Professor Robert E. Goostree is the co-ordinator. Emmet V. Mittlebeeler and Royce Hanson are academic directors in this undergraduate program of field study.

Fordham University has inaugurated an annual Moorhouse I. X. Millar lecture series in honor of the late founder of the University's department of political philosophy and the social sciences. Arthur F. Burns of Columbia University, former chairman of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers delivered the first series in October 1957.

At the University of Illinois, the Charles E. Merriam Fellowship in Political Science has been established carrying a stipend of $1500. This has been made possible by a gift to the University by his son, Charles J. Merriam of Chicago.

The school of government of the George Washington University has inaugurated a summer seminar on the federal government. Part-time in-service training and direct observation of government will be included with class and research work. The program will be under the general supervision of Alfred G. Obern, assistant professor of public administration.

A new informal journal of research ideas and problems appeared in September and will appear bimonthly. It is called *Political Research: Organization and Design* (PROD) and is edited and published at Princeton, New Jersey. Alfred de Grazia is managing editor. Scholars active in PROD's publication are Karl Deutsch (M.I.T.), Richard C. Snyder (Northwestern), Chilton Bush (Stanford), Carl Stover (The Brookings Institution), and Ben Gedalecia (Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn). Others will be named shortly.

PROD collects and circulates among its readers the ideas of political and behavioral scientists about research that might advance man's knowledge of political behavior. It is more a free expression of what may be promising inquiries than it is a medium for elaborate designs, research memoranda, or reports of completed work.

Every political scientist or anyone else is cordially invited to address himself to the pages of PROD with a contribution of 1500 words or less. Subscriptions cost $2 for academicians, $3 for libraries and institutions, and $10 for commercial organizations. Address all correspondence to PROD, Post Office Box 294, Princeton, New Jersey.

The Wayne State University political science department is engaged for the second consecutive year in training Indonesian public officials in public administration and state and local government under the sponsorship of the International Cooperation Administration. Henry C. Bush is program director, and Roger H. Marz is assistant program director. Fifteen officials, from several national and provincial units of government, whose work would correspond to that of county and state officials here, are here for 12 months. Formal instruction will be combined with internships in various state and local public agencies of government.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has received a three-year grant from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh for a program designed to further the political education of engineers and scientists. Robert C. Wood, formerly of the department of government at Harvard, has been made director. A program of field and case studies is being developed on political activities associated with metropolitan and regional issues involving questions of particular interest to engineers and scientists.

The problems of furthering research in Marxism and Leninism on an international basis were the subject of a recent conference of scholars from European countries and the United States. The meeting, which was held in Amsterdam from August 1, to August 3, 1957, continued discussions that had begun in January of this year in Berlin. Representatives from the United States included A. G. Meyer of Michigan State and G. L. Kline of New York.

A Study of the operations of the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, the Bay Area's prototype for regional government with joint city-county participation, and the first such agency of truly regional scope ever to be created in that area will be undertaken by the bureau of public administration, University of California under the direction of Stanley Scott.

The political science section of the AAAS was cosponsored this year by the American Political Science Association and the Midwest Political Science Association. Charles S. Hyneman presided and papers dealing with the subject "Studies in Electoral Behavior" were read by Warren E. Miller and James A. Robinson. The session was held December 29, 1957 at the Lincoln-Sheraton Hotel in Indianapolis.

The Rangoon-Hopkins Center for Southeast Asian Studies is now in its fourth year. This joint undertaking of the Johns Hopkins University graduate school of advanced international studies and the Rangoon University is headed by Htin Aung, the rector of Rangoon University as director of the Center. The present co-director is William C. Johnstone, professor of Asian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, who is in Rangoon on a two-year assignment. Mr. Johnstone is also visiting professor of international relations at Rangoon University, and he is directing the study and research of three graduates of the school in Washington, D.C., who are concentrating in the Southeast Asian area.

Another group of graduates of the school are teaching at the Gadjah Mada University in Djogdjakarta, Indonesia, under a six-year contractual arrangement between that university and the School of Advanced International Studies.

A bureau of government research has recently been established at the University of Missouri with George Y. Harvey, lecturer in the school of business and public administration as director for the present year.

A politics center has been established at Vanderbilt University under a three year grant to the political science department by the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation. David A. Booth is executive secretary.

Harold F. Alderfer, who is on leave of absence from The Pennsylvania State University, has been appointed by Governor Leader as deputy secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Instruction.

Elton Atwater, recently promoted to professor, is on leave for two years from The Pennsylvania State University to serve as associate director of the Quaker Program at the United Nations.

Chester W. Bain of the University of Virginia is serving as visiting professor of political science at West Virginia University during the academic year 1957–58.

E. E. Schattschneider, John E. Andrus professor of government at Wesleyan University, has been selected chairman of the Citizenship Clearing House for the year 1957–58. Other officers elected to serve with Dr. Schattschneider include Arthur S. Flemming, president of Ohio Wesleyan University as vice-chairman; Russell D. Niles, dean of the New York University Law School, as secretary-treasurer; and George H. Williams, professor of law at New York University, as director. Dean Alexander Heard of the graduate school of the University of North Carolina and dean Lawrence Chamberlain of Columbia College have also joined the executive committee.

William B. Ballis of the University of Michigan, has returned from a tour of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. His trip was sponsored by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants. Professor Ballis has been appointed chairman of the committee on the program in Russian studies at the University of Michigan.

The director of the legal research institute of the faculty of law, University of Ankara, Hikmet Belbez, will join the staff of the center of Turkish studies at Columbia University, during the Spring Session.

Philip Buck of Stanford, whose grant from the Ford Foundation to study British politics has been extended, will remain in England until October 1958.

Ronald Bunn, instructor in government at The University of Texas, has received a grant from the University Research Institute.

L. K. Caldwell, coordinator of the Thailand administration project at Indiana University served as chairman of the workshop leaders at the November meeting of the American Society for Public Administration's Management Institute.

Kenneth C. Cole has resigned the executive officership of the political science department at the University of Washington. He will be a visiting professor at Stanford University during the winter and spring quarters.

Fred Cottrell, department of government at Miami University, participated in the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies in February and March.

Harry R. Davis has been made acting chairman of the department of government at Beloit College.

John A. Davis is on partial leave from the City College of New York to serve as commissioner of the State Commission Against Discrimination appointed by Governor Harriman. He was also appointed to the economic committee of the National Democratic Advisory Committee.

J. William Davis, head of the department of government at Texas Technological College is president of the Southwestern Social Science Association for the year 1957–58. The association meeting will be held in Dallas at the Adolphus Hotel next Easter.

David Deener of Tulane University is serving this year as executive secretary of the Duke Commonwealth Studies Center and during the spring semester as visiting professor of political science in the department of political science.

Raymond Dennett, president of the American Scandinavian Foundation, has been named lecturer in government in Columbia College for the current academic year.

John T. Dorsey, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, is now serving as chief of the public administration division of the Michigan State University technical assistance group in Vietnam.

John H. Ferguson, on leave from the Pennsylvania State University, is serving as budget director in addition to secretary of administration of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Russell H. Fifield of the University of Michigan has been designated a member of the National Defense Executive Reserve of the Department of State.

Floyd Flom, assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota has been appointed by Governor Freeman as a member of the Governor's Committee on Ethics in Government.

Morton J. Frisch, of the College of William and Mary, is serving during the present academic year and through the summer session as visiting professor of political science at the University of Minnesota.

Lowell H. Hattery, professor of government and public administration in the school of government and public administration in The American University is on sabbatical leave.

E. Allen Helms is serving as acting chairman of the department of political science at Ohio State University during the academic year 1957–58.

Samuel Hendel, who spent the month of June in Russia under a grant from the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, has been elected chairman of the department of government, City College of New York.

John H. Herz of The City College of New York has been serving as visiting professor at the school of international affairs at Columbia University during the winter session. He has been appointed visiting professor at the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research for the spring term of 1958.

Dell G. Hitchner will be acting executive officer of the department of political science at the University of Washington during the winter and spring quarters.

Neal D. Houghton of the University of Arizona will be a visiting professor of political science at the University of Washington for the winter and spring quarters.

Charles D. Hounshell of Emory University has been named chairman of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation selection committee for Region VI comprising South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

Robert N. Carew Hunt has been appointed visiting professor of government at Indiana University for the second semester 1957–58.

Jack Kenny, University of Southern California, has been elected president of the American Society of Criminology.

Philip E. Jacob, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, delivered the Rufus Jones Lecture at Pennsylvania State University, November 10 on "Changing Values in College"; and was resource leader of a special faculty conference on the same subject.

Wilfrid Knapp of St. Catherine's College, Oxford is a visiting associate professor of government at Oberlin College for the year 1957–58.

Ivan Kubanis, instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed by Governor Freeman as executive secretary of the Governor's Study Committee on Agriculture.

Walter Z. Laqueur, editor of *Soviet Studies* (England), was visiting associate professor at the University of Chicago during the winter quarter 1958 under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation in International Relations.

Walter H. C. Laves, chairman of the department of government at Indiana University and Charles A. Thomson have received a grant from the Lilly Foundation of Indianapolis for research in American foreign policy. Professor Laves gave an address on "The Role of Institution of Higher Learning in Developing Asian-US Relations" at the UNESCO conference in San Francisco.

J. Gus Liebenow, assistant professor of government at The University of Texas has been given a research grant by the University Research Institute.

William S. Livingston, associate professor of government at The University of Texas, has received a grant from the University Research Institute. Livingston has resigned as assistant dean of the graduate school to return to full-time work in the department.

H. Malcolm Macdonald is the new chairman of the department of government at the University of Texas.

Heath Macquarrie who resigned as professor of political science and international relations at Brandon College, University of Manitoba in 1956 served as Rockefeller Research Associate in political economy at the University of Toronto in the winter term 1957. In June

Professor Macquarrie was elected to the Canadian House of Commons from the constituency of Queens Prince Edward Island.

Seymour Mann of Harpur College has been responsible for a study on the Binghamton metropolitan area sponsored by the New York State Temporary Commission on the Constitutional Convention.

M. Nelson McGeary, of The Pennsylvania State University, has been appointed by Governor Leader of Pennsylvania to the Commission on Constitutional Revision.

Dean E. McHenry, University of California (Los Angeles) has completed a study of higher education in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Among those associated with him on the survey was Richard W. Van Wagenen of American University.

Lennox A. Mills, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, held a Guggenheim research grant during the summer of 1957. He was on leave of absence during the winter quarter, 1958.

Hans Morgenthau addressed the annual meeting of the American Historial Society on "In Defense of the National Interest."

Alfred G. Obern of The George Washington University spent the last summer as a consultant at the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland.

Jean Pajus has been appointed visiting lecturer at the University of Miami.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, recently was elected as secretary of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He will continue to be a member of the Board of Trustees of the Academy.

Ernst Posner, retiring graduate dean of the American University and professor of history and records administration in the school of government and public administration at The American University is spending a sabbatical year in Europe on a Fulbright fellowship.

Pitman Potter of American University gave a series of lectures on "Recent Developments in International Organization" at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes. Etudes Internationales in Geneva November 11–13, 1957.

Henry Reining, Jr., dean of the school of public administration, University of Southern California, has been appointed chairman of the Los Angeles Charter Study Committee.

J. William Robinson, chairman of the department of political science and international relations, Whittier College, has been elected director of the Institute of World Affairs for the year 1958. He will be responsible for the program of the 35th Annual Session of the Institute, which is sponsored by the University of Southern California with the co-operation of other colleges and universities of the Pacific Coast and Mountain States.

Russell M. Ross of the State University of Iowa has been reelected to a second term as mayor of University Heights.

Joseph S. Roucek of the University of Bridgeport has been elected to the board of associates of the Ethnic Institute of Georgetown University.

Steven E. Schanes, director of the division of pensions, department of the treasury, state of New Jersey, has been elected president of the conference of state social security administrators at the seventh annual conference in Denver, in September, 1957.

John R. Schmidhauser has been awarded a research assistant professorship for the spring semester of 1957–58 at the State University of Iowa.

Frank Sherwood, on sabbatical leave from the University of Southern California, spent three months in Iran as a consultant to the Institute for Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran. The Institute was established by USC under a contract with ICA.

Vergil A. Shipley, formerly associate professor of political science at the University of Wichita is a visiting lecturer at the University of Miami.

J. David Singer of Vassar College is on a Ford Foundation International Relations Fellowship at Harvard. He has recently been appointed Psychology Editor for the journal *Background on World Politics*.

Lloyd M. Short, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Minnesota, was on leave of absence during the fall quarter, 1957. Professor Charles H. McLaughlin served during this period as acting chairman. Professor Short has received a University fellowship for European travel during the summer of 1958.

Fred A. Sondermann, assistant professor of political science, Colorado College, has been at Stanford University, under a grant from the Ford Foundation's International Relations Training Fellowship program. He also served as visiting assistant professor at the Social Science Foundation, University of Denver during the summer of 1957.

Ivan Stone of Beloit College will be on leave during the second semester, 1957–58 to do research in Greece, Yugoslavia and western Europe.

Robert Strausz-Hupe, of the University of Pennsylvania, attended, as a member of the American Steering Committee, the Conference on the Atlantic Community at Bruges, September 8 to 16, 1957. The members of the American Steering Committee were: Gaylord P. Harnwell, Chairman; Raymond B. Allen; Detlev W. Bronk; Colgate W. Darden, Jr.; Thomas K. Finletter; Hans Kohn; Frank C. Nash; Sidney Smith; and Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr., executive secretary.

Edward Taborsky, associate professor of government at The University of Texas, has been granted a research leave for the spring semester of 1957–58.

Charles H. Titus of U.C.L.A. has been granted a one-half year sabbatical leave to conduct research in Spain and Italy.

Herman H. Trachsel, University of Wyoming, has been granted sabbatical leave for the second semester of 1957–58 to carry on research in Washington, D.C.

Donald Urquidi, instructor of government at the University of Miami is on leave of absence on a Fulbright Fellowship in Rome.

Paul van der Veur, assistant professor of government at the University of Hawaii, attended the Ninth Pacific Science Congress at Bangkok, Thailand (Nov. 18–Dec. 9, 1957), where in the Division of Anthropology and the Social Sciences he had the dubious distinction of being the only political scientist present.

Robert Walker of Stanford served as chairman of one of the sessions of the panel on Economic and Technical Assistance at the National UNESCO Conference in San Francisco.

O. Douglas Weeks, professor of government at The University of Texas, has been granted a research leave for the fall semester 1957–58.

Norman Wengert, of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, served as a staff member of the third Management Institute sponsored by the American Society for Public Administration. The meetings, held in Chicago, November 17–22, 1957, were devoted to the subject of Communications in Public Administration, and were attended by sixty members of local, state and federal governments.

APPOINTMENT AND STAFF CHANGES

David E. Apter of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Vernon Aspaturian has been promoted to associate professor at The Pennsylvania State University.

Russell H. Barrett was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Michael Biloz, a doctoral candidate at Syracuse University, is serving as visiting instructor in Political Science at Harpur College.

Robert Boynton, formerly assistant professor of history and government at Wells College has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the State University of Iowa.

J. Alton Burdine, professor of government at The University of Texas, has accepted a double appointment as dean of the college of arts and sciences and associate dean of the graduate school at that institution.

L. Gerald Bursey has been appointed instructor in political science at M.I.T.

Frank B. Cliffe, Jr. has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science and assistant coordinator of the Vietnam Project at Michigan State University.

O. B. Conway, Jr. formerly assistant director of the graduate school of the Department of Agriculture is now with the Albany graduate program in public administration conducted jointly by New York University and Syracuse University in cooperation with the State University of New York. He is professor of public administration on the New York University staff and professor of political science at the Maxwell School.

Geoffrey Yates Cornog has accepted a position as instructor of political science at Michigan State University.

Joseph Cunningham has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in electronics in management.

James A. Dator has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer.

John Paul Duncan has been promoted to the rank of professor at the University of Oklahoma.

John H. Fenton has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Charles N. Fortenberry is acting dean of the graduate school, University of Mississippi.

Guy Fox has returned from Vietnam where he was chief of the division of the National Institute of Administration Programs of the Michigan State University technical assistance group. He has been appointed professor and acting head of political science at Michigan State University.

Harry J. Friedman has accepted a position as instructor of political science at Michigan State University.

Robert S. Friedman has been promoted to an assistant professorship at Louisiana State University.

Sterling H. Fuller has been promoted to full professor in the department of government at Texas Technological College, Lubbock.

Frederick H. Gareau joined the staff as assistant professor of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Edward B. Glick, director of the Commission on International Affairs of the American Jewish Congress, has been appointed as lecturer in government in the School of General Studies of The City College of New York.

Robert B. Dishman has been promoted to full professor in the department of government at the University of New Hampshire and simultaneously was re-appointed as a Democratic member to the New Hampshire Legislative Council.

Robert E. Goostree has been appointed assistant to the dean of the school of government and public administration in charge of the Washington Semester Program at The American University.

William Jay Gore, formerly of the department of political science at the University of Kansas, joined the faculty of the graduate school of business and public administration at Cornell University, in September, 1957, as assistant professor of public administration.

Jack Gourman has received a permanent appointment as instructor of political science at Immaculate Heart College.

Jerome Hall has been appointed Distinguished Service professor of law, at Indiana University.

William C. Havard of the University of Florida has been appointed associate professor of government at Louisiana State.

Charles M. Hersh has been appointed assistant to the dean of the school of government and public administration in charge of the uptown program at The American University.

Robert S. Hill has received an appointment as instructor at The Pennsylvania State University.

Harry A. Holloway, formerly of Cornell University, has accepted appointment as instructor in government at The University of Texas.

A. F. Jandali has accepted a position as instructor of political science at Michigan State University.

Henry L. Janssen has been promoted to associate professor at San Diego State College.

Ned V. Joy, assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College, has been promoted to associate professor.

Morton A. Kaplan, in addition to his academic duties, has been appointed acting secretary of the Harris Memorial Foundation by the University of Chicago.

Sabe M. Kennedy was promoted to full professor in the department of government at Texas Tech. Dr. Kennedy is also serving as general program chairman of the Southwestern Social Science Association meeting to be held in Dallas this spring.

James Kitchen has joined the political science staff at San Diego State College as an assistant professor.

David C. Knapp, assistant professor of government for the last four years at the University of New Hampshire, has been appointed assistant to president Eldon L. Johnson, a former member of this Association dating back to his professorship at the University of Oregon.

George Liska has been appointed assistant professor of the department of political science at the University of Chicago and research associate in the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy beginning October 1958.

Normal S. Mackie Jr., doctoral candidate at Columbia has become instructor in government at the University of Miami.

Howell C. McCleskey, formerly of Harvard University, has accepted an appointment as instructor in government at The University of Texas.

Herbert McClosky, who was recently promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, has received a grant from the Social Science Research Foundation to be used over a period of two and one-half years.

David W. McCormick has become assistant professor in the department of social science at Eastern Illinois University.

Josephine F. Milburn, connected with Chicago City Junior College during 1956–1957, now holds an appointment as instructor in government at Simmons College.

Alfred G. Meyer has accepted a position as associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Benjamin Nimer has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Washington and Jefferson College.

William E. Oden has been promoted to associate professor at Texas Technological College in the department of government.

Daisy Parker has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the Florida State University.

Paul J. Piccard has been appointed an associate professor of political science at the Florida State University.

Mejmir Povolny has been appointed an instructor in international relations at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1957–1958.

James W. Prothro has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the Florida State University.

Lucian W. Pye has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Leo F. Redfern recently returned from a Sheldon Fellowship in Europe, has been appointed instructor in the government department at Harvard.

Peter Remec of Fordham University has been named an assistant professor.

William E. Rhode of Michigan State University has been appointed assistant professor at San Diego State College.

George H. Ritter, formerly of the University of Missouri, has been appointed instructor in political sciences at West Texas State College.

George K. Romoser has been appointed as an instructor of political science at Ohio State University.

Lloyd I. Rudolph has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard University.

Susanne H. Rudolph has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Harvard.

Elmer Rusco of the University of California at Berkeley has been appointed instructor at San Diego State College.

Dankwart A. Rustow has been promoted to associate professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

Warner R. Schilling, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at M.I.T. He will be in charge of developing graduate studies relating to National Defense Policy and Military Technology in collaboration with General James McCormack, Jr., vice-president of M.I.T. and formerly director of research and development of the United States Air Force.

Robert G. Scigliano, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, is now serving as assistant to the chief advisor of the Michigan State University technical assistance group in Vietnam.

John A. Shannon, assistant professor of political science at Creighton University resigned his post at that institution, August, 1957, to enter government service. Dr. Shannon is currently serving on the White House staff.

Kurt Shell, assistant professor of political science at Harpur College will be a visiting lecturer in the department of government at Cornell University.

Donald Smith has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of Rhode Island.

Manes Specter, chief, Training and Development Division, Veterans Administration, has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer in personnel administration.

Richard A. Steele, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at West Texas State College.

Raymond P. Stone, formerly on the staff of Dickinson College, has been appointed as instructor at The Pennsylvania State University.

Melvin P. Straus has been advanced to the rank of assistant professor of government at The University of Texas.

Seth P. Tilman has been appointed instructor in political science at M.I.T.

John A. Toomey has resigned as instructor of political science at Marlboro College to become Middle Atlantic Area Director of the Great Books Foundation.

Arthur G. Umscheid has become director of the department of history and political science at Creighton University.

John F. Wallerstedt has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in comparative government.

Jess Walters, in the fall of 1957, joined the staff of the legislative reference bureau of the University of Hawaii and has assumed part-time teaching dutes in the University's department of government.

Edwin W. Webber, doctoral candidate at Tulane University, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of history and government at St. Lawrence University.

Charles F. Whittemore was appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Wyoming, beginning in September 1957.

Francis Wilhoit of Mercer University has been appointed instructor in government in the department at the University of Miami.

IN MEMORIAM

P. Raymond Nielson, director, departments of history and political science, Creighton University, died suddenly as result of a brain hemorrhage, May 27, 1957. A.B., Manhattan College, 1922; A.M., Catholic University of America, 1924; Ph.D., Ibid., 1926. Member of Creighton faculty for thirty years. At time of his death he was serving as acting dean of the graduate school.

Robert W. Rafuse, professor of political science at Harpur College, S.U.N.Y., died at the age of fifty in Binghamton, N. Y. on October 10, 1957. During the last academic year he had been away for the fall term on sick leave, and had been able to appear on campus but once before his untimely demise.

Although his secondary school training had been much postponed by illness, he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Colgate University in 1934. Both his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees were received from the University of Illinois. Dr. Rafuse began his teaching career in 1936 as an instructor in political science at Williams College. After teaching in the summer session at North Adams State Teachers College in Massachusetts in 1940–41, he served as assistant professor of political science at Middlebury College until 1947. At Middlebury he established an enviable reputation as a brilliant teacher that is recalled by many now in our profession who were then his students.

At Bucknell University in 1947–48 he was an associate professor and later a visiting lecturer at Bowdoin College, Maine. He joined the Harpur faculty after a period of service as research associate and specialist in government for the Educational Research Foundation at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Professor Rafuse joined our faculty at the time Harpur was being integrated as a part of the newly established State University. The years following were ones that demanded great efforts in the development of the College and the University. To these he contributed first as chairman of the political science department from 1950–52 and as chairman of the division of the social sciences from 1952–56. He was also a member of the University Senate and greatly instrumental in the organization of that body as the first all-University faculty representative institution.

Seymour Z. Mann

Clyde Eagleton, Research Professor Emeritus of International Law at New York University, died in his sleep on January 30, 1958. He was born in Sherman, Texas in 1891, and received his A.B. and A.M. from Austin College in 1909 and 1911. Another A.M. at Princeton in 1914 and another A.B. in 1917 from Oxford, while a Rhodes Scholar, was followed by a Ph.D. at Columbia in 1928. In 1918 he began his teaching career at the University of Louisville, moved to Southern Methodist University in 1919, and finally to New York University in 1923, where he remained until his retirement in 1956.

He was always active in groups that sought to educate people toward greater understanding of the world in which they live and devoted considerable time and energy to the work of organizations such as the American Society of International Law, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the Foreign Policy Association, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the New Commonwealth Society and the International Law Association, of whose American Branch he was President at the time of death.

As an officer of the Department of State from 1943 to 1945 he participated in the drafting of the United Nations Charter and served as a technical expert at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, at the Committee of Jurists (which drafted the Statute of the International Court of Justice) and at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization. In 1948 and 1949 he served as a consultant to the International Law Commission. He was a frequent contributor to periodicals but will, perhaps, be best remembered by scholars for his *International Government* (published in 1932 and revised in 1948 and 1957), *The Responsibility of States in International Law* (1928), *The Forces that Shape our Future* (1945) and as editor of seven volumes of the *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs* (1949–1956).

In 1948 he persuaded New York University to establish a Graduate Program of Studies in the United Nations and World Affairs, and was its first director from 1948 to 1953. During these same years he participated in the creation of the University's Institute of International Law. In May 1957 the Institute received a grant from the Ford Foundation to support a three-year study by Clyde Eagleton of problems pertaining to the use of the waters of international rivers.—WALDO CHAMBERLAIN

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
V. O. Key
Harvard University

President Elect
R. Taylor Cole
Duke University

Vice Presidents

Cortez A. M. Ewing
University of Oklahoma

Earl Latham
Amherst College

Francis O. Wilcox
Department of State

Secretary
Ruth C. Silva
Pennsylvania State University

Treasurer
Max M. Kampelman
Washington, D. C.

Executive Director
Evron M. Kirkpatrick
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Managing Editor
The American Political Science Review
Harvey C. Mansfield
The Ohio State University

Associate Director
William Gibbons

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

William T. R. Fox
Columbia University
Ruth Weintraub
Hunter College
John D. Lewis
Oberlin College
Thomas H. Eliot
Washington University, St. Louis
Alexander Heard
University of North Carolina
York Willbern
University of Indiana
Allan Saunders
University of Hawaii
Christian Larsen
Sacramento State College

John A. Davis
Commissioner, New York State
Arthur B. Dugan
University of the South
Ralph K. Huitt
University of Wisconsin
Marian D. Irish
Florida State University
John W. Masland
Dartmouth College
Milton R. Merrill
Utah State Agricultural College
J. Austin Ranney
University of Illinois
H. Arthur Steiner
University of California, Los Angeles

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Henry Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning

Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam
Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines
Robert C. Brooks

Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus
Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. MacMahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell
E. E. Schattschneider

An important new text by a distinguished teacher and author ....

American National Government

Cortez A. M. Ewing, University of Oklahoma

- Thorough treatment of basic principles
- Emphasis on concepts and institutions
- Consistent focus on political science
- Easy-to-grasp visual aids
- Marginal headings
- End-of-chapter bibliographies
- Carefully documented text
- Glossary of terms
- A timesaving Instructor's Manual

53 tables • 15 charts • 9 maps • 6 figures • 4 graphs

State and Local Government in America

Jewell Cass Phillips, University of Pennsylvania

- Comprehensive coverage of all aspects of state and local government
- Full treatment of the interrelationship of state and local units

COLLEGE DIVISION

55 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, New York
American Book Company

COLUMBIA

YEARBOOK of the UNITED NATIONS, 1956

The YEARBOOK presents the most comprehensive account of the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and provides a permanent reference source for UN activities for the year. The tenth edition records the course of events discussed by the UN in 1956. *"This is the nearest thing we have ever had to a meeting of mankind."*—The New York Times $12.50

SOVIET MARXISM

A Critical Analysis

HERBERT MARCUSE. To explain the general direction and some of the major changes in Soviet Marxism, Dr. Marcuse considers the historical reality behind Soviet doctrine from the point of view of its basic Marxian concepts. He traces Soviet doctrine through Leninism, Stalinism, and post-Stalinism, defining its apparently shifting aspects in terms of stages of development that are logical within the system. $4.50

The AGRARIAN FOES of BOLSHEVISM

OLIVER H. RADKEY, Jr. A study of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the political expression of the peasant movement in Russia. Dr. Radkey describes its role during the critical period of February-October, 1917, discussing the errors and deficiencies of leadership by which the party lost its power, and points up the contributions to socialist theory, particularly by Victor Chernov, that influenced the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democrats. $8.50

The RISE of the REVOLUTIONARY PARTY in the ENGLISH HOUSE of COMMONS, 1603-1629

WILLIAMS M. MITCHELL. By means of an examination of the journals of the House of Commons and other pertinent literature Professor Mitchell has discovered that the beginnings of the English system of representative political parties are to be found in the reigns of Elizabeth and James. The author tells the dramatic story of the growth of a true opposition to royal policies and documents his case with a wealth of original source material. $4.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
Publishers of THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA

a

challenging

text

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

by JAMES L. McCAMY

University of Wisconsin

866 pages $6.50

A Teacher's Manual is also available

HARPER & BROTHERS

49 East 33d Street, New York 16, New York

Three significant new texts for your Political Science classes

THE GOVERNING OF MEN:

An Introduction to Political Science

Austin Ranney

A survey of characteristics common to all governments forms the basis of this book. Beginning with a description of universal institutions, it examines the variations in practice and the nature and consequence of these variations in both democracies and dictatorships. A final chapter acquaints the student with the current state, methodology, and problems of politics as a science. Illustrated by accounts of actual political episodes and case studies.

April, 1958

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ANNUAL: 1958-1959

Ivan Hinderaker, Jack W. Peltason, Earl Latham, Austin Ranney, and Robert G. Neumann

The first of a series of supplementary yearbooks designed to update and complement the major subject areas covered by *any* American government course: public law, the political process, Congress, the President, and governmental functions. Articles are analyzed specifically for the beginning student by professional political scientists.

May, 1958

CASE STUDIES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS

Sponsored by the Eagleton Foundation, Rutgers University

This new series will introduce the case method into the teaching of American politics through lucid and dispassionate accounts of actual party activity. Intended for use in series or as individual supplements, two cases will be available in May: "A Case Study of the 1956 Campaign of Congressman Frank Coffin of Maine" and "A Case Study of a Non-Partisan Election in Wichita, Kansas."

March, 1958

Recent Publications . . .

GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
Bailey • Samuel • Baldwin **1957**

BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, Third Edition
Dimock **1957**

A COLLEGE TEXT IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Revised
Bruce **1957**

Henry Holt and Company
383 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Ready in April

Parties and Politics

An Institutional and Behavioral Approach

by **AVERY LEISERSON**

Vanderbilt University

This introduction to politics is theoretical rather than merely descriptive. A comparative work in that it considers other societies than our own, it seeks to reveal general truths about human behavior in political situations. And because it aims at comprehension rather than indoctrination, its method is inductive.

6¼ *x* 9⅜ 416 *pp.* $6.00 *text*

Just Published

World Politics

by **A. F. K. ORGANSKI**

Brooklyn College

"Mr. Organski throws the venerable doctrine of the balance of power out the window and develops a new scheme of analysis to picture the relations within the Eastern and Western power blocs and the relations between them. His long-term projections of the shifts in these relations, based on his estimates of trends in the basic factors in national power, are both challenging and disquieting. The coherent and persuasive presentation will command the attention of college students, to whom the book is primarily directed. Yet the forthright argument and bold forecasts will stir spirited discussion in that much wider circle of persons seriously concerned about what the future holds for our international position."—V. O. Key, Jr., *Harvard University*

6¼ *x* 9⅜ 482 *pp.* $5.75 *text*

ALFRED A. KNOPF, ***Publisher***

501 Madison Avenue *College Department* New York 22

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Decision to Intervene

Volume II of Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920

By GEORGE F. KENNAN

The story of events in Russia during 1918 when the U.S. government and the Allies decided to involve themselves in the Soviet Revolution by sending troops to Russia. It was an involvement that marked a turning point in modern history, and George Kennan has recreated the immense and discouraging perplexity of the intervention as well as the color, the drama, and the excitement. In this worthy sequel to his Pulitzer Prize winning *Russia Leaves the War*, Mr. Kennan shows how the decision to intervene helped to destroy the last remote possibilities for a fruitful development of early Soviet-American relations and poisoned the air to the present day. *520 pages. Illustrated. $7.50*

The Politics of Israel

The First Decade of Statehood

By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN

A full account of Israel's first ten years of statehood, with a complete analysis of the internal political development—the politics of Zionism, the evolution of the constitutional framework, party politics, the electoral process, the legislature and judiciary, the cabinet and office of President, the struggle for economic independence, and the welfare state in action.

378 pages. Maps & Tables. $6

Organized Business in France

By HENRY W. EHRMANN

The first book to give a comprehensive description of a major French pressure group—the French employers' trade and association movement. Professor Ehrmann covers a significant period in French political affairs from 1936 to the present, when organized business played a prominent role, to show how this movement operates, how its policies are formed, and how its influence extends into the heart of French politics. *480 pages. $7.50*

Order from your bookstore, or
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, Princeton, New Jersey

THE HOUSE WITHOUT WINDOWS:

France Selects a President

By CONSTANTIN MELNIK and NATHAN LEITES. A RAND Corporation Research Study. The authors use the unique election of President René Coty as a vehicle for a brilliant exploration and interpretation of French parliamentary behavior. In the context of this election, the authors analyze the rules of the game of parliamentary politics in contemporary France, and provide a close-up of the behavior of the political parties and personalities involved. Probably the most important contribution to date for a proper evaluation of postwar French politics. *1958. 360 pp. Prob. $5.50.*

GERMAN REARMAMENT AND ATOMIC WAR:

The Views of German Military and Political Leaders

By HANS SPEIER. A RAND Corporation Research Study. No one before has succeeded in presenting so incisive an analysis of the complicated German postwar situation. No later historian will be able to do without it. "[Dr. Speier] illuminates fundamental politico-military problems besetting the West: the nature of coalition, the consequences of nuclear bipolarity, and the probable effects of efforts to share nuclear power more widely."—Colonel Charles A. H. Thompson. *1957. xiv+272 pp. $5.00.*

WEST GERMAN LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY

By HANS SPEIER and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON. A RAND Corporation Research Study. "Here, at last, comes a deeply searching analysis of the forces that mold the foreign policy of the Bonn republic."—Felix E. Hirsch, *Library Journal.* Six political scientists, basing their observations largely on firsthand interviews, examine the political attitudes of German leaders. Their purposes are to assess the viability of the West German Republic and to anticipate foreign policy developments in West Germany. *1957. x+323 pp. $7.00.*

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY: Myth or Reality?

By CECIL V. CRABB, Jr., Vassar College. A penetrating analysis of the implications of bipartisanship for American foreign relations. Five major episodes are examined: the construction of the United Nations, the European recovery program, the North Atlantic Pact, postwar relations with China, and crises in the Middle East. *1957. 279 pp. $4.50.*

LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION:

A Sociological Interpretation

By PHILIP SELZNICK, University of California. Foreword by Clarence B. Randall, retired Chairman, Inland Steel Company. A brilliant inquiry into the nature and quality of leadership. Mr. Selznick "knows whereof he speaks and uses extensive examples from government, industry, and business to prove his points . . . the basic elements to be considered in the growth of leadership sufficient to make organizations satisfactory institutions."—Harold L. Roth. *1957. xii+162 pp. $4.00.*

ROW, PETERSON AND COMPANY **Evanston, Illinois**

Charles Scribner's Sons

is pleased to announce
the appointment of

Harold W. Chase

of the University of Minnesota
as Advisory Editor in
Political Science

Political Research Studies

HOW THEY BECAME GOVERNOR, by Joseph A. Schlesinger The political careers of all governors elected in the U.S. between 1870 and 1950.	**$1.00**
POLICY CHANGE IN PRISON MANAGEMENT, by Richard H. McCleery A study of communication processes and regimes in two penitentiaries considered as small scale political communities.	**$ .50**
THE MICHIGAN ONE-MAN GRAND JURY, by Robert G. Scigliano Michigan's unique experiment in the administration of justice described as part of the political process.	**$1.00**
POLITICS IN THE PRESS, by LeRoy C. Ferguson and Ralph H. Smuckler An analysis of press content in the 1952 senatorial campaigns in Connecticut and Wisconsin.	**$ .50**
LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN URBAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS, by Ralph H. Smuckler and George M. Belknap An investigation of the relationship between types of issues and the involvement of various leadership groups in the local community.	**$ .50**

ORDER FROM: GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH BUREAU,
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,
EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN

WILEY BOOKS

EXPLORATIONS IN ROLE ANALYSIS

Studies of the School Superintendency Role

By N. GROSS, *Harvard University;* W. S. MASON, *U. S. Office of Education; and* A. W. McEACHERN, *The John Tracy Clinic, Los Angeles.* The authors present and test a theory for role conflict resolution based both on psychological and sociological variables. They offer one of the first systematic investigations of the impact of consensus on role definition, and give a penetrating treatment of conformity to expectations. *1957. 379 pages. $8.75.*

THE AMERICAN WAY OF GOVERNMENT

By ALFRED de GRAZIA, *Stanford University.* Interprets the American way of government on the national, state, and local levels, and smoothly blends the traditional methods of presentation with the newer functional-behavioral approach. The book incorporates the results of the 1956 Presidential and Congressional elections, and works the text of the Constitution into the main body of the material.

National Edition: 1957. 806 pages. $6.50.
National, State, and Local Edition: 1957. 972 pages. $6.95.

SOVIET EDUCATION FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

By ALEXANDER G. KOROL, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.* Takes the reader beyond the facade of the official propaganda and undifferentiated statistics and examines the Soviet educational structure—its purposes, its strengths and weaknesses, and its potentialities—on the basis of detailed documentary evidence. *A Technology press book, M.I.T. 1957. 513 pages. $8.50.*

THE CHANGING POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

By CONRAD TAEUBER, *Bureau of the Census; and* IRENE B. TAEUBER, *Princeton University.* Includes information on geographical distribution, economic activities, households, education, income, migration within the country, and the declining contribution of immigration. Special attention is devoted to the decreasing death rate and the fluctuating birth rate, the rise of cities, and the rapid growth of suburban areas. *A publication in the Census Monograph Series, Sponsored by the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with the Bureau of the Census. 1958. 357 pages. $7.75.*

Send for examination copies today.

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc. 440 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.

OGG and RAY'S

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

ELEVENTH EDITION, by WILLIAM H. YOUNG. While retaining the *comprehensive character and the exactitude of presentation which* made Ogg and Ray's *Introduction to American Government* the outstanding text in American government for over thirty years, William H. Young *has modernized the treatment, more closely knit the* subject matter, and brought the content up to date. *Complete Edition, 926 pages, $6.50. National Government Edition, 698 pages, $6.00.*

LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS

ELEVENTH EDITION, by ROBERT E. CUSHMAN. This successful text has again been revised and enlarged to keep it abreast of the most recent developments in American constitutional history. Three new cases have been added to the Eleventh Edition bringing to a total of sixty the number of cases reprinted in this book. Some twenty new cases are commented on in the editor's notes or are quoted or discussed in the opinions. *481 pages, $3.75.*

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN JURISPRUDENCE

By WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER. This historical introduction to the foundations of our modern legal institutions has been written *specifically for undergraduate political science students who are en*rolled in a course in jurisprudence. It assembles a wide range of materials about the origin and development of early institutions. This book is well written and easily understandable; it can be read by undergraduates without difficulty. *230 pages, $3.25*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By VERNON VAN DYKE. This text, which stresses the causes of war and the conditions of peace, offers a balanced and reasoned analysis of the "whys" and "hows" of the behavior of states in their relations with each other. The treatment is topical and analytical rather than historical, focusing on questions and generalities pertaining to all states. "It is coherently organized, cogently presented, clearly written." *483 pages, $5.50.*

Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

35 WEST 32ND STREET NEW YORK 1, NEW YORK

NEW Prentice-Hall Books . . .

1

FUNCTIONS AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Big Democracy in Action

Edited by JACK W. PELTASON, University of Illinois and JAMES M. BURNS, Williams College

This is a series of integrated essays on the policies and functions of American government, especially of American national government, written by experts in the various fields. It covers all major areas, such as fiscal and budgeting, foreign and military policy, farm policy, labor policy, etc. An introductory and final chapter integrate the study of specific policies and functions with the study of the political process generally. The book covers not only the policies and functions of American government, but also the developments that led up to them, plus various alternative policies which might be considered.

448 pages • Pub. March, 1958 • Text price $4.95

2

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

by CHARLES O. LERCHE, Jr., Emory University

A new introductory discussion of American foreign policy that seeks to develop principles and concepts rather than infinite detail, and to give a balanced treatment of policy formulation processes and policy content. Using "The American People" as a constant frame of reference, the book helps students to recognize the permanent issues. Analysis is made within a consistent conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 1, that is reflected both in the arrangement of chapters and in the material of each chapter.

approx. 547 pages • Pub. Feb. 1958 • Text price $7.50

3

ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT

by ERNST B. SCHULZ, Lehigh University

A new text designed to prepare students for further work in any of the subdivisions of political science. The first 8 chapters are devoted to a consideration of the nature and origin of government, to an analysis of such basic concepts of political science as the state, nationalism, sovereignty, law and liberty, and to a review of various theories concerning the proper role of the state in society. The last 14 chapters emphasize political institutions and practices and the asserted advantages and disadvantages of different organizational and procedural arrangements.

approx. 608 pages • Pub. Feb. 1958 • Text price $6.95

To receive approval copies promptly, write: BOX 903

PRENTICE-HALL, Inc.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

World Peace Through World Law

By Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn

"There can be no peace without law."

These words of President Eisenhower form the basic premise of this book. Here two distinguished lawyers present a comprehensive and detailed plan for the maintenance of peace—in the form of a proposed revision of the U. N. Charter. In preparation seven years, this plan represents the first attempt to spell out in explicit detail, rather than in the usual generalities, all the world institutions and basic rules which are required for the effective prevention of war.

$7.50 through your bookseller, or from
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
79 Garden Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION

ROBERT H. FERRELL

Carrying forward the account of American foreign policy begun with his previous book, *Peace in Their Time,* Robert H. Ferrell presents a diplomatic history of the United States during the crucial years of 1929 to 1933, when the great depression swept across the country and spread throughout Europe.

$4.50

THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS

ERIC A. HAVELOCK

A challenge to the monopoly that Plato and Aristotle have long exercised over the Greek tradition, presenting with full documentation the thesis that there had arisen before their day a body of liberal theory in support of the Periclean democracy.

$6.00

Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Two New Oxford Political Science Texts

Elements of Democratic Government

THIRD EDITION

by **J. A. CORRY,** Hardy Professor of Political Science, Queen's University, and **HENRY J. ABRAHAM,** Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

Already a leader among textbooks in introductory courses in political science, ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT now contains a wealth of new material. Most significantly, France has now been included as a third democracy for discussion and comparison with the United States and Great Britain.

The material in the textbook has been brought completely up-to-date, and all sections on American government—particularly those on civil rights—have been strengthened and expanded. For greater ease of reference, many new headings and sub-headings have been introduced throughout the text, and the authors have prepared an up-to-date bibliography, and a thorough, cross-referenced index.

February 1958 746 pages $6.50

Principles and Problems of State and Local Government

by **JOHN M. SWARTHOUT,** Professor of Political Science, Oregon State College and **ERNEST R. BARTLEY,** Professor of Political Science, University of Florida.

This book sets forth the development of state and local governments, the characteristics of their legislative, executive and judicial systems, their relationships to their citizens, their functions, and the problems that have arisen in the conduct of local government. Special attention is given to the division of powers with the federal government, the strength and weaknesses of state legislatures, the significance of parties at the local level, and the financing of local government.

Spring 1958 384 pages; charts, figures, and tables probable price $3.95

Oxford University Press Inc., 114 Fifth Ave., New York 11, New York



Are your staff benefits keeping pace?

1. Does your retirement plan offer protection against inflation that occurs during retirement?

2. Does your medical expense plan provide benefits to meet truly catastrophic expenses?

3. Are your staff members assured a reasonable income if total, long-term disability strikes?

A modern, well-rounded staff benefit program can play a key role in attracting and keeping a top-flight professional staff. Your Association, TIAA, is the non-profit, legal reserve life insurance company founded by Carnegie organizations to provide insured plans to meet the needs of educators.

Colleges, universities and independent schools are eligible.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND
522 Fifth Avenue **New York 36, N. Y.**

CROWELL REVISED EDITIONS

ANNOUNCING THE FOURTH EDITION
V. O. KEY, JR.

POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS

This standard text has been almost completely rewritten without sacrificing the broad structure found so successful in classroom use. POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS, Fourth Edition, analyzes and integrates recent research in American politics.

Accordingly, we find in the Fourth Edition: a revised theory of the nature of the two-party system, a new conception of the place of minor parties in the American system, a concise but comprehensive examination of the character of the party systems of the states based on the author's researches, a fuller treatment of the nominating process, and a new treatment of elections, both congressional and presidential.

March, 1958 799 pp. $6.50 (approx.)

THE 1957 THIRD EDITION
MACDONALD, WEBB, LEWIS, and STRAUSS

OUTSIDE READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

With this inexpensive volume of 114 readings in the hands of his students, the instructor can select pertinent articles for assignment knowing that they will be readily available. More than ever before, OUTSIDE READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT has become an integral part of courses in American government in colleges throughout the country.

The selections in the Third Edition range from *The Mayflower Compact* to George F. Kennan's *Is War with Russia Inevitable?* Among the authors represented are: Edward S. Corwin, V. O. Key, Jr., James Macgregor Burns, Paul H. Douglas, Dean Acheson, Charles A. Beard, Norman Thomas, Allan Nevins, Richard H. Rovere, Arthur Krock, Sumner H. Slichter, and Felix Frankfurter.

1957 884 pp. $3.25

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY
432 Fourth Avenue • New York 16, N. Y.

OXFORD books of exceptional interest

Democracy in Western Germany

By **RICHARD HISCOCKS.** The prospects for democracy in Western Germany now and in the future. The author considers the lack of a democratic tradition; political parties; government and politics at all administrative levels; the civil service; trade unions; the German people and politics; and political education. 2 maps. $7.50

The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire

Second Edition—2 volumes

By **MICHAEL I. ROSTOVTZEFF.** Out of print since 1940, the second English edition of this standard work consists of the text and notes of the original edition with additions and modifications from the later Italian edition as translated by Peter Fraser. Further corrections and additions and 20 plates have also been added. $26.90

Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947, Volumes I and II

Edited by **SIR MAURICE GWYER** and **A. APPADORAI.** A careful selection of a large number of significant speeches, resolutions, statements, letters, acts of government, and the like dating from the Government of India Act of 1919 to the establishment of self-government in 1947. Authors of these documents include Stanley Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Churchill, Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, and many others. $11.95

The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople, 1886-1891

By **COLIN L. SMITH.** This work deals with British diplomacy and her leading diplomat in Constantinople during a period when the Near Eastern Question could no longer be considered exclusively in terms of the Balkans and the Straits. Egypt, Central Asia, and numerous colonial disputes had to be considered. 2 maps. $4.00

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc., N.Y. 11

ST MARTIN'S PRESS ◆ NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA

BOMBAY ◆ CALCUTTA ◆ MADRAS ◆ MELBOURNE

Winner of the *George Louis Beer Prize* for 1957

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945

by Alexander Dallin
Columbia University

A distinguished contribution to the study of occupation policies. A monumental work of scholarship. $10.00

TITOISM

by Charles P. McVicker
Yale University

A valuable addition to the literature on the communist phenomena. Of the greatest interest to students of politics. $6.00

THE CITIZEN ARMY

by Frederick Martin Stern
Introduction by Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey

The Story of the citizen-soldier in the twentieth century. Used as a textbook in courses in defense policy.

THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS

by Edward H. Carr

A classic in the literature of international relations. Used as a text in courses dealing with the theory of world politics. $3.75

BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES

by R. T. McKenzie

A brilliant analysis of the interrelationships between British government and politics. $7.50

THE ORIGINS OF THE LABOUR PARTY

by H. M. Pelling $4.00

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

St. Antony's Papers: Volume II: Number One $3.00

THE SECOND TORY PARTY

by Keith Feiling $4.25

THE ITALIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS 1956

St. Antony's Papers: Volume III: Number III $3.00

Order on approval—at professional discount

College Department

ST MARTIN'S PRESS INCORPORATED

103 Park Avenue, New York 17, New York

MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD ◆ LONDON

A D B DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

Darwin, Marx, Wagner

JACQUES BARZUN. This famous study considers the three figures who epitomize the thought of the late 19th century and whose influence persists to the present day. $1.25

A Collection of Essays

GEORGE ORWELL. Thirteen of Orwell's best essays on such topics as literature, politics, and the English language. 95¢

The Myth of the State

ERNST CASSIRER. A masterful study of the origin, growth, structure and techniques of modern political myths by a major philosopher of our time. $1.25

The Future of American Politics

SAMUEL LUBELL. A lively survey of the social changes which have transformed the pattern of American politics since 1928. 95¢

For a complete list of all Anchor Books now in print, see your bookseller or write DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS, 575 Madison Ave., New York 22

announcing
a new
imprint...

In this spring announcement of New York University Press there appears for the first time the imprint of the Associated College Presses. This division has been created by New York University Press as a publishing service for other colleges and universities, foundations, institutes, and associations that do not have the necessary facilities to publish and distribute books to a wide audience.

Educational, scientific, and philanthropic organizations with important material that should reach either selected groups or the general public may, through a cooperative effort with the Associated College Presses, publish and distribute either under their own imprint or under the Associated College Presses imprint.

New York University Press, through this new division, offers its publishing experience to all organizations so that the results of worth-while projects in research and scholarship may be made permanently available to the specialist and the interested layman.

The Associated College Presses represents a vital service and stimulant to the furtherance of educational exchange. If you wish to learn more about its advantages and possibilities for your organization, please write to: The Director, Publishing Services, New York University Press, Inc.

associated college presses

TOWARD GETTYSBURG: A Biography of General John F. Reynolds, by Edward J. Nichols. A Pennsylvania State University Press book. **$6.00**

JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: The Religion Clauses, by F. William O'Brien, S.J. A Georgetown University Press book. **$5.00**

GRASS ROOTS PRIVATE WELFARE, edited by Alfred de Grazia. Published for the Foundation for Voluntary Welfare. **$4.75**

THE AMERICAN CLYDE: A History of Iron and Steel Shipbuilding on the Delaware from 1840 to World War I, by David B. Tyler. A University of Delaware Press book. **$5.00**

GUIDE TO GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY, edited by Jacob I. Hartstein. Distributed for Long Island University. **$1.75**

CLASSROOMS IN THE FACTORIES, by Harold F. Clark and Harold S. Sloan. Published for the Institute of Research, Fairleigh Dickinson University. **$3.75**

ADIRONDACK BIBLIOGRAPHY, edited by Dorothy A. Plum. Published for the Adirondack Mountain Club. **$10.00**

PR POLITICS IN CINCINNATI: Thirty-Two Years of City Government Through Proportional Representation, by Ralph A. Straetz. **$5.00**

INTERDISCIPLINARY TEAM RESEARCH: Methods and Problems, by Margaret Barron Luszki. Published for the National Training Laboratories, a section of the Division of Adult Education Service of the National Education Association. **$6.00**

EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS AND GROUP CULTURE, by Dorothy Stock and Herbert A. Thelen. Published for the National Training Laboratories, a section of the Division of Adult Education Service of the National Education Association. **$6.00**

New York University Press, WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK

associated college presses

32 Washington Pl.,
New York 3, N.Y.

In the fine tradition *of the first two editions*

Less than a year after publication
the new Third Edition has been adopted by
more than 150 colleges and universities

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS

THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, AND GERMANY

THIRD EDITION

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER • JOHN H. HERZ • JOHN C. RANNEY

These important qualities have been retained in the Third Edition: the **parallel organization** of the first four sections; the extraordinarily **objective** attitude of the authors; the **comprehensive,** yet manageable, detail suitable for the beginning student.

But the Third Edition's usefulness has been enhanced by: a new Part V, "Government and Politics in the Twentieth-Century World"; judicious trimming that results in a text even more **suitable for the one-term course;** the discussions of administration and local government in single units. 817 pages. $7.50

---

examination copies supplied on request

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 750 Third Avenue, New York 17

ON PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY EDWIN O. STENE AND ASSOCIATES

Hard Cover—$3.00 Soft Cover—$2.00

GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY H. B. JACOBINI AND ASSOCIATES

Hard Cover—$3.00 Soft Cover—$2.00

THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY

BY JOHN H. ROMANI

$1.20

THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY O. D. CORPUZ

Hard Cover—$3.00 Soft Cover—$2.00

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Yearly subscription—$4.00

Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Public Administration

Send orders to: *Institute of Public Administration*
University of the Philippines
Box 474, Manila

Timely McGraw-Hill Political Science Books

ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State University; and DEAN E. MCHENRY, University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* New Third Edition. Ready in March

A completely reorganized and rewritten edition, presenting a comparatively brief and elementary review of national, state, and local governments. Simpler terminology has been substituted for complicated materials. New materials have been added on such subjects as: the 1956 presidential election; civil liberties; Supreme Court decisions; foreign policy; federal-state relations; recent Congressional acts; the U.N.; and government expenses and taxes.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College. New Sixth Edition. Ready in June

A thorough revision of one of the most authoritative and thought-provoking texts on the subject. It offers the college student a stimulating introduction to international relations in terms of the origins, forms, forces, and prospects of the world community of nations. This new edition is an up-to-date account of recent political, military, and diplomatic developments throughout the world, with sections including the challenge of communism, the International Geophysical Year, and the new role of the U.N.

DEMOCRACY AND CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA

By CURRIN V. SHIELDS, University of California, Los Angeles. 310 pages, $5.00

A terse, lucid book that clarifies for the layman the actual relation between the Catholic religion and Democracy. It is an intelligent protest against the biased anti-Catholic writings of recent years. Neither theoretical nor technical, the book discusses the problem in terms of everyday experiences which the reader can readily grasp. The author shows that while there is no necessary incompatibility between Democracy and Catholicism, there is no necessary connection either.

AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

By HUGH A. BONE, University of Washington. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* Second Edition. 686 pages, $6.50

An excellent objective analysis of the organization, operation, function, and significance of political parties and pressure groups in the United States. It treats the subjects of ethics in government and party leadership and influences in Congress and administration while surveying the 1952 presidential nominations and election. In discussing the first year of the Eisenhower administration, public opinion, propaganda, newspapers and TV, it presents a well rounded picture of political processes.

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

330 West 42nd Street New York 36, N.Y.

Send for copies on approval

a new publication
available this spring . . .

GOVERNMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY

WITH EMPHASIS ON AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

R. Wallace Brewster,

Pennsylvania State University

Students and teachers alike should welcome this new and versatile approach to the basic course in political science—one developed during ten years experimentation with the large introductory course, and one which has been used successfully with both terminal students and those progressing into advanced courses. Throughout, stress is laid on principles and problems of government, but the structures and processes of American government receive emphasis so that the student can think concretely 'about' government.

Containing a sound basis in the social processes, GOVERNMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY features a thorough study of American national government, a generous treatment of modern philosophies of government, and a full discussion of the existing international situation.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
Boston 7 Chicago 16 Dallas 1 New York 16 Palo Alto

AN IMPORTANT NEW DOUBLEDAY BOOK

Liberal Democracy

by Massimo Salvadori

Professor of History, Smith and Bennington Colleges;
author of *The Rise of Modern Communism*

AN eloquent, brilliantly argued statement of the case for liberty and democracy, in which these widely misused words are restored to their original concepts and shown to have a real and distinctive meaning for the post-fascist and post-communist worlds. A challenging clarification of the subject that will serve as an instrument to extend liberty to those areas where it is not yet enjoyed — by one of the leading interpreters of modern America to Europe and the world.

> *"Like all Salvadori's writings, Liberal Democracy combines deep insights, felicitous wording and a true warmth in the defense of liberty." —HANS KOHN*

$3.00 at all booksellers

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC., GARDEN CITY, N. Y.

Examination Copies Now Available:

The Revised and Enlarged Edition of

UNDERSTANDING
THE CONSTITUTION

by Edward S. Corwin and Jack W. Peltason

REVISED AND THOROUGHLY UPDATED, the new edition of *Understanding the Constitution* is now ready for classroom use. The original edition,

ACCLAIMED IN THE PAST by scores of teachers as a "brilliant commentary" and a "standard in its field," has been somewhat enlarged to include new materials that will further help the student to an understanding of the Constitution through article-by-article discussions that avoid meaningless generalities and inessential legal detail. The authors have

REWRITTEN AND EXPANDED the commentaries on the individual articles and included a new Appendix containing the complete text of the Constitution. Two new chapters provide additional historical background and a discussion of general constitutional principles. The new *Understanding the Constitution*

PROMISES TO BE EVEN MORE WIDELY USED as a *basic text* for shorter courses in American Government, in the American Constitution, and in social science, and as a *companion text* for certain other courses in government, political science, American society, and social science.

256 pages. List $2.50

The Dryden Press

110 West 57th Street • New York 19, New York

new titles in

THE VAN NOSTRAND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

By Conley H. Dillon, *Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science;* Carl Leiden, *Associate Professor of Political Science;* and Paul D. Stewart, *Associate Professor of Political Science, all at Marshall College.*

This unique volume is exactly what it claims to be—an introduction to the field. It organizes basic concepts of political science as a unified whole, rather than a confusing mass of abstractions. It covers every major area of political science and offers a glossary, the only one to be found in an introductory volume in Political Science. *320 pages, $4.85*

MODERN GOVERNMENTS

By Harold Zink, *Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.*

This forward looking text achieves a remarkable balance, both in subject matter and approach. It recognizes the vital significance of European political experience, and therefore devotes greatest attention to Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. At the same time it discusses the importance of other governments in the modern age—Norway, Sweden, Latin America, Japan and India.

Coming soon

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

National, State and Local

By Harold Zink; Howard R. Penniman, *Professor of Government, Georgetown University;* and Guy B. Hathorn, *Assistant Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland.*

Offering the traditional structural approach, this text gives a complete, although brief, picture of the operation of government at national, state and local levels. The text incorporates significant developments in current political and legislative affairs, including the Supreme Court decisions on civil liberties, school integration, anti-trust, and the opening of FBI files in criminal cases. A maximum of accuracy and objectivity is assured by the fact that all three authors, whose political viewpoints vary, carefully checked the book.

Coming soon

Write for examination copies

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

120 ALEXANDER STREET PRINCETON, N.J.

ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE

by ALAN F. WESTIN, *Cornell University*

Based upon a wealth of primary source materials, ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE presents a realistic record of the famous "steel seizure" case of 1952, including extracts of actual court proceedings, plus an analysis of the repercussions of this case in the press. In a step-by-step analysis of the workings of the Federal court system, Professor Westin discusses the causes of the rise of the dispute, the maneuvering of parties to invoke judicial intervention, the conflict of the courts, and the impact of the ruling.

Coming Spring 1958

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

by ROCCO J. TRESOLINI, *Lehigh University*

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW is a direct and perceptive analysis of the American legal system.

- Over 80 Supreme Court decisions, set in vivid, historically accurate backgrounds, illustrate the evolution of constitutional doctrines, with particular stress upon the civil rights crisis.
- Emphasizing the human side of the law, biographical portraits show how the social and economic philosophy of a justice may play an important role in the rendering of decisions.

Coming Winter 1958

THE ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1914-1956

by D. N. CHESTER and F. M. G. WILLSON
The Royal Institute of Public Administration
1957, 457 pages, $6.00

GREAT CITIES OF THE WORLD, Revised Edition

by WILLIAM A. ROBSON, *University of London*
1957, 814 pages, $11.00

The Macmillan Company
60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

Yale University
U.C.L.A.
University of Michigan
Kenyon College
Rutgers University
Tulane
Northwestern
Florida State
Abilene Christian
Wellesley
San Francisco State
University of Nebraska
Lafayette College
Mills College
Brooklyn College
Austin Junior College
Southern University
Coe College
University of Redlands
Knox College
Michigan State
Hunter College
Wisconsin State College
Russell Sage
Walker College
University of Oregon
University of Massachusetts
University of California (Berkeley)
Columbia University
University of Houston
Indiana University
University of North Carolina
Cornell University
Western Reserve University

U. S. Military Academy
University of Maine
Ohio State University
Smith College

Stanford University
University of Texas
University of Dayton
Harvard

University of Minnesota
University of Pennsylvania
Peabody College
Louisiana State University
Princeton
University of Akron
University of Buffalo
Eastern Michigan College
Western Michigan College
Central Michigan College
Wayne State University
Washington University
Bowdoin College
Berea College
Illinois Inst. of Technology
Middlebury College
North Carolina State
Pomona College
Heidelberg College
Memphis State College
Georgetown University
Trinity College
Drake University
Iowa State University
Montana State University
Washington & Lee
Syracuse University
Bradley University
Simmons College
Oglethorpe University
Gonzaga University

They (and many others) are all currently using one or more of the 3 available editions of

Carr • Bernstein • Morrison • Snyder • McLean

American Democracy in Theory & Practice

- **ESSENTIALS OF NATIONAL, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT** (737 pp)
- **NATIONAL GOVERNMENT** Revised (957 pp)
- **NATIONAL, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT** Revised (1104 pp)

As of Oct. 1, 1957

207 colleges and universities had ordered 10 or more copies of one of the above editions for class use.

(smaller orders are not included in this count although many such orders indicate continued use of the text adopted in previous years.)

City College of New York

Case Institute of Technology

If you want to know why so many consider this "one of the finest texts on American government ever written," send for a copy of the edition best suited to your courses.

WRITE NOW TO

RINEHART

& COMPANY, INCORPORATED • 232 MADISON AVE., NEW YORK 16, N.Y.

Publishers of THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS

by David Fellman

The book your colleagues everywhere are discussing because it so sharply clarifies our ideas of essential justice and their abrogation today. See it at your bookstore.